In the last few years, Brazil is attracting international attention in the field of horizontal technical cooperation. A historical beneficiary of international technical cooperation, Brazil has become known for freely furnishing to developing countries techniques and knowledge that helped it to achieve its current level of development. The example of agriculture is illustrative of this new reality, because Embrapa’s national and international recognition stimulated the government to use this asset as an instrument of foreign policy. Although it does not have commercial, political and ideological interests, the Brazilian technical cooperation with developing countries meets with other objectives of Brazilian foreign policy.

Keywords: Embrapa; horizontal technical cooperation; diplomatic action.
growth and growing social inclusion. Over the last twenty years the country has multiplied riches, removed the shadow of inflation and of high unemployment, reduced the inequalities and extreme poverty, consolidated a vigorous domestic consumer market, strengthened the democracy and improved social indicators, everything through firm and transparent public policies that will make Brazil walk towards reaching, in 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).¹

All of these changes opened up new opportunities also in the foreign scenario. Brazil’s international projection made the country overtake new and more elevated levels. Given the strengthening of the developing nations and the persistence of a global system still cast in the interests of the developed countries, the country saw the dimension of South-South cooperation as a valuable instrument of public policy. Especially during the terms of the presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, joint initiatives with developing countries were multiplied, many of which were led by Brazil, in order to defend common interests (Ipea, 2010).

At the same time, the stage of development reached by Brazil also allowed the country to stand out as a great supplier of international cooperation. Under the spirit of solidarity, it begun to contribute to the potential social and economic progress of other peoples. The international highlight was imminent, seen as the country has valuable characteristics: its knowledge of different, complex and even contradictory domestic realities; encourages the practice of dialogue with countries of different degrees of development; possesses a society with a pluralist structure that comprises different races, creeds and social classes; and traditionally allied with democratic and humanist values.

From the growth and the excellence reached in the academic and professional fields and of international projection, the renown Brazilian institutions started being even more on demand to provide their services and to share their knowledge with other developing countries and of lesser relative development. As soon as this happened, grew the perception in the heart of government towards the importance of cooperation, especially the technical modality, as an instrument of foreign policy.

It is not without motive that agriculture is the sector that heads the list of concentration areas of Brazilian technical cooperation among developing countries — Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (CTPD).² ³ During the last few decades, Brazil has emerged as one of the greatest agricultural powers

¹. Article elaborated with information available until May of 2012.
². The expressions technical cooperation among developing countries and horizontal technical cooperation can be used interchangeably.
³. According to budget resource of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC).
The country is considered the greatest worldwide producer of coffee, sugarcane, orange juice and beans, and stands out also in the production of soy, corn, red meat, poultry, among others. Brazil is able to produce competitively in the most diverse commodities, its agriculture excels today for being modern, scientific, capitalist, diverse and business-like, and its productivity is among the highest in the world.

The success reached by Brazilian agriculture, with the help of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) can be measured not only based on numbers, but also with international recognition. Brazil today is recognized as a great international power, which is expressed, for example, in the demands of developing countries, international organism and even developed countries through technical cooperation in agriculture.

Brazil, while an emerging power and, therefore, willing to seek a growing space in the international scenario, resorts to various means to expand its capacity and to attract other nations to positions and proposals of specific interest. Facing global projection of Brazilian agriculture and of the institutions involved, the formulators of foreign policy soon sought to use them as instruments of foreign policy through horizontal technical cooperation.

The Brazilian CTPD, especially in the agricultural field, for catering interests dear to developing countries, such as the fight against hunger and poverty and the correction of socioeconomic inequality, is configured as a strategic tool for diplomatic action, whose potential does not deserve to be overlooked. However, one cannot say that Brazilian horizontal technical cooperation, especially in the agricultural sector by itself determines the reach of all the goals sought by Brazil in terms of foreign policy, but also one must not refute its relevance in reinforcing friendship ties, conferring credibility and trust to Brazil’s international performance and increasing the country’s influence power.

The instrumental effectiveness of the Brazilian CTPD may be analyzed according to the directives of Brazilian foreign policy based on three levels of evaluation. The first level is based on the teleological objectives of the CTPD of enabling effective contributions to the progress of partner countries on the road to development. The second level refers to the real contribution to the consolidation of relations between Brazil and the partner countries, in several fields. And the third level takes care of the construction process of legitimacy, credibility and leadership of the country in the international scenario, especially, but no limited to, being a relevant player in the horizontal cooperation efforts. The second and third levels are taken as central for this article in order to prove the instrumental effectiveness of the CTPD, and their relation to Brazilian foreign policy will be the objective of this work.
2 CHARACTERISTICS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BRAZILIAN CTPD

Since its beginning, the Brazilian CTPD has been characterized for understanding cooperation for development not as an interaction between donators and receivers, but as a trade among equals, with mutual benefits and responsibilities. Consequently, it has aspired to differentiate itself from traditional technical cooperation, of an eminently vertical character, and has sought to reject the asymmetric and unequal character between supplier and receiver, ever so present in the North-South cooperation. In the South-South cooperation, should prevail an effective partnership relation for the development and a non-imposing performance of respect towards the local socioeconomic culture and reality, which implies the constant readjustment of projects to the real necessities of the applicants.

These partnerships and complementarities of interests become evident when it is analyzed how Brazil implements its programs. Unlike the countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE), which hire specialist to develop their cooperation projects, often detached from State organs, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC),4 of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE), draws on Brazilian technicians who work in public entities of recognized professional excellence. As such, besides sharing national knowledge with the corresponding institutions of the receiving country,5 this Brazilian technician learns with the local reality and, many times, has access to information that will be useful for the furthering of his research in Brazil.

In this line, the Brazilian CTPD consolidates itself as demand-driven and not as supply-driven, as is commonly the case of the cooperation provided by the DAC countries. Instead of elaborating a project based on their own data and searching for developing countries that need help in the specific sector of the project, the Brazilian government only meets the demands of countries that recognize that Brazil has reached levels of excellence in determined fields of knowledge. This is expressed through a formal request of the foreign government, from which the federal government, through ABC, searches internally the entities that may cooperate in the partnership and will make prospecting trips to the partner country in order to weave a diagnostic of the regional situation.

4. Created in 1987, the agency is responsible for planning, coordinating, execution, financing and monitoring of the Brazilian technical cooperation. Nevertheless, the technical execution of the projects and of the activities are the responsibility of the Brazilian institutions that have the technical knowledge and know the solutions that may be transferred; ABC merely intermediates.

5. According to the guidelines of the Brazilian Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (CTPD), the terminology used in this article seeks to eliminate expressions like supplier and receiver, typical of the countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE), substituting it for partner. However, they will be used interchangeably.
Furthermore, the horizontality of the relationship and the collaboration of the receiving countries enable the emphasis in programs of national, regional and local impact, as well as the concentration of efforts in projects with complete cycles, instead of punctual and isolated actions, in order to avoid the pulverization of efforts. As such, are enabled the creation of multiplier effects and sustainability of its results.

The Brazilian proposal of privileging projects that allow for the capacitation of national institutions, aiming at the internalization of knowledge and the establishment of their own conditions for innovation, has as a premise the definition of what the partner country will offer, seeing as the co-responsibility of management is implied and the real commitment of the partner country is guaranteed, better yet, “local appropriation”.

Brazilian cooperation, therefore, given its characteristic of not transferring commercially its knowledge, focused on specialized consulting, personnel training and capacitation, and completion of infrastructure available in the partner institution, as on the promotion of the autonomy of the partners involved. Still, for Brazil, the role of international technical cooperation is not exhausted in sending experts to the receiving country. The contemporary Brazilian point of view on international cooperation embarks on a road of transversal themes, players and experiences, be them national or international, that work articulately in direction of common objectives previously determined.

ABC adopts three relevant principles in the elaboration process of its international technical cooperation projects: \textit{i)} ownership; \textit{ii)} good governance; and \textit{iii)} accountability. These refer to the capacity of the countries to manage, with responsibility, rigor and transparency, the available resources, in addition to opening space for the participation of civil society.

Another principle dear to Brazilian diplomacy is solidarity. Nonprofit and unrelated to trade interests or political conditionalities, Brazil's horizontal technical cooperation shares knowledge and practices always giving

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6. The resources mobilized by the partner country in return normally comprises non-financial resources, such as basic infrastructure, human resources, physical space, among others, and does not usually represent a high percentage of the total expenditure, once that several of the receiving countries have limited financial capacity. A considerable part of the costs of the projects is covered by the ABC and by Brazilian cooperating entities, not in financial resources, but in human resources and sometimes in equipment.

7. The principle of solidarity was emphasized by president Lula already in his inaugural address, when he underlined the main guidelines of his foreign policy, oriented to consolidating a “solidary and humanist globalization”. The then minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, also in his inaugural address, referred to the solidary aspect of Brazilian cooperation: “A politically stable South America, socially fair and economically prosperous, but due to our own progress and wellbeing.” It is interesting to note that Lula’s speech recalls the original program of the Workers Party (PT), inscribed in its founding document dated from 1980 which foresaw an “international policy of solidarity among the oppressed peoples and the mutual respect among nations for strengthening cooperation and serving world peace” (Valler Filho, 2007, p. 223).
priority to human development. Thereby aiming at overcoming asymmetries, sustainable socioeconomic growth and the improvement of the benefited populations’ life standards. ⁸

### 3 OVERVIEW OF CTPD’S ACTIONS DURING 1995 TO 2010⁹

Between 1995 and 2005, no less than 261 bilateral technical cooperation projects were developed, coordinated by ABC in 37 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and the Middle East, involving 24 thematic areas. In terms of specific activities,¹⁰ 279 initiatives were carried out in 51 countries of the same aforementioned regions and of Eastern Europe, covering 26 large thematic areas. They are, in all, 540 activities between 1995 and 2005 (Puente, 2010, p.154-155). In terms of geographic areas, these numbers may be divided in the following manner: South America with 94 projects and 87 isolated activities; Central America and Caribbean with 86 and 94; Africa with 69 and 87; and Asia, the Middle East and European Europe with 12 projects and 11 isolated activities.

The description of the previous data results in the fact that the Brazilian technical cooperation actions are geographically highly concentrated. Most of the actions concentrate on the American and African continents; almost two thirds of them are developed in the former. Although South America has figured among the priorities declared by the foreign policy of the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula), the region divides its importance with Central America and the Caribbean and Africa, in number of actions. It should be noted that in the African case, the Brazilian CTPD concentrates in a reduced number of countries, mainly in five of the African Countries of Portuguese Official Language (PALOP), they are: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe.

In terms of volume of resources employed by the ABC in CTPD actions, the picture is quite different. Africa leads with 52% of the resources applied in the period, followed by Asia, the Middle East and Europe with 23%, South America with 15%, and Central America and the Caribbean with almost 10% (Puente, 2010).

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⁸ Several critics attack this solidary aspect of the Brazilian CTPD and accuse it of being costly and of diverting resources from resolving domestic problems in the country. In response, it is worth mentioning that technical cooperation, by nature, is less onerous than other cooperation modalities for development. In the Brazilian case, the costs are still modest, for there are no financial donations and neither are there many examples of donated equipment. The impact of the technical cooperation actions is infamous. For example, in 2005, when the ABC obtained a great budget increase, the overall budget of the agency represented merely 2.4% of the total budget of the MRE, which in turn represented, in the same year, close to 0.4% of the total Fiscal Budget of the Union. Consequently, the total expenditure of the ABC with CTPD reached, at most, 0.009% of the annual fiscal budget of the Union (Puente, 2010, p. 250).

⁹ For methodological reasons, the analysis of the time period of 1995-2010 will be divided into two: from 1995 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2010.

¹⁰ The projects gain more complexity and length with time, in contrast with the isolated activities.
The Instrumental Bias of Brazilian Horizontal Technical Cooperation

The African preponderance in this regard is explained by three reasons. Chiefly, the operational costs to undertake any technical cooperation action in Africa are significantly higher. Not to mention the per diems, invariable regardless of the place, the costs of transporting technicians and, sometimes, equipment are high. Besides the distance, something that also inflates these values is the deficiencies of regional infrastructure, which require larger and more costly displacements. Secondly, the types of actions carried out in Africa require more resources to pay for constant displacements of Brazilian technicians and equipment, for example the cooperation in occupational training. Lastly, there was a certain allocation of resources, especially for the PALOP. For the sake of exemplification, 94% of the projects and 69% of the isolated activities were allocated to the PALOP.

In a comparative analysis of the number of actions and of financial resources required, it is worth noting that the specific weight of the technical cooperation with Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, which almost all of the initiatives occurred in East Timor. Although representing close to 4% of CTPD’s actions, one fourth of the total value were consumed, once again due to, mainly, greater displacement costs of technicians and equipment. In South and Central America and the Caribbean, however, because of the fact the costs of Brazilian technical cooperation be lower, the costs were smaller – respectively, 15% and 10% –, in spite of the great quantity of projects and isolated activities – respectively 36% and 33% (Puente, 2010).

Speaking of distribution of actions by thematic areas, the fact of covering close to 25 fields of knowledge demonstrates the variety and breadth of areas covered by the Brazilian CTPD. Again, this reflects the degree of development that the country has reached in several fields of international competition, many of which are strategic to national – and worldwide – socioeconomic development, and the global recognition of Brazil as an emerging power.

Despite of the diversity, there is still a clear predominance of horizontal technical cooperation actions in the agriculture and health sector. This concentration is not without reasons. Evidence of Brazilian success reached, for example, in the fight against the epidemic of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) and HIV/AIDS, in producing and developing generic medications, as well as in the growing production in terms of quantitative and qualitative commodities and food products, has been internationally replicated.

As for the general overview of the CTPD actions, between 2006 and 2010, different from the previous period, there has been remarkable growth of the Brazilian CTPD in several aspects. The number of projects and activities

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11. For example, the thematic areas vary from agriculture to health and even the environment and public safety.
were multiplied – they went from 150, starting in 2006, to 590 in 2010 –,\textsuperscript{12} capital invests, beneficiary countries, geographical regions covered and, above all, in terms of projection and international credibility.\textsuperscript{13}

The priority conferred to the South American neighbors and to Portuguese speaking countries was kept, but, in the African case, there was an increase of the projects with non-Lusophone countries. In the other continents, there are innovations that demonstrate the diversification of partnerships implemented form 2005 on, such as the execution, for example, with the Ukraine, Afghanistan and North Korea.

In line with the number of actions, the volume spent in financial resources also increased. Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa kept on as the main partners of the Brazilian CTPD. Comparing with the previous period, it can be observed that Africa still continues to concentrate a little over half of Brazilian spending with horizontal technical cooperation (53%). However, the participation of Latin America grew to 39%, while Asia and Middle East fell to 8%.

It is worth noting that the resources employed between 2006 and 2010 surpassed the ones of the previous period almost six times. Taking into consideration the second (2006-2010) and half of the first period (1995-2005), it can be concluded that the increase of spending over the last five years is considerable, portraying an enormous effort of the federal government to expand its actions of technical cooperation.

Concerning the distribution of projects and activities of the CTPD through thematic areas, the recent panorama is not much different from the previous. As before, nearly half of the technical cooperation actions involve three sectors: agriculture, health and education, in decreasing order. It is worth mentioning there was greater presence of actions in the environmental and public safety fields; and this one, incidentally, was not even relevant in the previous period.

It is worth noting that Brazilian horizontal cooperation also grew in tri-lateral terms. The success of the national CTPD drew the attention of not only the current and probable partners in horizontal technical cooperation, but also of international organism and developed countries, many of which have a long tradition in international cooperation. There, together with Brazil, started to develop technical cooperation projects based on the principals of South-South cooperation, namely: being demand-driven; not interfering in internal affair of the beneficiary countries of trilateral cooperation; not establishing conditionalities

\textsuperscript{12} ABC data.

\textsuperscript{13} In the period analyzed, there was an increase of Brazilian cooperation as a whole, the country stood out in the fields of humanitarian assistance and technological and scientific cooperation.
to the beneficiaries; among others. This confers the legitimacy that several traditional donators needed to execute their projects in other countries.

Traditional donators of international cooperation, such as Germany, Japan, United States, Canada, Spain, France, Italy, Australia, Israel, England, Egypt and Argentina, started manifesting a growing interest in promoting joint triangular technical cooperation with Brazil, having registered such positions several times in a high political level. International organisms present in Brazil, for example the Organization of the United Nations for Agriculture (FAO), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations to the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), among others, began to identify synergies in themes which the Brazilian institutions had renowned technical capacity.

4 THE BRAZILIAN CTPD AND THE GUIDELINES OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FHC AND LULA GOVERNMENTS

The guidelines of foreign policy of the governments of FHC and Lula reflect much of the domestic and international context in which the country is inserted. Although there are differences in the focus of each term, it is possible to establish some general objective observed in both governments, roughly speaking.

The foreign policy adopted by FHC is in line with the post-redemocratization governments. Through more assertive and participative international action, the country sought to recover its image, stained by the years of global isolation. From being the former villain in environmental, human rights and disarmament issues, Brazil began to adopt a pro-active posture in such subjects, following, in general terms, traditional parameters of Brazilian diplomacy: the rule of international law, pragmatically seeking to fulfill national interests and the principles of the peaceful solution of disputes, of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples and of democracy.

The Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Junior arguments that, due to transformations occurred in the international scenario with the end of the East-West polarization and the acceleration of the globalization process from 1990 on, it was necessary to introduce innovation elements in Brazilian foreign Policy. It was necessary to substitute the reactive agenda of Brazilian foreign policy that prevailed until the end of the Cold War. Such agenda was guided by the logic of “autonomy by distance” – meaning “distance” from the polemic aforementioned issues – and was substituted, in the first
FHC years, by a proactive international agenda, asserted in the logic of “autonomy through participation”.\(^\text{14}\) According to the ambassador, three new pillars emerged in Brazilian foreign policy: regional integration, emphasis in multilateralism and renovation of credentials. For this, Brazil put aside its somewhat uncooperative posture and was willing to actively participate in the global forums.

At the core of these new pillars, national interest was being redefined and traced the following central axes of action for Brazilian foreign policy during the two FHC mandates (Puente, 2010, p. 219):

- prior attention to strengthen Mercosur – which foresees special attention to the relations with Argentina – and, above all in the second mandate, the relations with South America;
- attempt of political approximation to the United States;
- preservation and broadening of the dialogue with the European Union and Japan;
- broadening of bilateral relations beyond traditional partners, with prior inclusion of emerging countries such as China, India, Russia and South Africa, with which sought to establish strategic and political ways for cooperation;
- defense of democracy in the international field;
- active participation in multilateral initiatives, and in this scope, adherence to several multilateral regimes, among which the nuclear non-proliferation – constituting in the illustrative significance of signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1998;
- defense of the reform of the United Nations and, at its core, the Brazilian candidacy to a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC);
- criticism of international financial regimes and of the volatility of speculative capital;
- relationship with Portugal and with the African countries of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) – even though, as a whole, the African policy has remained at the background in Brazilian foreign policy; and
- with the rest of Latin America, relationships with Cuba and Mexico.

\(^{14}\) The term adopted by the Itamaraty at the time was similar: “autonomy through integration”. 
This search for greater global credibility also catered to domestic interests. After years of hyperinflation, economic stagnation and growing debt, the intent was to recover macroeconomic stability. For this, it was necessary to count upon the support of the global community, especially the international financial organizations, the task of restructuring Brazilian economy, since Brazil still dependent on international loans and the entry of foreign capital.

The visible course alteration of Brazilian foreign policy – which actually started in 1990 with the government of Fernando Collor de Mello, with the first initiatives of opening and deregulating the economy, based on principles of the so-called Washington Consensus –, was consolidated in the trinity “democracy, monetary stability and economic liberalization”, being that the last one encompassed trade liberalization, deregulation and privatizations. It was sought to, thus, overcome the previous paradigm of developmental State.

This trinity alongside the subjects that the country embraced since the end of the Cold War, such as human rights, sustainable development and nuclear non-proliferation, was used as a guideline for foreign action, to the extent that it would understand the formulators of foreign policy, conferring greater legitimacy to Brazil in the international scenario.

At the same time in which it sought to resolve its domestic problems and to recover international credibility and legitimacy, greater attention was given to recognizing Brazil as an emerging medium power that evermore intended to consolidate its condition as a global trader. Along these lines, regional integration served as an instrument for the competitive insertion in the world scenario. As a way of achieving the mentioned integration, different means were used, among them was technical cooperation.

However, technical cooperation provided by Brazil through ABC did not have the same attention and emphasis if compared to the following government. Nevertheless, the importance given to the CTPD was already significantly greater than in the previous years. The case of Embrapa reflects this situation; especially during the Lula government, since it began to figure among the Brazilian institutions that most served as an instrument of foreign policy. During the FHC government, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) was relatively more required to participate in Brazilian diplomatic action, mainly because of international recognition of the National STD and AIDS Program, the increase of production of generic medications in the country and pragmatic performance of Brazil in the Conference of the World Trade Association, in Doha, in 2001, defending the right of developing countries to resort to the mechanism of mandatory licensing of pharmaceuticals – popularly known as “patent breaking” –,
planned in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),\(^{15}\) in cases of grave threat to public health in the country (Barbosa, 2008).

Although Brazilian technical horizontal cooperation still has not given a forward leap in quantitative terms, the FHC government used to straighten ties with several countries and to increase international projection of the country. In every opportunity, the speech on technical cooperation was always consubstantiated in a constitutional commandment. The Federal Constitution of 1998 (CF/1988) determines in its 4\(^{th}\) Article that, the Federative Republic of Brazil conducts its international relations, among other principles, by the “cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity” and stipulates, in its sole paragraph, that “Brazil seeks economic, political, social and cultural integration with the peoples of Latin America, aiming to form a Latin-American community of nations” (Brazil, 1990).

Based on its Magna Carta, Brazil has consolidated an insertion principled through which it is characterized until today. In the case of the CTPD, it was not different, being that it always aimed at reflecting, in the period studied, even though at times in a non-explicit manner, the essence of these master lines in Brazilian foreign policy, some inscribed in the Constitution itself: the defense of peace and the pacific solution of conflicts, the equality among States, the self-determination of peoples, the non-intervention principle and the prevailing of human rights.

Some authors defend that the 4\(^{th}\) Article of the Charter incentivized the process of constitutionalizing Brazil’s international relations.

The Brazilian Charter marks a step forward in the process of progressive constitutionalization of Brazil’s international relations when it establishes among its principles the prevailing of human rights, the defense of peace, the pacific solution of conflicts, the repudiation of terrorism and racism. (…) The global goals that Brazilian society pursues – democracy, respect of human rights, social balance, and eradication of poverty – are thus reflected in the foreign action of the country (Valler Filho, 2007, p. 46).

President Lula’s term did not bring substantial alterations along the traditional lines of foreign policy. The same guiding principles, many of them being constitutional, were kept: rule of international law, defense of the peaceful solution of controversies, self-determination, non-intervention, sovereign equality among States, and the pragmatic seeking to fulfill national interests. Neither were substantially altered two of the three pillars added by FHC’s diplomacy: democracy and macroeconomic stability.

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15. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was signed in the wake of the Marrakesh Conference, in 1994, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created.
In general, it may be stated that the Brazilian foreign Policy central axes of action during the Lula government could be condensed in the following goals: the revitalization and the magnification of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), which would cover new topics, such as the social ones; intensification in the relationship with South America; increased presence and cooperation with African countries, not only the Portuguese speaking ones, rescuing the traditional role of Africa in Brazilian foreign policy; seeking mature relations with the United States and Europe; following through the dialogue and approximation to countries of the South, chiefly with regional powers such as China, India, Russia and South Africa, but also from other regions like the Middle East and Arab countries, for example; defense of the reform of the United Nations, with a proposal of expanding the number of permanent members in the Security Council that is the most assertive stance of Brazil’s candidacy; continuation and intensification of participation in multilateral forums, mainly the economic ones, the WTO for example, the negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and the bi-regional ones – Mercosur-European Union, with the updating of coalitions with emerging countries – G20 –, in order to defend common interests (Valler Filho, 2007, p. 220).

Of these central axes, some deductions that differentiate the Lula government can be made. First of all, it can be observed that there was further approximation with great countries of the South, this process, once, begun in the previous government but acquired new perspectives in relation to the degree and intensity of the goals pursued. The Lula government sought to foment a closer coordination, weaving a great arch of strategic alliances based on concrete multilateral objectives, above all those economic and geopolitical in nature. Evidence in this sense, is the configuring of the following blocks: India, Brazil and South Africa (Ibas) or G3; the institutionalization of the block made up of Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa\(^{16}\) (BRICS); and the creation, by Brazilian initiative, of the Trade G20, in the scope of multilateral trade negotiations. It is worth noting some initiatives such as the Summit of South American-Arab Countries (Aspa) and the Africa-South America Summit (Afras), with Arab and African countries; and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), in the Latin-American scope.

The great effort of Brazilian foreign policy over the last years therefore have been of diplomatically situating the country in the emerging situations and finding niches of opportunities for exercising active roles in the process of building or enforcing new rules, in parallel to dedicating itself to building new realities of coexistence (Valler Filho, 2007, p. 47).

\(^{16}\) South Africa joined the BRICS only in December of 2010.
In parallel, the Lula government made an effort to reinforce the space of the African continent in the agenda of Brazilian foreign policy. There were many visits to Africa since President Lula practically visited all of the African countries, with which he signed several treaties. The traditional approximation with the Portuguese speaking African countries, with which Brazil holds significant historic and cultural ties, was kept, but also grew the relationship with non-Lusophone countries.

With Latin America, the process was not different. Besides consolidating and broadening Mercosur, with the adherence of Venezuela, Brazil encouraged regional economic, political, social and cultural integration which gained momentum and was institutionalized with the creation of Unasur and CELAC. Other initiatives deserve note, such as the founding of the Bank of the South in 2007 and the growing internationalization of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).\(^{17}\)

In fact, president Lula fulfilled the promise he made during his presidential campaign that was ratified in the inaugural address of his first presidency in 2003, when he informed that “(...) the priority of foreign policy will be the revitalization of the Mercosur and the integration of Latin America, as a whole”.

The approximation to Africa and South America was not without reason. Both regions are important consumer markets of Brazilian products, mainly the industrialized ones, those that Brazil has difficulty of selling to other markets. Currently, Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa answer for over 20% and 6% of Brazilian exports, respectively.\(^{18}\) Commercial trade has been growing progressively, as well as the interest of Brazilian companies in expanding their investment flow in these regions.

The parallel between expansion in Brazilian partnerships with southern countries and the internationalization of Brazilian companies is evident. The consolidation of relationships with developing countries served as a port of entry for many Brazilian companies, both public and private, large, small and medium, or be it acquiring local companies.\(^{19}\) Noteworthy is that the location of investments has been concentrated, mostly, in developing countries.

In fact, the integration with its South-American neighbors, during the Lula government, went beyond merely the direct economic and political goals, with the support of Brazil in the great international forums. Another element that justifies the greater presence in the region is found in Brazil’s support for

\(^{17}\) More information on the international insertion of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) can be seen at the following address: <http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Areas_de_Atuacao/Exportacao_e_Insercao_Internacional/>.


\(^{19}\) Despite the global crisis, the investments of Brazilian companies abroad reached in 2008 the second highest mark in history, reaching US$ 20.5 billion, against US$ 7.07 billion registered in the previous year – a growth of 190%.
deepening and reinforcing democracy in Latin America. At the same time that
the country defends the prevalence democracy’s inherent values domestically,
since it is a constitutional commandment, the respect of pluralism, tolerance,
a search for consensus and the rule of Law are extended to the range of foreign
action of the country.

This effort to promote democracy is coupled with the national of fomenting
stability in the region, historically marked by wars and internal and external
political disputes. Likewise, the consolidation of democratic regimes in the
continent contributes to a more stable international system and generates better
opportunities for overall economic growth. As such, during recent crises in the
region, Brazil was present to negotiate, be it directly or indirectly, through orga-
nizations such as Unasur.

This higher emphasis in horizontal cooperation denotes another differentiating
characteristic of the Lula government. The paradigm “autonomy by participation”
was substituted by the logic that several authors started calling “autonomy through
diversification” (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). Searching for more balance in the
relationships among developed countries, adjustments were made to the foreign
policy program, so that Brazil’s international alliances and its global protagonism were
increased. New opportunities were sought in developing countries with the express
purpose of diversifying the political and economic partnerships. Multilateralism gained
even more strength and served as a mechanism for disclosing Brazilian interests for a
more just and inclusive globalization.

Along the same lines, “autonomy by integration” of the Cardoso era was
substituted by the concept of “sovereign presence”. This expression incorporates
at least four elements: i) humanist perspective on foreign action; ii) national af-
firmation; iii) rebuilding the people’s self-esteem; and iv) recovering the inductive
role of the State in economic development, especially in social progress and
the decrease of inequalities (Puente, 2010, p. 220). However, to guarantee this
“sovereign presence”, the country should count with a regional solid base,
consubstantiated in South America and whose nucleus would be Mercosur, once
the region represents the territorial space in which the specific weight of Brazil is
preponderant under any criterion: territory, population, natural resources, industry
and technological advancement.

This “sovereign presence” is consistent with the Brazilian perception that the
globalization process requires growing interdependence among nations, indepen-
dent from their level of development. It would be up to the country to broaden
the scope of their international partnerships, also to expand the possibilities of
increasing their influence under relevant themes of the international agenda.
Furthermore, the internationalization of markets and the evermore intense worldwide
competition is a justification in itself for diversifying alliances, as well as the initiative of strengthening mechanisms of economic and political regional integration, such as Mercosur, Unasur, among others. Keeping in mind the Brazilian tradition of approximation with countries of the South, it makes sense to begin this diversification with developing nations.

This diversification of partners fit in the Brazilian goal of participating actively and having more influence in the multilateral decision forums. The consecutive elections of Brazil as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in the post-redemocratization period are a good example of this. Together with Japan, the country has been in this position the most, considering that, during the military dictatorship, Brazil spent years without being a candidate for this collegiate. Other important examples are the greater voting power of Brazil in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the election of Brazilians for the direction of several agencies and international courts, among which are better know: the election of the judge Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade for the International Court of Justice in 2009, of Dr. Jose Graziano da Silva as director of FAO, and of Roberio Oliveira Silva as executive of International Coffee Organization (ICO), both in 2011.

Despite these achievements and with a strategy of broadening and consolidating the participation and the exposure of Brazil in the international scene, the biggest Brazilian claim, announced by the former chancellor Celso Amorim to the Ministry of Foreign Relations during the Itamar Franco government, continues to have a permanent seat in the reformed and expanded Security Council. Defending multilateralism and more balance in international relations, defending that due to the growing importance of the large emergent countries, it is necessary to reform the main instances of world power.

To justify its candidacy, Brazil does not merely underline the weight of its economy in the global and local level. It understands that its past free of recent wars, its position as an articulator of consensus, its regional leadership, its defense of multilateralism and of the pacific solution of controversies, and its plight for a just and inclusive globalization reinforce its campaign. In light of this retrospect, the decision to become a candidate becomes easily comprehensible and perfectly consistent with the trajectory of Brazilian foreign policy.

Considering that in a possible reelection for permanent members of the Security Council, becomes necessary the approval of both the Council and the majority of the members of the United Nations General Assembly, which is composed in its vast majority, by developing countries, the strategy of approximation

20. Brazil has occupied the non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ten times, the last term being in 2010-2011.
to developing countries favors Brazilian candidacy for the organism. It is not without reason and to corroborate this pretension, specific cooperation actions, not only technical, have been developed in several contexts, covering bilateral, multilateral and regional initiatives. Embrapa, without a doubt, exerts a relevant role in this subject.

Besides having a permanent seat in the Security Council, Brazil is interested in the international diffusion of Portuguese, as well as in its consolidation as a working language of the organization. As an old claim in the UN, especially in Unesco, it is understood that, under the goal of greater worldwide projection, it should be included a linguistic dimension, which increases the number of speakers of Portuguese and specialists of the national culture. Incidentally, it is through their language that the countries spread their culture, values, points of view and, indirectly, interests. With this aim, Brazil develops projects of cooperation in education, many of them specifically on the Portuguese language. In East Timor, besides contributing to the strengthening of institutions and assuring means for economic sustainability and social progress, the Brazilian CTPD strives to reintroduce Portuguese as the dominant language.

It is not merely democracy that the Lula government stressed in its foreign actions. It was worthy of great international projection, as a distinctive and singular element, expressing greater humanism of its foreign policy, the adoption by the president of the issue of combating poverty and hunger, not only in the domestic scope but also in the international arena.\textsuperscript{21} Following the example of the Zero Hunger Program (\textit{Programa Fome Zero}), it was brought to the international sphere the relevance of food security in countries relatively less developed. Stricken with precarious local technical infrastructure and by the competition of agricultural products subsidized by developed countries, this group of countries, majorly African, produce barely enough to supply their own basic needs.

In this point, Brazilian technical cooperation in agriculture gained special relevance. Through its cooperating institutions, especially Embrapa, Brazil started bringing to these countries all the knowledge that it acquired in decades of agricultural research. The country started cooperating with several developing countries in an unconditional, non-commercial and solidary way, in capacitating the specialized local organization for managing appropriated technologies for its necessities and its specific type of soil.

Under the coordination and financing of ABC and UNDP, Embrapa participated in several international multidisciplinary missions for addressing specific demands of the countries with which the Brazilian government had the

\textsuperscript{21} On the institutional plan, the General-Coordination for International Actions in the Fight Against Hunger (CGFome) was created in Itamaraty, it is dedicated to coordinating the national programs of humanitarian assistance.
intention of narrowing diplomatic ties, with the objective of transferring knowledge for boosting the development of their agriculture and livestock. Among the goals of these missions, there are included the transfer of technology for the genetic improvement of seeds; the improvement of cultivation techniques and livestock management; and the enhancement of the productive process, with emphasis in training foreign technicians who will come to multiply this knowledge in forming teams capable of acting in the strengthening of the agricultural institutions. Similarly, this technology transfer enables local farmers, ensuring food security in the beneficiary country, fighting hunger and poverty locally, besides attenuating external vulnerability by allowing an increase in productivity in several economic sectors and stimulating industrialization.

According to the Foreign Policy Balance of 2003-2010:

Given that Brazilian technical cooperation is concentrated in the training of human resources and in strengthening local institutions, it ends up also contributing to political stability and economic development of the continent. The structuring of the health care systems, the diffusion of new agricultural techniques and of family farming programs and the partnership with governmental organs for the improvement of public services, for example, helping to secure the rural population and creating alternative sources of income, which has decreased the pressure on the capitals and creates a more dynamic economy (Brasil [s.d.]).

At the same time that the international insertion of Embrapa has grown, it has been noticed that it is necessary to increase the physical presence of the company in foreign lands. Thus, Embrapa offices were installed in Africa, Ghana, Latin America and Panama; a business office in Caracas, Venezuela, in partnership with the Brazilian Agency for Industrial Development (ABDI); and there was expansion of the Foreign Virtual Labs (LABEX) with scientific ends, besides implementing structuring projects in Haiti, Mali and in other countries.

Along these lines, the agricultural research and Embrapa, in particular, gained strategic value that go beyond the function of supporting technological and scientific development in national farming and agribusiness, becoming one

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22. Besides sending national technicians abroad to train local technicians, the Brazilian government decided to also attract these to Brazil to conduct training courses. With this goal, in 2009, arose the Center for Strategic Studies and Training in Tropical Agriculture (CECAT), for which the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) contributes substantially. In CECAT, technicians can be trained in sustainable production systems designed for regions with the characteristics of the Amazon, Cerrado, Pantanal, Semi-Arid and the Coastal Plains. In 2010, CECAT offered 43 courses for foreign students. For the period 2011-2012, the number of foreign students graduated is expected to exceed three hundred. These students will have access to courses that include different themes such as production of oilseeds and meats, bioenergy, agro-ecology, biotechnology, rural economy, information technology in agriculture, environment, satellite tracking, food processing and genetic resources.

23. The internationalization of Embrapa also attended the internal interests of the company. Through it, it was opened new opportunities for access to knowledge and genetic materials previously unavailable. In this perspective, internationalization is a priority for the need to seek knowledge where it is available to benefit the competitiveness of Brazilian agriculture.
of the main instruments of implementing the strategy traced out by the foreign policy of the country. This leads to significant increase both in supply and in demand for cooperation, which comes from several parts in the tropical world, but also from developed countries, inducing its internationalization in consonance with Brazil’s geopolitical strategy.

The role played by Embrapa fits in with the broader interest of being prominently placing the country at the core of the international community. The same way that technical cooperation was created to aid the partners in reaching greater economic and social stability and better quality of life, thus making available the necessary elements for domestic development, the Brazilian CTPD – as well as Embrapa in the case of agricultural cooperation – is a means at the disposal of the State to aid, to some extent, in the deliverying of foreign policy objectives. The Foreign Policy Balance of 2003-2010 clarifies this function of the Brazilian CTPD.

The technical cooperation developed by Brazil was broadened following the guidelines of the policy for consolidating the South-South dialogue, as an instrument of foreign policy of the Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva government. This cooperation seeks to strengthen the bilateral relations of Brazil with the rest of the world, elevating its profile in the world scenario. As a result of the recent economic growth, the country has taken on a protagonist position in the international discussions and has spearheaded the movement of integration and strengthening of developing countries. In this regard, technical cooperation has been one of the most important elements of Brazilian foreign policy (Brasil [s.d.]).

Not only the Foreign Policy Balance reinstated the potential of the Brazilian CTPD, but also the former minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Amorim, several times has stated that cooperation is a fundamental instrument for Brazilian foreign policy. In an interview with the ABC Bulletin (Bolétim Via ABC), of June 2006, published by the ABC, he commented that:

in minister level official visits I have had the grateful opportunity of addressing the broadening of technical cooperation with other developing countries (…). I witnessed numerous times the positive impact that technical cooperation project were capable of generating in the local community, aiding in promoting social and economic development (…). By offering cooperation opportunities, Brazil does not seek profit of commercial gain. Neither are there “conditionalities” involved. We seek to make the new vision of the relationships among developing countries reality, inspired in the communion of interests and in mutual help. (…) Our geographic surroundings were always an area of priority action for the ABC. We recognize the existence of development asymmetries among the South American countries. This leads us to contribute, within our means, with cooperation initiatives that have a multiplying effect (Celso Amorim, apud Valler Filho, 2007, p. 92).
It is also noteworthy that the CTPD can contribute indirectly, and frequently does so to the increase and consolidation of the economic presence of the provider country in the receiving country, including opening up space for national private and public companies to install themselves or to trade with the country. Although Brazil unbinds its cooperation from commercial conditionalties, and naturally that, at the time of continuing the project at their own risk, or better yet, after the end of the projects, the receiving country relies in the Brazilian companies as partners, for being more accustomed with the technology transferred or by producing the machines and materials needed for production.

Keeping in mind the aforementioned aspects, it is not without reason the effort of Itamaraty in promoting and expanding technical cooperation supplied to these developing countries over the last years. Technical cooperation is one of the instruments, among many which are valid, that Brazil disposes of for reinforcing the ties of friendship and expanding its foreign projection, conferring credibility and confidence to the country’s performance. The growing demands for cooperation are a proof of this, especially in countries of South America, the Caribbean and Africa, in which South-South Brazilian cooperation has reached significant results. It is about the element of visibility, affirmation and updating of Brazilian foreign policy.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to state that the Brazilian CTPD, especially in the agricultural sector, determines by itself the reach of the results sought by Brazil in terms of foreign policy. The equation CTPD-Brazilian foreign policy objectives is not direct, neither can it be confirmed that it is inexistente. Actually, technical cooperation consists in one of the instruments Brazil has for reaching its goals in the foreign arena. Not necessarily can it be asserted that only through CTPD can the country garner or not a certain goal; neither can it be said that without the CTPD, Brazil would surely conquer. However, what can be said is that horizontal technical cooperation is a tool valid with which Brazil has wide tradition and reputation. Dispensing its use – or any other resource for foreign action – would be to restrict the possibilities of executing the defined guidelines of foreign policy. Consequently, in the various mechanisms for acting abroad, the Brazilian CTPD is defined as an innovative formula and alternative resource for implementing actions and maximizing results.

5 INSTRUMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BRAZILIAN CTPD
Beyond the discourse, it is interesting to seek ways to prove the instrumental path of the Brazilian CTPD. For analyzing its effectiveness, it is possible to find three levels of evaluation. The first would be consubstantiated in the teleological objectives of the CTPD, which are: to provide effective contributions for the progress of partner countries on the path of development. The second level would refer to a real contribution for consolidating the relationships between Brazil and the partner countries, in several fields. Finally, the third would be for the “international
The instrumental bias of Brazilian horizontal technical cooperation projection of Brazil, especially but not only, as a relevant actor in the efforts of horizontal cooperation, but also contributing to the construction and reinforcement of legitimacy, credibility and leadership of the country” (Puente, 2010, p. 253).

The second and third levels are central, because they reveal, in a more marked way, the instrumental relationship between the CTPD and foreign policy. As such, through analysis of the instrumental effectiveness measured in commercial and political terms, one could weave a relationship between Brazilian technical horizontal cooperation and the foreign policy goals defined in the second and third levels respectively.

5.1 The instrumental effectiveness in commercial terms

The Brazilian CTPD is devoid of lucrative purposes and unrelated from trade conditionalities of any nature. Therefore it does not propose increasing economic and commercial presence of the country directly and automatically in foreign lands. Actually, the effects of Brazilian horizontal technical cooperation on trade relations are still limited. However, one cannot deny that technical cooperation contributes to create an environment conducive to establish other elements of presence, such as trade relations and investment opportunities for Brazilian transnationals:

it would not be an exaggeration to state that the CTPD, through the comprehensiveness of the thematic areas and by the possibility of producing important synergies, may also directly or indirectly act spearheading posterior economic-trade actions. By occupying spaces, building relations networks, therefore consolidating the bilateral ties, the CTPD will also facilitate conditions for Brazilian companies to act (Puente, 2010, p. 256).

There are no few examples of Brazilian companies that benefit from the CTPD projects in African countries. In the agricultural sector, one of the companies that benefited the most is Embrapa.

For as much as there are horizontal technical cooperation programs, in many countries there are no conditions that allow the substantive commercial presence. It is the case of East Timor, Haiti and other countries in Central America and the Caribbean, who have a meager domestic market and few competitive industries.24 Provided, CTPD’s role in promoting Brazilian economic and commercial presence in the developing countries is not expressive, direct, automatic, nor short-term, but it exists, and its contribution, as indirect as it may be, cannot be denied. A way of observing this role of the horizontal technical cooperation is through an analysis of the bilateral commercial relations between Brazil and its partners.25

24. In these cases, the teleological goals of the CTPD should be observed in order to provide effective contributions for the progress of partner countries on the road to development.
25. For a second level analysis, this work only presents preliminary conclusions, product of an ongoing research.
With almost all of Brazil’s partner States, there have been significant commercial ties. With all of the Latin-American neighbors, with the exception of a few countries such as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the Bahamas, increased their commercial trade with Brazil; taking into consideration only the agricultural cooperation partners, there has been increase in commercial trade. The African picture has also been very prosperous; with the exception of Mali, Malawi, Zimbabwe, among others, all of the other States increased trade with Brazil. Now with Asia, Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, in all the countries except Nepal, Brazil has increased its trade relations.

The most interesting is to analyze the case of countries with which Brazil developed the most technical cooperation actions recently, they are: Paraguay, Guatemala, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola, Uruguay, Cuba, Mozambique, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Cape Verde. It can be observed that all of them have had an increase in commercial ties with Brazil. The following cases are noteworthy: in Guinea-Bissau, the increase of trade relations was of 6,178.59%; in Sao Tome and Principe, of 4,248.69%; and in Haiti, of 13,324.75% (table 1).26

It is worth mentioning that, speaking of countries with which Brazil has agricultural technical cooperation programs, the picture is no different. With the exception of Liberia, Mali and Zimbabwe, Brazil experienced growth of commercial trade with all of the countries.

It is natural that the Brazilian government seeks a good relationship with countries that have investments of Brazilian companies or that have bought numerous national products, especially in the case of some African countries, in which domestic turbulences and political interferences tend to influence the business environment. Nothing better than the Brazilian technical cooperation for this, for it demonstrated that, beyond business, Brazil is interested in local socio-economic development.

Although it is difficult to establish a direct correlation between the increase in trade of the direct business investments and the existence of technical cooperation partners, it can be inferred that the CTPD consists in an able instrument for increasing Brazil’s credibility and, consequently, the receptivity of the partners in face of its products and companies. Evidently, it is not the case of cause and effect, even because the Brazilian CTPD does not revolve around commercial goals. However, it is not prudent to deny that technical cooperation contributes to creating favorable environment for the establishment of other elements of presence, among which is trade, for, given the data and the aforementioned examples, this in fact occurs.

26. In some cases, it is highlighted that, although the growth of bilateral trade is perceptually expressive, the trade in absolute terms remains small. This is the case of Haiti, which has been going through internal turbulences and natural catastrophes, and of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, whose economies are small.
TABLE 1
Commercial Trade of Brazil with the main countries receiving the Brazilian CTPD (1994-2010) (In US$ FOB)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Commercial trade in 1994</th>
<th>Commercial trade in 2003</th>
<th>Commercial trade in 2010</th>
<th>Variation between 1994 and 2010 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>169,507,146</td>
<td>243,021,070</td>
<td>1,441,573,704</td>
<td>750.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>6,485,479</td>
<td>9,013,092</td>
<td>27,308,363</td>
<td>321.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>79,862,560</td>
<td>91,992,230</td>
<td>488,288,895</td>
<td>511.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>63,004,023</td>
<td>164,600,594</td>
<td>271,896,048</td>
<td>331.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>235,024</td>
<td>257,519</td>
<td>14,756,202</td>
<td>6.178.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>412,828</td>
<td>31,761,171</td>
<td>55,421,131</td>
<td>13.324.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>7,666,224</td>
<td>14,945,358</td>
<td>42,380,333</td>
<td>452.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1,406,077,866</td>
<td>1,183,500,567</td>
<td>3,159,308,489</td>
<td>124.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>22,006</td>
<td>387,852</td>
<td>956,972</td>
<td>4.248.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>109,378</td>
<td>163,141</td>
<td>49.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1,300,838,155</td>
<td>943,659,957</td>
<td>3,105,229,135</td>
<td>138.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.2 The instrumental effectiveness in political terms

It is not only in commercial terms that the Brazilian CTPD influences positively the foreign policy. In an even more significant way, the horizontal technical cooperation of Brazil contributes to the country so that it achieves its political goals in the international arena.

It is undeniable that there is a certain difficulty in identifying concrete results in political terms that may be attributed to the instrumentality of technical cooperation in Brazilian foreign policy. The fruits of the CTPD are not automatic and direct, or necessarily short-term and, more importantly, it is difficult to dissociate them from other variables present both in the context of bilateral relationships and in the international environment. However, the fact that Brazil makes use of different foreign policy instruments to reach its goals does not discredit technical cooperation as an efficient mechanism for, among other goals, consolidating political relationships with the countries with which it cooperates and increasing Brazil’s international projection. Therefore, the Brazilian CTPD should be analyzed according to the general guidelines of Brazilian foreign Policy.

Over the last decades, Brazil has put considerable effort into projecting itself internationally. Recognizing itself evermore as a medium and emerging power, the country has sought space in the world forums to prevail its interests. Thus, it has understood that it is necessary to join efforts with other developing countries,
since it often not only defends common interests, but also needs political support for its claims. To obtain such support, political approximation was necessary.

More emphatically than FHC, Lula has sought approximation with other developing countries. Proof of this is the amount of offices created during his term. In eight years, the number of new embassies and consulates has surpassed two hundred, most of the in developing countries, especially in Latin-Americans, Caribbean and African.27

The fact that all Latin-American and Caribbean countries currently have Brazilian embassies, for example, is not without reason. There is evident governmental concern in maintaining itself as an influential player in the region and consolidating its continental leadership. The political map and economic scenario in Latin America and the Caribbean are always in profound transformation. The recurrence of coups and regional disputes, the existence of guerillas, the emergence of social movements, of nationalist and anti-globalization leaders, and populist politicians are constant destabilization factors. It is in the interest of the Brazilian government the pacification and stabilization of regional politics. In this regard, initiatives such as the creation of Unasur and of CELAC and the technical cooperation provided by Brazil stand out.28

Brazilian CTPD in the agricultural sector consists in the undeniable effort of promoting not only social and economic development, but as a consequence the general goals of pacification and regional stabilization, once that political instability in some countries is often a consequence of basic needs of the population. This perspective of cooperation generates impacts not only on the bilateral relations, but also in terms of international projection, credibility and continental leadership.

The political consolidation with countries of the American continent also answers other challenges. The growing presence of China, the expansion of economic-commercial ties of the South and Central American countries next to the Pacific Ocean with Asia and a strong influence of the United States in the region are additional challenges for the formulators of Brazilian foreign policy. Without a doubt, the CTPD contributes as a legitimizing element of Brazilian partnership with its neighbors. Brazil is evermore associated by its partners to the causes of promoting economic and social development, which is also illustrated by the growing demand of developed countries and international organisms to establish mechanisms of triangular cooperation with Brazil.

27. During the FHC government, due to budget restrictions and successive international and domestic crises, several foreign offices were closed, especially in countries where the bilateral relationship was small.
28. In the FHC and Lula governments there was growing emphasis in promoting political stability in allocating technical cooperation. The most obvious cases are illustrations of this, East Timor and Haiti and similar initiatives in Guinea-Bissau, Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay. These four countries received CTPD missions after going through political and institutional crises.
The CTPD, especially in the agricultural sector, for the African countries and some Latin-American ones, is the justifying element for a bilateral relationship and stimulates the works of the new embassies established in countries with which Brazil did not have great ties. This type of cooperation, as well as cultural cooperation, often constitutes in the element of presence possible in specific countries. It is also, without a doubt, necessary. Technical horizontal cooperation, in certain cases, occupies a space that is at times not feasible with other present elements, such as significant commercial trade. (…) At certain conditions, the Brazilian CTPD may fill in a space that, in some other way would be transformed in an almost absolute vacuum (Puente, 2010, p. 256).

The consolidation that technical cooperation provides in bilateral relations contributes a lot to the exercise of influence on partner countries. The CTPD is, without a doubt, one of the many manifestations of soft power, according to Joseph Nye.29 Consequently, CTPD may be seen as one of the various resources that the Brazilian diplomacy has for the affirmation of this heritage of credibility and legitimacy of its international action. By its specific nature, its horizontality, for being detached from profit and unassociated with any political or economic impositions, Brazilian technical cooperation is progressively accredited as a significant element of South-South cooperation (Op. cit., p. 260).

Finally, regarding the instrumentality of horizontal technical cooperation, it is difficult to derive it with precision in concrete cases where Brazil has achieved political success. It cannot be stated that the role of the CTPD, independent from which sector, is especially important in all the cases. There are numerous other elements present in the bilateral relation that compete, on different levels of importance, for the conformation of this favorable predisposition of the partner countries in accepting as relevant Brazilian interests (Puente, 2010, p. 259). It is worth recalling that the Brazilian CTPD does not consist in a mechanism especially established for contributing gains in terms of foreign policy for the country, though it often is. Neither can it be hoped that it is always possible to count the direct results in the field of foreign policy in consequence of the CTPD’s actions (op. cit., p. 261).

This political effectiveness can be refuted by the analysis of two important and recent facts in Brazilian diplomacy: the Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the election of Jose Graziano da Silva as general director of FAO.

The necessity of reforming the UN and the UNSC seems to be a global consensus, however the way that it should be implements and mainly which

29. In short, soft power is the ability to influence others into doing what you want, but without using physical force of military power.
countries should permanently occupy a seat in this council, independent from having or not the power to veto, is a subject of extensive controversy.

Among the foreign policy goals of the FHC and Lula governments, was the election of the country for a permanent seat in the UNSC. Thus, it is to be expected that these rulers have benefited from several instruments of foreign policy for increasing the chances of electing Brazil, among them technical cooperation. It would be interesting to study which countries supported the Brazilian candidacy – independently from the way they expressed it – and verify which of them have technical cooperation partnerships in general or in the agricultural sector with Brazil.

The result of this study seems to testify the importance of technical horizontal cooperation for Brazilian foreign policy: almost all of the main partner countries of the Brazilian CTPD support Brazil’s claim in occupying a permanent seat and a possible expansion of the UNSC. In the American continent, Brazil receives the support – explicit and private – of 20 neighboring countries, other than four favorable manifestations. However, there are four countries in the region that are part of the initiative “United for Consensus”, who oppose the proposal presented by the G4, groups which Brazil is member. In this initiative, stand out the cases of Argentina and Mexico, who historically oppose the Brazilian candidacy.

In the African continent, the Brazilian claim has the support of 27 countries – nineteen explicit and eight in private – and four favorable manifestations. Thus, no technical cooperation partner of Brazil in Africa opposes to the Brazilian interest. On the contrary, all defend, in different degrees, Brazil’s proposal. The same pattern is repeated in Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East: seven explicitly support and one expresses favorable manifestation. Nevertheless, three States have not manifested themselves. In total, the country has received 63 supports – 45 explicit, nine in private and nine in favorable manifestation – of a universe of 67 cooperating States.

Interpreting this information, it is possible to conclude that the CTPD, in general, contributes in a certain way, though there is no possibility of measuring the degree of contribution, so that the partner countries support the desire of Brazil of being a permanent member of the UNSC. It would not be smart to allege that these facts are coincidences, as some critics of the Brazilian CTPD claim;

30. When the question involves merely the support for the Brazilian candidacy, the near totality of the main receiving countries of the CTPD supports Brazil’s claim. However, in relation to the proposal of the G4, the difficulties increase, because of other factors that are added to the equation, including specific regional injunctions, as is the case of the African countries.

31. On July 26th, 2005, Italy, Argentina, Colombia, Pakistan and Canada, representing an even larger group of States called United for Consensus, presented to the United Nations General Assembly a proposal in opposition of the one defended by the G4, made up of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan. The project also keeps the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but increases the number of non-permanent to twenty.
the complexity of international politics demands that the statesman make use of several means of reaching its foreign policy goals. Also, almost all of the countries with which Brazil historically has not had expressive contact, the Caribbean countries for example, support the Brazilian candidacy. The setting up of embassies and the establishing of partnerships of technical cooperation probably helped in the bilateral approximation and in the greater knowledge by the States of the international projection and the proposals of Brazil.

Concerning the positions of the main receiving countries of the Brazilian CTPD in agriculture, in relation to the reform of the UNSC, in the American continent, a country is supported by fourteen States and one favorable manifestation, but three belong to the “United for Consensus” initiative. In Africa, there are nineteen supports – eleven explicit and eight in private – and three favorable manifestations. Finally, in Asia, Eastern Europe and in the Middle East: two explicit supports. In total, there are 39 supporting – 27 explicitly, eight in private and four favorable manifestation – and three objectives.

Again it is highlighted the importance of horizontal technical cooperation achieving other foreign policy goals. The near totality of the receiving countries of the CTPD in the agricultural sector defend the Brazilian position at the core of the United Nations.

The election of José Graziano da Silva for the seat of the FAO general director of was undoubtedly a great challenge and an extraordinary victory for the Brazilian diplomacy, for it is the first Latin-American to preside the institution charged with fighting hunger in the world. This fact reflects the global recognition of the extensive experience that Brazil has both in the agricultural sector as in, more specifically, in the field of food security and of the eradication of hunger. This predicates consolidated the country as an attractive player in the global scenario. The study of voting options of the country members of FAO is able to ratify this understanding.

Concerning the Brazilian CTPD in general, Brazil gained eleven explicit supports in South America; seventeen explicit and one support of another candidate in Central America, in North America and in the Caribbean; 27 supports – 22 explicit and five in private –, one undefined and eight supports to another candidate in Africa; and four supports – 3 explicit and one in private –, one undefined and five supports to another candidate in Asia, in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East. In total there were counted 59 supports – 53 explicit and six in private –, two undefined and fourteen to another candidate. It is worth

32. In the specific case of the election of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), also weighed heavily on the choice of countries other Brazilian projects that overflow the technical cooperation area, such as the More Food Africa Program (Mais Alimentos África – MAF).
highlighting the expressive support that the Brazilian candidate gained in the American continent. In Africa, the region that historically has suffered influences of several other powers, the vote in favor of Graziano was significant, being that the favorable votes and the support to other candidates were three times greater than the undefined votes. Even in Asia, Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, regions where Brazil has more recent contacts and where there were their own local candidates for the election, the fact that there were four countries favorable can be considered as a great accomplishment. Finally, in general, the support for Brazil was four times larger than for the votes for the other candidates.

With regards to the Brazilian CTPD in the agricultural sector, the Brazilian favoritism was undeniable and suggests to address the doubts as for the instrumentality of the horizontal technical cooperation provided by Brazil. In South, Central and North America and the Caribbean, eighteen explicit supports were given, with no private supports, undefined votes or in different candidates; in Africa however, there were 24 supports – nineteen explicit and five in private – and one support for another candidate; finally, in Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, there were two supports – one explicit and one in private. In general, were counted 44 supports – 38 explicit and six in private – and only one support for another candidate.

Once more, as with the candidacy with the UNSC, it is not possible to attribute all of the weight of Brazilian victory in the election for the FAO on the CTPD, more specifically in the agricultural sector. Many authors influence, in different degrees, in the decision making process of the receiving countries of the CTPD of Brazil. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the previous data provides a good indication that horizontal technical cooperation is one of the valid instruments that Brazilian diplomacy has for defending its interests in the international arena.

6 CONCLUSION
With the title *Speak softly and carry a blank cheque*, the magazine *The Economist* characterized, in an article of July 2010, the new level reached by Brazil in terms of international technical cooperation. The previously eminently assistance receiving country is today a great partner in horizontal cooperation initiatives. The reasons for this international recognition are not few.

Over the last two decades, Brazil has greatly increased its capacity of cooperating. Through technical cooperation, Brazil has transferred to developing countries technologies, experiences, knowledge and training at its disposal, which have been combined with local technical capacity, in order to contribute to the development of the partner country. However, the country did this on non-traditional, better yet, it followed its own parameters.
In an innovative way, non-interventionist, solidary, non-commercial, non-imposing and consonant with the spirit of South-South cooperation, Brazil respects the local culture and socio-economic reality when structuring its projects and tries to give emphasis to the demands of the partner, and not of the offer of the supplier, assuring the most possible horizontality in the relationship of the partners.

In the FHC era, technical cooperation steadily expanded and allied itself with the stabilization initiative, such as the examples of East Timor and Guinea-Bissau. In the Lula era this impulse was kept and diversified, consolidating the commitment with horizontal cooperation – fight against hunger and poverty – and the use of the CTPD in a more instrumental way.

During the FHC government, the emphasis was kept on Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. However, especially after Lula’s second mandate, there was a certain diversification of partners, with projects that are not restricted to the PALOPs and with more American States cooperating. The commitment made by the stabilization and economic recovery of Haiti (devastated by political instability and natural catastrophe) is noteworthy.

In both governments and in all of the regions reached by the Brazilian CTPD, agricultural cooperation was preponderant. Be it in Africa or in the Americas, Embrapa has carried out a relevant role for Brazilian foreign policy. At the same time that it answered Brazilian desire to promote food security in the developing countries, it projected Brazil internationally, increased its credibility and legitimacy as a country defender of the interests of the developing countries and attracting more and more partners for the Brazilian sphere of influence.

If in fact the Brazilian CTPD is very well situated in the global arena, because of criteria like tradition, volume and density of actions, geographic comprehensiveness, thematic breadth, non-commercial character, visibility, projection, among others, this is in part due to the work carried out by Embrapa. To meet the demand of the partners, the company opened representation offices in order to get closer to the local reality and better organize the structuring projects. Furthermore, it organizes itself to transfer knowledge in the most different branches of the agricultural sector.

The advantages for Brazilian foreign policy of this cooperation in the agricultural sector still arouse doubts in scholars and laymen alike, being one of the reasons for the issue to be discussed in this study. In fact, the instrumental effectiveness of the Brazilian agricultural CTPD is difficult to be measured. Nevertheless, this difficulty does not discredit its predicates as a valuable instrument for diplomatic action. In the three analyzed cases, the increase of bilateral trade relations, the support of Brazilian candidacy for the Security Council and the
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election of Dr. Graziano at FAO, there is strong evidence of the validity of the international work carried out by Embrapa and by the ABC, though it is not possible to establish direct relations.

Through the analysis of the data presented, there is evidence of the CTPD’s influence, especially in agriculture, on the position of the partner countries of supporting or not the Brazilian interests. To take refuge in the argument of coincidence is not consistent with the complexity of the interstate relations of today. The most certain would be to recognize that the CTPD contributes indirectly to creating conditions conducive for the practice of other elements of presence, including economic, commercial and political strategy, and confers, better yet, recognizes its deserved condition of being a valid instrument and of diplomatic action.

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