Sino-Latin American trade grew dramatically since the turn of the century, with the commercial relationship between Brazil and China leading the regional trend. Bilateral trade grew almost fifteen-fold between 2000 and 2013, with a trade balance favoring Brazil. The resulting relationship has matured, and is nowadays evolving beyond mere trade into a complex matrix that includes developmental, political, cultural, and “soft power” dimensions involving not just state and corporate actors, but common citizens as well. This article seeks to move the discussion forward by contrasting Latin American and Brazilian perceptions of China obtained from public opinion polls. The focus is placed on how the particular nature of the early Sino-Brazilian economic and political interactions enabled a mild “honeymoon” from the perspective of Brazilians, in which socioeconomic or ideological positions had little impact on the general positive opinion of China. Nonetheless, this “honeymoon” should not be taken for granted, as the exchange that was favorable to Brazil in the early stages is likely to change in the near future.

Keywords: China-Brazil relations; trade; public opinion; soft power; perceptions.

Sino-Latin American trade grew dramatically since the turn of the century, with the commercial relationship between Brazil and China leading the regional trend. Bilateral trade grew almost fifteen-fold between 2000 and 2013, with a trade balance favoring Brazil. The resulting relationship has matured, and is nowadays evolving beyond mere trade into a complex matrix that includes developmental, political, cultural, and “soft power” dimensions involving not just state and corporate actors, but common citizens as well. This article seeks to move the discussion forward by contrasting Latin American and Brazilian perceptions of China obtained from public opinion polls. The focus is placed on how the particular nature of the early Sino-Brazilian economic and political interactions enabled a mild “honeymoon” from the perspective of Brazilians, in which socioeconomic or ideological positions had little impact on the general positive opinion of China. Nonetheless, this “honeymoon” should not be taken for granted, as the exchange that was favorable to Brazil in the early stages is likely to change in the near future.

Keywords: China-Brazil relations; trade; public opinion; soft power; perceptions.
¿UNA LUNA DE MIEL CON CHINA? PERCEPCIONES PÚBLICAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y BRASIL

El comercio entre China y América Latina ha crecido de manera espectacular desde el inicio del siglo con la relación comercial entre Brasil y China liderando la tendencia regional. El comercio bilateral ha crecido cerca de quince veces entre 2000 y 2013, con la balanza comercial favorable a Brasil. La relación resultante ha madurado y hoy, además del comercio, abarca una matriz compleja que incluye dimensiones del desarrollo, política, cultura y soft power, involucrando no sólo a los actores estatales y corporativos, sino también a los ciudadanos. Este trabajo analiza las percepciones de América Latina y de Brasil hacia China desde las encuestas de opinión. Se centra sobre todo en la naturaleza de las primeras interacciones políticas y económicas entre China y Brasil, las cuales han permitido a los brasileños crear una imagen de una "luna de miel" entre los dos países, de modo que las posiciones socio-económicas o ideológicas tuvieron poco impacto en la valoración general positiva de China. Sin embargo, esta "luna de miel" no debe darse por hecha, ya que las relaciones de comercio inicialmente favorables a Brasil probablemente cambiarán en el futuro cercano.

Palabras clave: relaciones China-Brasil; comercio; opinión pública; soft power; percepciones.

JEL: Y8; Z13.

1 INTRODUCTION

The trade relationship between China and South America has grown dramatically since the turn of the century. The official Chinese policy of “going out” has certainly favored this drive, along with the Asian country’s demand for natural resources and new markets for its manufactures. South American nations have welcomed China: the newcomer is today among the top three trading partners of most South American economies.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the regional bilateral trade reached a record volume of US$ 261.3 billion in 2013 (figure 1). Since the turn of the century, Brazil has been at the forefront of this dynamic relationship. Sino-Brazilian trade grew almost fifteen times between 2000 and 2013, and in that last year, it alone amounted to 34% of the total China-Latin American and Caribbean commercial exchange. Furthermore, Brazil has enjoyed a favorable trade balance with China since 2009. In 2013, Brazil’s favorable trade balance was about 13% of the total bilateral exchange (UNCTAD, 2014).
Most of the academic and policy attention has been placed on the trade and investment dimensions of this rapidly evolving relationship (Dussel-Peters, 2014; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2008; Rosales and Kuwayama, 2012). Debates over the developmental impact and challenges brought up by China’s “arriving in” Latin America also abound (Rosales and Mulder, 2012; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Marques, 2009). Mainstream international relations scholars have followed closely the relationship, asking questions about the opportunities and challenges this commercial link poses to the hemispheric and regional status quo (Arnson and Davidow, 2011; Ellis, 2014b; Roett and Paz, 2008).

It is only natural that, as the relationship matures, new perspectives attain increasing relevance. For Latin America and China, this relationship is not just a commercial partnership (Moreira et al., 2010). The bilateral trade exchange is also an important platform, particularly for China as an ascending global power, to project its cultural presence and political influence abroad, and to develop and deploy soft power in the service of its national interests. One of the most pressing questions since the onset of the dramatic rise in trade between China and Latin America is, how much do the partners know and understand each other? This is not a trivial question. For instance, the special status of “strategic partners” that the governments of China and Brazil have conferred to each other requires a more sophisticated understanding of mutual perceptions (Domínguez et al., 2006, p. 3; Oliveira, 2010; Strauss and Armony, 2012).
This article seeks to move the discussion forward by focusing on perceptions about China in Latin America. As such, it elaborates on previous work (Azpuru and Zechmeister, 2013) and incorporates a more detailed look at perceptions among Brazilians. These insights are key to understanding the ways in which China is incorporated as a key player into the mindsets and agendas of both Brazilians and Latin Americans in general.

The dramatic growth in the bilateral trade relationship is mirrored by the rise of news coverage about China in Latin America. Figure 2 shows the coverage (in Spanish only) about China in Latin American newspapers. In the case of Brazil, growth in trade has not necessarily translated into greater news coverage about China, as figure 3 indicates. The number of articles rose steadily until 2007, but since then it has kept a downward trend.

FIGURE 2
News coverage on China in Latin American newspapers (Spanish only)

Source: Latin... (2014).
Elaborated by the author.

FIGURE 3
News coverage on China in Brazilian newspapers

Source: Latin... (2014).
Elaborated by the author.
Recent studies suggest that, as the relationship between Latin America and China has been steadily maturing, the links between the partners are becoming more complex. If the first wave of the relationship witnessed a surge in trade, a more recent phase has been characterized by important Chinese investments in the region, with expanding Chinese business presence. This trend is leading to a more direct, day-to-day interaction, between the Chinese and Latin Americans. The dynamic of the relationship is thus changing: it is entering a stage that presents new challenges. These cannot be reduced exclusively to issues related to State or corporate relations, but they involve a transversal set of relations that connect a wide variety of actors (Ellis, 2014a). In this sense, the role of the media and public opinion in shaping the relationship are of fundamental importance (McCombs, 2004).

2 LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZILIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON CHINA

According to data from the 2012 Americas Barometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop), China is perceived favorably across Latin America and the Caribbean (Vanderbilt University, 2012). It is seen as an influence that is both mildly strong and mildly positive in the countries of the region. When researchers from Vanderbilt University compared trust in the government of the United States and that of extra-hemispheric powers, China was placed just below the United States on the trust scale, with both of them receiving scores of moderate trust, while other countries such as Russia and Iran were not seen as trustworthy (Azpuru and Zechmeister, 2013).

Brazilians rated China's presence just below the Latin American averages both in terms of the strength of Chinese influence over the region and the nature of Chinese influence over each Latin American country. It is interesting to note that regional heterogeneity on views regarding Chinese influence is minimal, which suggest that there is a mild public opinion honeymoon between Latin Americans and the Asian newcomer (figures 4 and 5).
FIGURE 4
Strength of Chinese influence in Latin America

Argentina  
Belize  
Bolivia  
Brazil  
Chile  
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
El Salvador  
Guatemala  
Guyana  
Haiti  
Jamaica  
Mexico  
Nicaragua  
Panama  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Trinidad & Tobago  
Uruguay  
Venezuela

Average: 66

Source: Vanderbilt University (2012).
Elaborated by the author.
Note: Minimum value = 0; maximum value = 100.
There is a clear sense that Chinese influence in the region will grow over the next decade. The polls show that in 2012 a quarter of respondents believed that China was already the most influential country in the region, and almost a third of them believed that it would be the most influential in 2022. While in both accounts China ranked below the United States, the United States position is expected to decline in contrast with the Chinese rise. In brief, Latin Americans expect a substantial shift in the relative influence of the United States and China over the next decade.

Brazilians tend to align with Latin Americans, with differences no greater than 1% (figures 6 and 7). Studies that have compared the public’s trust on the Chinese and the United States governments conclude that the former enjoys a more homogeneous image, while the latter shows greater variation across subregional economic blocs (Azpuru and Zechmeister, 2013). The rest of the Latin American
region sees Brazil’s influence as more positive, albeit weaker, than that of China (Zechmeister et al., 2013, p. 20).

FIGURE 6
Most influential country in Latin America in 2012, according to Brazilians (In %)

Source: Vanderbilt University (2012).
Elaborated by the author.

FIGURE 7
Most influential country in Latin America in 2022, according to Brazilians (In %)

Source: Vanderbilt University (2012).
Elaborated by the author.
Despite these positive views on Chinese influence, Brazilians do not think of China as their preferred model for development. While there is greater heterogeneity among Latin American countries over their rate of preference for China as a model for development, Brazil’s rate of 22.0% is very close to the regional average of 19.6% (figure 8).

More than 60% of the Brazilian respondents identified the United States or Japan as their preferred models of development. These are of course nations with liberal democracies and undisputedly capitalist markets, the ones that until the turn of the century were the unquestionable economic leaders in the Asia Pacific and the Americas, and with strong trade and migration ties with Brazil. Thus China’s third place can have multiple readings. Other public opinion polls, as the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, explore in more detail the level of admiration and disposition toward the Chinese model. From the Pew Research Center’s analysis, we can infer that while Brazilians, as the rest of Latin Americans, admire Chinese material and scientific development, they are less enthusiastic about Chinese cultural production and its projection in Latin America. Sixty-eight percent of Brazilians admire China’s technology and science, but only 36% view the spread of Chinese ideas and customs as a positive trend (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 28).

So far we have reported average results. The analysis thus begs the question: can the respondent’s ideological position, socioeconomic level, or education background explain her attitudes toward China? It seems that not. When we cross the abovementioned
variables with respondents’ overall view of Chinese influence in the region, we get very similar results to the general average of 63 over 100 (figures 9, 10 and 11). These results suggest that the Chinese image as a positive influence on the region is generalized across socioeconomic and ideational variables, albeit there is reticence toward following China as a model. The question of how well informed is the public about the Chinese model is left open, a question that wide but shallow surveys as Americas Barometer and Pew Global Attitudes Project are not well suited to deal with (Armony and Velásquez, 2015).

FIGURE 9
Brazil: perception by ideology

Source: Vanderbilt University (2012).
Elaborated by the author.
Note: Completely negative influence = 0; completely positive influence = 100.

FIGURE 10
Brazil: perception by class

Source: Vanderbilt University (2012).
Elaborated by the author.
Notes: 1. Completely negative influence = 0; completely positive influence = 100.
2. The number of respondents from the higher class was too small to calculate a 95% confidence interval.
Both the Pew Global Attitudes Survey and the Americas Barometer hint toward Chinese business as the “weakest” flank of the Chinese “going out” policy in Latin America in terms of public opinion. While both surveys are different in their design and reach, they concur on one point: Latin American public opinion shows uneasiness with the way in which Chinese business activities are conducted in their countries. It is important to note that, especially in the Americas Barometer data, the perception of the economic impact that the Chinese presence has on national and household economies is mildly positive, in range with the previous measures (figures 12 and 13).
Policy oriented and academic literature on Sino-Latin American relations has expressed concern over the long-term economic and developmental effects of the trade model that has characterized Latin America’s relationship with China in recent years. Among the main concerns are the sustainability of a re-primarization of the Latin American economies, with the critical domestic effect of an erosion of the domestic industrial base, particularly in Mexico and the largest South American economies (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Rosales and Kuwayama, 2012; Becard and Macedo, 2014). Some commentators think that the conditions for a smooth trade honeymoon between China and Latin America are already at their natural decline (Ferchen, 2012). However, irrespective of the optimistic or pessimistic readings of the national and domestic economies from 2010 to 2012, the Americas Barometer data show that the average perception of Chinese influence remains very close to the general mark of 63 points. We may want to monitor the evolution of this perception over the next few years. It may be possible that, in a country as unequal as Brazil, visible or perceived challenges brought about by changes in the production and consumption cycles could translate into public opinion wariness of China.

For the time being, Brazilians’ overall qualification of the impact of Chinese business on national development has been positive at 58 out of 100, and very close to the regional average of 62. In this respect, only Mexico and Argentina show a definite neutral view of Chinese influence, with scores bordering the 50 points mark. The rest of the countries have averages that surpass the 55 points mark (figure 14).
It is worth exploring this issue in more detail. When people are asked whether they are aware of problems faced by Chinese businesses operating in their country, the responses clearly indicate that people entertain the notion that Chinese companies do meet with a variety of problems. Respondents highlight communication and legal or political problems with greater frequency than cultural and labor problems. Figure 15 shows the results for the case of Brazil.
Our analysis of the Americas Barometer data reveals that the best predictor for negative views on Chinese influence was people’s knowledge of Chinese business facing at least one type of problem (which could be a communication, legal/political, cultural, or labor problem). Figure 16 summarizes the results. This finding holds true for both Latin America as a whole as well as for Brazil in particular. In the latter’s case, knowledge about Chinese companies having problems erodes in 13 points the perception of the benefits to the national economy of Chinese business, to the point where the view is turned to neutral, on the 50 points mark.

This is indeed relevant, because Chinese business presence in Brazil is rising, ranging from large corporate holdings to small detail business ran by Chinese (Lorentz, 2013). A report sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and the China-Brazil Business Council shows that, since 2007, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil has translated into dozens of large Chinese corporations in the South American country, either by the establishment of local branches or through acquisition of previously existing operations. The report states that market-seeking investment is more prevalent than resource-extracting investment in absolute numbers, although the report does not disaggregate each category’s share of Chinese FDI (Frischtak, Soares and O’Conor, 2013, p. 41-43). The report explains that stereotypes about Chinese investments in Brazil are relatively common, but emphasizes that these perceptions will change over time. According to the authors, China will be viewed as a “normal’ albeit late-coming investor, whose presence should not raise eyebrows any more than any other investor operating under the laws and regulations which frame the activities of both domestic and foreign companies” (Frischtak, Soares and O’Conor, 2013, p. 86).
These findings are in line with some of the most recent studies on Chinese companies’ operations in Latin America. These studies argue that one of the most important challenges facing Chinese business is their ability to manage the multifaceted difficulties that they encounter in Latin America. It seems that the average citizen is aware of these problems. The question is whether there would be tolerance or whether the existence of these problems would erode the mild honeymoon between China and Latin America in the near future (Barbosa, Tepasse and Biancalana, 2014; Ellis, 2014a).

4 CONCLUSION

Brazilian public opinion has met the initial stages of the Chinese “landing” with mildly positive views. Much in line with the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean region, Brazil’s public has entertained a “mild public relations honeymoon” with China, the new trading and investing partner whose influence changed the economic outlook of the past decade. Furthermore, Brazilians, as well as Latin Americans, believe that China’s influence in the region will increase in the future, not just in economic but in political terms as well. These opinions are until now transversal to socio-demographic variables, showing very slight variations across different segments of Brazilian society. In this sense, in terms of soft power, China has a moderately advantageous position upon which to project its image and interests further into Brazil and the region.

Nonetheless, there are evolving conditions that suggest that China’s “public image honeymoon” with Brazil cannot be taken for granted in the near future.
First of all, there is the question of how well informed are the Brazilians on China, and on the dynamics of the bilateral relationship. Mainstream and specialized media’s priming will undoubtedly play a significant role on the evolution of public opinion perceptions.

Second, the economic conditions that favored the bilateral trade boom enjoyed during the past decade and a half are at a natural deceleration. In this recent past, Brazil enjoyed an advantageous position through a positive trade balance, due mainly to the export of primary goods. However, the other side of the coin is the challenge posed to the Brazilian industrial base by the increasing competition from Chinese manufactures. The inherent difficulties in balancing these two dimensions are likely to translate into public policies and economic decisions that will impact the nature of the relationship and the public’s perception of Chinese influence.

Additionally, the increasing presence of Chinese companies and products will turn the relationship into a more complex, day-to-day, experience. It is very telling that the strongest indicators of public malaise in recent polls come from perceptions over the problems faced by Chinese companies operating in Latin American countries. While this holds true for all the countries in the region, the comparatively larger Chinese FDI in Brazil will probably lead to stronger and sooner impacts on public awareness and public opinion in comparison with other Latin American countries.

REFERENCES


PEW RESEARCH CENTER. America’s global image remains more positive than China’s but many see China becoming world’s leading power. Washington: Pew Research Center, 2013.


