The geopolitics of cities
old challenges, new issues

Renato Balbim
Editor

ipea
How an urban global agenda should respond to the social, economic and environmental challenges faced by an unequal urban society? How would it address the increase of socio-spatial inequalities and segregation present in cities, mostly in developing countries?

Various chapters in this book have casted light on how and why such an agenda should address the drivers and consequences of social-spatial inequalities, such as the growing number of residents living in informal and unserviced settlements; concentration of property in the hands of a few, increasing financialization of land and housing, privatization of public spaces, rising urban insecurity, and shrinking spaces for civil society.

In seeking to account for the unequal distribution of wealth, resources and opportunities, many prepositions advocate for a paradigm shift about how urban development is financed, produced and governed. Government commitment to redistribution, de-concentration and re-democratization efforts in housing, property, basic services, public spaces and governance sectors, is one proposed shift. They emphasize that commitments towards an urban paradigm shift should lead to the realization of the right to the city for all, consisting in the right of all inhabitants, present and future, temporary and permanent, to use, occupy, produce, govern and enjoy peaceful, just, inclusive and sustainable cities, villages and settlements, understood as a common good essential to a full and decent life.

It would require the shift from a techno-economic approach to a people-centered and rights-based one. This would entail giving power and resources in local governments; claiming and preserving territorial spaces for underrepresented groups and excluded communities, recognizing informal settlements and labor, enforcing the social function of land, tackling real estate speculation, securing progressive taxation over property. Questions then arise as to whether it would be possible to engage governments to implement such shifts in contexts of privatization, limited social service provision, neoliberal governance, and market-oriented governance.

This book contributes to ask and address all these questions, taking advantage of the realization of the III United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development in Quito, which will count on the participation of civil society organizations, social movements, academics, private enterprises, foundations, national and local governments and UN representatives.

Letícia Osorio

**Program Officer – Human Rights**

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Federal Government of Brazil

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This book is presented as a continuation of the various efforts made by the Ipea in preparing Brazil to Habitat III and the wording of the Brazilian Report to the UN conference. The many efforts include the elaborating on: regional and national seminars, virtual platforms for social participation, other books, publications and reports, surveys, interviews, data bases, monitoring processes, negotiations in government and civil society, television programs, video documentaries etc. This rich and innovative route involved more than 2,500 people and, according to comparisons made with 34 other countries and as presented here in one of the chapters of this publication, qualifies as the most thorough participatory process of the New Urban Agenda development.

The organization of this book, as well as the invitation of several experts and scholars contributing to this debate, are directly related to the National Seminar Habitat III “Participa Brasil,” conducted by Ipea and partners in Brasilia in early 2015. Due to the complexities involved several topics addressed at that time could not be considered by the Brazilian Report for Habitat III. Most of which are due to the intersectionality of analysis necessary for understanding, escaping or surpassing the manner of an official government report to the UN is shaped.

Thus, important issues such as geopolitics between states and cities, technological innovation and its impact on international networks and deepening of democracy, as well as many other pending critical issues, justify the collaboration between scholars concerned to generate these innovative ideas and to explain the current process of urbanization. The goal was to make them accessible to a broader audience. Similarly, the search for new contributions could focus precisely on issues that require deeper analyses and references.

This book occupies a critical space at the local, national and international scales debate about the ongoing process of construction of the “New Urban Agenda”. Concurrently, this book shows the profiles of a new geopolitics involving cities and nation states debating at the same time in contradictory and combined way the new directions of global urbanization.

The geopolitics of the New Urban Agenda is depicted from the old challenges of urbanization, the innovations urban practices brought from the new technologies of communication and information, the configuration of international cities networks and others thematic networks surrounding the urban, social and climate agendas. In addition, the configuration of a new geopolitics of cities is retracted according to the worldwide understanding debate about the right to the city, herein discussed from the viewpoints of both social activists and renowned scholars.
This book also illustrates the plural view of the Ipea in the analysis of crucial issues for the nations’ development. As required, the approaches presented surpass the strict field of urbanism, extending the analysis of geopolitical of cities to many other areas of knowledge, including, but not limited to, sociology, economics, geography, environmentalism, urban and human rights. This book also includes contributions from international and Brazilian authors, scholars and representatives of organizations, all of whom are in some way fighting and advocating for the right to the city, as well as for the empowerment of local governments and social participation as fundamental elements towards human cities.

Local governments and social organizations have an increasingly important role in the definition of international agreements. This book that we have the honor to present get this theme as a pathway to a new politics, built on multiple scales, towards the improvement of public agendas and policies worldwide and also in specific contexts. The Ipea’s mission is so far reinforced, the fifteen chapters that follow not only shed light on the understanding of processes, but also present crucial elements to the development and updating of public and social agendas in a world increasingly interconnected, a world in which cities play a fundamental role on daily organization of the largest portion of citizens, right and possibilities to live in a better sustainable future.

Ernesto Lozardo

President of the Institute for Applied Economic Research
The idea of promoting a debate about the geopolitics involved at the construction of the New Urban Agenda emerged from practical considerations. After coordinating the reporting and writing of the Brazilian Report for the Habitat III Conference for a year and a half, it was clear that the discussions and agreements held on the global scale lack analyses from a structural standpoint. In other words, themes concerning the creation of the New Urban Agenda must be analyzed as a broad process, as a historic process, from a double perspective: both from the global and also historic view of social actors and their regional or local arrangements.

The cities’ geopolitical game of chess is like a game that is played in the dark, at least for a substantial number of the pieces that compose the chessboard. If the playing field is relatively unveiled by a deep comprehensive analysis made by scholars dedicated to acquiring a critical understanding of globalization, the myriad interests involved in the production of the urban space on a global scale do not allow for a clear vision of the conjunctural arrangements involved in the decision-making processes.

As we pointed out in a recent analysis about the results of the Habitat II Conference, some of these arrangements turned out to be paradoxical. The decentralization of urban politics and the right to adequate housing, causes championed by social movements, served also in the last twenty years for the more structured neoliberal currents. Decentralization, more than democratization, served to reduce the size of Nation State. Pari passu, most of the time, international development agencies and banks based on the right to housing have dictated the mass housing production policies opposing to ideas related to the social production of housing and city. In other words, in the name of ensuring a broad right, private market and public interests together built up a huge global housing market in which principles related to legal security of tenure; accessibility; cultural adequacy; availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure do not have a place.

During the long participatory elaboration process of the official Brazilian report for Habitat III, the agreements and understanding between multiple social actors, the acknowledgement of the interests and positions of other countries also involved in this process, besides multilateral organizations, corporations and NGOs
(representing grass-roots movements in the international sphere), brought to light part of the current international power structure and its interests concerning the cities. Powers and interests related to urbanization, to human rights, as well as to the provision of urban services, to the lifestyle and its technologies, products with global presence, fashion, culture etc.

The international geography of cities can thus be revealed from the analysis of urban space production, based on the forms and shapes it acquires, on the processes it sets in motion, all of which composing with a global structure of unequal and combined development, as becomes clear in all chapters of this book. In the place this global structure shows itself in the social spatial segregation, in a geography that is perverse in many aspects, with emphasis on peripheral countries. A geography that reveals a somber future for cities if the foundations of the world’s urbanization model are not reviewed.

As it is evidenced in each of the 15 chapters written by several different authors invited to be a part of this project, it is not only about discussing a spatial configuration of transnational, national and regional networks of cities. Above all, we are analyzing the construction of a space of power, of a capital reproduction market which articulates itself intensely in the negotiations between nations and corporations, from different perspectives, from diverse social and spatial formations and places. What are the interests involved in the perpetuation of urbanizing standards? What are the actions and initiatives that point towards a new future? How do these social actors articulate themselves?

The geopolitical scenario that involves the urbanization processes is at one and the same time both innovative and conservative. Innovation is due in large part to the city’s processes of social participation and production that multiply across the world and increase in scale and importance within the power networks. Examples and analyses of this process that takes place on a global scale are present in several chapters of this book. This movement brings new social actors and different mechanisms of valorization of relative positions and of construction of trends and agreements to the realm of diplomacy and of international agreements.

But the geopolitical scenario is also innately conservative. Traditional mechanisms of official diplomacy structure agreements according to the dominant logic of the Nation States and to corporative interests linked to urban land as a commodity and to the transnational trade of urban services and technologies. Urban development financing mechanisms established by a global order in effect over the last forty years, since Habitat I, base themselves on the precise identification of urban problems, on the definition of principles and even rights that enabled this scenario to be overcome, but do not implement structural solutions as they do not break from modes and models of an exclusively capitalist city, the city as a commodity.
Billions of people around the world suffer with the lack of access to basic services and rights in the city, and this contingent has only relative and absolute grown in the last couple decades. The city’s financing and production mechanisms dragged by international agencies, linked to Nation States, and assimilated in the places, were not able to transform this reality. The failure of these policies lies at the core of the emergence of new tensions and power relations around the world. Possibly a new diplomacy, with new social actors and the revision of the geopolitics of the cities, can trigger new urbanization modes and environment use and preservation patterns.

As it was revealed to us throughout this book, the forms of dealing with the intense global urbanization process developed to date, beyond solving the problems that were raised have actually achieved remarkable success in perpetuating the challenges. The new problems of the present are simply the result of old challenges that were not overcome. Access to basic urban services, adequate housing, respect and valorization of human rights in the cities, dealing with migration as a complex social fact, are all problems that were identified a long time ago, which historically have justified countless revisions of international and national policies and agreements. However, the relived history is the necessary farce for the perpetuation of structured spheres of power. Just as more food is produced than what is actually necessary to feed the entire world population, there are also outstanding financial and technical resources to face the challenges related to the provision of access to the basic conditions of urbanity.

New problems also arise in the cities. These problems result from the old challenges, or the deepening of the production modes that are increasingly unequal, and do not correspond to the natural resources that are effectively available according to a sustainable matrix. All of this may eventually lead to increased natural catastrophes, social uprisings and revolutions that are strengthened by the ubiquity of communication and information technology.

Bringing the geopolitics of the cities to light also requires the understanding that certain new urban problems are intentionally produced as novelties or trends. Whether a result of technological advancements, or of transformations imposed upon the inhabitant’s lifestyle according to the interests of land expropriators and speculators, urgent needs are produced in the cities. This makes the quest for safety in everyday life seem like a consumer’s market for personal products.

Areas of the city that were vacant for years, made unavailable for use or sale and withdrawn from the market, are given high priority in public policies. International funds offer new housing standards, making it seem essential for people to have a private outdoor dining area to find happiness. Projects aimed at increasing accessibility, combating pollution, and urban revitalization and restructuring are
sold by the city’s marketing as a collective interest, as bringing significant gains for society as a whole in the competitive market of cities. Produced for specific purposes, these areas increase the extent of segregation and exclusions. The analysis of this global market reveals a powerful network of privileges that run against the essence of a democratic city.

In the same way, a panacea of technical artifacts sold worldwide promise to remedy problems related to traffic, to different types of pollution and to environmental risks that were previously ignored. Or, moreover, great masses of people are removed from their lifestyle to crowd together in blocks of concrete that spring up like mushrooms on the fringes where cities have expanded, making financial interests viable, creating new problems for which new companies and capitals will present their solutions, who knows, maybe a new highway, this one now, of course, tolled.

The city of the present is, first and foremost, a great market. Captured by the interests of the financial groups and its imaginable speed of exchange, the city sees its use assured predominantly as a service. Within this perspective, the debate over the right to the city, herein addressed in all chapters in very different ways, would only be of consequence if approached from the perspective of liberation, of the peoples’ autonomy, in a revolutionary condition in regard to current models, transformative of social and economic structures of production of urbaniy.

Nevertheless, there is hope in this process and the chapters presented here reveal analyses, mechanisms and even exemplary cases of what could be done to attain a city that is produced from its daily use, and that safeguards basic and human rights for all of its citizens. In the first part of this book, the present stage of city development is debated based on their long-standing challenges, and also focusing, in the first instance, on some of its new issues.

There is hope, for example, in the construction of a new social solidarity, or as addressed by Ladislau Dowbor in the first chapter – *Urban Policies and Participation: Reclaiming Democracy from below* – there is hope in the process of reclaiming the dignity of the excluded as a problem-solving mechanism for the problems of all citizens. To solve the problem of the poor means creating new social relations, a new utopia that draws nearer. Solving the problem of healthcare as a commodity, which buys the kidneys of poor young people in India so as to equip citizens of the first world, as exemplified, is to solve the problem of the healthcare system from the perspective of preventive healthcare. To solve the problem of the commoditization of urban land, which consigns thousands of people to poor, peripheral areas of the cities, is also to face the urbanization model that deepens crises and worsens environmental disasters that strike rich and poor alike. If the global and national erosion of governance results in reinforcement of social inequality
and in environmental destruction to the avail of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small minority, Dowbor also reveals his hope in the possibility of reclaiming a global governance wherein each place will have a fundamental role in the presentation of solutions, especially from the use of technology as a connectivity vector. According to the author, local management is in full development, moving in the opposite direction of globalization, and there are multiple examples of Internet-based productive local community organizations and their connections with foreign markets. In the same way, there are numerous examples of communities that have been multiplying their bonds of solidarity, locally producing cultural assets that are shown on a global scale, thus providing tools for the transformation of the dominant entertainment industry, and reclaiming culture as a fundamental element of identity and development.

Due to a highly complex context in which the Nation State no longer has any answers, traversed by the great corporations or involved in macro-level problems on a global financial scale, comparing the urban crises with the opportunities for transformation which arise is the theme addressed by Marcio Pochmann in the second chapter of this book, *Broken Promises: Introductory Notes*. The present crisis of capitalism and the analysis of its dynamic nucleus formed by no more than 300 interconnected subnational subspaces is counterposed to new exercises of national and local power that also connect themselves to face issues like work relations, environmental issues etc. in daily life, implementing social policies that generate friction and relativize the autonomy of this global order. Analyzing urban problems in the face of the crisis poses two risks, both of which the author underscores. Short-term, fragmented analyses and solutions are produced, guided by the unequal and combined capitalist model, and which ultimately serve to intensify the center-periphery dependency relation. Pochmann points out the hierarchical relations between the Nation States, the distinct models of transition from rural to urban society and its inheritances, the emergence of the neoliberal rationality, in addition to demographic and educational transitions and those related to the world of work in the urban context. Hence he debates the consequences that ensued from the unfulfilled promises, made forty years ago, of a superior society to be constructed, and which presently resurface as a retrograde entrenchment of social polarization.

The *Advances and setbacks in urban issues on route to Habitat III* are presented by João Sette Whitaker Ferreira in the third chapter of this book. In this chapter, Whitaker aims to reveal not only such advances, often related to social policies conducted by global agreements and agencies, but also to shed light on the state of stagnation of the democratization of the access to the city and its consequences. The chapter presents a number of reflections about important steps taken by recent urban policies in Brazil to show that the concurrent setbacks that have been experienced are a result of global urban logic; fundamentally segregating and excluding.
The perversity of the paradigm of the global city, the competitiveness between cities, the city as a commodity and the other models envisaged above all in relation to the least developed countries, are revealed here as fallacies. The analysis of previous Habitat conferences is performed with the objective of uncovering the organization of a geopolitical scenario of corporative interests. Once more, all hopes are turned to the exercise of citizenship and of local power and its relative advances, which can no longer be approached from the perspective of best practices, a logic that was applied in Habitat II. These advances must be approached as the production of local solutions on a global scale, from the democratization of the access to the decision-making arenas, as called for in Habitat III by social movements and city representatives.

In this sense, the key question posed by Nabil Bonduki, and used as the title of the fourth chapter, urgently calls for answers: Is a New Urban Development Agenda Possible? A Brazilian Perspective. The inequitable and perverse logic of the development process is approached from the uncertainties surrounding the civilizing process that took place in the second decade of the 21st century, and which conversely began in light of great utopian promises presented, for example, in World Social Forums. Economic crises and the deepening of inequalities are relativized by the hopes raised by recent social movements like Ocupe, Podemos, Cidadanos, Siriza and M5S. However, the inherent contradictions of these processes do not escape a close analysis, being their most visible aspect, deep, rising nationalist and anti-immigrant feelings. Policies of segregationist and xenophobic character draw nearer and will probably generate new social conflicts. Issues that seemed to have been overcome resurfaced with even greater weight in a world of hyperconnectivity. The impasses of urban Brazilian policies in recent years, marked by high social investments, reveal that if even with recent advances cities are still doing so badly it means that the urban development model has not been structurally transformed. This assertion derives from the analysis of the Habitat conferences and from the preparation for Habitat III based on the singularity of the Brazilian case, which, nonetheless, given some of its characteristics and the country’s relative leadership role in the urban geopolitical scenario, can shed light on conclusions about processes that have taken place in other countries, above all in Latin America. Despite the advances, the Brazilian trajectory also serves as an alert in the sense of globally rethinking the urban reform agenda. The intensification of local protagonism in definitions of global character is once more indicated as a course of action in the search for a new city.

Concluding the first part of this book, Ricardo Jordan and Felipe Livert deal with the An Old Challenge and a New Problem: Infrastructure Planning in Latin America. Stemming from the critical thought produced at the Cepal, the authors point to political and institutional factors responsible for the failure to overcome
urban problems in the specific Latin American context. The incipient understanding of the importance of territorial policies, as well as partnerships with the private sector that ensure profits before establishing public priorities, are factors that are analyzed. That is, the actual logic that ensures the maximization and accumulation of capital in cities in detriment of collective interest is analyzed here according to concrete criteria of evaluating specific public policies. Analysis of private investments, according to each sector and the mechanisms used, reveal the extent to which Latin American countries work according to the rationalizing logic of corporate interests. In particular, gaps in the infrastructure of selected metropolises in Latin America are analyzed, revealing the sensitive standards that need to be faced in formulating a new urban agenda, especially the review of the belief that only investment in urban infrastructure is enough to overcome its shortcomings. Once again, the role of local governance and participatory planning are shown as mechanisms that can be used to challenge the private interests that sustain the current model of urbanization.

The second part of this book, specifically dedicated to the theme of the geopolitics of cities, local governance and social participation, begins with a chapter by Renato Balbim which deals with *City Diplomacy: Global Agendas, Local Agreements*. Starting from the ascertainment of the model of urban development implemented in the last century, we are informed about the new forms of diplomacy that now articulate cities and local authorities in the debate and in the construction of global agendas, which are invariably transfigured into necessary local agreements. The role of international organizations, corporations and the Nation States is emphasized in the organization of the urbanization model to be implemented in cities, revealing the relative incapacity of rupturing with the unequal and combined logic of the capital accumulation, which has historically rationalized this process. The city as a global commodity is set against the understanding and the relative advances present in the debate with regards to the right to the city. The previous Habitat conferences and the role of the UN’s system of social conferences are questioned, sometimes revealing their corporate character. Lastly, an analysis is made of the preparation of countries for Habitat III. Special attention is given to the Brazilian participative process, revealing that the effectuation of the right to the city, beyond its rhetorical use, essentially covers the radicalization of democracy and the strengthening of the role of local powers in the global negotiation spheres. In other words, the revision of the urban geopolitical scenario, configuring a necessity for structuring not only a new diplomacy, but the bases for a new global order that allows the effective inclusion of new billions of inhabitants of precarious informal settlements, which the world will get to know in the coming decades.

In the chapter that follows – *Corporate City, International Actions and the Right to the City: Challenges Posed for Habitat III* – Ana Fernandes and Gloria Cecilia
Figueiredo conduct a systematic and rigorous mapping study of the hegemonic processes of production of the corporate city. This concept is borrowed from Milton Santos and reveals the limits placed for the new urban agenda, which does not break away from the existing model of relations between states and corporations. Just as international institutions should provide effective structural solutions, new forms of management are notorious for their role in perpetuating the prevailing logic of accumulation of the present historical period. Given the predominance of the language of urban business, the role of the United Nations in the construction of multidimensional agendas can be questioned, which in turn reveals the hierarchical nature of geopolitics with the protagonism of national governments and its asymmetric elements, as well as specific economic groups with multidimensional action power. International agreements and norms constructed as fables should consider the interests, limits and constraints of the UN system so that they can effectively bring about transformative processes throughout a long period of development. This chapter also analyses the problems and inconsistencies present in the new urban agenda that is currently being elaborated, revealing the underlying risks of that which could initially be understood as advances in the process, but which can bring about situations similar to that which was unfolded after Habitat II, with the transmutation of the right to housing into an intensification of the logic of capital accumulation.

In the eighth chapter, Jeroen Klink dedicates his analysis to the comprehension of Urban trajectories: circulation of ideas and the construction of agendas in the Global South – Limits and potential of HABITAT III. The theme is fundamental for the comprehension of the geopolitical field of the cities in so far as the production of urban ideals, ideologies and practices coordinates the investment actions, the public policies and even the agendas of social struggles in the city. The author argues the need for transforming the paradigm of international circulation of ideas, with the aim of recognizing the limits of dependency and give value to the importance of interdependence in the production of knowledge and of urban solutions. This way, a reflection on urban reform in Brazil is presented, revealing that social conflicts do not overdetermine the socio-spatial contradictions of the cities, a relevant theme that is also explored in regards to South-South relations. The transformation in how ideas circulate is thus resumed as a basis for a critical analysis of the limits and potentialities of a new urban agenda and also of the adoption and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals – SDGs.

The following chapter, Chapter Nine, presents recent information about Hybrid Scales of Social Engagement: how technological integration can scale-up participatory processes? based on two experiences in different countries, Taiwan and Portugal. The theme is debated by Giovanni Allegretti, Audrey Tang and Michelangelo Secchi; all of whom reveal how technological development can
transform power relations in the city, reconfiguring politics and, by extension, diplomacy, and establishing new power relations within the debate of the global agendas. From the very beginning there has been a conscious effort to avoid that which the authors call “a local trap,” or the act of associating ideas and values such as democracy, poverty, rural, traditional etc. to the term “local.” The capacity for influencing global processes and intensifying the exercise of democracy is therefore conceptually and pragmatically analyzed, based on the use of collaborative platforms in participatory budgeting in Portugal and via the analysis of the civic hackers movement in Taipei. The civic hacking community connected a physical occupation in the city with a virtual network of people who brought pressure on the government and proposed new political mechanisms and revisions to the legal system. The basic notion of these two examples of the sharing of ideas as a way of ensuring effective social participation capable of transforming processes is in a way similar to the understanding presented in the previous chapter, on the interdependence of relations in the production of new discourses, visions and urban processes. The local scale is able to address your problems more adequately and insightfully because it knows and also experiences your priorities; the fact is that it is unable to envisage the particular operational logic of the global scale. However, hope can also be found here, stemming from the appropriation and use of the new information technologies, which at present are relatively accessible to all.

The tenth chapter, Contributions of the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals to a New Urban Agenda by Cleandro Krause and Luis Fernando Lara Resende, revisits two agendas of the UN. The first of which was successfully concluded with all targets met. The second of which is currently in its initial implementation phase and one of the basic frameworks for the elaboration of a new urban agenda, revealing not only its interactions, but above all, pointing out the management innovations that were introduced in both the Brazilian and international contexts and which are necessary for the implementation of global agendas in the 21st century. The technical cooperation between cities is indicated as one of these mechanisms, further supporting the arguments found throughout the book for the activation of effective city diplomacy, an instrument that could possibly rethink/revert the power structures which have been tightly bound to the present urban development model in the last few decades. The authors analyze and map the possible dialogues between the SDGs and a new urban agenda paying special attention to each of the targets of the eleventh goal, which deal specifically with the urban issue. It is concluded therefore, that amongst other points, the success in the implementation of these agendas passes through a revision of global governance associated with these themes, bringing into the UN, or in other words into the diplomacy of the Nation State, both local and regional governments as well as social movements.
The eleventh chapter addresses *International Agreements, Climate Change and Urban Challenges* and gives continuity to the topics explored in the previous chapter, in the sense of critically verifying how the system of conferences, agreements and agendas of the UN individually conforms the resultant of each process according to a general framework. This strong systemic organization is profoundly hierarchical, as underscored in the chapter written by Ana Fernandes and Gloria Figueiredo. The authors Gustavo Luedemann, Jose Antonio Marengo and Leticia Klug, in turn, were assigned the task of revealing, with a high level of discernment and clarity, the relationship between this agenda and the strategic role of the cities in their effectuation, both in regards to the reduction of emissions and to the need for adaptation to the new agreements that have already been established by the nations. This analysis was made based on documents that substantiate the decision-making process in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The third part of the book reveals the effort of four authors to deal with the theme of social inclusion, so fundamental to the transformation of the model of cities. Social participation and the right to the city are specific themes that consolidate the inclusion in the urban plan.

Lorena Zárate presents the twelfth chapter entitled *Right to the City and Habitat III: a shared agenda between civil society and local governments*. This is essential reading when it comes to the current arrangements in the international geopolitical scenario of the construction of a new urban agenda, from the specific and fundamental standpoint of social movements. The predecessors of the right to the city and of social justice are revisited in view of providing detailed insight into the field of international dispute resolution. In particular, the strategic principles of the right to the city are didactically examined: full exercise of human rights in the city; the social function of the city, of land and of property; democratic management of the city and territory; democratic production of the city and in the city; sustainable and responsible management of commons (natural and energy resources, as well as cultural patrimony and historic heritage) of the city and its surrounding areas; and finally, democratic and equitable enjoyment of the city. The author also presents the necessary challenges for ensuring the right to the city as a new field of international agreements.

In the thirteenth chapter, Francisco Comaru deals with an issue of great relevance for the international debate, viewed predominantly from the perspective of the construction of urban discourses, which has already been addressed. *Participatory and Democratic Brazilian cities? Reflections on the Eve of the Habitat III Conference*. The country which, in recent years, became internationally renowned for its arenas of popular participation, consultative and deliberative bodies for diverse policies etc., also reveals severe constraints to the real democratization of society and of cities. Here, the urban crisis is analyzed by focusing mainly on the participation
crisis, revealing the limits of these mechanisms, often acknowledged vis-à-vis the dominating order, which uses these processes to legitimize its actions according to directives and principles in global agreements and agendas. As substantiated in the author’s final conclusions, unfortunately the democratization of the city is not a right that can be taken for granted in our society, as it contradicts corporate interests, or because democracy itself contradicts the interests of individuals and corporations, ensured according to privileges. This chapter raises a “red alert” for the new forms of diplomacy that unfolds in the international geopolitical scenario.

Next, Nelson Saule addresses *The Right to the City as a Key Issue for the New global Urban Agenda*. The understanding of this fundamental role for the definition of a new agenda is justified both from a theoretical standpoint initially promoted by Henri Lefebvre, and from the practical actions by social movements and organizations around the world in the elaboration of normative documents concerning the theme since 1992. At least seven international Charters and Treaties are quoted in the construction of a central framework for the debate on the right to the city as a human right, a legal object, in its territorial extent, for the obligations that it engenders and as a previously existing right and fact. The final part of the chapter presents a pedagogical overview of the key issues for the introduction of the theme in the new urban agenda.

To conclude this book, Fernando Kleiman presents a series of analysis of *Livelihood and Social Inclusion: public policies as the result of social struggle – the experience of the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan.”* The aim is to understand and reveal the obstacles and difficulties in making public policies reach those who most need them. This important Brazilian experience affirms the extent to which an autonomous social policy can effectuate transformations of a structural character vis-à-vis the direct interests of the global market and the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Nation State. The building experience of this social policy is narrated from a thoroughly critical view, in detail, enabling the multiple interests to be envisaged according to their levels of action. The management of the program, as well as aspects pertaining to the transparency of the process and access to information, contribute to the improvement of public policies and introduce important elements to the debate on urban policies in particular, especially as it involves similar levels of complexity.

Among several other aspects addressed in the fifteen chapters that comprise this book, it can be perceived that the solution for the structural confrontation of urban problems does not lie in simply providing human, technical or even financial resources. Or rather, conversely, there is an excess of financial resources in tax havens, as well as technical and human resources having knowledge to respect the lifestyle, culture and identities to produce urban spaces adapted to each place and its people.
Above all, it is necessary to implement a new model of urban governance on a global, regional, national and local scale, all of which are based on the assimilation of new social actors and interests. This new arena could potentially transform the allocation of existing goods and resources, as well as create innovation and effectuate a structural transformation of urban problems, both old and new.

Evidently, a political decision-making process also needs to take place. In order for this to occur, it is again clear that the correlation of forces in the geopolitical field of the cities must be transformed. Communication and information are the paths for the effectuation of the much-needed (re)conciliation between politics and the polis.

Ultimately, to re-examine the role of the Nation State in the urban production and management, to decentralize resources, to intensify social participation and democratize the diplomatic sphere, are all measures with which the participating authors in this project agree and defend.

It is clear from this collective work that this set of actions must be implemented concurrently, propelled by new forms of political organization that can be highly conducive to the fulfillment of the pivotal role in governance by the various domains of the state, by unions and syndicates, by political parties, by social movements and NGOs, within the context of international protection of human rights, a position which, as a matter of principle, is evidently contrary to the maintenance of privileges that are flagrantly inscribed within the configuration of cities across the globe, and which unfortunately permeate our daily lives.
Part 1

Development and Cities: old challenges, new issues
1 GLOBAL DETERIORATION OF THE GOVERNING CAPACITY

The erosion of the governing capacity in the broad sense, the so-called governance, is increasingly more visible, not only in a few countries, the so-called failed states, but rather everywhere. Technologies have radically accelerated the process of globalization, while the fragile political dynamics continues essentially fragmented in 195 national governments.

Finance, in particular, is globalized, while the global instruments for its regulation are crawling. And finance is the sector that holds the straps of the resources bag, that is, it defines who takes possession of resources and for what purpose, impacting and deforming all the other sectors. The permanent worldwide instability expands the government’s own financial capacity in the countries, especially in the failed states.

The 28 major financial groups own assets of approximately 50 trillion US dollars, equivalent to the world’s entire public debts, generating a seizure of political power that is historically new in its dimensions. Today, 147 major groups control 40% of the corporate world, 75% of which are banks. The pyramidal system of financial control by taking shares or acquisitions leads to the formation of economic galaxies that operate in tens or hundreds of economic sectors, in a number of countries, imposing financial results to millions of companies.

Nearly all major groups make their financial flows pass at any given step through tax havens, resources that reappear with other names and destinations, eliminating the possibility of tracking and regulating them, generalizing tax evasion and opening the gates to the worldwide trade of drugs, weapons, adulterated medicines and alike.

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1. This article recovers and systematizes researches developed in several other works, and is the result of years of work in very different conditions in several countries, particularly seven years in Africa, of course besides the experiences in Brazil. Several of his studies were discussed in Habitat-II, in Istanbul.

2. Ladislau Dowbor is full professor of economy at PUC-SP, and consultant for several United National agencies, in addition to being the author of countless studies available at: <http://dowbor.org>. Contact: <ldowbor@gmail.com>. 
We face a new global economic architecture that has little to do with the market economy, and whose design is apparent today thanks to the important researches initiated after the 2008 crisis.

Planetary chaos is installed, making precarious any control attempt at the national level, because corporations can easily move their headquarters or part of their operations to other countries, undermining the taxation capacity and cheating national control.

More recently, legal mechanisms that enable corporate giants to sue States are in expansion. No matter how much the G-8, G-7, or G-20 and other ad-hoc meetings try to suggest some regulation, the fact is that democracies have become mostly impotent to face the planetary power systems. The results of global and national governance erosion are the deepening of two critical trends: inequality in the social sphere, and destruction in the environmental sphere. The combination of those two macro-trends is at the center of our challenges.

The mechanisms are simple: in the social sphere, those 99% at the base of society spend what they earn, while 1% invest in financial products; since the profitability of financial investments is higher than the production earnings, in practical terms, resources are transferred to those that produce the least.

The financial capitalism, which is now installed, blocks or deforms the productive system itself. The result is that 1% now have more accumulated wealth than 3.6 billion people, the poorest half of the planet. In social terms, this is socially and politically explosive. As long as the speculation of financial papers provides more gain than production, there is no recovery in sight.

The second macro-trend follows equally simple mechanisms: to draw water from the aquifers for a second harvest has a potentially bigger pay-off for a big agribusiness company, and modern technologies enable this. The result is the depletion of groundwater in regions as rich as California. In the Amazon, scorched earth and excessive use of chemicals both contaminate waters and sterilize the soil.

For a multinational corporation, if water or soil is depleted, it is just a matter of moving to another country, or going a little further into the Amazon. How is it possible to prevent big companies from continuing their activities based on fossil fuels, if they are cheaper, inherited from nature? The decades of the battle to prevent the announced global warming disaster, and the huge impotence in view of the paradoxical dynamics that binds us all together, and which reveal, in addition to the problem itself, the fragility of our governance instruments.

We just have to think about VW, which for years has developed fraudulent activities as business strategies, or about the irresponsibility of Vale and of Billiton regarding the outsourced company Samarco, or about HSBC and other financial
groups frauds, let alone the so-called *Big Pharma* – all of them now paying billions of US dollars due to convictions – of illegal, and often criminal, activities, to realize that the issue of the decision-making process in big corporations has become crucial. Even more serious is the fact that they are convicted to pay fines, with no need of acknowledging their guilt, within the framework of the so-called settlements, by which nobody is actually punished. For the corporation, it is enough to ensure that the profit obtained from frauds is bigger than the fines.

When deformations are generalized, it is not about being evil or individually ignorant, but rather a systemic deformation. A deep divorce was created between those who know their technical and productive field at the base, and the shareholder or other financial investor that only follows the results in terms of the profitability of the papers. Between 1970 and 2010, we destroyed 52% of the vertebrate life on the planet, according to the WWF report. The framing power of technologies and the erosion of the ambiguous virtues of the so-called accountability can ultimately lead to disaster.

These two macro-trends, inequality and environmental destruction, summarize the problem: we are destroying the planet in benefit of a minority. Our central challenge, in terms of strategy, is therefore to reorient the financial, technological and organizational resources in order to ensure the survival and productive inclusion of billions of people deprived of decent life conditions, and to promote the change of productive paradigms aiming to reduce the pace of the destruction of the planet.

In other terms, this is about creating a decision-making process that allows our production factors – financial resources, technologies and organizational capabilities – to be actually used to solve our problems, not to aggravate them.

Our problem is thus not the lack of resources, but rather their rational allocation. The planet produces something around 80 trillion US dollars of goods and services every year, which means nearly 4 thousand US dollars per month per a 4-person family. However, the inventory of resources in tax havens amounts to approximately 21 to 32 trillion US dollars, which means one third of the planet’s GDP.

The huge worldwide debate that led to the Paris conference about the climate has struggled to create a commitment of finding 100 billion US dollar per year up to 2020. Large public indebtedness schemes make taxes paid by workers feed financial brokers, in detriment of public policies for health, education, security, or even the financing of infrastructure. What is at stake is not the generation of new resources, but rather the productive use of the existing ones.

This is the dilemma. We have financial resources, we have detailed statistics about our problems, we know the solutions, we master the corresponding technologies, we all want to evolve to a more decent society, to say it in a simple way, but we find ourselves paralyzed, somehow, due to a generalized institutional impotence.
Why am I presenting the global dilemmas to address local governance? Because if the manifestations of problems are global, this does not mean that the solutions are also global. Local policies might not be enough, and we will necessarily have to evolve to some sort of planetary governance recovery. But the anchor of the process, the public space that becomes the sociopolitical arena where people can organize themselves so that their immediate territory ensures a good quality of life for all, with clean and not contaminated rivers, organic and not poisoned horticultural produce, social balance so that no child whatsoever is deprived of school, food or a pair of shoes, preventive and curative health systematically articulated, respect of public leisure spaces with a profusion of parks, squares and urban aesthetics, safe homes and streets, in short, a decent life – all of these can mostly be ensured through local policies and actions.

And there is more: when adopting proper policy management instruments, local powers can become a more organized social fabric at the base of society, positively affecting the entire power pyramid. The democratization of local, everyday spaces that are part of the concrete dimensions of citizen’s life is essential for the existence of democracy in other levels.

It is from this viewpoint, in line with the recovery of social governance based on the cities, where the majority of the planet’s population lives today, and 85% of the Brazilian people live, that we address new emerging potentials for local power.

2 A UNDERUTILIZED POTENTIAL

Big or small, coastal or touristic, rural or industrial, the municipalities, local powers of a country, the political units that form its everyday territory, comprise the blocks with which a nation is built. If the blocks that comprise the construction are not solid, there will not be a balanced development, in the same way as there will not be a thriving industry if companies are not managed competently.

Ultimately, each municipality, each city with its rural surrounding, has to take the task of coherently and evenly managing its resources, and to ensure the major goal that is a good standard of living for all.

Over the past few years, we have seen overwhelming progresses in Brazil. Approximately 40 million people were drawn from extreme poverty. The Brazilian has gain 10 years of life expectancy. Formal employment has radically expanded. The study “Atlas Brasil 2013” showed that while in 1991 85% of the municipalities were in the “very low” HDI group, in 2010 only 0.6 % of the municipalities were still in this catastrophic situation. The deforestation of the Amazon, from 28,000 km$^2$ in 2002 was reduced to approximately 4,000 in 2014. The percentage of young people graduating from high school increased from 13% of the total in 1991 to 41% in 2010. All these indicators have in common the fact that...
they show undisputable advances, but also point to the long way we have ahead. Having divided by seven the area that is deforested annually in the Amazon is a huge accomplishment, but those 4,000 we keep deforesting is still a disaster. The directions are correct, but there is a long way ahead.

The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 created the legal and institutional bases for a higher participation of local powers in the management of the country’s resources. It also provided for the development of means of direct participation, side-by-side with the system of formal representation. This axis of management rationalization, which are the decentralized policies at the territory level, opens a vast set of opportunities.

However, when, in 2013, millions of Brazilians went to the streets to demand better health, education and urban mobility services and other basic rights, it became clear that there was a huge gap between the people’s needs and the current decision-making process. When so many people try to manifest their dissatisfaction in the streets, it is evident that the transmission belts that decentralization and direct participation should guarantee are not working. In this regard, a leap of quality must be carried out in this field. The halt of the progressive policies that has been seen in Latin America especially since 2014 is due to their own success, which provoked a political reaction of the oligarchies. These oligarchies are today articulated to global financial interests, who felt threatened. But the solution is in deepening democracy, not in restraining it.

3 BRINGING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS CLOSER TO THE BASES OF SOCIETY

Institutional rationalization is part of a comprehensive process, surpassing the simplifications of privatization. Improving the governance of the country through the reorganization of the development of the institutional context is an absolutely vital axis of action.

The key problem is not the lack of resources, but rather the decision-making process prior to their use. It is not only about organization charts, it is about the logic of the process, the administrative culture inherited by each nation. The dimension that is in focus here is the importance of decentralization, transparency and participation, which are essential elements to make all the efforts converge towards a general sense of citizenship.

In Brazil, there have been no changes to the classic division of powers, structured around the executive, the legislative and the judiciary branches. However, there is undoubtedly a different understanding about the way civil society is organized to ensure the political support to all.
We are used to seeing the functioning of the State based on the partisan organization. This political-partisan axis of society’s organization around its interests in general transmits, and it is necessary to say that, the positions of the major economic groups, and in particular of the global financial system. The political-partisan expression of the people’s aspirations is not enough.

The development of labor unions, ambit of negotiation of the access to the social product, has strengthened another axis of organization, the union-labor axis, based on the organization space represented by the company, and centered on the fairer redistribution of the social product. When we analyze characteristically social-democratic countries, we observe that they know how to develop this second axis, creating more participatory systems.

In practical terms, there is no doubt that the fact that farmers, metallurgical and bank workers, and other segments are soundly organized, allows society to democratize itself, and the summit negotiations that characterize the political parties find a democratic counterweight in the several organized professional interests.

The organization of professional interests was undisputedly facilitated by the fact that workers started to work together in the corporate space, recognizing each other and observing what they had in common, and not surprisingly large companies have in general more sound professional organizations.

We can extend the same reasoning to the impacts of the modern urbanization process. We have to remember that the history of mankind is essentially rural, that the formation of big corporate companies dates back to a little over one century, and that generalized urbanization is even more recent.

The idea that we want to bring here is that when a society is no longer a discontinuous fabric of scattered rural workers, and becomes a complex pyramid of villages and cities, new manners of organizations are naturally adopted not around the universe of jobs, but around “local spaces”, the living place, what John Friedmann called life space.

The political impact of the formation of this third axis of society’s organization around its interests, the community axis, marks the evolution from a society ruled by “representatives” to a system in which the direct participation of citizen acquires a much more important weight, simply because of proximity and interaction effects: a contaminated river disturbs the lives of everybody. In different ways and to varying degrees, obviously, and this inevitably creates tensions, but in a scale that engenders ownership and leads to the negotiated resolution of the issue in question.

The Swedish citizen today takes part in four community organizations on average. They take part in their school, neighborhood management, in the decisions of their municipality, of cultural groups, etc. The decentralization
of public resources is thus a process articulated with an evolution of the State functioning: when 72% of the government’s financial resources are used based on decisions made at the local power level, people effectively participate, because they are not going to a political meeting to clap to a candidate, but rather to decide where the school will be built, which types of health centers will be created, how the city land will be used, and so forth. An authentic political appropriation is generated.

This is naturally not about reducing society to the “local space”, in the poetical line of a generalized “small is beautiful”. It is actually about understanding the evolution of political organization manners that provide the support to the State: the modernity requires, in addition to political parties, labor unions organized around their interests. And also organized communities to manage the daily routine of where people live.

This “three-legged stool” strategy approach for the management of public interests, which can be characterized as a “participatory democracy” mechanism, is undisputedly steadier than the precarious balance centered solely on political parties.

In other words, we are watching a broad process of displacement of public administration spaces, and we should rethink in general terms the hierarchy of decisions that affect the development.

This has created the principle of subsidiarity, an obscure term, but nonetheless intended to highlight a basic axis of development management: when there are doubts, and whenever possible, decisions should be made as close as possible to those who will bear their impacts. And the more centralized, and more distant from the citizens and their everyday life, the greater the possibility of their appropriation by corporations and interests disconnected from social and environmental commitments.

4 LATE URBANIZATION: A STATE OF THE 20TH CENTURY IN A 21ST CENTURY WORLD

It is important to consider that, like other Latin America countries, Brazil underwent late urbanization. Moreover, urbanization in this case was not spurred by new job opportunities in the cities, as occurred in most developed countries, but predominantly due to displacement of people from the countryside.

The Brazilian rural world was pervaded by a modernizing current that implemented widespread monoculture and mechanization processes and drastically reduced employment opportunities. At the same time, the country was also swept by another deeply conservative current that transformed agricultural land into a store of value, whereby property owners neither use their land nor let them be used.
With no work prospects in the countryside, or at the most, seasonal or temporary (low-paying) jobs offered by monoculture plantations, and without any other access to land, people were literally expelled from rural areas. The flight to the cities gave rise to impoverished settlements on peripheral areas of cities, with neighborhoods often having growth rates of over 10% per year.

At present, this process has been exacerbated by the incorporation of new technologies and its impact on the industry and on urban services, which are forced to reduce the overall size of the labor force, making a large part of the Brazilian population turn to informality, working as housekeepers, janitors, watchmen or in private patrol or security guard services, and in other activities where it is increasingly difficult to understand who is actually taking care or looking after who. Despite the huge social advances in the past few years, the informal sector still represents nearly 40% of employment occupations in Brazilian cities.

This situation brings about a surge of local problems affecting the population across the nation relating to housing, health, mobility, pollution, lack of adequate education or sufficient schools, organization of urban services like sanitation and water supply systems, in addition to special programs to reduce extreme poverty, and so forth.

Therefore, municipalities now face an explosive situation requiring immediate attention and major interventions, which extrapolate the daily routines of cosmetic improvements and provision of services and amenities in upper-class neighborhoods. This relates to comprehensive infrastructure projects, social policies and employment programs, in addition to local strategies to dynamize economic activities, and it is essential that the local population is able to determine what their priorities are, once these circumstances affect them directly.

Municipal governments are on the frontline of problems, but are also the lowest level of public administration. The generalized displacement of problems to the local sphere, while political-administrative structures remain centralized, has created a type of institutional impotence that dramatically hinders any modernization of the local management, while benefiting the traditional domination of local chiefs articulated with physiological relations in the upper levels.

In Sweden, as we saw, the State manages two thirds of the social product. However, the work by Agne Gustafsson about “Local Government in Sweden” shows that the government manages very little at the central level. The country has 9 million inhabitants, of which nearly 4.5 million are active, and of these, 1.2 million are public servants of municipalities and counties. That is, approximately one worker in each four is a local public servant. The practical result is that the central government of Sweden is satisfied with 28% of the country’s public resources, while the local management structures, which allow the more direct participation
of the citizen, control about 72%. This figure is compared to 5% in Costa Rica, 4% in Panamá, and probably 13% in Brazil.

When countries were formed by one capital and a few number of cities, but surrounded by a disperse mass of peasants, it was natural that all the significant decisions, especially those regarding financial allocation, were made at the central government level. With the urbanization process, problems were displaced, but not the corresponding decision-making system. Thus, what we have today is a set of modern problems, and government machines characterizing the institutional needs of past times.

5 RESISTANCES TO CHANGE

Looking at countless innovations that are occurring in the local space make us have a strange feeling that processes are changing rapidly, but within an extremely viscous cultural, political and institutional general reference framework. An image that has been used to illustrate attempts of university reformation suggests that we see this reality as a soccer game played by elephants. There is movement, rules, goals, even energy, but the result is not exactly agile.

An important aspect, though, is to observe enormous inertia that permeates society. We visited an extremely promising and well-designed experience of employment creation in the interior of the Northeastern state of Pernambuco, by means of family agriculture in small farms irrigated with waters from the São Francisco River. The small farmers harvest more than 20 ton of excellent grape per hectare, and granted right of occupancy. As they use intensive agriculture and have no savings, they require support to gain access to credit in case they suffer any setbacks. At this point, the traditional local oligarchy comes into play, interfering with credit granting, forcing the small farmer into bankruptcy, and buying the precious land for peanuts for the infrastructure and water lines that are already in place. At a second moment in time, the small farmer once again practicing meager subsistence agriculture in the Caatinga (Brazilian savannah), is invited to make progress again with guaranteed profit, but now cultivating marihuana. Thus the traditional narrative of truculence swallows up and absorbs modernity.

The moral of the story is not complex. There are limits to the progress that can be achieved by social organization when the political structures are kept under the control of a system that is sufficiently strong to invert the political orientation of any action. It is not a only a prerogative of wealthy fossilized patriarchs known as coronéis, or colonels. In São Paulo, Lúcia Bógus has studied the improvements achieved in housing units of a popular neighborhood, in the region of the city called Jabaquara: the original intention was undoubtedly to improve the life conditions of the low-income community. But the result was actually the valorization
of houses and property in the area, now under the control of real estate specula-
tors, and the expulsion of the poor who were forced to live in worse conditions in
distant neighborhoods. These gentrification processes reveal that segregation and
inequality are still powerful vectors of the socioeconomic organizational structure.

Another a classical example is the report that examines an experience of
do-it-yourself popular housing construction in the state of Paraná, in southern
Brazil, an initiative of the local residents organized by a well-intentioned priest.
Images of nice little brick houses and happy residents were replaced by the news
that the state architects association, outraged at the construction of houses without
their approval, and above all without using their contractors, imposed penalties
and fines on the residents that are higher than the actual value of their houses. It
is necessary to enter and follow the system simply to erect four brick walls, even
when this is ludicrous from a technical point of view, and proves overtly expensive
in economic terms.

The crucial point here, and which underscores the value of several examples
of actual success found in the cities, is that organizing any action with the initiative
of the stakeholders themselves means confronting powerful resistances. In other
words, when a popular group or association manages to join efforts to achieve a
common goal, this is a remarkable victory that ultimately signifies a political and
cultural awakening. In this regard, the decentralization in its deepest sense of local
people taking fate into their own hands entails not only decentralizing policies
and resources, but also creating a new political culture.

6 PARTICIPATION AS A RIGHT
The key concept that emerges when we talk about organized society taking owner-
ship of processes is evidently that of social capital. And not only because Robert
Putnam is now fashionable. After decades awarding financial speculation experts,
the Nobel Prize committee has finally realized that the economy has to do not
only with making profits but with human beings, and finally awarded Amartya
Sen a prize for her efforts. The most prevalent concept in Development as Freedom
is that of trust, a notion that is equally central to Putnam’s most recent book, titled
Bowling Alone. The Reports on Human Development bring us a new vision whereby
the real function of economic processes are duly returned being a mere support
for providing that which is most essential: quality of life and the restoration of
individual rights. Are we actually building something that historically makes sense
when we choose to deal (only?) with small matters.

A degree of moderation is required here. It is natural that we look for the hopes
of a great utopia in any embryo of social renewal. When we listen to Paul Singer
talking about self-managed companies, the dimension of hope is overwhelming
in comparison to the relatively modest size of what actually happens. Others talk about municipal experiences, and probably generate the same feeling of shock and hope. Also, others will even see the bright horizon of the social future in civil society organizations.

I think none of us is as naive any longer. But is a worthwhile image, as is the enormous power of citizenship, which ultimately has the potential to revive idealism in this ocean of cynicism that ravages the planet. Today, I have no doubt that most of the strength that encouraged Paulo Freire (besides Elza, of course) stemmed from the fact that he experienced the powerful feeling of seeing an illiterate person discovering that they create and produce culture, communicating and repeating this as someone who discovers that the earth rotates. This repossession of the universe by someone who had previously been excluded is as mind-bending as an earthquake, in cultural terms. Therefore, moderation is welcome, but also a great disposition to return to citizens the space that always belonged to them in the first place.

This naturally takes us beyond practical results in terms of children mortality and the local GDP growth rate. By redeeming citizenship, and from discovering joint action, trust can be reinstated, together with the slow, incremental construction of social solidarity. The strength of this does not only arise from restoring dignity to the excluded, but also from the fact that the loss of citizenship affects all of us, and that the process does not only consist of solving the problems that derive from poverty, but of creating new social relations.

The pleasure and enthusiasm that we encounter in the most varied social echelons and realms linked to this type of experience are undoubtedly minor manifestations. However, as diffuse as this this can be, the feeling of retrieving our place in the sun, or under the shadow of a mango tree, as wrote Paulo Freire, is mighty powerful.

7 THE VECTOR OF IDENTIFICATION OF LOCAL SYNERGIES

This understanding is important to appraise and evaluate every experience. The volume of physical results is not always essential, in view of such major cultural change produced by recovering a sense of initiative within a previously passive community. In a meeting with militaries at Unicamp (State University of Campinas – SP), amidst a discussion about new directions, I addressed the topic of participatory budgeting and the process that currently takes place in Porto Alegre. I was interrupted by a general who said he lived in Porto Alegre, and that the participatory budgeting process there has absolutely no importance, seeing it involves only a small percentage of the whole municipal budget.
One has to have taken part in participatory budget meetings and seen the eyes of poor citizens alight with astonishment in realizing that the money being discussed is actually his own, that this is a public thing, and that not everything that is related to the public sphere is touched by deception and cynicism. In his brilliant doctoral thesis, Pedro Pontual shows the huge educational impact, in the broader sense of citizenship redemption, of the experiences of participatory budgeting. The truth is, generals rarely take part of participatory budgeting meetings, let alone read critical works like Pedro Pontual’s.

This point is crucial, because although it is very important to evaluate programs by their practical effects, for example, the supply of safe drinking water or the reduction of informality, we must always evaluate this other side, represented by the construction of citizenship and social capital. When a contract to build popular housing is awarded to a contractor, though houses will be delivered, a huge opportunity to create social capital is lost. When cisterns are built with the participation of communities in the Brazilian Northeast, with the massive participation of the ASA (Brazilian Semiarid Articulation), a lot more than water reservoirs are actually being constructed.

There is little doubt that our vision is essentially oriented towards the poor who experience dramatic, life-threatening situations on a daily basis and must be prioritized. However, it is surprising how the search achieving better solutions with multiplying effects often demands that we shift our focuses. I took part in an interesting meeting with car dealers in Santo André, a metropolitan region of Greater São Paulo. Just like the “popular” participants of that first participatory budgeting meeting, their eyes budge when the secretary of the local government entered the room. The proposal was pretty simple: the purchase of a car is essentially a family affair, which involves comparison between several brands and options. In this sense, administrators commonly say that the best place for a car dealer to be is right next to their competitors. The local government suggested taking advantage of the proximity of several car dealer shops in that neighborhood to close the street to cars and a space for children and leisure, and create a dedicated event where a purchasing policy could be offered to the public, and so forth. A different balance between car and pedestrian spaces, with shared advantages.

It is curious that in the beginning the car dealers could only think of holes in the asphalt, street curbs, issues related to the local government. But then the understanding that a much more ambitious rationale for the urban space could be achieved began to emerge, making the region socially more attractive and also more commercially productive. The various segments of urban society can start to think of solutions together and exploit opportunities for synergies. The interests of the public and the private sectors are not necessarily contradictory, especially if they can be mediated by the strong presence of organized civil society.
8 THE COMPLEXITY OF LOCAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES

This is an important topic because it touches on conventional social simplifications. In our minds, the notion of the theoretical see-saw survives: private or state, market or planning, social or individual, and so forth, inherited from the major dichotomies that prevailed in the 21st century. At present, there are many well-known experiences, such as Emilia Romagna in Italy, Barcelona in Spain, Jacksonville in the United States, as well as countless Brazilian municipalities that have introduced participatory budgeting and other more democratic management mechanisms.

Regardless of isolated experiences or projects, the huge complexity and diversity of articulated solutions is what stands out the most. Companies, the State and civil society organizations are articulated; central planning systems with market mechanisms that encourage community participation in decision-making; differentiated sociability spaces. What we are learning from effective proposals that bring good results, and also from others that do not work well, is that lying ahead of us is the entire complexity of modern society.

Articulating differentiated dynamics, which follow disparate cultures and have distinct paces, pushes us to carry out increasingly complex exercises, but above all, to have much greater respect for social dynamics, as they actually occur in society. It is undoubtedly more difficult to midwife a middle ground wherein differentiated interests can be articulated, than to outline broad theoretical avenues about what the ideal solution would be.

The new sociability being constructed today comprises the entire complexity that we find, for instance, with the new weight of connectivity and the Internet, the huge impact of urbanization, the drama of huge urban outskirts, the displacement of traditional productive axes and of professional articulations, and so forth. In a way, when observing how differentiated the political architectures of support to successful experiences can be, we understand that the courses of action need to be reinvented every time. And every new experience deepens our understanding of how forces are articulated within each transformation processes. We increasingly realize that social management has less to do with knowing how to give orders, or pushing our models, than to know how to hear and to interact.

It is not only because they are politically and economically excluded that the poor are amazed by dialogue spaces. It is because the political concept of a type of management that listens to and articulates diversified interests is novel to political culture as a whole. The win-win concept, as in the works of Hazel Henderson, is not actually part of the general culture. And in this sense, this misunderstanding is common to both the poor and affluent business people.
The issue being posited here, therefore, is that we will hardly build a political culture change if we seek to introduce it only into the poorest segments of the society. What is being built is a social articulation in the broader sense, and the modernization of the vision of privileged segments can have intense multiplying effects in terms of political culture, particularly when those segments are often the most politically backwards. There is no space here for magical formulas and simplifying arguments. It is the realm of the common sense, supported by a deep knowledge of the local reality.

9 A NEW MIX OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES

We are experiencing a profound displacement of productive processes. Firstly, it is pretty obvious that while agriculture has lost space, or centrality, in economic dynamics, followed by decades of delay from the relative loss of space suffered by the industry, social sectors appear to be moving in the opposite direction are quickly expanding.

Education now represents a gigantic issue that encompasses more than a quarter of the Brazilian population, including students, teachers and administrators. The main economic sector of the United States is not the military or automotive industry, but health, which currently accounts for nearly 20% of the country’s GDP. The entire industrial sector of the USA employs less than 10% of the labor force, and half of those industrial employees are in bureaucratic positions.

If we add to this, in the American case, health, education, security, and the new giant represented by the culture and entertainment industry, we have around 40% of the American GDP. It is undoubtedly a major emerging sector. Amartya Sen recently showed her indignation with that fact that there are still people today who believe that the money invested in the social sector can be regarded as an expense, while in the industry it can be considered as an investment. In the social field, it is thought of as an investment in people, an economic activity with great return in terms of systemic productivity.

It helps a lot to try to undo the confusion that prevails about the general concept of “services”. As a whole, it is a residual concept, which throws into the basket of “others” any activity that does not deal with land (primary) or machinery (secondary). We thus have a gigantic universe of “others” (tertiary or services, according to preferences) that represent, by an order of magnitude, 70% of the modern activities. Analyzing our reality when the “others” represent such a magnitude cannot be taken seriously, and Manuel Castells is rightly outraged with this concept.

In reality, agriculture has not lost so much importance: it is the modern farm that uses artificial insemination services, transportation services, soil analysis services, silage services, and so forth. Theoretically speaking, there is widespread
confusion about the technological sophistication of agriculture, which now encompasses a larger composition of knowledge-intensive activities, as a new sector. The same activities performed with more advanced technologies are not actually a new sector. Rather, they represent a higher technological level of the same sector.

In attempting to “give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s”, we see that most of what we currently call services are simply more advanced procedures within agriculture and industry. It is important to remind ourselves that the actual productive activities continue to have a major dimension in the economy in general. But we also begin to envisage more clearly the specific universe represented by the social sector, a universe which, within the confused conception of what social services actually are, represents a coherent area that requires different management strategies, and whose main priorities lie precisely in local development.

This area, which grows at a rapid pace, and which we loosely qualify as “social”, comprises sectors such as health, education, culture, sports, information, leisure, housing and security, and is, therefore, in the center of this curious confluence of participatory practices, of partnerships, of new production relations. And it is not surprising that participatory structures like civil society organizations can commonly be found in this field.

It is a simple logic. The activities of the social field are capillary: health has to reach every child across the 60 million Brazilian domiciles, for instance. It is essential to understand that this type of activity requires social relations of production that are different from those defined as paradigms in agriculture or in industry. Health does not work when it is treated as “the disease industry”, nor education when seen as “the diploma industry”, and so forth. These are sectors wherein, by definition, the public interest should prevail. Someone can choose or not to buy a fashionable garment, and the market works independently. But the access to health or to schooling is a public right.

The social sector acquired such a degree of importance only in the past few decades. A culture around this sector has not entirely been formed yet, unless in countries which adopted a welfare state long ago. The inherited management paradigms – you just have to flick through the pages of an administration magazine, or the correspondent university curriculum – drag solid industrial roots. They talk only of Taylorism, Fordism, Toyotism, just-in-time, and so forth. How can we create a just-in-time childbirth method? This engenders the tragedy of the more than 50% of C-section deliveries in Brazil. Culture, as an entertainment industry dominated by the advertisement and marketing industry, generates a universe of nonsense. Social policies are part of the universe of rights, and are not a marketing option.
This new weight of political policies in the set of activities points to much more decentralized management systems, not because of some local bucolic vision, but because of the extreme capillarity of such activities, the differences of the needs and demands according to regions, and its own interaction with the different sectors, and which ultimately makes the local integrated policy much more efficient. And they are, in the modern societies, the major sectors of the economic activity.

**10 SOCIAL POLICIES AND MANAGEMENT MODELS**

It would be relatively simple to regard the social as naturally belonging of the domain of the State. But here, the paradigms are related to the domain of public administration: Weber, Prussia, the pyramids of authority of the unitary state. There is increasingly less space for simplifications of this kind. How to reach tens or hundreds of thousands inhabitants from a central command chain? The social sector is necessarily capillary: health has to reach every child, every family, in extremely different conditions. Is the centralized management of big administrative pyramids of such a scale feasible?

In practical terms, we know that when we surpass five or six hierarchical levels, the leaders have the illusion that someone down there in the bottom of the hierarchy will effectively execute their desires, while at the base it is imagined that that there someone up there is actually in the command. The agility and flexibility required by very different social situations can no longer depend on endless state hierarchies that paralyze decisions and deplete resources.

The Brazilian SUS (Single Health System), currently broadly studied in other countries, is in this regard a huge progress, in understanding health as a right, and therefore of an essentially public sphere, with a vision of decentralized management. The success of its organizational architecture is undoubtedly due to the intense participation of the social movements of this area, which also play a key role in debating its constitution.

However, the system is paralyzed by the central structuring factor that affects every initiative of the kind in Brazil: the inequality. Like in other Latin America countries, we have created public systems with insufficient resources for the masses, and expensive private systems for the elites. The extent to which the sector has become a business can be seen in the distribution of the control of the 6.2 thousand hospitals operating in Brazil as of 2013: the public sector has only 2.1 thousand, the non-profit community sector 1.4 thousand, and the profit sector 2.6 thousand, with strong financial interests. Only the D’Or Network had a turnover of 5.5 billion in 2014, a 22% increase against the previous year. The private sector is essentially interested in curative healthcare, where the turnover
is high, and evidently not in preventive and integrated health policies that could eventually reduce the number of customers.\(^3\)

The world of profit has long discovered the new gold mine that the social arena represents. Who will refuse to expend all their money to save a child? And what alternative information has the patient if the doctor recommends a treatment? Today, in the United States, a hospital is being sued because it paid 100 dollars to any doctor who referred a patient to the hospital’s services.

Is the patient a market commodity? In India, there are now villages with countless young people showing the alarming reality of an extracted kidney: solid health companies of developed countries buy cheap kidneys in the third world to transplant to citizens of the first world. Here, the private health plans managed by financial insurance companies are transforming health into a nightmare. What is the limit?

We took health as an example because it helps to understand the organizational dimension of big emerging sectors: To have a healthy population requires a cross-sectoral and localized integrated policy. We know that in Brazil one real invested in basic sanitation reduces expenses with diseases in 4 reals: this is one of the most effective ways to ensure a healthy life. Between 1991 and 2010, according to the Atlas Brasil 2013, the Brazilian population had its life expectancy increased from 65 to 74 years, the result of initiatives so different as to ensure that children eat better, conditioning the Bolsa Família to school attendance, families no longer living in unhealthy shacks thanks to the Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life) and other programs.

Without doubt, national policies are necessary in this regard, but their realization and effectiveness vitally depends on the capacity of local management for allowing that different axes of support from State ministries or secretariats are transformed into coherent and synergic policies in every city or neighborhood. It is not about an alternative between centralization and decentralization, but rather a coherent organization of the different management levels, with less bureaucracy in the top in the same proportion as a participatory management in the bottom, to allow for greater flexibility.

This reasoning can be extended to several sectors. Television, for instance, currently covers 97% of Brazilian domiciles. The reduction of the oligopoly of commercial media implemented measures that enabled the development of local and regional TV programs, highly impacting the dynamization of noteworthy cultural activities, and adjusting the information to what is needed for the region or municipality development.

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The underutilization or deformation of a medium of communication, which entertains people for hours a day, is a waste of already paid-for infrastructure and equipment, in addition to being a waste of people’s time, and which could be a powerful vector for raising people’s cultural level, and the dynamization of different creative capacities of each region or place. We are talking about areas which relative importance in the whole social reproduction tends to become central, and which role of structuring participatory and social capital policies is essential for a more balanced development.

The social sector actually has more need for a political-administrative reformulation than for more money. Where it works, such as in Canada or in the Scandinavian countries, the social sector is managed as a public asset, in a decentralized and intensely participatory way. It is a simple reason: the citizen involved with the health management in his neighborhood is not interested in becoming ill, and is aware that he is taking care of his life. A father will not mess around with the future of his children and wants a school that works. In a way, the direct interest of the citizen can be capitalized to design a non-bureaucratic and flexible social management, pointing to new paradigms overcoming both the excessively centralized state pyramid and the “anything goes” nature of the market, and can improve the productivity of the whole.4

This naturally does not imply that social policies can be restricted to local action, to the partnerships with the private sector, and the dynamics of the third sector. Hilary Wainwright, for instance, makes an analysis of public-public partnerships that involve the local administration and social movements, as well as public service unions themselves, which are very interested in the revalorization and efficiency of their functions. The Paris experience of returning the water control to the municipality is very interesting in this regard.

This reformulation directly affects the way how the national policy is conceived in several areas of social management, questioning the present hierarchization of government spheres, and forcing us to rethink the process of domain of private macrostructures that control the health industry, the information systems, the instruments of culture, and increasingly the upper education sector as well. In this regard, decentralization is a powerful tool, however as essential as decentralization it is to create the corresponding organizational and financial architecture.

Recent social management trends force us to rethink the forms of social organization, to redefine the relation between the political, the economical and the social, to develop researchers cross-crossing several subjects, systematically

4. A good summary of the organization of the social sector in Canada can be found in the book by Frank McGilly, Canada’s Public Social Services, Oxford University Press, Toronto 1998.
listening to state, corporate and community stakeholders. It is really a universe in construction.

**11 TECHNOLOGY AS A VECTOR FOR CONNECTIVITY**

One interesting piece of information emerging from the more global analysis of experiences in progress is that the initiatives are very differently distributed in metropolises, large, medium and small-sized cities. In general, it seems that in large metropolises experiences take more time to become significant, because of the scale of the urban concentration, and the power of previous dynamics. But, in small and middle cities, the intensity of lessons learnt regarding local development across Brazil is very impressive. Countless experiences in other countries are also sources of inspiration. The local management is developing at a steady rate, moving in the opposite direction of the excesses of globalization.

Technologies can have several political meanings. In the corporate field, flexible production is already commonplace, showing that modern processes make small scale production possible. It is possible to be small, provided that strong articulations with others are established – always the networks – and thereby initiatives do not necessarily need to come from large companies, and from above. At present, being a small municipality inevitably implies facing a number of difficulties, but also affords opportunities. The main problem of being a small municipality in the interior has always been isolation, but that is quickly changing. There are multiple examples of small municipalities where local producers organize themselves via the Internet and start exporting produces with no agrochemicals directly to Europe. Today, we are all becoming integrated on the Internet, and new perspectives are opening up.

Thus, from the perspective of mere articulation of sectoral policies, in the municipalities we are evolving to understand that both small and medium-scale cities can be regarded more broadly as a basic unit of social accumulation, where economic, social, cultural and political initiatives are articulated to generate a systemic rationality.

It might seem surprising to be writing about this when all people talk about globalization, blocks, macroeconomic policies. In a way, it is about understanding that the more the economy becomes globalized, the more society has spaces and the need for local anchors.

In general, we can observe that the potential of new technologies in management experiences is highly underutilized. In this regard, the experiences that we follow are at times instructive for what they lack. The essential fact is that several cities are providing urban Wi-Fi, and this connectivity between everyone and everybody else will also allow a networked horizontality of the management concept itself to emerge.
In Brazil, the National Broadband Plan quickly progresses despite resistances from the oligopoly of telephone companies. Such changes are essential for our reasoning about decentralization, insofar as the monitoring and coordination of decentralized activities become possible from the upper levels, which allows allying local management flexibility with the systemic coherence of the whole.

12 NATIONAL POLICIES FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

In the same way as the economy is structured upon a set of companies, the country’s development needs to be structured upon basic territorial units that have to be rationally and productively managed. This vision of municipalities as “blocks” with which the country is built is essential, though not sufficient. Upper management spheres are vital, creating large infrastructures, ensuring the macroeconomic balance, developing technological policies, and so forth. All this effort, however, must be ultimately materialized in well-managed territories, appropriated in an intelligent, democratic and participatory way by the local actors.

No matter how much effort is put in at the federal or state levels, it is the municipality, that ultimately has to organize thing, along with the local power, a domain wherein social actors know their problems and thus can articulate themselves in a creative way, organizing and sharing information and project monitoring systems, and so forth.

Upon improving the management capacity at the base of the country, we are improving not only the local productivity, but also the systemic productivity of all the economic and social agents. By ensuring decentralized support to the small producer, to the participatory local management processes, we are contributing to democratize the local decision-making processes.

On the whole, more support is needed. It is also necessary that this support is less fragmented, and better integrated into the local level. It is also necessary to ensure that this support does not replace the local appropriation of the development process, but rather encourages it. It is also necessary to qualify people so that resources are well utilized. We must also help create less rigid institutional solutions, facilitating the structuring of inter-municipal consortiums, of partnerships between various sectors, of councils, forums and development agencies, seeing as the executive and legislative powers are only part of this universe.

Greater, more appropriate means, less bureaucracy and greater flexibility in its management, greater and more organized participation by local actors, more qualification and information, solutions pointing towards full employment and towards the sustainability of the process. These are the several “axes” of solutions and supports that have been identified as necessary. Undoubtedly, great policies and great projects, are necessary. However, support to small-scale initiatives and
to the local development, releasing the productive potential that lies at the base of society, can itself be a major policy, and by releasing the upper instances from dealing with the micro demands, lead to improvement in the broader management of the nation.

Companies try to rationally allocate production factors, and for that there are courses in business administration that teach integrated and efficient management of available resources. Likewise, the territorial unit has to learn how to optimize the use of its natural, human, social, cultural and economic resources. And in a democratic way, seeing that the owners of the enterprise are, in this case, the community members themselves.

In this field, an important line of research that is opened up, and where we have made little progress in Latin America and especially in Brazil is that which: what are the measures at the national level that improve the urban space and the effectiveness of local management? Tax, legal reforms, media decentralization and democratization, flexible access for the social sector to financing, and other initiatives should become increasing concerns, as local actions acquire greater importance and become widespread in the national scenario.5

13 LOCAL FINANCING SYSTEMS

Long ago I was informed about the data of a small survey done in Bertioga, a coastal city in the southeastern region of the state of São Paulo, wherein they analyzed what happens with the money deposited by the residents in local bank branches. They observed that for each 100 reais that were deposited, 92 reais were invested outside the city. What does this mean? In the past – and today “in the past” means a few decades ago – a bank branch manager would talk to all the local business people, trying to identify investment opportunities in the region, becoming a fomenter of local development. Now, the manager is remunerated according to a ranking system based on how much he can extract. Yesterday, his work was kin to that of a farmer, in search of fertile ground for harvesting local investments. Today, he is simply a mechanical vacuum cleaner that leaves a void.

In the total amount of Brazilian public resources, the municipalities, whose share of national resources was raised to about 17% with the 1989 Constitution, now work with a level of resources that is closer to 13% (in developing countries, the municipalities’ share lies between 40 and 60%). If we add the impacts of the weakening of local public resources and the deviation of private savings by large chains of financial brokers, the practical result is that countless small initiatives

5. In this regard, see the report of the research for the National Policy of Local Development Support, comprising 89 practical proposals in the fields of financing, technological support, and others. See: <https://goo.gl/KUaFCL/>.
that are essential to dynamize the local economic fabric of 5,570 Brazilian municipalities no longer exist. Municipalities are being drained, rather than irrigated.

What happens to the ordinary citizen, who is neither the government, nor a businessman or organizer of the local development? He is treated as a customer, in the modern conception of the term. Firstly, he does not choose the bank, because one is assigned to him along with the job. It is what we can call the captive customer. In reality, each company negotiates a roster of future customers with the bank. The customer opens an account where his wage gets deposited by his employer. This is a very important point, as it means that for ordinary mortal beings, there actually is no market competition, and banks can raise their fees or charge whatever interest rates they desire, only stopping to check what other banks are doing every now and then, so as not to stray too far from the average.

Some aggregated data has begun to appear, although this major scandal of our economy deserves more in-depth research. The results we find so far, recently presented by the Brazilian Central Bank, is that the financial costs consume 46.5% of the Brazilian family income, for instance. Naturally there is the fact that business companies have found out that much more money is gained from dealing with money than with actual products. As they make little money, the poor can afford to pay less, and are forced to fragment their purchasing power in installments, at savagely high interest rates.

The result is that the purchasing power of the population, essential to dynamize the economic activities of the country, is sterilized, because it has rendered into remuneration to financial brokerage. At some point down the line, the paralysis hits the government, as well as the productive activities, the dynamics of local development, and the fundamental driving element represented by the domestic market, a phenomenon curiously called “stability”.

The fact is that the financial brokerage culture that was implemented in Brazil and in several other countries is no longer used to identify investment opportunities and to foster production and the provision of services, but rather to create other uses for the local savings, transferring them to several “financial products”. It is noteworthy that this culture not only reigns in commercial banks, but has also partially impregnated the official banks.

Official banks, in the pursuit of building a financial support system, are driving microcredit initiatives, special lines to support the purchase of construction materials, and have implemented some regulation efforts that allow people to get credit to buy with cash, or even to loan money directly from the company where they are employed. In this scenario, the appearance of community development banks, which allow local savings to be effectively used for local development needs,
is also highly significant. They already add up to 107 in Brazil since 2015. These initiatives help, but the general local picture is grim.\(^6\)

What we want to show here is that the financing subsystem, genuinely interested in effectively fostering local development initiatives, and with great capillarity like the Banco do Brasil, the Caixa Econômica Federal, or the BNB, in the Brazilian case, should encourage the formation of local or regional fostering councils, or other systems of horizontal articulation, whereby the capacity of support from the several institutions of the S system,\(^7\) the municipal or academic incubators of companies, the civil society organizations, the local administration itself can contribute to the joint management of the limited budget for fostering resources.

### 14 INFORMATION FOR THE LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

There is no participation without proper information. And this means adequately compiled and updated information, made available in a convenient, easy to access platform, differentiated according to different users – in particular internal managerial information and the information flow to the community – and supported by a communication system that ensures it is accessed and appropriated by the economic and social agents of the municipality. There is no better guarantee of the rational use of resources than the visibility generated by the access to information. The Access to Public Information and Transparency Law, enacted in Brazil in 2012 for all government levels, is a powerful tool. Each institution can create its own monitoring, evaluation and control system, which in turn enables them to appraise the level of productivity of their efforts.

This way, the decentralization of management also encompasses the organization of baseline information and managerial information, enabling democratic, participatory planning and effective management processes. The systemic productivity of the territory depends on a great density of well-organized information, provided to all actors and social stakeholders involved.

With the new information and communication technologies, having a community that is well informed about its problems, opportunities and potentials has become relatively easy and cheap. Considering the productivity gains obtained and the costs that have now been reduced by the new technologies, organizing a comprehensive local information system is probably one of the most cost-effective actions.

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\(^6\) The details of how the financial brokerage system works in Brazil, and how it hinders the development, can be consulted in our study *Resgatando o potencial financeiro do país* (Redeeming the financial potential of the country), updated in Dec. 2015, available at: [https://goo.gl/v47Pw6](https://goo.gl/v47Pw6).

\(^7\) The “S” system in Brazil represents institutions like Sebrae, Sesc and others, which provide institutional support to the private sector, including training and other initiatives.
The degree of disinformation of city councils, often of mayors, and also of business people, of social movements, about the actual data about the region where they work is generally bewildering. It is unthinkable to have an officer taking a position in a company without any pertinent managerial information. However, this is the situation of most of those responsible for decision-making at the local level. The consequence is the great difficulty of managing the different areas so that the several initiatives can converge and create synergies.

In Brazil, the information exists. Each municipal department produces information, companies are enrolled in registers, there are researches and studies, surveys carried out by specialized agencies, statistics from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and state bodies. However, this information is provided to senior management, and not returned in an organized fashion to local actors and social agents. This system enables the publication of national statistics yearbooks, the elaboration of doctoral theses at the universities, but in order to foster local systemic productivity such information has to be territorially organized and broken down according to the necessary rationalization of local decision-making processes.

Citizen participation cannot take place without organized information. The fragmentation of the existing information, segmented into sectors, following different methodologies according to the external institution that elaborated it, does not allow for the integration of such information at the local level. The financial information of the municipality itself is organized according to the classifications of the court of auditors, for control purposes, and not for financial management and rationalization of resource allocation.

The different social, economic, cultural and environmental programs only function effectively when citizen participation is integrated in the process. Civic participation essentially takes place at the local level, which is where people know each other, where they can appraise the social resources available, articulate themselves in neighborhood meetings, and so forth. It is essential that the information is broken down at least for the municipal level, to enable informed local action. Theoretically it is feasible for a person in an actual municipality to search for information about its own reality in the several information institutions, but the existence of thousands of pieces of fragmented information spread across several national institutions, with divergent methodologies and classifications, and, on top of that, which employ territorial divisions that do not always coincide, make this task rather unviable.

The fact is that local administrations are generally seen as information providers, so that decision-making actors and social agents in an upper echelon are able to take their interests into consideration, or to better ensure their own interests. This type of information philosophy is coherent with a political ideology that regards
the members of society as a user, or even as a “customer”, rather than subjects of the decision-making process. The central axis thus consists of understanding that all the local actors need to be properly informed, so that they can actively take part in the decisions about their own fates. It is a condition both of the rationale of local management, and of the promotion of more democratic processes.

In a way, the technological world of information has radically changed, but we still produce information in a traditional way, according to categories, organization and forms of access that were devised in another era. Poorly directed light only dazzles us, rather than light up our way. The major challenge is to organize information according to the practical needs of the social actors that intervene in the local development process. The big investment, which is the actual production of information, has already been carried out. New forms of accessing and using it must now be developed. With the technologies currently in place, it is a relatively simple project, and with extremely high social productivity.

According to Unesco’s World Information Report, “there is a big difference between having a right and being able to exercise it. Poorly informed people are often deprived of their rights because they lack the power to exercise them. The access to information is a right we have, such as the access to justice, and should be ensured for free as the other public services”.

In addition to being a right, well organized information that is made publicly available is a powerful self-regulation instrument at the base of the society, because all the social actors, business people, local government authorities, community organizations etc., can make better, more informed decisions. And in this regard, huge advances in information technologies can undeniably make this perspective feasible at a reasonably low cost.

15 SUGGESTIONS FOR A DECENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT

Visits to interesting experiences currently in progress evoke a curious feeling. On one hand, there clearly is no catechism, and each place has to reinvent a way or approach towards political renovation. On the other side, when we find a positive experience, we immediately know it is effective. Thus we have a series of more or less implicit criteria to classify a good experience, or a good form of governance, in modern terminology. It is a phenomenon that is rather similar to that of non-governmental organizations: everybody has a hard time trying to define them, but when we get into a work room we know we are in an NGO. Because of the ambiance, the energy, the idealism, or who knows what feature of that which we presently call the intangible elements of management.

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8. Unesco, *World Information report 1995*, p. 280-282 – Important initiatives are emerging in Brazil in recent years, with the Nossa São Paulo movement that publishes the Irbem (Municipal Well-Being Indicators), and others.
The first emerging feature, as a common denominator of the broad majority of successful experiences, is a new architecture of social articulations. This could be in the form of development councils that allows us to bring together several social actors, several types of partnerships, agreements between several institutions, inter-municipal consortiums, agreements, contracts, or even simply an informal articulation space, but the fact is that the key to the renewal of local governance lies in a decision process that is jointly-made, in a participatory manner, by the actors that were acting separately until now.

A second point, directly related to the first, is the philosophy of the search for balancing the various interests at stake. It is not about defeating other players, being successful at the expense of others, but rather of obtaining the maximum benefits and advantages for everyone. It is a win-win game, so well systematized by Hazel Henderson. The upper government levels can help a lot here, by conditioning financing to the creation of participatory bodies in the definition of financed programs.

Another important point is to understand that successful activity is always a full cycle. Professional qualification means nothing if it does not result in a job. Creating an incubator of companies means nothing if the corresponding credit mechanism is not created, and so forth. The introduction of democratic planning, offering a comprehensive and long-run vision of individual projects, can help a lot in the process. The reality is that we form technicians in public administration or in business administration, but rarely in integrated territorial management, a very traditional area in, for example, the aménagement du territoire, or ordering of the territory.

It is equally essential to be oriented by final results, in terms of the peoples’ life quality, because we are frequently satisfied with only analyzing the inverted means. How many times have we seen news about how much an entity has spent in professional qualification, or the number of patrol cars the police department has put in circulation out in the streets? We were in a meeting about the issue of street children, wherein the Public Prosecution Office presented its report of how many companies it has fined for using child labor, and then the Labor Secretariat presented a report showing how many children it managed to get off the streets by getting them a job. The intensification of the means is frequently misunderstood as or taken for the accomplishment of goals.

A very important element to emphasize in the several decentralization and participatory development experiences is that civil society organizations do not perform a substitutive role for public policies, although they frequently point out the weaknesses of such policies. Somehow, we can also say that their actions frequently start by “patching up the holes along the way” where the State or the company does not provide proper answers.
But the most significant function of civil society organization resides in articulating several social forces, bringing them closer to each other, weaving, organizing, creating partnerships, showing the actual needs of society, when many times the interests of the contractor prevails. For local administration authorities, they can be precious conveyors of the tensions and aspirations of the people, acting as intermediates in the decision-making process of the public administration or of the big economic groups.

In this regard, it is important to reinforce the several types of education and training, with adequate courses and research to develop the necessary skills and knowledge, aiming to reinforce the local capacity of territory management, so that the decentralization of a series of policies, particularly in the social sector, can find the corresponding reception capacity at the local level. Partnerships can be made both with universities and with NGOs, and the government schools in place in several Brazilian states, can also help to achieve this. It is about promoting capacity-building schemes that interweave elements of social work, administration, economy, and education, with the aim of qualifying managers for the promotion of integrated local development.

In general, we still observe an underutilization of the huge potential of the new information technologies. Essential initiatives like the organization of integrated local information systems, are still “spinning their wheels”, without actually moving forwards and achieving their goal, and should encompass information centers, life quality indicators, managerial information and the modernization of records and registers. Information generates transparency, and transparency generates empowerment.

The weak spot or shortcoming of the experiences is still communication. Several municipalities still approach communication as political marketing, other communicate poorly as the result of a poor organization of systematized information, others simply have not understood that communication is essential, part of the fundamental rights of the citizen, which in the United States is known as the right to know. It is always worth remembering that the local citizen is the owner, so to speak, of the company.

In the past few years, we observed considerable progress in terms of external relations, including foreign relations, by the local governments. Non-governmental organizations already have a growing understanding of the importance of such initiatives. Some local governments have established dynamic and functional international networks. However, in general there is still a long way to go, both in terms of knowledge of international local development experiences, and in terms of opening the e-commerce market to local companies, of working towards cultural agreements to foster and promote networked education, and so on.
Those observations, although seemingly obvious, are important to emphasize that institutional rationalization is part of a comprehensive process, which go beyond the simplifications of privatization. On the other hand, they show that the reorganization of institutional context at the base of society is an absolutely vital axis of action. This is not only about organization charts, it is about the logic of the process, of the administrative culture inherited by each nation. The municipality, Brazil’s basic structuring unit, has gained momentum and autonomy with the 1988 Constitution, and decentralization, which enables differentiated and more finely tuned actions regarding the particular conditions of each place, need to be provided with corresponding management tools.

Suggestions made in this field are countless. It is essential that the administrations be open to innovation, to other forms of organization, to initiatives in other regions of the country and of the world. For a long time the political and economic debate was restricted to the major simplifications that prevailed in the past century, where everything boiled down to the fight between privatization and liberalism on one side, and socialization and statism on the other. This polarization still feeds our ideological hatreds, and hinders the development of constructive solutions. However, on the whole we are evolving towards other forms of social organization, other paradigms. It does not really matter whether this represents a third or fourth way. What really matters is the expansion of freedom of personal opportunities and lifestyle choices of the oppressed and excluded segments of the population, and the construction of a more civilized, or, as says Paulo Freire, a less ugly society, one that is less evil and more humane.

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CHAPTER 2

BROKEN PROMISES: INTRODUCTORY NOTES

Marcio Pochmann

1

1 INTRODUCTION

Throughout the whole world, different generations of this beginning of the 21st century are facing significant changes in the way of living. On the one hand, the urbanization concentrates even more population and production in less places in the world, making the administration of existing cities even more essential.

On the other hand, the prevalence of environmental degradation shows that advances in technological progress and the organization of global value chains, alone, are not enough to create a decent standard of living with sustainable quality throughout time. Despite this, promises are still being made without commitments to its fulfillment, generating not only political discredit, but also the risk of the continuing consistence of democratic regimes.

Given this, the present contribution aims to identify some aspects that are associated to the problems of urban life. In a way, a brief comparison between the promises that were presented and the effective dimension of urban reality containing crisis and opportunities for transformation.

2 INTRODUCTION TO THE ONGOING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITIES

After registering one of the most successful trajectories in terms of expansion of its productive forces combining with the process of increase in the middle class for almost 30 years since the end of World War II, the center of world capitalism is once again facing a large-scale crisis. With no visible solution, the turbulence of global dimension that started in 2008 is increasingly similar to the great depressions that swept through the world such as those of 1873-1896 and 1929-1945.

In all great crisis, the geographical displacement of the world’s dynamic center presented itself as a complex problem facing the disparity of the relation between the center and the periphery imposed by the unequal and combined capitalism of development. While in the last quarter of the 19th century the long decline of the
English domain began with the start of the emergence of the second Industrial Revolution and the end of free competition capitalism, the 1929 Great Depression consolidated the American hegemony over Germany who was defeated in the two World Wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945).

During this beginning of the 21st century, the increasing polarization between the United States and China has turned the focus to the controversial topic of the actual transition inside the dynamical capitalist center in the world.

On the one hand, the new border of capitalist expansion opened by Asia in which the main vector has been the rapid and considerable process of capital monopolization through global value chains (Glattfelder, 2013; Milberg and Winkler, 2013; Rothhopf, 2008). The level of concentration and centralization of capital in a few transnational corporations simultaneously leads to the deepening of the fragmentation in the production scattered around some parts of the national territory that are increasingly interconnected by the strength of the advances of the third Industrial and Technological Revolution.

Nowadays, not more than 300 subspaces, fragments of national territories spread throughout the world are interconnected and articulated and are responsible for the centrality of the global capitalist form of production and distribution. These subspaces, and their relative autonomy, compromise the functioning of public policies and empty the autonomy degree of the national States (Narodowski and Lenicov, 2012; Dreifuss, 2004).

Nevertheless, one should highlight that the level of independence of these areas’ from the nation States and subnational governments is not absolute. Remain in the realm of local governments, the daily working relations and environmental issues among others that tend to make the degree of autonomy of these subspaces from the nation-states relative.

On the other hand, the decrease of the industrialization pattern and the Fordist regulation that is in place since the 1970s, is accompanied by a consequential dismantling of the income society, mainly the one formed by a larger proximity between the base and the top of the social structure. We are seeing, therefore, the transition of the traditional employed middle class and industrial workers to a new and extensive precariat with an important social polarization (Standing, 2013; Beck, 1999; Pochmann, 2012).

3 CRISIS AND THE URBAN PROBLEMS
Currently, in order to sharply analyze the urban problem one should consider the systemic relation between capitalist development, in crisis, and the cities, as well as the systemic relation between the city model and the pattern of society,
considering some approaching risks. Initially, the short-term risk given the emergency response of Public Policy, thus losing the planning perspective given the predominance of the understanding of cities as a product from a short-term logic set by the financial Market.

Then, a second risk comes from the fragmented and partial views, contemporaries of the advance of the post-modern perspective. The fragmented organization of State’s specializations and sectorializations tends to compromise a more effective operationalization of public policies, keeping an increasing distance from a wider approach which is able to provide wholeness to the complexity resulting from the different areas of formal knowledge (economic, cultural and social relations, among others).

In this regard, one should not seek to understand the cities located in underdeveloped countries by mirroring central countries. It is assumed that capitalist development is unequal because its organizational form is hierarchic from the existence of a dynamic center that articulates with other components of the global pretensions’ system since its dominant existence.

In general, the hierarchic relation established between the dynamic center and the remaining parts is one of subordination and peripheral dependence. The founding elements of the dynamic centrality depend on the existence of an international currency, of the presence of a consistent army and of the capacity of technological production and dissemination.

Since underdeveloped countries do not present these three elements that would qualify them in the capitalist system’s world context of hierarchical positions, they would maintain their peripheral subordinated development, such as in the historical case of Brazil. But when there are crises within the dynamic center, new opportunities of repositioning arise inside the development of the global capitalist system.

This could be observed, for instance, in Brazil. In the 1880s, the country went through a political reform in 1881, the end of the slave labor in 1888 and the transfer from an Imperial Regime to a Republic in 1889 with the implementation of a new Constitution in 1891.

All that, which allowed for the advance to a new agrarian non-slave society, helped by the economic coffee cycle and the organization of the Old Republic (1889-1930) occurred in parallel with the long Depression (1873-1896) that hit the old dynamic capitalist system established beginning in England. Also with the Great Depression of 1929 that significantly shook the world starting from the USA, Brazil made a new leap, setting in place the movement to a new urban and industrial society.
From that moment, one can see how Brazilian cities were being transformed from old cities connected to the agrarian sector to urban cities, but not accompanied by civilizing reforms. As in the agrarian societies, the existing cities were compact (small), the matrix of urban and industrial cities started to segregate leisure from work, for instance, resulting in the respacing and sectorialization of cities leading to a waste of time and bureaucratization.

Apart from this, the existing authoritarianism given the lack of reforms, such as agrarian and tax reforms, that allowed the maintenance of the agrarian power with new forces of the urban capital pointed by the waste, the real estate speculation and collective transportation, for instance. The transition of the old agrarian city model to the urban and industrial one without the reforms mentioned above led to the constitution of extensive cities, with the presence of public buildings in devaluing areas with no urban reference, mainly in peripheral regions belonging to great urban centers.

Over time, this city model has proved to be ungovernable. The costs to assure the universality of access to the city were extremely high due to the spread of the population throughout long territorial areas in the cities.

Programmed alternatives such as the peripheral urbanization have proved to be possible, but the results were not fully reached. The movement to a service-based society has been another sought way.

But that assumes a change in the State and in governments, which tend to support the model of cities belonging to the 19th and 20th centuries’ societies. The fragmentation kept in the public policies inhibits the management of a service-based city model.

The service-based society, in this regard, constitutes a new perspective of change to the territorial space’s organization in the cities and governments. Therefore, the matrix – and not only sectorial – reorganization in the public administration such as the organization into teams who enable actions in the totality of individual and collective needs of living in cities in the 21st century.

Given the crisis in the dynamic center of capitalism that began in 2008, a new opportunity of repositioning has been presented to peripheral regions and countries. In Asia, especially in China, the repositioning project is being implemented, not yet seen however in Latin America, as previously registered, such as in Brazil.

4 THE EMERGENCE OF NEOLIBERAL RATIONALISM

Nowadays, however, the engaged perspective of capitalism defenders has been very different. Facing the signs of blockage in the expansion cycle of productive forces with advances in the mass consumption society still in the 1970s, the presented
response, from then on, has been directed towards the understanding of a significant opportunity for the transition to the superior civilizing pattern.

In brief, the converging view that the therapies of the neoliberal policies would have the function of freeing the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalist productive forces’ at the same time as the emergence of the third Industrial and technological Revolution (Davis et al., 2006; Ellsberg, 2011; Anderson, 2013).

Inspired by some technological determinism and envisioned leaps in the productivity of immaterial work, a new group of promises have been made towards the desired free time society extended by creative idleness, full-time education and the contention of heteronomous work (only to survive). Increasingly permeated by the media culture of individualism and by the competition ideology, neoliberalism has continued to see an increase in the numbers of its supporters worldwide.

With that, a new perspective arises affirming that social changes would inexorably affect the cities’ functioning. With the demographical transition, new expectations began to be presented. The propaganda about the increase in life expectancy to almost 100 years, for instance, should open unprecedented perspective for the postponing of the entrance in to the labor market so that youth can finish higher education, study during there whole life and work a maximum of 12 hours a week.

The new postindustrial society, therefore, would be offering a civilizing pattern never reached by the capitalist way of production and distribution (Masi, 1999; Reich, 2002; Santos and Gama, 2008).

It was under this mantle of promises for an increased liberation of the working man’s struggle for survival (heteronomous work) through the postponing of the entrance in to the labor market until after the completion of higher education, as well as the offer of education throughout life, that the neoliberalist rationalism was created. In a way, the understanding that the emptying of the relative weight of the rational economy coming from the primary (agriculture and cattle raising) and secondary (industry and civil construction) sectors would enshrine greater expansion of the tertiary sector (services and commerce) (Aron, 1981; Bell, 1973).

Finally, a post-industrial society that was the protagonist of achievements greater than the milestones of the second post war’s social democrat agreement. But the promises did not lead to the effective and expected realization.

5 DEMOGRAPHIC AND LIFE SPACE’S TRANSITION

It seems increasingly feasible for our life expectancy to be of around 100 years old, compared to the current age of 65. In addition to the important decrease in the infant mortality rate, one can see acceleration in the reduction in the fertility rate
and in the number of residents per home. In this scenario new family structures become increasingly important, many of them are increasingly monoparental, with a growing difficulty of reproduction of traditional family sociability.

One should also highlight the population’s health conditions, which are expressed by the new composition of the causes of death. Transmittable diseases and diseases whose cause is associated with nutritional, maternal and perinatal conditions lose importance while the causes associated with non-transmittable diseases (cardiovascular, psychiatric and neoplasm) and external causes (traffic accidents and violence) increase.

Although public and private resources present a considerable increase, the scenario of lack of safety remains the same. In general, violent crimes affect more the youth – especially male – and those belonging to low-income families.

Yet, the lack of decent infrastructure in urban areas is associated with the precarious conditions of our urban mobility, the collective and individual transportation systems, not being insignificant the deaths caused by traffic accidents. Therefore, the population’s health conditions require, more and more, inter-sectorial policies that are articulated and attend the whole population.

In addition, environmental sustainability has gained importance with the need to perform changes in the model of production and consumption of high carbon steel, leading to a more technological advanced economy laid on the transition process to the dematerialization of the economy. All of this required dealing with the whole population’s health conditions, with the dimension of knowledge and the perspective of human labor (Altvater, 1995; Alier, 2005; O’Connor, 1994).

6 TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Regarding the education situation, one should highlight the recognition $a$ priori of the actual demographic modification, with a reduction, in general, of the younger part of the population and increase of the older age range. At the same time, one can note the increase in the average life expectancy, which puts in place a set of new issues in the health, mobility and social integration policies among others.

With regards to the knowledge dimension, notwithstanding the advance with the educational process, there are undeniable gaps and disparities still to be considered in the whole world. Starting with the degree of illiteracy that still persists in the beginning of the 21st century.

This number grows if we consider the functional illiterate. In general, the concentration of poor and miserable people, as well as the increased unemployment rate and precarious occupations are characteristics of a population with lower level of education.
In this regard the educational system as it is nowadays is relatively recent and it shows undeniable signs of insufficiency. Until the transition of the old agrarian society to the urban and industrial one, education was something inexistent to the larger masses of population. Only the aristocratic families had conditions to hire tutors for their children, while the Church was responsible for transferring the knowledge formalized throughout the years.

In the agrarian world, knowledge was transmitted in the old “father to son” way, where the eldest were more important due to their accumulation of experiences. In general, only the passing to the urban and industrial society changes the role of education, starting from the construction and dissemination of formal schools. Before that, the national issue, constituted by the emergence of the nation States in the 19th century, became essential to generalize the condition of people associated to the limits of a nation’s sovereignty. In this manner, the unification of the mother tongue and the identification of national values were essential for the creation of the content of formal education.

In addition, the emergence of labor in manufacturing started to require values such as discipline and industrial responsibility, as well as basic operations and common language, no longer transmitted by families who lived in communities in the agrarian society. In the cities, families not only decreased in size, but the work was also carried out by the parents in a place far away from home.

The sociability crisis taking place inside the families belonging to the industrial and urban society was faced by the action of public policies. With the dissemination of educational systems by the State, those aged 14 and below were released from work, as occurred in the agrarian society, making it necessary for them to be inactive to be able to meet the contents and requirements of the education, this being a founding element to enter in the labor market.

Once the primary stage of education had been finalized, entering the labor market took children away from schools. Thus, education in the 20th century was functional to the requirements of the nation States’ conformation and for the transition from inactivity in to the labor market.

With the third technological revolution, which provided the emergence of new communication and information Technologies, educational requirements rapidly expanded. Educational systems geared only towards the early ages, seem to no longer fit.

Besides turning higher education into the basis of the new knowledge society, the creation of an educational system for life urges. If knowledge increasingly takes on the condition of being the main asset for generating richness, what is the sense in studying little and in unfavorable conditions?
7 METAMORPHOSES IN THE WORKING WORLD

In full transition to a services-based society, the entering into the labor market needs to be gradually postponed, possibly to begin labor activity only after the completion of higher education, aged 22 years or above and with a synchronized exit to the advance of inactivity. All of that accompanied by a reduced workload, which allows us to observe that heteronomous work should correspond to not more than 25% of human life.

In this regard the perspective of the human work is presented. One should highlight that in the old agrarian society work began when children were 5 or 6 years old and would continue practically until death, with long working hours (14 to 16 hours a day) and with no resting periods, such as vacations and paid inactivity (retirements and pensions). For someone who managed to reach 40, and had started to work at 6, for instance, they would have compromised about 70% of their whole life working.

In the industrial society, the entry in the labor market was postponed to 16 years old, assuring to the employed ones, from then on, the access to weekly resting, vacations, pensions and retirements coming from the public regulation of work. With that, someone that started working after they were 15 and stayed active during 50 years, would possibly have a few more years of paid inactivity (retirement and pension).

In this way, about 50% of a lifetime would be compromised with the exercise of the heteronomous work. The rest of the life cycle, not compromised by work and survival, should be associated with the reconstruction of sociability, study and education, increasingly required by the new internationalized organization of production and distribution.

This is because, with the high and constant gains in productivity, a reduction of weekly hours of work is possible from something around 40 hours a week to not more than 20 hours. In a way, the transition from the urban industrial society to the post-industrial society tends not to clearly and strictly separate the time spent working and not working, being able to generate a greater mix between them, with a stronger intensity and risk of expansion of the labor journey beyond the traditional place of effective work.

It is within this context that one redefines a new base for the relation between the heteronomous work time and life. In general, the functioning of the labor market links along time series of typical and atypical forms of use and paying the workforce with an excess of labor force resulting from the internal and external migratory movements without control.
In many countries, the lack of classical reforms of contemporary capitalism such as the agrarian one, has led to the transfer of great part of the rural surplus of workers to the cities. Also with no planning, cities have absorbed a great contingent of workers allocated in marginal forms of occupation, whose informality made decent work impossible. The scarce experiments of democracy in the labor relations have compromised the potential action of unions in the form of collective contracts closer to gains in productivity reached in the economic sectors.

8 CONSEQUENCES TO A NEW URBAN AGENDA

After almost four decades since the generation of promises directed to the construction of a superior society, one can see the strengthening of the undeniable signs of regression inside capital society. From the progress registered around the construction of a social structure with an increased middle class by social-democrat policies from the second half of last century, one should note the return of strong social polarization in the beginning of the 21st century (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2009; Lojikine, 2005; Kumar, 1997).

One the one hand, the degradation of the social structure inherited from the Fordist industrialization has deconstituted a great part of the medium class, strengthening the expansion of a new precariat. On the other hand, the concentration of significant gains in richness and income with a minority part of the population generates an unthinkable social context where only 1% of the world population concentrates more richness than the other 99% of the planet's inhabitants.

In more than three decades of preponderance of the capitalism’s neoliberal regulation, the promises of construction of a superior civilizing pattern are undone. The advances have been for a few, while the observed setbacks are for many.

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At the UN Conference Habitat III government and civil society resumes those old discussions on cities and their political, social, economic and spatial conflicts that started at Habitat I in Vancouver. Forty years later, we are forced to realize that there has been little advancement in practical terms, even though there has been significant progress in placing the urban issue on the international political agenda and, more specifically, in helping several governments to perceive the need to fight social and spatial inequality in cities into their action plans.

We know that since that first conference, the trend to urbanize has accelerated. By 2007 the world had become more urban than rural. The dominant urban morphology of informality and precariousness has, however, become increasingly present in underdeveloped countries. Even in those countries which are at the heart of capitalism, the end of what Thomas Piketty called “the Glorious Thirty” and a strong return to a concentration of wealth under patrimonial capitalism has caused these countries to experience an increase in the number and extent of precarious settlements. The already classical title of Mike Davis’ book, “Slum Planet”, has become increasingly apt. If we look at cities and their urban territories around the world, urban and housing precariousness are probably no longer the exception but rather the rule.

In Brazil, despite the many advances in the regulatory framework for urban settlements since the 1988 Constitution and its clauses on Urban Reform, the passing into law of the City Statute in 2001, and even the advent of a massive program to finance low income housing (Program My House, My Life – Programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida), we have to admit a certain stagnation of this process to democratize cities over the last decade. Indeed, in the case of the 2001 City Statute, fifteen years later very few cities have actually applied it in a systemic and integrated way or used it as an important tool to rebalancing economic, social and spatial distortions in our urban territories.

The autonomy of municipalities in territorial policy as established by the new federative pact agreed after the 1988 Constitution came into being is most certainly
an achievement in the progress towards democratization. On the other hand, however, it has become a political obstacle to implementing the advances discussed here. The achievements which the City Statute represents have happened at federal level which, has helped to focus lobbying on a single political entity, the National Congress. However, the need to cascade its effects down to more than five thousand Brazilian municipalities through municipal regulation soon became a priority and this has not been an easy transition, involving as it does the fragmentation and capillarization of a central political discussion into thousands of local discussions. Progress has not been helped by the archaic nature of the tensions and power structures at the municipal level, where patrimonialism, domination of political life by local oligarchies and absolute control over the land itself are still prevalent.

As a result, the implementation of the instruments required to promote the Right to the City recommended by the City Statute, which include participatory master plans, Special Social Interest Areas (Zeis, in the Portuguese acronym), progressive property taxation, and other measures, has become the cause of local disputes, in which the democratic forces are not always – indeed, or hardly ever, hegemonic. Moreover, the dynamics of the federal system with its control over financial budgets, political patronage and a more direct, and complicated, relationship with State governments – has added challenges to this process. Despite significant advances at the federal level, Brazil’s progress towards urban reform at the municipal level has been slow and marked by setbacks.

I believe, for example, that many of the problems faced by the popular housing financing program mentioned above, which are usually attributed to the its design, as well as to the complex interplay between the Federal government, the Ministry of Cities and Caixa Econômica (the federal housing finance bank), are also the result of barriers erected at the municipal level. In fact, considering the program as, in its essence, a line of credit, the political management of land allocation necessary to implement the program in the cities without repeating the traditional spatial segregation of sending the poor to the periphery, should have been a municipal responsibility under the terms of the 2001 City Statute. However, very few municipalities have the necessary local political conditions to confront the challenge while there is a lack of land stock in the more accessible parts of the city, which has meant they have had to yield to the logic of agreements with construction companies, by which the more valuable plots were assigned to the program participants with higher incomes and the distant plots on the periphery were assigned to lower income participants.

Although, undoubtedly, this problem has structural barriers, it depends, perhaps even more, on “simple” political confrontation. An interesting case is the way the city of São Paulo broke this apparently well-entrenched logic by promoting a Master Plan in 2014 which established a large number of Zeis (Zones of
Special Social Interest) across the city and created new tools to fight the economic concentration of land, such as the Solidarity Quota; by promoting an increase in population density outside the traditionally privileged axes matching the public transport network; and, especially, by promoting an aggressive land expropriation policy. In three years, more than R$ 700 million have been invested in land and property expropriation, part of which has been made available via a bidding process to the My House, My Life Program (both in its company and its entities modalities).

But if this is an exception, the general trend, not only in Brazil but also in the developed world, is for urban population increases to be defined in their origin by segregation. Precariousness and informality have become the rule and not the exception in urbanization, good in principle, but that can not keep up with the demand, a quite frequent assertion. Urbanization in the last decade has happened in a structurally unequal pattern, that is, since its genesis, the urban space has developed through a perverse logic of social and spatial exclusion. As I have said on many occasions, the production of space in the underdeveloped world is a transposition of the economic logic of peripheral capitalism to the territory.

This structural inequality did not originate in contemporary capitalism, although it has exacerbated it. Its origins are in the development of society and the State in most peripheral countries, characterized by a slavery system, an economic and political patrimonialism and logic of elite society, at least in the Brazilian case. However, it is impossible to deny that early in this 21st century, Brazil has experienced a virtuous economic phase that has produced structural changes, including some advances in shifting the concentration of wealth.

But, regarding this point, there is a little-commented inherent antagonism to urbanization in the capitalism of hyper-consumerism: economic growth brings economic fulfillment to the middle class as it generates new possibilities for consumption, but it also exacerbates social urban tensions, because it increases the pressure on unsustainable urban dynamics. An increase in purchasing power generates more demand for the kind of city that is based on the same economic system that the city reproduces (the space is itself a product of capital): it creates attractiveness for a population in search of economic improvements but there is no State capable of providing them, more centralities exclusively destined for consumption, more closed commercial centers, more individualized spaces, more cars, more walls, less streets, more gated communities.

One example is the proliferation of “popular” shopping malls in neighborhoods previously unattractive to developers. Those developments introduce new areas to a consumption model within architectural temples – boxes isolated from the city. Or the example of housing developments for the low to medium-income population that repeat the anti-urban patterns of luxury condominiums: electrified
fences, watchtowers and access gates, trendy spaces such as fitness centers, “gourmet” barbecue facilities, etc. that reduce the size of the housing unit in exchange for features that have more value for their status than utility. In all its variables, these patterns of urbanization promote wealth concentration and segregation of populations.

What has been seen over the last decades in Brazil has also been seen in other developing countries, deepening urban inequality. Not only in Brazil, but also in Mexico, Chile and China, large mass-housing developments have proved to be, despite the positive aspect of providing housing, an urban and environmental ticking time-bomb due the liabilities they are generating.

If in Habitat I, in Vancouver, it was possible to consider achieving a balance between the rural and the urban by regulating urbanization, forty years later it has become clear that urbanization is now inexorable and, even worse, based on a web of inequalities that threaten the cities of the world with collapse. State regulation, which was still trendy at that time, was then conceived as a possible option to organize urban growth, inspired by the relatively successful model of post-war Europe and North America. It has not, however, proved compatible in practice with the patterns of development being followed by countries in the south, in the context of enforced structural changes dating from the 1970s. Instead, the prevailing economic model, influenced by Rostow’s theories (1956-1959), relied on wealth concentration to create an accumulation of wealth capable of driving an economic take-off for these countries. A model that has, as we now know, deepened inequalities.

Reactions to this predatory urbanization process started not long after the Vancouver Conference, coming, as usual, from the core capitalist, or “developed” countries. The grammar of “sustainability” began to emerge at this moment as well as urban practices aiming to create a “good city” – a city capable of some social and spatial balance and respect for the environment, as a result of a more effective public regulation. The Barcelona paradigm, motivated by the 1992 Olympic games, was established as an example of state regulated urbanization, focused on “smart and strategic” local solutions. In several European cities, starting with Paris, large urban projects anchored in major cultural and sporting buildings, in association with an effective urban transport system, led to an urban development model that would be proposed use all over the world, including in the second Habitat Conference, held in Istanbul in 1996.

If the state as regulator still appeared as an important player in the dynamics of cities, there was then a clear focus shift, from national states to local powers, giving cities a level of autonomy and a prominence never seen before. In a way, it was a recipe that allowed them to harbor remnants of the State presence where it still existed (essentially in countries with a strong social welfare legacy), but now
making room for this local “autonomy” – particularly in the city’s relationship with the globalization of the world economy – as desired by the new and hegemonic neoliberal paradigm. The “glocal” concept, so fashionable at that time, is the perfect translation of this movement (Borja and Castells, 1997).

This urbanization based on the dynamics of the market and the local capacity of cities, led them to become more competitive, underpinned by the paradigm of Global Cities, where the practical enforcement was through Strategic Planning. This recipe, aligned to the advance of neoliberalism was advocated worldwide, especially in Third World countries, as the only possible solution for the survival of cities in this new global paradigm. A fallacy, as we have demonstrated previously (Ferreira, 2007), that has had a significant impact on the late 20th century urban mindset (Arantes, Maricato and Vainer, 2000).

As a result of this paradigm, and even as it proved incapable of sustaining universal and structural policies, the “best practices” methodology gained momentum. Pilot experiments, some very interesting and innovative but also specific and without potential to be applied generally, now served as urbanization models to be followed. Multilateral agencies focused on urban issues disseminated and promoted the adoption of these best practices without, however, paying attention to the political and economic opportunities needed to convert specific practices into public policies.

Thus, even if Habitat I has in some way advocated state-guided global urbanization, moving towards a more liberal pattern from the 1980s (clearly influenced by Reaganism and Thatcherism), what actually happened away from the developed core was a complete absence of a public power capable of guiding the process of urbanization, particularly in underdeveloped countries where the concept of the Welfare State never took hold. Trampled by the neoliberal pattern of globalization, these countries passed straight from structural adjustment to hyper-liberalism, without passing through intermediate stages to consolidate policies, much less urban policies. The privatization of water and sanitation services, symbolized by the events in Cochabamba in 1999 are paradigmatic of this process: the transfer to private exploitation of urban services that are the prerogative of the state which the state had never actually established, in situations of extreme poverty.

In the underdeveloped world, cities and the production of space had, more than ever, become a business in themselves, burying any possibility of overcoming the urban and environmental deficit inherited from the previous era. On the contrary, increasingly accelerated urbanization in these countries became even more predatory, unequal and segregated.
On the other hand, the progressive dismantling of the social welfare model in developed countries, and increased wealth concentration resulting from the advance of neoliberalism led to a resurgence of urban issues in developing countries which had been in balance previously, similar to the ones faced by the developing world. Migration, war and natural disasters, unemployment, in short the whole globalization menu, associated with an evident retreat of State from involvement in these issues, caused the emergence of extreme poverty in places where previously there had been no informal or precarious settlements – as the surviving residents of the New Orleans’ floods or the Romanian migrants in Paris. The crises in the housing complexes in the Paris suburbs in the early years of this century showed that, increasingly, North and South are increasingly sharing the same urban social problems. Unfortunately, it is the problems that are becoming closer, not the solutions. The world is moving towards a generalized urban fragility.

The result is a powerful social and economic tension that, undoubtedly, will explode in the cities. The June 2013 movements in Brazil have already clearly showed that, at least in our country, the explosion of popular demands will be based essentially on an urban agenda. The question on the eve of another Habitat conference is therefore very simple: what directions should the urban debate take to achieve real transformative power? The question might be simple, but the answer is extremely complex, as it involves a much larger reflection – on capitalism in general. The main question proposed by events such as the World Social Forum, “is another world possible?” becomes especially well suited to discuss the urban issue. Another city, socially fair, does not look possible in the present global economic paradigm.

Perhaps precisely because the answer is complex discussions in Habitat II tended to prioritize local alternatives as specific solutions. The “local was the global” (Borja & Castells, 1997), we were told, and local solutions were classified as the “best practices” to be suggested around the world. A praiseworthy recommendation on paper, but long from reality: best practices were possible – that when they are actually good practices and not government marketing factoids – because there was, in those cases and contexts where they happened, a convergence of political, economic and social factors that contributed to the advance of some issue: an alternative sanitation proposition, an innovative accessibility solution, and so on. However, it is utopian to generalize to other places, political scenarios and cultures as there is unlikely to be sufficient convergence. This might be one of the most important criticisms of the financing programs of multilateral agencies: the absolute lack of discernment in deciding which local project should be financed, which might as well all be the same as not attention is paid to place and context – the political situation, the ethical background, or the commitment of the local government that is benefited.
However, as it was impossible to say with conviction that the necessary urban transformations were, in reality, structural transformations of the present economic system, local and specific actions, some very good, others not so good, have become a way of celebrating that urban policies still existed and were being implemented. Such a strategy, intentionally or not, clearly could not last long. On the eve of Habitat III, it has become evident that if urban practices have not been able to become public policies, they have had little effect.

It is interesting to note that, from a technical, economic and legal point of view, all the necessary elements for a structural solution to urban issues are already available. The sum of efforts made in the last thirty years, from local democratic governments engaged in searching for effective solutions to urban poverty, civil society groups and associations working on successful self-management experiences, alternative techniques, constitute a fantastic technical background named, appropriately, “social production of knowledge” by the urbanist Yves Cabannes. Nowadays, there is sufficient scientific and technical knowledge to successfully deal with environmental sanitation, housing, urban mobility, and other issues, often using alternative and innovative solutions.

It is also the case that, if there were interest, there would be money available to fund this transformation. Cities in developing countries increasingly concentrate huge investments, always more concentrated and indifferent to the surrounding poverty, sustaining increasingly conspicuous business centers and revealing the extreme contrast between poverty and wealth. Urbanists such as the South African Alan Mabin (2013) have shown the increase of modern business urban environments in major African cities, substantially financed by international funds and always following the neoliberal globalization recipe. Countries like Brazil, among the ten largest global economies, should not have the right to allege financial difficulties preventing them from facing housing and urban issues. It is clearly a matter of priorities.

From a legal point of view, Brazil is an example for the world regarding the regulatory framework necessary to advance in this issue – at least on paper. The 1988 Constitution addressed important areas for urban reform, which culminated on the 2001 City Statute. Master plans, urban tools and different sorts of regulations are already available to be used at the city level, however they are not yet enforced or not as consistently as they should be. The 2014 Master plan of São Paulo city showed how much the city political and legal regulation can be used to ensure that socially fair processes take place: the areas of social interest (Zeis) doubled in number, pushing for construction of popular housing; innovative tools

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2. Presentation of Yves Cabannes in the International Conference “Repenser les quartiers précaires”, Paris, 8 and 9 June 2015, AFD/LaVue.
such as the Solidarity Quota were created, leading to the donation of land for social housing in large real estate developments; a densification dynamic outside privileged neighborhoods and close to the axes of mass public transportation was established; a department for supervising the social function of property was created; among others.

But, if it is possible to believe in transformation in the fields of knowledge, law and finance, why has the urban poverty situation changed so little? Because it is a fact that, not just in Brazil, but throughout the world, as discussed by the urbanist Agnes Deboulet (2015), violent evictions controlled by business, often anchored in official urban projects requiring public intervention such as major road works or mega sporting events, have become the rule.

Truth might be in the fact that there has never been a real political and economic intention to end urban inequalities. On the contrary, some improvements can be made in poor neighborhoods, improving them a little, occasionally benefiting some local good practices, but reality is not structurally transformed. Apart from the fact that misery is a function of capitalism, even as a pool of labor the poor neighborhoods in cities are, in their fragility and illegality (a illegality created by a juridical formalism, as in practice, they are neighborhoods that have been working in a consolidated way for decades), important land reserves for urban expansion of capital. Entire neighborhoods, considered informal, subject to several bureaucratic obstacles to becoming regular, give place overnight to commercial enterprises, business neighborhoods and luxury condominiums that, miraculously, solve all these legal and bureaucratic barriers previously insuperable. Issues such as sanitation and drainage, seemingly unsolvable when dependent on public investment, become easy to solve when the financial solution is leveraged by the private sector (even though, covertly, using public funds). The dispute and control over land is still at the heart of the housing and urban issue.

Certainly, this situation is possible also because the urban problem is, in a way, invisible. It is not actually a “problem”, at least not for the dominant sectors of society. Segregation is so intense in cities in the developing world that a rich person might go through life without any real contact with urban poverty. Rich neighborhoods, perversely called “noble districts” in Brazil (reinforcing a culture in which the privileges of the elite are hereditary and exclusive to those who were born with “rich blood”), work perfectly well on the margins of poverty, depending of and using it for its proper functioning. At the end of the day, the poor pile up in an inefficient public transport system travelling for hours to their exile at the periphery of the city. Those who suffer from it are the only ones to resent the housing issue, in these distant and invisible neighborhoods. In rich regions, a booming real estate market is actually only serving a very restricted demand of those that can pay the price of urbanized land.
These are the reasons why actions such as those implemented in São Paulo, which is trying to break this pendulum movement in the city by improving public transport in more distant neighborhoods, multiplying areas of social interest or promoting significant expropriation of land to make better located building plots available for social housing in its 2014 Master Plan. For this reason a program like My House, My Life is important, as it provides a substantial subsidy to ensure access to housing for the poor, giving a more democratic access to urban space. Unfortunately, these are still incipient actions that rely on strong political commitment from the federal and municipal governments – something which is still far from happening.

Lastly, it is important to highlight the still existing difficulty to effectively include the poor, those who are actually in need of and demanding housing, in the decision-making processes for policy decisions. In Brazil, there has been a significant advance in the creation of participatory tools such as mandatory public hearings or the creation of participatory councils at all government levels. However, those are still too dependent on municipal effort to be enforced. In São Paulo, as an example, councils, with gender parity and quotas for diversity of color, were re-established from 2013, after being virtually abandoned in the previous administration.

Internationally, UN-Habitat events show how much this has still to advance: official participation from popular housing movements in World Urban Forums, contrary to what happens in the World Social Forum, is secondary to such a degree that these movements have started a parallel popular forum. If there was a visible interaction between both forums in Rio de Janeiro, in 2010, where they happened close to each other and with information on the parallel event available at the official forum, the same was not true for Naples in 2012. Then it was almost impossible to know where the parallel forum was happening, being completely ignored by the official agenda. However, in both cases there was no real insertion of the popular movements’ voice, in a proportional way, in the official agenda. If the urban issue cannot be solved without a more radical change in the present economic system, the housing issue, in turn, will not be solved only by technical and administrative decisions from governments and multilateral agencies.

What stands out, above all, is that, despite a questionable improvement in the urban issue in the world and a visible impasse in finding an actual political and economical solution, there have been advances and Brazil has an important contribution to make in this matter. Even if, presently, the country lives an undeniable democratic setback, which menaces the maturation of many of these achievements, the experience acquired since the 1988 Constitution should be given as an example to the world: the establishment of urban instruments for protecting the Right to the City, the institution of a specific ministry for the urban and housing issue, the approval of the City Statute, the implementation of vertical financing and
social participation mechanisms, the implementation of a mass housing program with real subsidies to the low income population (as opposed to similar programs in other countries where the financing has only benefited low-middle income groups), the multiplicity of financing formats for the housing policy, including funds committed to expropriating land (as in São Paulo), are advances that form a unique set of actions, atypical in the developing world. Due to this accumulation of knowledge and struggle, Brazil might become a major player in the debate on paths for real democratization of the cities.

REFERENCES


CHAPTER 4

IS A NEW URBAN DEVELOPMENT AGENDA POSSIBLE?
A BRAZIL PERSPECTIVE

Nabil Bonduki

1

1 INTRODUCTION

The 3rd United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (UN-Habitat III) is happening at a time of major political, environmental, and urban uncertainties and concerns about the future of our civilization.

At the dawn of the 21st century there were promising signs for those championing the reduction of inequality and injustice in the world. They led to a predominant feeling of optimism at the first editions of the World Social Forum which has since 2001 under the motto “Another world is possible” motivated social movements, NGOs and other organizations, activists and a new generation of youth that is taking up the struggle for “changes for better”, both in geopolitics and in the agenda of social and civil rights.

Now, 15 years after the 1st World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, which was asked at Habitat II in Istanbul to host the event as a result of its participatory management, the “new world” seems distant. The horizon has become darker then we talk about “change”, which was strongly related to positive processes in the past, we need to qualify it by adding “for the better”, because we are experiencing setbacks and there are major risks of “changes for the worse”.

At the turn of the century, the perspective seemed much better. The struggles against globalization and for a new world order, the rise of horizontal social organization through Internet mobilizations for action and the newly born social networks, the emerging new agendas against economic exploitation were expanding to include gender, race and sexual orientation and were building on the momentum they had gained in the 1990s. This process has shown that philosopher Francis Fukuyama’s prophecy that the “end of history” was upon us had no basis whatsoever, and seemed to point the way to a new cycle of transformation, a new period of conquering rights and democracy.

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However, for those believing that a “new world was possible”, the past few years have been frustrating. Political processes and movements that seemed to be pointing to the advance of democracy, such as the “Arab Spring”, which have thrilled the youth of countries still living under autocratic regimes and where there were no basic civil rights and democratic freedoms, ended up creating, with the interference of major western world powers and the emerging religious fundamentalism, armed conflicts where the rise of pure barbarism, violence and destruction have destroyed any hope.

The capitalist economic crisis, which has affected western countries since 2008, generated positive mobilization such the “Occupy” movement, which emerged in several cities of the western world, and the birth of new political organization forms, such as the Podemos and the Cidadanos, in Spain, Movimento 5 Stelle or M5S, in Italy, and the Siriza in Greece, which have tried to break the rigidity of traditional political parties while on the other hand has given strength to nationalistic and anti-immigration feelings, supported by conservative European movements and resulting in a movement closer to the brink of fascist intolerance.

The terrorist attacks that have happened in major European cities, a symptom of these new dark times, have reinforced the conservative and xenophobic forces, which defend the strengthening of police forces, the control of citizens and frontiers, and at the far boundary, advocate authoritarian states. Popular support for right-wing or extreme right-wing leaders and parties is growing in the western world, which are promoting agendas against the advances and social rights that have been achieved since the second world war, and more recently achieved civil rights following the fight against homophobia, racism and intolerance. The choice of a majority of British voters to exit the European Union can be seen as an omen of a nationalistic wave that may have serious consequences.

The urbanization process and the environmental impact of the capitalistic exploitation model spreading throughout the world, in particular in poor and developing countries, are not alien to those circumstances. The big immigration movements around the whole planet are not only the result of big waves of refugees fleeing from armed conflict zones such as Syria, but are structural phenomena resulting from the intense rural – city migration experienced in highly populous and still predominantly rural regions of Africa and Asia. It should be remembered that it is only recently that the total urban population has exceeded the rural population.

In the past, a less crowded planet managed to absorb the population imbalance generated by the expansion of the capitalism: in the 19th century, a lightly populated America which had slaughtered the pre-Colombian peoples could absorb most of the population surpluses from the rapidly urbanizing Europe while in the second half of the 20th century, Latin-American cities could welcome rural populations under
the banner of development, albeit precariously. In the 21st century it is not clear how the huge populations displaced because of war, ecological disasters, ethnical and religious disputes or because of changes in rural landownership, largely from the poorest countries, will be accommodated in a planet increasingly affected by extreme climatic phenomena and a wild urbanization that has abandoned millions of human beings to their own fate.

It is in this context that countless developed countries have introduced ant-immigration policies that are likely to generate major social and geopolitical conflicts over the next few decades. Those complex processes are difficult to understand because they are heterogeneous and are different in each context. This has emphasized the need to rethink the way in which urban development should happen and to face the environmental issue. It appears unfeasible to reproduce on a planetary scale the unsustainable and unequal model of cities designed in the 20th century along the European and American model, which are still a reference for developing and poor countries.

In this perspective, it is increasingly relevant to analyze the trajectory of Brazilian urban policies in the past forty years. Brazil, which has urbanized very fast, is an important dimension in the international scenario and has the potential to innovate in the management of urbanization, helping it to become a reference to those countries that are now undergoing similar processes, always taking into consideration the clear specificities of each nation.

The Brazilian experience following our re-democratization is rich in expressive advances in formulating and implementing public policies, especially in regard to the implementation of the urban reform agenda. However, it has also revealed problems and contradictions leading to impasses and difficulties. It seems clear that a radical change must take place to review paradigms and enter a new cycle of innovation, with the perspective of renewing and expanding the urban reform agenda.

2 THE DEADLOCKS OF THE BRAZILIAN URBAN POLICY IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The street demonstrations of June 2013 in the main Brazilian cities revealed a deadlock in the reformist agenda that had been being actively pursued since the beginning of this century. The strength of the demonstrations, which had their origin in a protest against rising public transport prices and for the right to mobility, have shown the limitations and discontent with the development and social inclusion projects implemented by the PT administrations.

Subsequently, the more conservative elements took advantage of the unrest to put into practice a strategy to undermine the government.
From the beginning of the century, the country had been in a euphoric mood, as a set of positive economic factors ensured high growth rates and admirable progress towards social inclusion through an increase in the number of formal jobs, a real increase in the purchasing power of the minimum wage, the assurance of a minimum income for families whatever their social condition through the Bolsa-Família (Family Allowance), and countless other programs with a massive social impact.

It was believed that Brazil would be able to maintain the pace of state investment which would simultaneously sustain the drive towards a post-developmental economy based on subsidized interest rates for state and private enterprise financing and on encouraging consumption while ensuring the social inclusion of a significant proportion of those who so far had been excluded from their rights as citizens, while simultaneously launching an infrastructure investment program — the Accelerated Growth Program (PAC) — implemented through the conventional model of contracts with major contractors, supporting many infrastructure works in different sectors and also to help the country host mega events such as the World Cup and the Olympics.

Despite the government’s commitment to the Urban Reform agenda, these investments maintained, or even strengthened, the urban development model that had driven the growth of Brazil’s cities in the last century, which gave priority to cars and real estate speculation fuelled by horizontal urban expansion, incentives for house ownership and a public works agenda heavily focused on expanding the road system. This program was supported by the major construction companies.

From 2007 to 2014 nearly R$690 billion (Bonduki, 2014) of federal funds were used in urban programs, such as PAC-Sanitation, PAC-Urbanization of Slums, PAC-World Cup, Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life), and Mobility Pact, while R$470 billion were used to subsidize housing projects for the middle class.

Billions in taxes were not collected because of tax breaks for automobiles, a waiver of the CIDE fuel tax, and subsidies to the gas price, measures that encouraged the use of cars. Never before in Brazil was so much was invested on cities, including tax resources to subsidize housing for low-income families, through the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program.

Paradoxically, despite this massive investment, urban problems, above all in the main metropolises, continued to worsen. The demand for housing increased, rents and the value of land soared, the mobility crisis worsened; on the other side, universal sanitation was not attained; closed real estate developments multiplied, green areas reduced while idle land and buildings were left vacant; while property speculation drove out low income families and some of the middle class from neighborhoods.
This unsatisfactory situation can partially be explained by the fact that, despite the major legal and institutional achievements in the first decade of the century, such as the Statute of the City, the creation of the Ministry of the Cities and regulatory frameworks for housing, sanitation, solid waste disposal and mobility, the traditional city management model did not change, despite a serious effort to improve the inclusion of the poorest urban dwellers.

The expansion of credit and investment in social and market housing, in the absence of a land use policy capable of resisting real estate speculation, resulted in an astonishing increase in real estate prices which ruled out social housing projects from better localities and even excluded the middle class apart from the better developed neighborhoods. As a consequence, the cost of mobility increased, leading to increased public subsidy for mass transport.

If cities are not doing well even with so much investment, it is because the urban development model established in Brazil in the second half of the 20th century, and the way public authorities have operated since 2003 under the coordination of the Ministry of Cities, has proven incapable of creating better cities.

An elementary principle of urbanism has not been observed: the city is not a mere sum of housing projects + sanitation + urban transports + urban programs. It requires a fully-articulated strategy, including a land policy that regulates the social use and function of land, and sectoral projects that are based on integrated planning and formulated with the participation of society.

Although the urban regulatory frameworks approved by the House of Representatives, in particular the Statute of the City, require cities to produce master plans and housing, sanitation and mobility plans, the interventions funded by the Federal government ignored those instruments and did not encourage the cities to fight speculation and to guide investment through a well-articulated urban strategy.

In spite of these problems, or even because of them, the Brazilian story deserves special attention because, as we show later in this document, the country was one that most advanced towards implementing a progressive urban agenda following Habitat II. The country had the political conditions required to implement its own institutional structure to address cities and to approve legal frameworks compatible with advanced technical recommendations and the Habitat Agenda. The country became an international reference in a scenario in which large countries such as India and China or whole continents such as Africa underwent accelerated urbanization.

At this point, in which the urban strategy established in Brazil since the 1988 Constitution needs to be rethought, it is necessary to review the paradigms and to reflect more deeply on a new urban development model for the cities.
3 FROM VANCOUVER TO ISTANBUL

Between the 1st United Nations Conference on Urban Settlements in Vancouver in 1976 (Habitat I), and Habitat II in Istanbul in 1996, urban Brazil went through major political changes.

In the 1970’s, Brazil experienced a period of intense urbanization, with the rapid growth of cities creating or worsening urban problems. However, the migration of the rural population to urban areas itself already represented an important step forward, because it gave access to social benefits such as a minimum of health and education, which were entirely absent in the countryside. Re-democratization pointed the way to serious progress with key social rights.

In those twenty years, Brazil passed through an interesting transition from dictatorship to democracy, where the main landmarks were: the political amnesty (1979); the reorganization of political parties (1980); the creation of trade union federations (1981-1983); the first direct elections for state governors (1982) and the mayors of state capitals (1985); the fight for direct presidential elections (1984); a Constitutional congress open to popular participation which resulted in the Citizen’s Constitution of 1988; direct elections for President (1989); and economic stability achieved by the Real Plan (1994).

Although conservatives consider these two decades as lost because of the low GDP growth, very high inflation rates, and delays in modernizing infrastructure, they were fertile. A management model was created where popular participation and social control had a relevant role in formulating innovative public policies. Democracy moved forward, establishing a statutory basis for social rights, the basic principles of citizenship, respect for diversity and earmarked tax funding for education and health.

New actors set foot on the political stage: urban social movements, supported by ecclesiastic communities and linked to the progressive Church, and civil society organizations promoting social participation in public policies. Groups mobilized and organizations expanded into society with the rebuilding the labor union structure; the movement for direct elections; creation of the Central Popular Movements; the fight for civil rights by black and indigenous peoples, women and LGBTs; and environmentalist activism. Universities, professional associations and NGOs participated more actively in critical thought on alternative public policies, and progressive legislation in fields such as the environment, education, social services and health.

In the area of urban and housing policy, the crisis in the Housing Finance System, the disarticulation of the national housing policy in the 1980s, and the increasing lack of housing led housing activists to occupy idle land and real estate, demanding concrete proposals from the public authorities.
With the federal government paralyzed the local authorities and organized society took the leading role. Public initiative produced an amendment for urban reform which was submitted in 1987 to the Constituent Congress led to, for the first time in the Brazilian Constitution, specific clauses on urban development which ensured the principles of the social function of property and of the city, and the right to housing.

The innovative initiatives emerged at the municipal level, where the cities tried to respond to the problems with alternative programs, which were an opportunity to put into practice new assumptions that were defended by the housing movements and progressive professionals, based on participatory processes.

New management forms and programs appeared, such as self-managed house building through the joint efforts of the community (mutirão), urbanization and ownership regularization of slums and illegal land developments, free technical and legal assistance and the social housing in city centers. Even without a consistent national urban and housing development policy, alternative paradigms started to appear generating exemplary and innovative experiences in housing, mobility, sanitation and urban policies.

In the run up to Habitat II, Brazil was undergoing two mutually-contradictory processes. On one hand, at the local level significant advances in urban management were being made while at the national level, a strict monetarist policy affected jobs, disorganized public institutions working toward urban and housing policy, and increased social inequality in the division of urban land. These actions did, however, secure economic stability which enabled President Lula’s administration to invest heavily in financing a housing policy.

These “lost decades” were also “times of hope”, when dreaming was not forbidden. New more sophisticated proposals emerged, although they appeared impossible to realize at that time they sowed seeds that subsequently flourished and had a significant impact on various public policies. The basis of a stable, democratic, contemporary Brazil was slowly established (now, in 2016, perhaps threatened), through political negotiation.

This process allowed Brazil to have an important position at Habitat II. Initially, because of the key role of the Brazilian urban planner Jorge Wilheim, who was responsible for organizing the conference and made a significant contribution to the success of the event. The participatory environment in Brazil helped Wilhelm establish a structure for the countless preparatory events worldwide which had significant popular participation. He also contributed to the exceptional presence of local institutions and social movements in the conference, who took leading roles in what would otherwise have only been a meeting of national representations.
Secondly, the country showcased some outstanding experiences. Innovative projects in Brazilian cities were comprehensively debated, such as the Participatory Budget of Porto Alegre, which was awarded the prize of best urban management practice in the world in Istanbul.

At Habitat II, Brazil presented many urban experiences which supported the tripod of sustainability, right to the city and right to housing, as well as popular participation, which was stressed in the Habitat Agenda, the document which resulted from the conference. The official participation of the Brazilian government, though, trailed behind a much broader social and political process involving subnational federative entities, popular movements, NGOs and universities, in what can be seen as another example of the leading role of society in urban policy development in the 1990’s in regard to the federal government.

The divergences between organized society and the State concerning the national report led to the unusual decision to submit an incomplete text, due to the lack of consensus between the federal government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and the civil society representatives who were part of the Preparatory National Committee on the proposed National Action Plan drafted by the Urban Policy Secretariat of the Ministry of Planning.

This disagreement actually revealed a positive aspect of urban Brazil in the 1990s, showing the vitality of democracy, with society engaged in debating urban themes, and the relative openness of the neoliberal government, even reluctantly, to public debate. This vitality in the conflict was essential for the advance in the following years toward the commitments assumed at Habitat II, especially in regard to the right to the city and to housing, and the construction of social control mechanisms.

4 BRAZIL POST-HABITAT II: WALKING TOWARD THE RIGHT TO THE CITY?

As the result of the above mentioned vitality, the years following Habitat II saw many achievements and advances in the Brazilian urban agenda during the second term of FHC and Lula’s two terms. There was a positive progress toward addressing the Habitat Agenda, making Brazil one of the principal countries fighting for the right to the city.

Landmarks of this process were the approval by the National Congress of a Constitutional Amendment which established housing as a social right (2000), and especially, the Statute of the City (2001), which regulated the Urban Policy section of the 1988 Constitution after eleven years of discussions, debates and political bargaining by several groups engaged in fighting for the right of the city and for the social function of property.
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso approved the law with some vetoes, which were subsequently reincorporated in the legislation through the Provisional Presidential Decree 2.220/2001. With the passing of the law, a reformist urban reform agenda was established within the patrimonialism of Brazilian society but leading to a significant advance to spread the principles of the right to the city to the entire country.

The Statute of the City regulated the use by local authorities of urban planning instruments to fight real estate speculation, such as the progressive tax which increased over time to help reduce speculative investment in idle or underutilized properties, the onerous granting of the right to build, to charge a fee for more intense use of land than allowed in zoning regulations, the adverse possession of private land, and the special use concession for housing purposes, to facilitate the regularization of land ownership, and the Special Zones of Social Interest (ZEIS) to support a land policy addressing the production of social housing.

The application of such instruments, though, was subordinate to the master plan, for which the municipalities were responsible, and which became key to urban reform and the future of the cities. We can say that the Statute transferred to local authorities the responsibility for defining new limits for the right to property and for the urban reform, making political negotiations at the local level decisive to the implementation of the right to the city and to housing. As land owners have a significant political influence at the local level and on the drafting of the master plan, this became an obstacle, or at least held back the implementation of urban reform.

The Statute contributed for the democratic management of the city, by determining that all urban projects and plans should compulsorily be submitted to participatory processes, in an attempt to overcome the heavy authoritarian and/or technocratic influence in the municipalities. The debate on the master plan was transformed into an arena disputed by different interests on the urban issue.

However, the urban planning instruments created by the Statute of the City are difficult to apply, because the legislation itself has created tortuous ways to implement them. Consequently, fifteen years after the approval of the Statute, very few municipalities actually make full use of a strategy to fight real estate speculation, such as charging the progressive time tax for vacant or underutilized properties. Despite the advances in legislation, there were few actual results. When the country regained the capacity to invest in housing during the 2000s, the land issue was one of the bottlenecks.

Yet, the Statute of the City was a landmark during a still more fertile period to implement a new urban policy at national level. With the creation of the Ministry of the Cities (2003), in charge of coordinating a new urban policy at the national
level, articulating the housing, environmental sanitation and mobility policies, and of the Council of the Cities (2003/4), to ensure social participation and control, a new era of institutional articulation began, and progress toward ensuring the right to housing and to the city was made.

A tremendous amount happened over the years that followed. With the support from the Ministry of the Cities between 2003 and 2006, master plans were drafted in the two thousand largest Brazilian municipalities. It was a favorable moment for cities to define an articulated urban development strategy, introducing instruments capable of fighting real estate speculation and democratizing access to land, identifying priority projects and works that would ensure the right to the city.

At the national level, advanced regulatory frameworks were approved in social housing (2005), basic sanitation (2007), solid waste (2010) and mobility (2012). In all these sectors, bold objectives were defined addressing the right to the city, and national systems were regulated articulating the three government levels, allowing the transference of funds to the municipalities, in a modern institutional architecture.

Supplementing this favorable picture, the country went through an expressive improvement of its macroeconomic conditions, supporting a major increase in investments in housing (both social and market housing), sanitation and mobility from 2007, when the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) was launched, and subsequently the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program (2009), and the World Cup PAC and the Mobility PAC (2011).

It is indisputable that this new wave of investments brought benefits for the cities and the excluded population. Among others, the following gains should be highlighted: the PAC of Precarious Settlements Urbanization, which for the first time supported large scale action in the main Brazilian cities in informally urbanized areas; sanitation works that significantly expanded the coverage of water, sewerage and drainage systems, and a few mobility works, which improved collective transportation.

However, while investment capacity increased, the federal government was setting aside the regulatory frameworks it had established, the result of an expressive participatory process since the 1990s, and started to reproduce conventional management practices. The regulatory frameworks and the national plans, such as the National Housing Plan (PlanHab) were set aside, with the adoption of pragmatic attitudes, aiming for fast results both in regard to the realization of investment projects, which were mostly carried out in partnership with the private sector, as to activate the economy.

This happened with the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program (2009), which supported the production of large numbers of housing units, meeting the housing needs of the poorest, and creating a support model for self-management
(PMCMV-Entities), which however did not adequately confront the land and urban issue, reproducing outdated forms of housing production.

On the other hand, many master plans were restricted to generic guidelines, not regulating instruments of urban reform, while the federal government used its powers to transfer funds for the production of social interest or popular market houses to encourage municipalities to make their urban planning laws more flexible on a case-by-case bases, and to expand the urban area, without creating conditions to fight speculation, and with no incentives to ensure better locations for the housing projects.

The urban strategy that should have articulated urban programs in different sectors and guided projects and works within the scope of the municipal master plans was disregarded (when they existed) in benefit of immediate results fed by a constant flow of resources and special projects, such as the mega-events.

Despite some isolated and quantitatively inexpressive initiatives, such as the PMCMV-Entities, adopted due to the pressure from popular movements, this investment cycle was no longer innovative in its decision-making and management, reproducing old practices for contracting construction companies, or at the most only adopting more contemporary contracting mechanisms, in the case of the public/private partnerships, but not transforming the underlying logic. Above all, the number of municipalities that defined interventions without comprehensive participatory processes and without following urban strategies in line with the right to the city, is significant,

On the other hand, economic policy initiatives adopted by the federal government in areas directly related to cities, such as tax exemptions and subsidies to cars and gas, and the encouragement to consumption, ended up impacting against the urban and mobility policies which, in political speeches and in the regulatory frameworks were supposed to be encouraged.

For those various reasons during the period starting in 2009, taking into account the actions of the federal government, the urban reform agenda started to lose momentum, despite the presence of important representations of the several segments of such movement in the Council of Cities. The Ministry of the Cities, which was ultimately responsible for coordinating the urban policy of the federal government and of all the sectoral systems related to it, lost the capacity to articulate a consistent proposal for the cities, because its political leadership following the second Lula’s administration, the result of pragmatic political alliances, had no interest whatsoever in the Urban Reform agenda.

In the light of this scenario, although the 2013 demonstrations had taken the political forces of the country by surprise, it was predictable that a diffuse discontent against the government would emerge in the cities, because the concrete
problems of the citizens remained serious despite the good performance of the economy. In the municipal elections of 2012, there was a debate about the idea that “life has improved from the door inward (more salaries, more credit, more consumption), but got worse from the door outward”.

As consequence of the process of public and private investments, expansion of credit and consumption, real estate speculation increased, resulting in rising rents and tenant evictions while the use of cars increased, worsening traffic and revealing the neglect of public transportation, generally of very poor quality.

The central issue in this process is that there was an attempt to universalize access to goods such as cars and house ownership – until then restricted to the middle class while maintaining the same 20th century urban development model which excluded large parts of society, as if this could be possible with no structural change. That is, an attempt was made to reconcile patrimonialism, the car culture, housing as a private asset, among other aspects and inclusion policies but without addressing real estate speculation and other components and economic interests embedded in such a model.

An example of this is access to cars. While the car was restricted to the elite, and subsequently to the middle class, it was possible to make, to the detriment of other public agendas, large investments in the road system – widening of avenues, express ways, flyovers, tunnels, highways, etc. – to enable the circulation of cars, which in average transport only 1.3 passengers per vehicle.

With the democratization of access to cheaper cars, generated by increasing credit, subsidy and improvement of workers´ incomes, the result of the social inclusion policy of Lula’s administration, traffic and mobility became worse, in particular because the geography of the cities involved long distances to be travelled between home and work.

As far as housing is concerned, the increased access to subsidized real estate credit of the Minha Casa Minha Vida program directly benefited approximately 3.6 million families (number of contracted housing units, of which nearly 2 million have been handed over), but created intense real estate speculation, with increased rents and land cost, causing the housing and territorial exclusion of a very significant number of families.

Those examples show that promoting the right to the city is much more complex than ensuring access to consumer goods such as electrical appliances, mobile phones and furniture. It requires more decisive and transformative actions, which the government did not manage to achieve, or instead, could not face in view of its alliances with conservative forces.
Therefore, the urban reform agenda, as well as innovations in the management of municipalities was hindered in Brazil at precisely the time when the favourable political and economic conditions could have supported a more significant transformational process for cities. The huge capacity of local authorities to provide specific and municipal responses to housing and urban problems – which was the major leap taken in Brazil in the 1990s - ended up being restricted. The federal government, by centralizing and homogenizing actions, ultimately inhibited the innovative capacity of the local authorities.

We have yet to achieve the historical perspective needed to evaluate and reach conclusions about this recent period, but the current deadlock shows the need to reflect on the experience and trajectory of Brazilian urban management, both in its virtuous cycle and its more recent difficulties. It is evident that we need to rethink the urban agenda.

In view of the huge urbanization process the planet will experience in the next two decades, it is necessary to reflect on new perspectives for urban development, which is not just a mere reproduction on an expanded scale of the urban logic and culture of the developed countries and which is imposed on the others as a compulsory agenda for the modernization of cities.

5 A NEW URBAN AGENDA FOR HABITAT III

As shown above, the Brazilian experience in addressing the urban issue in the past three decades is one of the most important worldwide, and has become a reference for social movements, cities and countries that wish to implement progressive urban policies within a democratic process, where now the right to property and the market economy prevail.

Brazil can also be considered a reference for the implementation of the Habitat Agenda, which makes a study of the Brazilian trajectory extremely important to reflect about which directions to follow in the next twenty years, i.e., on the recommendations to be made at the Habitat III.

The report shows that Brazil has progressed toward the right to the city, but also reveals that the path so far has been unable to resolve the great problems caused by the accelerated urbanization in the second half of the last century. Also, in order to respond to the new demands of the 21st century, it is important to study a society that for nearly five decades has been predominantly urban, and to show new perspectives. The Brazilian trajectory is a warning to those countries that are going or will go through similar processes, showing the need to rethink the urban reform agenda.
The government agenda was insufficient because, in the urban issue, the agenda of inclusion and public services improvement (access to cars and houses, expansion of infrastructure networks, big and expensive road systems and public transportation works, etc.) is insufficient if the structural cause of urban exclusion and the development model itself are not addressed.

Furthermore, new themes are being included in the agenda, in addition to the traditional urban reform agenda established in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s, within the struggle for a minimum of citizen rights. If for those workers who migrated from the countryside between 1940 and 1990, access to basic education, basic health services, land, housing and infrastructure (public transportation, water, light, public lighting, waste collection), even though precarious, already meant a substantial progress in relation to what they had had in the countryside, for the new generations this has become insufficient.

The problem gets worse because, despite the advances, the country entered the 21st century without managing to fully respond to this basic agenda of the fight for the right to the city (which remains necessary), but simultaneously started to be required to provide a second agenda. In addition, the advances accomplished after the 1988 Constitution, particularly the social inclusion policy implemented by Lula’s administration, raised expectations, above all of young people, the children of the migrant workers, who have mostly had the opportunity to complete schooling or even find a university place.

This second generation, already born in the city, has started to demand better quality basic public services (expressed, for instance, in the “FIFA standard hospitals” slogan, which was widespread during the demonstrations of 2013 and 2014, as a criticism of the big events and discontent in regard to the public services), and also to make new demands for services and infrastructure, that so far have not been a priority or even do not exist. In view of this, I the need to expand the reach of the urban agenda and of the right to the city is clear, and to challenge the urban development model that characterizes Brazilian cities.

The construction of this new agenda initially implies questioning the paradigms which are so strongly consolidated in Brazilian society, namely: the car culture and the privatization of the road space created by this culture; and private property, particularly the owned house; the divided and segregated city; the outsourced or even the uncontrolled commoditization of urban services; the security ideology as a urban value; the lack of concern for the public space and the environment; the rejection of shared goods, spaces and urban services; the waste culture; the intolerance for minorities and to those who are different.

This questioning gained strength in the first decade of the century, when new actors appeared on the urban political stage – very different from the traditional
social movements, which were so strong and important (and still are) in the struggle for the basic agenda of the right to the city – comprised of young people from both the expanded downtown and the outskirts, who organized themselves in the so-called “collectives”. They are not heavily institutionalized groups (they are not “legal entities”), they are horizontal organizations that reject or minimize the role of the leader, articulating and publicizing their agendas through social networks and the Internet, with practices based on activism and direct action.

Among these agendas brought up by those collectives the following should be mentioned: shared occupation and management of public spaces, such as squares and parks; advocacy for active mobility (foot, bike, skate, etc.); cultural citizenship (popular and peripheral culture, digital culture, theatre, dance, audio-visual, etc.); use of the public space for culture (graffiti, street artists, music, events, etc.); resistance to the verticalization of the city, associated with the generic fight against so-called real estate speculation; agro-ecology and urban agriculture; access to free Internet in public buildings and spaces; free public transportation; shared working (co-working), housing and vehicle spaces; defense of the architectonic and urban memory and heritage; cultural occupation of public or private spaces; agendas related to technological creation and innovation.

These are contemporary agendas that express the existence of social network-connected, more educated, social groups who are pursuing a new urban lifestyle, where culture, environment, and the use of public spaces are more important. And, on the other hand, they have slogans demanding civil rights and fundamental freedoms, such as gender, diversity, sexual orientation and racial equality, as well as the decriminalization of abortion and marijuana.

Those activists reject the values that mark the cities from the past century, and advocate for a new way of urban living, based on sharing, using public spaces, active mobility, connectivity, on a new relation with the environment, within diversity.

They fight capitalism, private property and real estate speculation, also opposing the public-private partnerships proposed by several municipal governments, of different ideological colors, which suffer major opposition from movements and collectives, which have exposed the excluding, speculative and gentrifying nature of such initiatives, even when proposed by progressive governments.

Examples of these movements are Occupy Estelita, which fought against the large scale real estate project in the historical area of Recife, and the Popular World Cup and Olympics Committee, which exposed violations to the human rights in the context of the mega sports events in Rio de Janeiro. In Rio de Janeiro city, the epicenter and biggest showcase of this strategy, proposals strongly supported by the federal government, such as the Porto Maravilha (Wonder Port) and other urban interventions, directly and indirectly related to the Olympics, were strongly questioned.
Without evaluating those urban projects, which is not within the scope of this chapter, the fact is that this context generated cracks in the urban reform movement itself, regarding the strategy adopted by the federal government, headed by the Workers’ Party (PT), and which generally supported these initiatives.

The critical position of such movements and collectives show that the urban strategy conceived by the progressive forces in the past two decades, based on a balance between private property and social property and on the acceptance of urban reform by the movement and, although reluctantly, of market economy provided that it is regulated by the public power, is no longer indisputable.

This balance between market and public power, which enabled the approval of the 2000 Statute of the City and that was at the center of progressive administrations’ strategy ever since, started to be challenged because of the difficulty in actually using the instruments to fight speculation and other instruments that tried to capture the real estate “surplus value” generated by public investments, and also because of a supposed submission of governments identified with this perspective to the real estate and financial markets.

Assessments of the use of instruments created by the Statute of the City in the municipal master plans since 2001 show that the real estate market is effectively little regulated, which strengthens the view that the urban strategy implemented in this period has been insufficient and limited to changing the urban situation of the country. More recently, even the historical advocates of the urban reform agenda in Brazil have started to question whether this strategy and the Statute itself should not be reviewed.

The experience of the municipality of São Paulo, the biggest in Brazil, reveals that when local governments effectively pursue and implement urban planning instruments provided for in the Statute of the City, with political will and technical competence, it is possible to advance both in the traditional agenda of urban reform as in the introduction of an innovative and modern agenda.

The Strategic Master Plan of São Paulo (PDE) approved in 2002 had already introduced nearly all the new urban planning instruments provided for in the federal law after a hard-fought dispute with the real estate market and conservative sectors. Its implementation, however, was inadequate because the municipal governments did not prioritize this agenda. Yet, the review of the PDE in 2014 benefited from the fact that instruments, such as charging for space created, the progressive tax for idle properties, ZEIS, among others, were included in the municipal legislation.

Haddad’s administration, which took office in 2013, simultaneously managed to deepen and regulate the urban planning instruments provided for in the Statute of the City, and to incorporate a new agenda, expanding the concept of the
right to the city, and trying to oppose the traditional urban development model in force in the city since the middle of the last century.

Boldly and creatively, he immediately put into practice a set of concrete initiatives that launched the bases of a new urban culture, articulating the traditional urban reform agenda with new demands and paradigms brought out by the contemporary urban mobilizations.

Two years after the enactment of the Strategic Master Plan (PDE), transformations in the city are already visible, within the context of reverting the unsustainable way the city has “developed” since last century.

The Master Plan is based on the principles of the urban reform agenda, such as the right to the city, the social function of property, reduction of social-territorial inequality and urban segregation. However, it incorporates more emphatically other principles such as sustainable development, active mobility, cultural citizenship, environmental protection and values public space. In contrast to other master plans, the proposed changes are turning into reality.

The economic recession, scarce federal resources because of the tax crisis, and the difficulty in entering into partnerships with the private sector, despite having frustrated some expectations, were sufficiently positive to challenge the old urban development model and to implement a new agenda, because the impossibility of making major works forced the municipal administration to be creative and innovative to respond to the expectations of the new actors on the urban stage.

A new agenda was introduced in the city, creating a more humane and welcoming environment in the city. It can be said that the proposed changes are in harmony with the new urban development paradigms: priority for public transportation and active mobility, exclusive lanes for buses and bikes; rationalized use of car sharing through applications and speed reduction; expansion of the public space with Streets Without Cars, small park spaces and more restrictions on cars in express ways such as the elevated urban highway Minhocão; incentive to culture in public spaces with free Wi-Fi in squares, licensed street artists and support to Street Carnival, among other alternatives.

In the perspective of securing land for housing production, the Master Plan doubled the number of ZEIS (Special Zones of Social Interest), land reserved for social housing, and emitted bonds to generate revenue (30% of the Municipal Urban Development Fund and 25% of the urban operation fund) to purchase land in good locations for Social Interest Housing. Furthermore, it regulated the enforcement of the Progressive IPTU (property tax) on vacant and un or under-used land lots to increase the land supply for housing production. The city council has already issued notices to more than 1,500 owners of unused property in this regard.
Housing developments search for more central locations, and along the public transportation axes, encouraged by the PDE, which restricted the construction of tall buildings inside the neighborhoods. Therefore, housing and working spaces are co-located in the same areas, reducing travel times, worker fatigue and CO2 emissions.

The experience of São Paulo shows that it is possible to respond to the traditional urban reform agenda, ensuring access to land and housing, and reducing social-territorial inequality, while also responding to the new demands related to cultural citizenship, public space, environment and mobility.

In this new agenda, the right to the city needs to be extended as a concept and to incorporate the democratization of the city road space, which can no longer be unequally appropriated by car owners, while other transportation modes, with better use, are in put in second place. The same agenda needs to be followed in the occupation of public spaces by culture, leisure and sociability.

In regard to the environmental issue, it has become strategic to the future of mankind, in view of the risks associated with climate change. It is no longer possible to disregard the topic of sustainability within the scope of an urban development strategy. In São Paulo, the environmental agenda has incorporated the agro-ecological agenda, with the recreation of the rural zone, regulating payment for environmental services, and making it obligatory for the local government to buy organic products for public school meals.

6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The experience of São Paulo in recent years shows that it is possible to find intelligent and simple alternatives, even when there are so many difficulties and so little resources available for investment. Above all, it shows the need to change an urban development model that is no longer compatible with the needs of the planet, and which are in disagreement with new paradigms, which are now valued especially by young people.

If we consider demographic forecasts, the world’s urban population will rapidly grow in the next few decades. If the current form of urban organization and consumption continues to increase, cities will become unsustainable in the near future.

For this reason, it is necessary to debate the new agendas that should be incorporated in the urban agenda more profoundly, from the perspective of finding ways capable of responding to the challenges posed to the cities in a global scale.
The Brazilian path shows that facing the urban problem of developing countries is not simple nor only dependent on financial resources. Besides limiting the right to property, to fight real estate speculation and to ensure the right to land and housing – principles of the traditional urban reform agenda – it is necessary to build new urban values, capable of providing sustainability and balance to the cities.

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CHAPTER 5

AN OLD CHALLENGE AND A NEW PROBLEM: INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA

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Felipe Livert2

1 INTRODUCTION

To plan investment in infrastructure in order to reverse patterns of urban unsustainability in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) involves addressing the political and institutional factors that affect the misallocation of public resources. To meet this challenge, governments should consider at least four criteria. The first criterion is to understand the role of investment in the territory and avoid bias of infrastructure plans, determined by the increased volume of investments, as well as develop a comprehensive plan that incorporates other drivers of development. The second criterion is to implement plans that aim to encourage private participation in order to make more efficient use of public resources and not anticipate public spending avoiding fiscal control. The third criterion is to determine urban infrastructure gap and, most importantly, identify the type of infrastructure deficit that cities face. The fourth criterion is to plan public investment by directing private investment, and strengthen the technical independence of planning units in order to reduce political influence in the planning process.

There is a broad consensus among scholars, policymakers and international organizations that infrastructure investment has an impact on regional development. The argument used to explain this is that differences in infrastructure stock between territories are the basis of differences in productivity (Biehl, 1991). However, this argument has not been consistent with empirical evidence (Deng, 2013), inasmuch as the causal link between investment and development is not categorical (Vanhoudt et al., 2000). In fact, there is a series of economic, social and political factors that have an impact on productivity in the territory and that are often neglected by those investigations biased towards the effect of infrastructure
investment (Rodrigues-Pose et al., 2015). In the case of LAC, there are no studies comparing the effect of infrastructure investment with other determinants of development, such as education or the quality of institutions. In this context, the results indicate that an infrastructure investment plan will be sustainable insofar as it includes other drivers of the economy.

Due to the broad consensus about the role of infrastructure investment in economic development and low levels of public funding in the past decades, LAC has a deficit of infrastructure investment3 (Perroti and Sanchez, 2011). Given this scenario, since the 1990s, the governments of the region have made systematic efforts to attract private investment (Eclac, 2014). These efforts have converted LAC into the continent with the largest private investment in infrastructure. However, this success must be seen in relative terms because the region has the highest rate of cancelled private investment and the largest number of contract renegotiations, which has generated high economic and political costs for governments (Engel et al., 2014). Therefore, to encourage private investment in a sustainable urban infrastructure plan involves the modernization of institutions, differentiation of roles in planning, investment promotion, contract administration and regulation in order to reduce conflicts of interest and political influence.

Although studies regarding the infrastructure gap and the relationship between infrastructure investment and economic growth have been conducted at national and international levels (Eclac, 2014; 2011; Calderon and Serven, 2004), such results cannot be extrapolated to the metropolitan areas. In this regard, it is important to move in this direction, because, in order to reverse unsustainable patterns, it is fundamental to determine the gap and know precisely the kind of deficit that metropolises experience, because a deficit at national level hidden urban heterogeneities. To move in this direction, metropolitan governments can use the methodology of Carciofi and Gaya (2007), which determines the vertical gap in infrastructure investment. With this methodology, metropolitan authorities can determine the gap and identify the type of urban infrastructure deficit.

One of the arguments developed in this chapter is that cities do not have the same behavior as countries regarding the effect of the provision of infrastructure. Because the relationship between investment and development at a metropolitan level is not univocal. LAC metropolises are characterized by high levels of inequality and residential segregation, therefore, the concentration of investment in one particular area often means ceasing to invest in other areas (Livert and Gainza, 2011). In this regard, investment planning in order to reverse urban unsustainability requires knowing precisely where to invest and how public investment can guide

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3. According to Eclac (2014) LAC invests about 3.5% GDP each year and to reduce the gap at 2020 Latin America needs to invest 6.2% of GDP.
private investment. However, the institutional challenge at a metropolitan and national level is the same, i.e., to increase the independence of the planning units and limit political influence on the planning process of infrastructure investment.

This chapter aims to generate results and arguments in support of the four criteria mentioned above. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 of the chapter critically analyzes the relationship between infrastructure investment and economic growth in LAC. Section 3 illustrates the main advantages and disadvantages of private participation in infrastructure in LAC. Section 4 identifies the vertical infrastructure gap in four metropolitan areas of LAC. Section 5 evaluates the results in the residential segregation of a planning process influenced by political factors. Section 6 presents the discussion of the four criteria aforementioned.

2 INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT: EVIDENCE FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Scholars agree that there now exists a broad consensus as to the role of infrastructure as a means to understand regional disparities (Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990). Basically, the argument has been that differences in the stock of infrastructure between regions is the basis to identify differences in productivity (Biehl, 1991; Holtz-Eakin, 1993; Glomm and Ravi Kumar, 1994). Additionally, it has been argued that investment in infrastructure would have a multiplier effect and generate positive externalities that facilitate the development of economic activities (Kessides, 1993; Deng, 2013).

The enthusiasm to invest in infrastructure is shared by the construction industry and policymakers, while the former benefits directly from public investment, the latter see the provision of infrastructure as a means to generate employment and growth in the short term, therefore it is seen as a political mechanism to increase the options for re-election (Crescenzi et al., 2016; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Esfahani et al., 2003). Such enthusiasm has also been supported in some cases by international organizations. For example, the World Bank determined that infrastructure is a key element to any strategy of territorial development, facilitating the movement of people, goods and information allowing to reduce imbalances between leaders and laggards regions (World Bank, 2009).

However, despite the existence of a broad consensus, empirical evidence has questioned the causal relationship between infrastructure investment and economic growth (Gramlich, 1994). Firstly, because causal link could be the opposite, i.e., higher growth would generate higher investment, and that is why investment would not be a driver of growth but a consequence of the level of development (Vanhouwtdt et al., 2000). Secondly, the impact of investment is not univocal, since the effect of investment depends on the quality of institutions and the original
endowment of infrastructure (Crezcenci et al., 2016, 2012; Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2015). Thirdly, each study uses different definitions of infrastructure, econometric techniques, sources of information and analysis periods, thus there is a wide range of results (Deng, 2013).

Additionally, there are plenty of empirical studies that focus exclusively on the relationship between investment and growth, omitting relevant variables, such as education, technology or quality of institutions (Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2012; Crencendi et al., 2016). For example, in the case of LAC there are systematic efforts to determine the infrastructure gap and the impact of investment infrastructure on economic growth (Perrotti and Sanchez, 2011; Fay and Morrison, 2007; Carciofi and Gaya, 2007; Calderon and Serven, 2004; Rozas and Sanchez, 2004), but there are not many studies that contrast the effect of infrastructure investment with other factors that affect the long-term economic growth, such as education or quality of institutions.

It is in this context that it has been decided to illustrate the relationship between investment in infrastructure, education and economic growth for LAC. In order to conduct the analysis, 33 countries in the region have been selected for a period of forty years (1971-2011). In model (1) the dependent variable is economic growth, the independent variables are capital spending, education and population. To determine the level of investment, the growth rate of expenditure on the construction industry and on the transport and communication were used. The variables associated with education correspond to the gross percentage of students enrolled in primary, secondary and tertiary schools. Finally, the annual population growth rate of the country was incorporated.

To estimate the relationship between the variables, an autoregressive panel data model was used $P$ in $y_{it}$ of the form

$$ y_{it} = \gamma_{1} y_{i, t-1} + \cdots + \gamma_{p} y_{i, t-p} + X_{it} \beta + \alpha_{i} + e_{it}, $$

(1)

with $y_{i, t-1}, \cdots, y_{i, t-p}$ as regressors and $X_{it}$ as a feature vector of country $i$ in $t$. Additionally, $\alpha_{i}$ is a fixed effect and $e_{it}$ is the error term. As mentioned above, the

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4. Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

5. General construction is the construction of entire dwellings, office buildings, stores and other public and utility buildings, farm buildings etc., or the construction of heavy constructions such as motorways, streets, bridges, tunnels, railways, airfields, harbours and other water projects, irrigation systems, sewerage systems, industrial facilities, pipelines and electric lines, sports facilities etc.

6. This division includes: (i) activities related to providing passenger or freight transport, whether scheduled or not, by rail, pipeline, road, water or air; (ii) supporting activities such as terminal and parking facilities, cargo handling, storage etc.; (iii) postal activities and telecommunication; (iv) renting of transport equipment with driver or operator.

7. Total enrolment in education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official education age (e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary). The indicator can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-age and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.
dependent variable $y_{it}$ is the economic growth rate of the country in $t$ and $t - 1$. In order to carry out the estimate, the Arellano-Bond estimator for dynamic panels with additional regressors was used (Cameron et al., 2010). Finally, we use two lags for economic growth within the explanatory variables ($p = 2$).

The relationship between investment, education and economic growth in LAC is shown in table 1. The results confirm the statement by the academy, in the sense that there would be a positive association between infrastructure expenditure and economic growth in LAC for the period 1971-2011. Additionally, the model (1) allows to identify how the type of infrastructure is more relevant than the volume of investment for economic growth. Since expenditure on transportation and communication infrastructure had a three-fold higher incidence in economic growth, despite the fact that construction spending includes major works, which means a greater amount of investment.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Robust standard errors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1. Economic growth (%)</td>
<td>0.0469</td>
<td>(0.0846)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2. Economic growth (%)</td>
<td>-0.129***</td>
<td>(0.0343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National population growth (%)</td>
<td>-0.520</td>
<td>(-1.061)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary gross enrolment (%)</td>
<td>0.0186</td>
<td>(0.0147)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary gross enrolment (%)</td>
<td>0.00504</td>
<td>(0.0226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary gross enrolment (%)</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
<td>(0.0334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction ISIC F (%)</td>
<td>0.109***</td>
<td>(0.0290)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport communication ISIC I(%)</td>
<td>0.360***</td>
<td>(0.0573)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.809***</td>
<td>(-3.402)</td>
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<td>Number of countries</td>
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</table>

Elaborated by the authors.

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Additionally, the results of the model (1) indicate how relevant the variable primary education for economic growth in the past decades, since a one per cent increase in the attendance at primary school had the similar effect on economic growth as the one per cent increase on construction spending. This result confirms other studies that reveal the effect of primary education in the economic growth of developing countries (Wolff and Gittleman, 1993; Loening, 2005). The latter result is provocative, because the public expenditure needed to increase school attendance by one per cent is far lower than the public expenditure needed to increase construction spending by one per cent.
Therefore, those countries that had development strategies focused on increasing coverage in primary education had an effect on productivity similar to those countries that defined their strategies through an increase in construction spending, but the first group of countries implement their strategy at a much lower cost to the public treasury.

In conclusion, investment plans seeking to reverse urban unsustainability must define what type of infrastructure has a greater effect on territorial development, because the evidence indicates that the increased volume of investment does not guarantee greater impact on the territory. Second, investment plans biased toward larger infrastructure are less convenient for the government because they are more expensive and less effective than investment plans involving other drivers of development. In other words, governments must abandon sectoral visions biased to increase investment and take up comprehensive plans that guarantee higher benefits to society at a lower cost to the public treasury (Crezenci et al., 2016). This implies improving the allocation of public resources and, in order to achieve this, Governments will have to face institutional constraints and political factors that weaken planning processes (Luca and Rodriguez-Pose, 2015; Flyvbjerg, 2009).

3 EVIDENCE OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Since the beginning of the 1990s and as part of the scholars, political and international consensus on the role of investment in infrastructure development, the countries of the region began to develop systematic efforts to attract private investment for infrastructure development in order to reduce the infrastructure gap generated in the previous decade by low investment, in the aftermath of the debt crisis (Eclac, 2014, p. 5).

The main arguments used by governments to attract private investment have been: i) an ill-conceived liberalization of fiscal resources. It has been alleged that, under budget constraint, private financing allows governments to allocate more resources to social programs (CChC, 2010); ii) private participation generates efficiency gains because, in theory, when it is the same company that builds and carries out the maintenance of the work, the company internalizes the life-cycle cost of the product during the construction phase.

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8. There is no liberalization of public resources because most projects are funded through future payments of the government. In addition, the construction cost of the project is the same under public or private provision. Finally, for the state the cost of obtaining a credit (interest rate) is much lower than for a private company, therefore it is cheaper to fund a project through public debt that through private funding.
without compromising quality service\(^9\) (Engel et al., 2009a), on the other hand, maintenance expenditure tends to be lower under the public provision because it is, politically speaking, less attractive than the development of new projects (Rioja, 2003); iii) private participation introduces competition, so the fee for the service is more efficient. Furthermore, if the project is entirely funded by users, it is possible to avoid white elephants (Bitran et al., 2010).

\(^9\) A company in charge to build and maintenance a project, it does not minimize costs in the construction phase.
After more than two decades of governmental efforts, the results indicate that LAC is the continent with the largest private investment in infrastructure with around 2,046 projects, which represents USD 987 billion, i.e., 40% of total private investment infrastructure in the world. The main investments in the region have been in telecommunications and electricity (graph 1). While, at a global level, airports, railways and water and sanitation have been the main sectors developed on the continent (graph 2). Private participation has focused its attention primarily on greenfield projects (graph 3). In comparison with other regions of the world, private participation in LAC has not been without problems, as, at an international level, the continent concentrates 55% of all private investment cancelled. In sectors such as natural gas and roadways, the region accounted for 90% and 70% of the total investment cancelled worldwide (graph 4).
On the other hand, private sector participation through public-private partnerships (PPP) has been criticized due to excessive additional costs for the governments of the region (Engel et al., 2014; Guasch, 2004). The large number of renegotiations have misrepresented the original purposes of the PPP. For example, in the case of Chile, infrastructure concession costs for the period 1993-2006 increased by 33% than originally projected, because each project was renegotiated at least three times (Engel et al., 2009b). The situation in Chile is not far from the reality in LAC. In fact, Guasch (2004) analyzed 1,000 projects in the region and concluded that in 55% of transportation projects and 74% of water and sanitation projects, the first renegotiation was carried out in the first three years.

The problem of PPPs in the region has been the result of institutional constraints and political factors that undermine the planning process. The nature of the PPP contract creates incentives for the concessionaire to renegotiate and for the State to expropriate. The problem is that under renegotiations, the concessionaire takes control of the project without a competitive process, therefore, the most efficient companies cannot compete and works end up being more expensive.

With regard to institutional weaknesses, evidence indicates that the problem is the conflict of interest and poor planning (Engel et al., 2014). It often happens that in the countries of the region, there is only one government agency responsible for planning, promoting investment, designing projects, awarding and renegotiating contracts. As this agency is evaluated by the amount of private investment developed, the authority of the agency has a bias in favor of building works instead of contract planning and regulation. Additionally, poor planning is due to the lack of independence of the unit planning. PPP projects can be used by the political authority as a means to increase the probabilities of re-election, because such projects allows governments to anticipate spending on infrastructure and evade fiscal control, since in most countries of the region such spending does not appear in the fiscal balance (Bitran et al., 2010).

4 INFRASTRUCTURE GAP IN METROPOLITAN AREAS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

As a result of consensus among scholars, policymakers and international organizations, there is abundant literature on the dimensioning of the infrastructure gap in LAC (Eclac 2014; 2011). However, at the urban level, there are no studies to determine the urban infrastructure gap at regional level. In this context, the objective of this section is to illustrate the vertical gap of urban infrastructure in LAC from the analysis of four metropolitan areas (table 2). The results show that at an aggregate level the infrastructure deficit is lower than at national level, while at an individual level, there is great heterogeneity among the selected metropolitan areas, therefore, to recommend investment plans and implementation strategies requires more information on the variables affecting metropolitan infrastructure deficits.

To identify the vertical infrastructure gap, the methodology by Carciofi and Gaya (2007) was used. They define the vertical infrastructure gap from the
relationship between supply and demand for infrastructure, considering one or more internal factors of the territory. The methodology compares the stock variation of the infrastructure (supply) to variation in demand (Perrotti and Sanchez, 2011). The assumption is that the development of infrastructure stock acts like the evolution of capital expense, whereas in order to determine the demand for infrastructure, developments in economic activity or other relevant variable is used.

This methodology has the advantage of showing in a clear and simple manner the aggregate infrastructure gap for the metropolitan areas of Bogota, Mexico City, Santiago and Sao Paulo (table 2). This is mainly because the gap is calculated as the difference between the evolution of supply and demand in a certain period of time. Due to the availability of information, the aggregate analysis is conducted for the period 2004-2010, therefore, 2004 is the base year, i.e., in 2004, the difference between supply and demand is zero. In this regard, the gap increases when demand grows faster than supply, whereas the gap decreases when supply grows faster than demand.

In contrast, this methodology has several disadvantages: i) The main problem is the difficulty to compare data at a regional level because the information comes from national accounts, therefore, the information between cities is not completely homogeneous; ii) The method reveals the amount of investment instead of the quality of infrastructure services, i.e., the method assumes that all investment is equally productive; iii) In the base year, an investment gap may have existed and omitted (Gaya and Campos, 2009).

### TABLE 2
Characteristics of selected metropolitan areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study area</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Available statistical information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bogota and area of influence</td>
<td>23 municipalities¹</td>
<td>8,446,990 (2010)</td>
<td>2000-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>16 delegations²</td>
<td>8,851,080 (2010)</td>
<td>2004-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo metropolitan area</td>
<td>39 municipalities⁴</td>
<td>19,889,559 (2010)</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Bogota and area of influence – definition of functional metropolitan areas (DNP, 2012; OECD, 2014) statistical information from National Planning Department; Mexico City – administrative definition, statistical information from National Institute of Statistics and Geography; Santiago metropolitan region – definition of functional metropolitan area (OECD, 2013), statistical information from Undersecretary of Regional Development; Sao Paulo metropolitan area – administrative definition, statistical information from Ipea.


Elaborated by the authors.
The aggregate result of the infrastructure gap for the four metropolitan areas is shown in graph 5. This graph confirms what Eclac said about the behavior of the infrastructure gap in LAC (Eclac, 2011; Perroti et al., 2011; Gaya et al., 2009) and this was that the selected metropolitan areas faced higher deficits during the expansive phase of the economy (2004-2008), whereas during economic downswings, the gap was reduced (2009-2010). It is, therefore, possible to argue that the deficit is mainly determined by demand, because supply could have a stable growth over time and the factor that determines investment is the variation of the economic activity. This confirms what is stated above regarding the challenge of planning investment in conjunction with other development drivers.

On the other hand, when comparing the infrastructure gap of the selected metropolitan areas to the existing gap in the respective countries (Eclac, 2011, 2014; Perroti et al., 2011; Gaya et al., 2009). It is possible to infer that the infrastructure gap in metropolitan areas is less than the deficit of infrastructure nationwide. Unfortunately, the aggregate analysis hides the heterogeneity of each metropolitan area, because the individual analysis takes into account the large differences between the selected metropolitan areas. On the one hand, there are metropolis without a vertical gap in infrastructure investment, but, on the other hand, there are metropolis with a large vertical gap in infrastructure investment.

The first group includes Santiago and Mexico City. These two cities do not have an infrastructure investment gap because the rate of economic growth was lower than the rate of infrastructure investment. At the other end, the second group

10. The period of analysis for Santiago is 2001-2014, whereas for Mexico City is 2004-2014.
includes São Paulo and Bogota. These two cities evince a significant investment gap. Over the past decade, these metropolises experienced sustained economic growth and very low investment.11

As can be seen in this small sample of cities, the reality of the metropolises in LAC is heterogeneous, therefore, plans and investment strategies should vary according to the type of metropolitan investment deficit. For example, metropolitan areas such as Bogotá and São Paulo require a large investment plan and an institutional strategy to ensure long-term financing. Given this scenario, metropolitan governments can review the experience of Eclac, as it has made systematic efforts to analyze and evaluate different mechanisms of infrastructure financing for LAC (Eclac, 2014; 2011; Livert-Aquino, 2011; Lucioni, 2009; Rozas, 2008; Rozas and Sánchez, 2004).

On the other hand, cities such as Santiago and Mexico City which, under this methodology, do not present a quantitative investment deficit, but problems of distribution of investment instead. This is due to the fact that these are highly unequal and segregated cities,13 where investment tends to concentrate in certain areas of the city at the expense of underinvesting in other areas (Livert and Gainza, 2011). In this context, the plan and the investment strategy must address the technical and political factors that influence the distribution and misallocation of resources.

5 METROPOLITAN INVESTMENT PLANNING: POLITICAL INFLUENCE, MISALLOCATION AND URBAN INEQUALITY

The relationship between infrastructure and development in the metropolitan areas of the region is not univocal. Firstly, because public investment provision could affect the distribution of private investment (Livert and Gainza, 2014). Secondly, because the concentration of investment in certain areas can be achieved at the expense of underinvestment in other areas (Livert and Gainza, 2011). Both features are particularly relevant in the metropolises of the region, which is characterized by high levels of inequality and residential segregation (Jordan et al., 2010). Therefore, the challenge for metropolises is to properly define the location of the investment in order to reverse patterns of inequality and segregation.

In this context, this section aims to illustrate an infrastructure planning process influenced by political factors that reinforce patterns of inequality and residential segregation. To illustrate this phenomenon, the distribution of investment in the metropolitan area of Santiago (SMA) between 2002-2014 is analyzed. The SMA has been selected

11. The period of analysis for Bogotá is 2000-2012, whereas for San Pablo is 2000-2010.
12. In theory, the risk of misallocation of public resources could be low in cities with large investment requirements because the deficit is homogeneously distributed, therefore, a great part of the project portfolio plan would obtain justification and the required social return rate.
13. In these types of cities, the challenge for planners is much higher, because the risk of misallocating investment is high, since the deficit is not evenly distributed, therefore not all projects are justified.
because this metropolis does not have a shortage of infrastructure investment (graph 6), since the investment rate was much higher than the economic growth rate (graph 7). In addition, the SMA is representative of other cities in the region, as it concentrates a large part of the country’s population\textsuperscript{14} and is the main driver of national economic\textsuperscript{15} (Villagran et al., 2013). Additionally, like other metropolitan areas in the region, the SMA has high levels of inequality and residential segregation (Jordan et al., 2010). For example, the AMS has a Gini index of 0.55, whereas Bogota, Mexico City and Sao Paulo have a Gini index of 0.62, 0.56 and 0.50, respectively (UN-Habitat, 2010).

\textbf{GRAPH 6}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Infrastructure gap index: SMA (base 2001=100)}
\end{center}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Graph6}
\caption{Infrastructure gap index: SMA (base 2001=100)}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item Infrastructure gap
\item Infrastructure stock
\item Infrastructure demand
\end{itemize}

\textbf{GRAPH 7}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Economic and infrastructure investment growth: SMA}
\end{center}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Graph7}
\caption{Economic and infrastructure investment growth: SMA}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item Infrastructure investment
\item Economic growth
\end{itemize}

Source: Subdere and Central Bank.
Elaborated by the authors.

\textsuperscript{14} SMA concentrates 40% of the national population.
\textsuperscript{15} SMA genera el 49% del PIB de Chile. SMA generates 49% of GDP in Chile.
The SMA is defined from the functional organization of 47 municipalities (OECD, 2013). At the institutional level, there is no metropolitan government, only an authority designated by the President, mayors participate only indirectly in the regional government and are democratically elected every four years by simple majority. Therefore, the SMA is managed under a highly centralized system where 47 municipalities do not participate directly in decision-making regarding investment allocation. At the regional level, the regional authority is responsible for formulating investment plans and policies for regional development and, collectively, making decisions regarding the annual allocation of the National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR) (OECD, 2009). This fund was designed for compensatory purposes and aims to finance infrastructure projects. To access the FNDR, the regional authority requires the approval of the National Investment System, which is in charge of technically assessing the benefit of each investment initiative and allocating public resources for its materialization (OECD, 2013).

To analyze the political impact on the allocation of investment and the result in residential segregation, three models were defined. The first model analyzes whether political factors affect the planning of public investment, whereas the second model analyzes whether political factors affect the distribution of private investment and the third model illustrates the relationship between the planning of public investment and the distribution of private investment. All three models allow to infer whether the investment pattern is regressive and increase residential segregation. The analysis is based on panel data and fixed effects, observations are based on annual data for the 47 municipalities for the period 2002-2014.

The dependent variable in the first model is public investment per capita, whereas the dependent variable in the second and third model is private investment in housing. Public investment is defined as infrastructure investment carried out in the municipality and which comes from FNDR. In the second and third model, the dependent variable is private investment intended for housing, which basically corresponds to the constructed square meters approved by the municipality.

The independent variables are: i) government coalition, binary variable equal to 1 when the mayor belongs to the government coalition and equal to 0 in other cases; ii) urban poverty, a variable representing the percentage of households living below the poverty line in each municipality; iii) residential density, variable that expresses the relationship between the area of the municipality and the population living in the municipality; iv) municipal staff expenses, variable representing the

16. In the metropolitan area, public investment comes from the FNDR. This fund represents about 75% of regional investment decision.
17. The procedure for municipal approval is: i) a real estate company develops a technical proposal (real estate project); ii) the municipality assesses whether the technical proposal conforms to the local standard; iii) if the project is approved, the company responsible for the real estate project must pay tax to the municipality in the concept of building permit.
annual budget allocated by the municipalities to finance the salary of professionals; 
v) communal population, a variable describing the total population at the municipal 
level. The data are official and from the National Municipal Information System.

\[ \text{Log (public investment}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{log (government coalition)}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{poverty}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{density}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{log (staff expenses)}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Population}_{it} + u_{it} \] (1)

\[ \text{Log (private_investment_residential_space}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{log (government coalition)}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{poverty}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{density}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{log (staff expenses)}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Population}_{it} + u_{it} \] (2)

\[ \text{Log (private_investment_residential_space}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{log (public investment)}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{poverty}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{density}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{log (staff expenses)}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Population}_{it} + u_{it} \] (3)

In all three models the subscript \( i \) corresponds to the 47 municipalities (\( i = 1, 2, 3 \ldots 47 \)) and \( t \) corresponds to the years (2002, 2003 \ldots 2014). Models (1) and (2) introduce the independent variable government coalition and are intended to illustrate the difference in the amount of public and private investment between municipalities when a mayor belongs to the ruling coalition. The implicit argument is that mayors belonging to the government coalition would get more resources for investment in infrastructure than mayors who do not belong to the government coalition. The model (3) seeks to analyze the relationship between public investment and private investment. The argument that led to the model (3) is that if public investment influences private investment, it is essential to ensure the independence of the planning units in order to reverse inequality and segregation patterns. Control variables, such as poverty, density, spending on municipal staff and population are used in each model.

The estimate of the relationship between political influence and distribution of public and private investment is found in table 3. According to models 1 and 2, the variable government coalition is positive and significant for the period 2002-2014. In other words, the model (1) states that mayors belonging to the government coalition received 12% more public investment in infrastructure than those mayors who did not belong to the government coalition. While the model (2) indicates that mayors belonging to the government coalition received 15% more private investment in housing than those mayors who did not belong to the government coalition.

Model (3) states that public investment in infrastructure is positively associated with new private investment in housing, i.e., when public investment increases by 1% in a particular municipality, the square meters of private investment for residential activity increase by 0.26% in the same municipality. Finally, it is possible to notice that, in each model, poverty is negatively associated with public and private investment, therefore, political influence in the allocation of public and private investment affects the metropolitan unsustainability increasing inequality and residential segregation.
TABLE 3
Relationship between political factors and public and private investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Investment</td>
<td>New residential</td>
<td>New residential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government_coalition (dummy)</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
<td>0.146*</td>
<td>0.256***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0499)</td>
<td>(0.0851)</td>
<td>(0.0714)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public investment (log)</td>
<td>-0.0135**</td>
<td>-0.0241**</td>
<td>-0.0217**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00612)</td>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
<td>(0.0104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (%)</td>
<td>-0.0135**</td>
<td>-0.0241**</td>
<td>-0.0217**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00612)</td>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
<td>(0.0104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density (nº)</td>
<td>-2.72e-05</td>
<td>1.81e-06</td>
<td>1.09e-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.45e-05)</td>
<td>(5.90e-05)</td>
<td>(5.83e-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending_salary (Log)</td>
<td>0.0692</td>
<td>0.0919</td>
<td>0.0285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0902)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (nº)</td>
<td>3.99e-06</td>
<td>-5.49e-06</td>
<td>-5.67e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.63e-06)</td>
<td>(4.51e-06)</td>
<td>(4.44e-06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>13.44***</td>
<td>11.03***</td>
<td>7.675***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
<td>(0.633)</td>
<td>(-1.150)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 607 611 607
Number of municipalities 47 47 47
R-squared 0.037 0.018 0.036

Elaborated by the authors.
Obs.: (Standard errors)*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In conclusion, the results allow us to establish how political factors influence public investment planning and private investment distribution, and how public and private investment planning had a regressive effect on the SMA, since it helped increase urban inequality and residential segregation. Therefore, it is possible to demonstrate the impact of misallocation of public investment and a skewed distribution of private investment. These results have direct political implications in the development of institutional improvement and investment planning.

In this context, many studies that have analyzed inequality and residential segregation in SMA recommend the creation of a metropolitan government to address inequality and residential segregation (OECD, 2013; Livert and Gainza, 2013, 2011; Jordan et al., 2010). However, apparently this is not just a matter of generating a new system of governance, but also an institutional design that ensures greater independence to the planning unit and limits political influence in the planning process.
6 FINAL COMMENTS

The aim of this chapter is to reduce the optimistic bias with regard to the role of infrastructure investment, and therefore a special emphasis has been put on the problems of distribution and allocation of public resources. The argument has been that a higher investment in infrastructure alone does not guarantee that the unsustainability of cities will be reversed and, for this is why examples relating to the provision at the national or the metropolitan scale under the scheme of public financing or public-private have been developed, and in each of these examples, public institutions are shown as weak and easily influenced. In this regard, the recommendations have been to increase the independence of the planning units, determine the infrastructure gap, plan investment more comprehensively taking into account other drivers of regional development and create institutional measures to increase the efficiency of private participation.

The problems of allocation and distribution of investment can be the product of construction industry lobby or political influence. In the first case, public investment growth is directly associated with the variation of the profits of the construction sector, and therefore, it is reasonable to infer that this sector is interested in an increase in investment and not necessarily in the location of the investment. The construction union can influence the government in various ways: 

i) financing political campaigns; ii) refusing to participate in public tendering; iii) delaying awarded projects; iv) seeking renegotiations with the associated political cost. For example, In Colombia, the construction of one million free public housing was approved in record time in 2012, and with very few observations by the Parliament due to lobbying by construction companies (Gilbert, 2014, p. 256). In Brazil, the construction union defined the rules for participation in the PPP; the PPP Act of 2004 limited the participation of foreign companies in PPP tenders in the transport sector (Portugal, 2010, p. 36-37).

On the other hand, political influence is biased towards the increase and distribution of new investment, because new projects improve the chances of re-election since a new public work provides the political authority with higher visibility to the electorate. For example, between 1979 and 1984, the Brazilian government paved 6,000 new kilometers of its roads and, in the same period, it stopped performing maintenance on another 8,000 kilometers of road, finishing in 1985 with a poorer quality of infrastructure (Harral, 1987). The partisan political bias in the distribution of public investment can be related with electoral cycle, prevalence of investments in certain territories or political favoritism towards population subgroups (Golden and Min, 2013). At the regional level, there is evidence of political bias in Argentina (Calvo and Murillo, 2004), Brazil (Ames, 2009), Colombia (Crisp and Ingall, 2002), Mexico (Magaloni, 2006) and Peru (Shady, 2000).
In this context, the territorial planning model that prevails in LAC raises a number of challenges for the New Urban Agenda (NUA), which is oriented to the consolidation of inclusive and sustainable cities. The analysis indicates that it is necessary to make advances in equity policies and metropolitan governance. This poses a greater challenge for governments because urbanization in LAC is due to economic instability, high incidence of poverty and inequality, social conflicts, democratic transition processes and strengthening institutions (UN-Habitat 2016). Therefore, in order to reverse urban unsustainability, new planning models including financing schemes and multilevel governance models need to be developed, and thus balancing the interests of the actors involved and the public resources available. In this regard, the NUA will become an appropriate roadmap built under a rights-based approach to the city. This means ensuring equitable profit of the city, recognition of the territory as the linchpin and the incorporation of social inclusion and sustainability as guiding planning principles.

Throughout this chapter, we have pointed out the need to plan the investment with other drivers of the economy since sustainable provision of infrastructure can only be done when there are integrated and long-term visions in the territory. This will involve political will at all levels to establish binding agreements and sectoral cooperation, and national legislation on development and land use planning, allowing to plan and manage urban development in alignment with the characteristics of the territory and the national development strategy.

Additionally, a comprehensive vision of urban development requires innovative financing strategies. For this reason NUA should define financial participation schemes to ensure comprehensive financing plans and long-term development, with special emphasis on investment in areas with high marginalization and extreme poverty (UN-Habitat 2016). In this regard, we consider private investment as a constituent element of cities, however, in this chapter, we have argued that private participation should depend on criteria of economic efficiency and be alienated to the planning of public investment.

Finally, our diagnosis reveals institutional weakness for planning and urban governance. This diagnosis is shared by the governments of the region which, in recent decades, have been developing a gradual process of decentralization of powers and resources to sub-national and local governments, which has had mixed results, mainly because the transfer of resources has not been coupled with an institutional strengthening at a sub-national or local level. The reason for this is that the regulatory framework responsible for protecting the public interest in cities has not led to citizen participation, which runs counter to the natural interest of organized society to participate in the design and monitoring of plans and urban policies. In addition, local governments (metropolitan or sub-national) have not developed
appropriate information and communication technological tools to support the sizing of underinvestment and planning, which would ensure efficient delivery of urban services and allow the rational use of resources.

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______. Ciudades Habitables e Inclusivas: El reto global de las urbanización soste


Part 2

Geopolitics of Cities and Participatory Local Governance
CHAPTER 6

CITY DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL AGENDAS, LOCAL AGREEMENTS

Renato Balbim

1 INTRODUCTION

This article aims at analyzing the strengthening of network cooperation between cities inaugurating new forms of diplomacy in the second half of the twentieth century. The main objective being to shed light on diplomatic relations between cities that have been established since the early 20th century and having gained prominence in the latest twenty years.

Since 1980 the neoliberal policies of nation-states has boosted the direct action of cities, social movements and NGOs in the search for local solutions to global city problems. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a growing presence of a broad range of financial capitals in special investment funds as a key player to shaping the future of cities matching global goals. This being either due to direct investments or through banks and international agencies, global agreements and goals that conform to principles of investment, with an emphasis in developing countries.

The existence at the global level of a new space of tensions and ventures is verified. Geopolitics is kept alive by the clash between institutions from different scales: global organizations, national states and also local powers represented or not in transnational networks.

In this new scenario several questions arise, among them being: do the local powers – i.e.: cities – represent a potential solution for contemporary global challenges? Do they undercut the near-monopoly of the national states on diplomacy? Do these often-ignored “subnational” players provide a new form of international negotiation? In this article we share along with other authors some of these issues and questions that are increasingly imposed on the international scene.

To reach these goals the UN Habitat Conferences was analyzed, a process that started in 1976. Aiming in particular at revealing the preparation processes by the various nations and in particular in the case of Brazil, for the United Nations

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1. This article is a partial result of my postdoctoral program at UCI.
2. Senior Researcher at Ipea. Post Doctorate at University of California Irvine (UCI).
Habitat III Conference which is to be held in Quito, Ecuador, in October, 2016. This conference will be the first to be organized in the framework as the Post 2015 Development Agenda and should reveal the relative strength of local governments in a geopolitical setting.

This conference aims towards an historic revitalization of the two previous conferences that were held in Vancouver (1976) and Istanbul (1996), both being relevant in worldwide urbanization scenarios. Topics such as the accelerated global urbanization process, the right to housing and, currently, the “right to the city” will all be handled towards the scale of nations and their impact on the establishment of policies, as well as multilateral programs, such as multilateral financing and development programs.

By recognizing the main role of cities in world development engines, we also notice how new democratic participative forms, empowered by New Technologies of Information and Communication (NTCI) are reinforcing the local “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 1986).

To reveal these goals this chapter has been divided into seven parts, including this introduction. The second part is a scenario of the actual urbanization of the world. Then we will introduce the third part where the concept of city diplomacy is clarified. We then move forward to discuss the first two United Nations Conferences Habitat and the concept of right to the city. Following on after that, the new geopolitics of cities are designed, exhibiting some data and actual information about city networks, which thus provide various forms of social capital in the global dispute relating to the contest of powers. The last two parts of this chapter deals with, the right to the city as the main subject along with the preparation for a New Urban Agenda and the background to show the preparation of countries towards Quito. We will also discuss unequal global urbanization and further social production of the city, a new city idea, for which a new form of diplomacy must be built to guide the geopolitical scenario setting that is outlined by the principles that have been listed.

2 WORLD URBANIZATION

2.1 Principles
The urban space is a social outcome, the result of an historical process, an unequal accumulation of time (Santos, 1997). The space is also a presupposition and a milieu of social production. From this perspective urban spatiality – cities – represent the crystallization of earlier patterns and also the possibilities towards future events that were brought up previously. The spatial configuration and the territory, are the key to read the past, learn the present and to envisage the future.
A similar proposition is stated by David Harvey (1978), allowing the path for Brenner (2004) and driving the way for a new conception of urban governance where cities and nation-states share new international decision arenas. With Brenner’s conception, the states spatial process under capitalism is as much like the geography of the city,

the geography of state spatiality must be viewed as a presupposition, an arena and an outcome of continually changing social relations. (...) The traditional Westphalian image of states as being located within static, self-contained territorial arenas must thus be replaced by a dialectical, processual analysis of how historically specific configurations of state space are produced and incessantly reworked through sociopolitical struggles (Brenner, 2004. p. 451).

Once the global urbanization process is produced and starts occurring on different scales, the configuration of “state space” (governance, in some way) will be in progress. This being a type of mutational organization involving cities, metropolis, regions, states, nations and supranational regions and organizations impacting on each other. That then forms and conforms the geographical space, a system of objects and actions, fixes and flows, being presented in a dialectical way to ensure maximization and capital reproduction.

In particular, after the Second World War “state space” began to invest massively in infrastructures to ensure capital circulation and social reproduction. In the territory, the implementation of different densities of objects (such as infrastructure and equipment) and actions (communication, capital flows etc.) promote a hierarchical system of cities which set up capitalist accumulation, assuring combined and unequal development (Smith, 2002). Accordingly, “state space” works for capital accumulation driving urban growth and expansion. “Consequently, urban governance must be viewed as a key institutional arena in which states attempt to influence the geographies of capital accumulation and everyday social reproduction within their territories” (Brenner, 2004. p. 457).

2.2 The process
We live in a new urban era when for the very first time more than half of the world’s population lives in towns and cities. Cities are growing and growing and urbanization is irreversible. This seems to be common sense but this process has nuances and a strong variance.

4. Among other clear examples that could reveal this analysis see: French promotion of megapolization in Ile-de-France during the 1980s. Brazil federal government promoting a metropolis system to improve the capital circulation in the 1970s. The Dutch spatial planning towards the Randstad megapolis in the 1980s.
Each city grows along its own socio-spatial formation process, following specific historical, economic, cultural and geographic circumstances. This is a multiscale process. At the local level some variables are reinforced such as the morphology and daily life. Following along the same path each city grows and participates in the global capitalistic system. The nation-state is a mediation between the global and the local “state space” playing different roles in each period. For these reasons many cities could decline or just become ghost towns while others could experience strong growth. At this moment of globalization the signs of an international production mode (local, regional and on a global scale) become progressively unglued from those who should be their first beneficiaries.

In 1950, one-third of the world’s people lived in cities. Just fifty years later, this rose to one-half and will continue to grow to two-thirds, or 6 billion people living in cities by 2050. This happens via many different means across the world. This also occurs many times in similar forms following an organized process. Or even worse, it occurs in similar ways following the perverse logics issued as the result of “corporative urbanization” (Santos, 1994).

At different times in each country, from the 1950s until 1980, the world experienced its most intense industrialization process. Cities were being rebuilt and new cities emerged enabling growing industrial production. The industrial modern city, welfare state, full employment, urban zoning, large housing estates and the automobile commanded and organized the production of functional cities. The intention was to enable through urban reforms, the reproduction of the labor force and increase consumption, including access to basic equipment and transport infrastructure. As of yet this has not been deployed into full force everywhere.

The rapid urbanization that the Americas and Europe met in the second half of the twentieth century had migration from rural areas as its largest booster, a movement which today is relatively stable in these areas. Nowadays, the most urbanized regions include Northern America (82% living in urban areas in 2014), Latin America and the Caribbean (80%), and Europe (73%). In contrast, we found a similar volume of migratory movements occurring at this moment in Asia and Africa. However, both processes are completely different. These two major regions in the world remain mostly rural with 40 and 48 per cent of their respective populations living in urban areas.

This being equal to what happened in the past in Europe and America. Africa and Asia now have very high flows of urbanization motivated largely by migration from rural areas. Specifically like as what happened in Latin America these accelerated migration flows settle on the precarious peripheries of the biggest cities.
As an economic process, these two moments could have some similarities, however, particularly in Africa wars and natural disasters have multiplied and intensified in recent decades. This being one of the reasons the world needs to include the deepening inequalities, not only resulting from economic issues, that are impacting upon migration.

In addition, as the graph above depicts, one must consider that in Africa the poorer countries have a lower current urban population, but they are the biggest
part of countries and they also have greater annual rates of urbanization. What that means is that the more intense and rapid urbanization not only happens on the poorest and most vulnerable continent in the world, but is also being concentrated in extremely poor countries of this region, and essentially happening in rural-based areas much more rapidly.

In these countries conflicts over land ownership, which still has not overcome the traumas of colonization, marked by international territorial disputes over mineral resources is the engine that drives huge masses of people to the cities.

Continual population growth and urbanization are projected to add 2.5 billion people to the world’s urban population by 2050, with nearly 90% of the increase being concentrated in Asia and Africa. But in which cities will these people live in?

Today, close to half of the world’s urban dwellers reside in relatively small settlements of less than 500,000 inhabitants. While only around 12% live in the 28 megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants. However, this is changing and it is changing fast, very fast.

Several decades ago most of the world’s largest urban agglomerations were found in the more developed regions. Today’s many large cities are concentrated in the South. The fastest growing urban agglomerations are located in medium-sized cities with less than one million inhabitants in Asia and Africa. In the very near future the present medium sized cities will become the new megacities.

Currently there are 28 cities in the world with over 10 million inhabitants, totaling 471 million people. Of these, twelve are in Asia (totaling 51% of this population), six in Africa (17%), four in Europe (10%), three in North America (11%) and the other three are in South America (11%). In 2030 this scenario will become greater. In total there will be 41 cities with more than 10 million inhabitants, totaling a population of 730 million people, a 36% increase in just fifteen years. Asia and Africa will respond to the higher growth of millionaire cities, with eleven new megacities taking place.

In Asia there will be twenty cities with over 10 million inhabitants, 52% of the total population living in millionaire cities, this being a somewhat absolute and relative increase. The case of Africa is even more pronounced. In 2030 Africa will total nine megacities which together will correspond to 23% of the population living in big cities. The Americas and Europe have a much more stable situation. In relative terms the participation of these continents to the total population of millionaires’ cities will decline. There will be five cities in South America (10%), four in Europe (7%) and three in North America (8%).

In conclusion, the current world pattern of urbanization generates: megacities and mega-problems. The precarious settlements, the slums, are the clearest picture of this urban nightmare that we live in. According to UN Habitat,

by 2030, about 3 billion people, or about 40% of the world’s population, will need proper housing and access to basic infrastructure and services such as water and sanitation systems. This translates into the need to complete a hundred thousand housing units per day with serviced and documented land from now till 2030 (...). In some cities, up to 80 percent of the population lives in slums. Africa, also Latin America, and the Caribbean have a slum population of a hundred million each, Asia has more than 500 million (UN Habitat).  

How will this keep happening? Following the same pattern of urbanization? Which type of funding will support this development? Who are the actors capable to change this pattern? What could be the role of the cities cooperation in a context of global and corporative agreements? How could cities influence the global forces and global capital reproduction in a new fashion? As you can see we have many questions to be answered.

2.3 Toward new urban patterns

In recent years the world has shown that exclusion, poverty, and inequalities are no longer exclusive to the global south. Nowadays, it is possible to find slums internationally, for example, in Spain, a country where six hundred thousand people were dispossessed of their homes during 2008 crisis. Following the US Census Bureau more than 45 million people, or 15% of all Americans, lived below the poverty line last year. Precarious settlements, homelessness and housing deficits are nowadays a constant worldwide.

We believe and advocate slums or favelas as we call them in Brazil which must be a part of the solutions in a new city. If we just view the slums as a problem to be solved the reproduction of the same patterns of urbanization is assured and the “planet slum” will no longer only be science-fiction but a reality.

With one foot in the past recognizing the existence and the dimension of unequal distribution of urban wealth and looking towards the future, we try to demonstrate that the social production of the city is the only way to change the urban global pattern. Changing the cities policies and increasing the participatory process, especially of slums (re)urbanization, it is then possible to think of a city that is not exclusively made to maximize capital reproduction, but a city made by and for citizens.

6. In this regard, see: <http://unhabitat.org/urban-themes/housing-slum-upgrading/>. 
In this chapter we advocate that the social production of the city— the right to the city— is the only way to deal with the force of capitalist accumulation in a fairer way. Diverging from social grounded forces we believed it is possible to create “corporative movements” and organizations, such as organized capital corporative interest. But in this way the corporative interest needs to represent the majority living in the city. The startup can be relatively easy, and happens daily worldwide. The utopia in this case is to build a system of city production based on space use value and not exclusively on space exchange value (Lefebvre, 1974).

The physical upgrading of slums, including housing improvement, creation of street networks and infrastructure systems makes economic and social sense. Once the process is accompanied and secured by community involvement in a participatory process, the transformations could be multiplied and the citizenship can overflow into other dimensions of daily life.

Economically, upgraded slums trigger local economic development, improve urban mobility, and bring in a new economically productive sphere, opening the interaction between slums and city exchanges. Socially, upgraded slums improve the physical living conditions, quality of life, and access to services and opportunities for their inhabitants. Symbolically, upgraded slums will create an address and legal security of tenure, changing the way people look forward. Also, by having access to local and small credit, it could change all possibilities available for a family and their community.

However, the goal should not be to simply transform favelas according to the formal city standards and regulations. If we just keep following the same old script and rules of international organizations, which means, to only play the underway process that already exists, we still end up supporting the process of differentiation and segregation between formal and informal city.

When precarious urbanization is no longer the exception to the rule, and when slums cease to be a problem in itself and start to be seen as part of a solution, new mechanisms, regulations, consumption patterns and habits have to be interpreted, understood, valued and (re)created in an organized manner, a sort of social corporative action. Only a new look at urban planning could cope with the worlds gentrification interests and mechanisms.

7. Social production of the city means the various forms of space production involving a greater or lesser extent formal circuits of the economy, whether public or private, but keeping the process organization, the main guidelines project definition, implementation control and use and ownership rules and mechanisms in the hands of collective organization, city dwellers building their own life space.

8. The social production of the city should not be taken as a synonym of the right to the city. Instead, it could be viewed as a set of tactics (or practices) and as such it could contribute to a path toward the right to the city, a path that gives special attention to the growth of autonomy in the production of the city. I would like to thank Cleandro Krause for the comment above.
If we could summarize the actual scenario of world urbanization the following points seems to be the most important: the world is still undergoing rapid urbanization; urbanization is increasingly concentrated in megacities; Africa and Asia nowadays repeat the same curves of urbanization as the Americas and Europe in the second half of the twentieth century; this process is similar to Latin America, uneven and combined (Smith, 2002), with socio spatial segregation and inequality.

In addition, we have profound differences between the world urbanized in the twentieth century and the current that is in process in the twenty-first century: climate changes; time-space compression and the whole influence of new technologies; very strong corporate powers and new networks; the end of the welfare state as the motor of development; violence, fundamentalism and terrorism, all reinforce the challenges of urban processes worldwide.

Looking at the actual global urbanization boom it seems more actual than ever to ask some questions such as: Who defines the design of urban projects? The architect, the planner, or the capital? The projects of new cities, like all projects, carries intention. The capitalistic intention is to maximize profit and concentrate wealth. The production of space reveals this logic in the areas selected by the logic of globalization to build new cities and to apply a *laisser faire attitude* in the development of new precarious settlements.

Neil Smith maintains that the subsequent erosion of the national scale as the primary agent in the process of capitalism created a pivotal link between the global and urban scales. Since the 1990s, the increasingly integrated global economy has given greater importance to the role of the city. Indeed, world city building has become a strong geopolitical force of capitalism. New spaces of accumulation in Asia, Latin America and Africa are gaining competitive advantages as new centers of command and control of surplus capital.

However, it is relevant to remember that modern cities were always created and remodeled as a strategy of accumulation. The main role of industry and financial capital can be demonstrated with Cèrda in Barcelona, Haussmann in Paris or Moses in New York. These urbanists had to work with the creation new financial mechanism to support their urban transformation projects, and in the same way to develop the whole economy of their nation.

The transformations of capitalism in a complex global financial system impose the question of who keeps up with the financial system nowadays. The urban space seems to be designed by technocrats for exclusive services of city modernization or additionally to rescue the valorization of capital. For Lefebvre (1974) this represented the negation of everything that the city held most positively: meeting, diversity, unpredictability, the city production by the means of usage and the right to the city.
The actual global urbanization boom or the urbanization in the era of neoliberalism profit by taking advantage of some of these conditions worldwide. Many of these conditions, technology, financial systems, state regulation, were published by authors such as Milton Santos, Doreen Massey, David Harvey, Alain Lipietz and Neil Smith.

We require the technology to build the new “spaces of globalization” (Santos, 1994), special skyscrapers and the revitalization of big areas such as waterfronts. What is also needed too is the revitalization of central areas, urban restructuring through creative destruction, the expropriation and the displacement of original dwellers, or as David Harvey called it, the “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2014) is everywhere. The biggest companies of construction also ensure the gathering of specialized labor forces, including entire teams for all the steps of a project that is not only physical, but also teams for viability and management of the projects, advocates, lawyers, financiers, engineering etc., besides the traditional labor force.

Jointly and across the world the global financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, etc.) arrange and organize the credit and the warranty for capital-surplus production and absorption. The lower regulation of national capital, the privatization of development banks and the decentralization of state economic capacity to local governments associated with global agencies are examples of the creation of a new space of accumulation, the cities.

Also, and most importantly, to secure the conditions of global capital assurance new governance forms are created, such as Public Private Partnership. There are also the guarantee of access to land, adaptation of laws and regulations, particularly environmental, etc.

In many ways, it is possible to advocate that the actual internationalization of cities is a result of the “urbanization of neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The Habitat II Conference in 1996, as we will see, was a milestone in this process producing the principles of a new city where the nation-state begins to share with local governments and civil society, an important part of urban policies and regulations. From then on the international agencies and development banks start a new strategy associated with international funds to directly support at a local level, urban improvements necessary for global capital accumulation.

Urban planning without social equity is like playing chess without the queen.9 However, the issue of unequal and corporative urbanization producing the segregation between a superclass, workers or middle class and the biggest part of dwellers excluded from urban wealth will not be solved only advocating for urban participatory causes. The conditions of the territory (Santos, 1997), the production of spaces (Lefebvre, 1974), the form of agglomeration economies, the infrastructural configurations, transportation and communications networks,

the social and spatial division of labor, the local culture, the everyday life all conform to the geographic space. Also too, space is the place of resistance to the global forces of accumulation (Santos, 1994). The last space where the resistance could be founded is inside the precarious settlements, where planning, design and social control could even be made by citizens to citizens.

In either case, although large parts of dwellers don’t profit from urban wealth, the capital accumulation needs not only to maximize their profits, but also manage a middle class to stabilize the democracy and the institutions in different countries, especially in the periphery of capitalism.

Including these elements in the same perspective, capital accumulation becomes the planner and the constructor of cities. However the result is not a usual city, it is a super city, a city made for the “super class”, this small percentage of people controlling the biggest part of capital in the world. To finalize that orchestration these new global spaces must be accepted by a relative majority believing that they will benefit themselves from these super spaces. Therefore, the capital created a marketing of cities to build intentions, needs, symbolic values (world games and festivals – global architecture).

Thus, from the new methodologies of the World Bank, launched at the beginning of the 1990s (1992 – New Urban Management Program – World Bank), and following the principles of neoliberalism, mutual funds became part of development banks that lend resources to national and local governments and banks to lend directly to families, without any need for a housing policy.

The neoliberalism urban ideology is that the opportunity cost determines the amount lent to the families. They buy new homes from the large companies which gradually internationalize. The middle classes in ascendancy constitutes a mass of new consumers, not necessarily citizens. Recalling again Santos, these are those of the imperfect condition of citizens and build more than perfect consumers (Santos, 1990).

This process heightened in the 2000s reveals its great success. Cities like New Kilamba, Angola, are a perfect example. That is a large housing development built by the China International Trust and Investment Corporation. The total cost, US$ 3.5 billion, is repaid with oil. People who will live there are what the World Bank called “bankable” to explain the whole access of credit, to buy a car, to buy furniture, to create a new lifestyle. This is not the right to the city, this is just capitalism mimicking the modern cities to maximize their profits, the imperfect citizen transformed into the “plus than perfect consumer” (Santos, 1990).

They are cities arising from financial capitals need to create new spaces to absorb an incredibly high accumulation. This is infinitely multiplied in its global games (Smith, 2002). There are countless examples of ghost towns in Mexico, taken by drug cartels. Peripheral block apartments through massive housing policies have
been built in Brazil or South Africa. In China, cities such as Daila with vast empty skyscrapers are waiting for migratory movements to be imposed by the central state.

Recalling the fables of Mariovaldo, by Italo Calvino, in Asia, Latin America and also Africa new “cities” emerge like mushrooms. These cities respond to global financial capital interests, not entering into industrial land planning as in the previous period. The logic is first towards the financial profits, the stock market, derivatives that one day find a place to take root.

“The perpetual need to find profitable terrains for capital-surplus production and absorption shapes the politics of capitalism”. And also as a result it shapes the city. “If there is not enough purchasing power in the market, then new markets must be found by expanding foreign trade, promoting novel products and lifestyles, creating new credit instruments, and debt-financing state and private expenditures” (Harvey, 2008, p. 24).

As can be seen, the spatial forms are produced by agents and capitalist structures (banks, funds, agencies) in relation to sectors that hold land ownership. By joining selected groups of designers, urbanists, architects, etc. and the public sector, an articulation to carry out a flow of development and to select places according to specific models are formed.

The financing role of banks and agencies as a universal policy becomes an instrument towards new colonization and the deep control of the urban space production, as a new commodity. Thus, the merchandise cities are increasingly becoming objects of state and corporate diplomacy.

FIGURE 1
Urban sprawl


“We’re waiting for the city to come to us…”
From the late 1980s globalization has increased the importance of large corporations across the nation-states to the point that some authors preach “the end of history”. “The victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete” (Fukuyama, 1989. p. 1).

However, after seventeen years, the paroxysm denounced by Fukuyama to explain the time of the Cold War involving ideological violence, absolutism, fascism, and updated forms of Marxism seems to not have disappeared, also the Nation States and the history.

Nation States work together with these giant corporations, who also often struggle against the new common global enemy: terrorism. The globalized democratic ideology justifies and ensure these events to fill the conferences and meetings of Foreign Affair’s where corporations gained power, as well as local governments and ground movements, or perhaps not.

Moreover, increasingly accentuated inequality is evident around the world, and a small number of people are now under control of a substantial part of global wealth, determining and controlling the development on a global scale.

Recently David Rothkopf, in his controversial book about global governance exposed the superclass’ disproportionate influence over national policy. Perhaps many social scientists don’t agree with the whole argument. Anyway, Rothkopf does not spare the reader with information about the concentration of wealth and power. Regarding subsidiary companies, for example, in 1960 the headquarters had an average of 100 subsidiaries. Nowadays they have 10,000. The top ten US corporations generate 60% of the revenue and employs 59% of the worlds force overseas. The 250 biggest companies’ sales are equivalent to 1/3 of the global GDP, with the 50 biggest having U$ 48,5 trillion of assets in the world or 1/3 of all assets in the world. The board of the 5 biggest companies in the US consists of a group of 70 persons serving on the board of another 150 of the largest companies in the world and in 25 of the most important universities. Also, following the Global Wealth Report of 2015 from Credit Suisse, the top 1% of wealth holders now own half of all household wealth.

The new class controlling the world is a smaller group in charge and the question is what connects these elite to the ordinary billions of people in the world? What mechanisms should be strengthened or created to democratize global governance? Which new agents will appear in this scenario? What existent crisis, in particular the environmental, could make this balance change?

If it is in the cities where wealth is produced with greater intensity and accumulates in various ways, then this is also the same city where poverty expands as well as higher energy costs and environmental crises deepens.

The city is the place of meeting (Lefebvre, 1974), a place of solidary actions (Santos, 1997), an essential place of contradictions and differences conviviality. Seen in these terms, could the cities come to play a role of resistance in a geopolitical scenario?

What are the effective limits to treat urban issues in a globalized world without the existence of an international alliance of cities? What governance needs to deal with the cities issues? Why from the beginning of the twentieth century is the internationalism of cities was set aside by Nation States? How can the emergence of other actors in the sphere of international negotiations strengthen the role of cities in the articulation of global policies? What could be the guidance of social movements to contribute to build a system based in local power or in your improvement? How could cities position themselves ahead of corporations? Could the nation states (re)create a new diplomatic power jointly for cities? How might nations and corporations use local diplomacy as a kind of soft power? What are the relations between soft and local diplomacy?

3 CITY DIPLOMACY OR PARADIPLOMACY

International studies have long been limiting the consideration of cities to a subjected position that is met with assumptions of “separateness, discontinuity and exclusivity”, which have placed the city as a mere subset of the nation. Until recently there was a general lack, at least in the international literature if not more broadly, of studies capable of demonstrating that cities “are not passive spaces suffering the indiscriminate exercise of top-down logics” (Acuto, 2013. p. 289).

There are too many questions to formulate and also some answers to be revealed where city diplomacy goes on inaugurating new international political arenas and networks. In any case it must begin by understanding the moment when modern city diplomacy was born and how the nation states got the absolute priority over the definition of political foreign relations.

The diplomatic relations between cities precedes the conception of international relations of modern states, in particular to establish the balance between regions. Before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the supremacy of the regular diplomatic missions was established between cities such as Athens, Milan, Vienna and Venice. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna, which ended the Napoleonic wars and reestablished national borders in Europe, made it quite clear that the preservation of peace was associated to the assurance of geographic boundaries that determine the desired balance of power and military sovereignty over the territories. Thus, cities are no longer part of international diplomatic relations giving way to national hegemony based on the territory and borders, along with currency and military power.
Even if territory hegemony, hard power, military games, financial control, boundaries, trade and other subjects were under the modern nation states control, the most relevant cities in the world, the metropolises, the “city-states”, still played an important role in the development of nations and cultures.

What should be highlight, for example, is the important role of Universal Expositions for the internationalism of cities. The issue of global industrialization was demonstrated in the French Industrial Exposition of 1844, revealing to the world the new modern life style, born and raised in a metropolis. In 1851 the first World Expo – Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations – was held in Hyde Park, London. After that the World’s Expo influenced the development of several aspects of society, urban life style including art, design, education, trade and technologies. In 1889 Paris held their 4th Expo during the 100th anniversary of the storming of the Bastille. The exposition reconfigured Paris, projecting the city even more as a global metropolis (among others city’s works Paris built the Champs de Mars, Trocadero, Tour Eiffel, Quai d’Orsay and the Invalides Esplanade). Among other Universal Expositions we must note the 1915 San Diego Exposition, 1922 Rio de Janeiro, 1933 Chicago, 1970 Osaka, and recently the 1992 Seville Expo. Each one showcased legacies to the world not only in new urban forms, but also a new life style and an insertion of cities among global diplomacy.

The theme of the construction of cities was released in 1910 in the Town Planning Conference organized by the Royal Institute of British Architects. Likewise, according to the views of urban policy, conferences and international meetings already had been happening since the beginning of the century.

Des réunions “internationales” d’élus ou d’administrateurs municipaux avaient aussi été conviées précédemment, comme à Chicago en septembre 1909 (Congrès et exposition Internationale et Municipale) ou à Düsseldorf en Septembre 1912 (dans le cadre de la Städte Astellung), ou envisagée comme à Bruxelles en 1905 (Saunier and Payre, 2004. p. 4).

In any case, as presented by Saunier and Payre (2004) the internationalism of cities, even before the formation of the League of Nations, which preceded the United Nations, has always been an issue and an international cooperation quite opposed by nations. The unification of territories, race, identities and even the language needed to be raised and be strengthened beyond the walls of cities. At all events, either by understanding the corporate field of diplomacy, or as a result of geopolitical factors, the primacy of international relations in the modern states has always been associated with the nations.

As we shall see, democracy as a peaceful relationship between people and cities will mark the establishment of city diplomacy throughout the twentieth century. Already urban techniques and urbanization as science are key issues in the strategies of cities, states, companies, banks and multilateral organizations that become involved in the field of international cooperation between cities.
Or in other words, the creation of a global market for services and urban solutions is a diplomatic issue that solidifies interested nations and companies.

Whether in the social sciences, politics, economics or in international and multilateral organizations, cities not only become the object of research but also instruments of strategies of capitalistic development. Cities have become relevant actors in this development. Since the launch of the book “Cities in Evolution” (Geddes, 1915), to the effective recognition of the global role of cities with “The World Cities” (Hall, 1966), the urban world not only grew, but turned to mimicking the capitalist territorial essence: unequal and combined as we know in the current period, along with being highly concentrated.

Rogier van der Pluijm (2007), in his foundation paper about City Diplomacy, advocated that since the end of the Second World War, actors other than states have entered the diplomatic field. In his opinion this is the beginning of the diplomacy between cities. However, as we advocate, the new relations between cities in the international scale has been organized at least since 1913. In the definition of Pluijim,

the concept of city diplomacy (is) defined as the institutions and processes by which cities, or local governments in general, engage in relations with actors on an international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interests to one another (Pluijim, 2007, p. 6).

In his vision, city diplomacy is a professional, pragmatic and upcoming diplomatic activity. The concept definition associates city diplomacy as a new branch of formal diplomacy.

In my own opinion, the diplomacy established by cities however is more than the recognition of a new field in a formal activity. Democracy, peace, and social participation were the subjects not only inspiring cities friendships. Urban technologies and planning form a new field of ventures that require innovative ways of governance and the formalization of relations depending on the subjects, but mainly due to the different and multiple stakeholders involved.

In general, the key themes of city diplomacy could be summarized in the following six items: peace and solidarity among peoples; democracy and local governance; security and social conflicts; minorities human rights; technical cooperation (innovation, technologies, best practices, bilateral solutions); environment (particularly water and waste), mobility and transport; culture and historic heritage (smart cities and city marketing).

12. The first author to speak in world cities.
Looking at documents and at the turning points of change we could say that the development of City Diplomacy as a political field has four phases. From 1913 to 1945 it’s a proto-diplomacy. Between 1945 and 1976 was the moment of Cities for Peace. From 1976 until 2000 the City Diplomacy is recognized by states. Finally, the actual phase from 2000 is marked by the city as a commodity in both diplomatic, and corporate international relations.
Just to indicate the probable correlations to be analyzed in the future, Google Books Ngram Viewer reveals the term local diplomacy has already been used since the nineteenth century. Already the most used terms in international relations (diplomacy and paradiplomacy city) present graphs that corroborate the periods covered here, or at least reveal something that can be seen as an impact towards the important moments indicated in bibliographic production.

The term – city diplomacy – began to be used post World War 2 until almost 1960. This was the most intense moment for the reconstruction of cities, innovation exchange and the search for a new global peace. However the term paradiplomacy began to be used a little later and it is quoted in books from the mid-1960. Between the years 1960 and 1970, with the height of the Cold War, the oil crisis and other major global important movements reveal almost the nonexistence of scientific and literary production about local diplomacy. This corresponds to the time when national governments wielded enormous power in all international issues. In the neoliberalism period, when cities and ground movements are called to divide the development efforts, new terms as city diplomacy come to be used with greater frequency. In this second decade of the XXI century the issue of participation of local authorities in international relations seems to gain even greater relevance as we continue looking forward.

3.1 First phase 1913-1945
Diplomatic relations between cities have existed since the olden days. However, from 1913 the diplomacy between cities gained a new status. Launched during the World Exhibition of Ghent, Belgium, the Union Internationale des Villes (UIV) or The International Union of Local Authorities (Iula) was created as the first international cities organization to advocate common ideas between cities. According to authors and other documents referenced, it can be said that this initial moment of city diplomacy, proposed at that time by the name of intercommunal cooperation, comes with the flags of local democracy, solidarity and peaceful relations among peoples. The scientific vocation related to the construction and management of cities in a world that has already announced rapid urban growth was also a common issue.

The oldest and largest global local government association, Iula has local government members in over 100 countries in all regions of the world. Iula was active until 2003 when a new world organization was created as a result of the unification of Iula and the United Towns Organization (UTO). The United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), commenced operations on January 1, 2004 and is headquartered in Barcelona, Spain. The UCLG still plays a leading role of advocacy, representing local governments and promoting its interests to the United Nations and other key international agencies.
It was however through the Iula that a permanent structure of internationalism and cooperation between cities was set up.

La proposition de création d’un Office Communal International Permanent figure dans la lettre d’invitation envoyée au début de 1913 aux municipalités européennes. L’identité et les affiliations de ceux qui la signent nous placent au coeur de l’entreprise de Gand et donnent la clé de la fondation de l’UIV.

After the First World War diplomatic efforts for peace were conducted by Nation States in collaboration with cities until the creation of the League of Nations, which became the United Nations after the Second World War.

3.2 Second phase 1945-1976
The second stage of cooperation between cities was marked by the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War. The transformation of diplomacy is closely attached to this moment as the reconstruction was not only about rebuilding infrastructures and equipments, but also to build a new peace process, solidarity between nations and people that quickly have been urbanized.

In 1955, city diplomacy seems to have taken a new level of organization. Giorgio La Pira, mayor at Florence, invites the mayors of the capital cities of the world to discuss the possible role of the cities in the construction of peace. “Despite the political climate characterized by the Cold War, the conference was attended by mayors from the US, USSR and even from the People’s Republic of China (that the Western governments did not recognize yet).”

At the inaugural speech La Pira said: “We will give birth, as it were, to a new diplomatic instrument: one that expresses the desire for peace of the cities of the entire world and which makes a pact of brotherhood at the very basis of the life of Nations.”

After this initiative several international associations of cities began to emerge around the world. In 1965, for example, the Metropolis network was created, now consisting of 193 representatives, and one of the most important networks associated with UCLG.

A niche literature has for a few decades attempted some retheorization with direct relevance for sub-national forms of diplomacy such as those of cities. Pinpointing the concept of “paradiplomacy” (short for “parallel diplomacy”), a long-lived notion that

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13. Giorgio La Pira served as mayor of Florence twice (1950-1956, 1960-1964), as deputy of in the assembly that wrote the Constitution of Italy after World War II. He was a diplomat and a tireless champion of peace and human rights who worked for the betterment of the poor and disenfranchised. See: <www.giorgiolapira.org>.
15. As La Pira said at this moment they were building a new diplomatic instrument expressing the desire for peace of the cities of the entire world. See: <https://goo.gl/fyRS2I>.
has been used since the 1960s to describe the possibility of the coexistence of parallel external relations “tracks” running across countries, this scholarship has introduced some attention for the external relations of local actors. This tiered understanding of diplomatic relations was largely sidelined until the late 1980s, when Ivo Duchacek – borrowing this terminology – revived the idea of paradiplomacy as a form of political agency by sub-national entities (Acuto, 2013. p. 290).\(^\text{16}\)

Besides this first reason for the subnational actors developing role in international diplomacy, that we could call cities for peace, we could also as we saw before enroll at least five other processes\(^\text{17}\) playing each one by itself and in an associated way relevant too the roles in the emergence of city diplomacy.

After the Second World War and with the emergence of the Cold War the world knew the internationalization of security issues (crimes, violence, drugs and armament traffic). This new scale of crime benefits from the enhancement of trade between nations, and their rationality is localized in the horizontal solidarity inside the cities, often in ghettos, peripheries, slums etc. To face these problems, the Nation States had to give up the monopoly of the negotiations and the use of force. Over the years both intelligence as military power had to cooperate on multiple levels, especially on the local scale.

Over the last forty years they have intensified the global agreements on issues relating to human rights as well as human settlements. The UN effort in this phase was to sew up different agendas by the principles defined after the Second War. In 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment, followed by the Habitat I, in 1976, that established the framework to discuss human rights.

### 3.3 Third Phase 1976-2000

In 1976 the first Habitat Conference took place. Following and followed by other thematic international conferences, the First Habitat can be used as a milestone not to inaugurate new forms of city diplomacy, but rather to be the beginning of the end of the national state primacy on diplomatic global issues, at least regarding social, human rights, cultural, urban and environmental issues.

The UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972) was a landmark event in the UN system, inspiring the realization of other thematic conferences, such as the urban conference, resulting in each one being able to establish specific interrelated Programs,\(^\text{18}\) bringing inside the UN system the role

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17. See before page XX.

18. Unep – UNCHS – HIC.
of major groups (NGOs, local governments and authorities, indigenous peoples, women and minorities etc.).

The First Habitat shows the intention of the Nation State to recognize themselves as the exclusive measure to treat urban development. But the Vancouver Declaration recommended public and local power participation to find the solutions to the global issues. That was the door opening for a new kind of diplomacy during the 1980s where neoliberalism commanded the organization of states and the development of nations, bringing to the “round table” new actors.

From 1990, it seems that due to the Nation State’s “inability” to deal alone with several new problems posed on the horizon of international negotiations, and also because of the spread idea of minimum state, that the UN and member countries recognized the major role of local governments in the efforts to achieve global agreements, especially correlated with the climatic issues, social development and human rights, i.e. Agenda 21 and Urban Agenda.

In 1992, during the Earth Summit, for the very first time the local authorities were recognized as a “major group” in a UN Conference. In this same year the Local Agenda 21 was launched, this being the flagship of local response to global challenges and the connection between global and local agreements became a reality. Following this new wave in diplomatic relations in 1996 during the Habitat II, the local governments were recognized as the closest partners by the UN. Also the First World Assembly of Cities and Local Authorities Wacla was officially acknowledged too.

In 1980 World Bank launched their rapport, Economy-Wide Adjustment, advocating and promoting policy reforms for the sub development countries, including the privatization of national housing institutions and the emphasis in governance. In 1992 the Bank launched their New Urban Management Program, the improvement of precarious settlements and local power and non-government participation. Also providing direct loans for a compromised population with the main role being: to transform poor people into bankable consumers. This strategy was countersigned by the countries and the support of cities and ground movements at the Habitat II in 1996.

On a national or local scale these general guidelines come from agencies and multilateral banks unfolded in normative, legal reviews and policies on both scales: national and local. Even social movements are associated with the neoliberal urbanism proposals once they raise flags such as decentralization and local empowerment via direct loans to the families. The debate by the nations urbanization models, as well as with environmental issues and human rights, conforms, under the auspices of the international agreement, the positions that guide investments to some of the social struggles.
A clear example of this translation of international agreements in local practices can be given to quoting the right of decent and provide adequate housing, defined in Habitat II. This theme should guide international and national investments, as recognized constitutionally in Brazil and others countries and in several infra constitutional laws.

At the same time, regions, states and cities are being influenced by monetary and fiscal policies of the World Bank and the IMF, are subjected to development and planning schemes heralded by global institutions (Pluijm, 2007, p. 8).

3.4 Fourth phase 2000 and ahead
The 4th phase of city diplomacy started with the 2000 Millennium Summit, a milestone in the UN system. Nowadays this conference is the largest gathering of world leaders in history. The Summit produced the Millennium Declaration and was derived from the MDG (Millennium Development Goals).

The success of the countries in fulfilling them led to the creation of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, unifying the social and environmental agenda. Among the sixteen sustainable development goals there is the number 11 “Makes cities and human settlement inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”, which specifically addresses the issues in cities.

From 2000 the International city networks began to create a series of organizations disassociated from the Nation States. This movement was followed by a series of innovations and achievements by the cities networks at the UN organization.

In 2002 at the RIO +10 the international local networks Iclei, Iula and UTO organized a local government summit to launch the Local Agenda 21. In Brazil, like in many other countries, the effort made by municipalities to implement the Local Agenda 21 was responsible for achieving many goals agreed upon by the nations.

In 2005 the Millennium +5 Summit launched their Final Declaration recognizing the local authorities as actors in the achievement of the MDG. Also in 2005 at the 8th World Congress of Metropolis the network of local governments presented a vision of the expected goals of the “World Bank of Cities”. In 2008 the pilot projects to test the WBC were launched. Just five years after launching the idea to have a financial support agency for the internationalization of cities (2010) the Global Fund for Cities Development FMDV was created in Barcelona.

In 2009 for the very first time at the UN General Assembly, in a session on disaster risk reduction, the UCGL president addressed the General Assembly. In November 2010 UCLG created the Committee on Development Cooperation and City Diplomacy, being the result of the merging of two previously existing
committees, the Decentralized Cooperation Committee and the Committee on City Diplomacy, Peace building and Human Rights.\textsuperscript{19}

In 2012 at Rio+20, the UN Secretary General received the messages of Local and Regional Authorities for the Rio+20 Summit. The Document acknowledges for the first time the role that local and regional governments play in the sustainable development agenda.

In 2013 the UN established the Global Taskforce of Local Regional Governments for Post 2015 and Habitat III. This group is convened at aiming towards the gathering of all local and regional government organizations.

All these milestones culminate to guarantee a specific city goal at the new Sustainable Development Agenda (SDG 11 Making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable). These efforts are in a way, the main guidelines of the New Urban Agenda at the Habitat III. In this way, the new urban agenda has the authority to create the agreements and the tools to operationalized parts of the SDG.

Even though, the structuring of city cooperation still has a strong relationship between the metropolitan city and the “colony” city. In other words, today the process of (de)colonization, especially in Africa, is still organizing the relationship between social movements, cities and nations. The global market of cities inaugurated in the last phase is extremely strategic. Land being the main commodity but not the only one. Environmental and infrastructure services, besides the governance, constitute fields of strong interest from companies and governments. Topics involving environmental technologies, the resilience of cities i.e., in the last years have strong incentives from banks and international agencies of the metropolis states, representing the interests of private and public corporations.

4 GLOBAL MARKET CITIES VERSUS RIGHT TO THE CITY

City diplomacy gained importance with the higher increase of global trade in which the big cities play various exclusive roles. As a circulation ruble or as a concentrated space of communications between people and companies, global cities constitute the nodes of many international networks. In this sense we could talk about an international city market formed by cities that gather the necessary conditions to bring together people and companies from around the world.

Contrary to the classical vision of global cities (New York, London, Paris, Tokyo) one realizes that, from 2005 on there is a strong increase in the participation of two major cities in this network or market: Singapore and Brussels. Today these cities lead by example for the realization of global meetings.

\textsuperscript{19} See: \url{https://goo.gl/YgQE2G}.
These two cities are not only city-states, as is effectively the case of Singapore, but are mainly *mondial* cities, in the French conception of the term, which goes far beyond the idea of global cities connected to the command of capital and technology.

This graph shows that from 2000 to 2014 the major cities holding the major international meetings in the world. Changes relative to the importance of cities in the global scenario shows a global movement as a piece of a new geopolitics, where large cities, the production of your space (airports, hotels, convention centers, safety equipment and headquarter organizations) has an important role in the international networks.

The proliferation of entrepreneurial approaches to urban governance in Western European cities is strongly intertwined with a broader reconfiguration of nation states to supra-regional level. The current supra-regional regulatory competition regime, is present in almost all European economy activities, which has the requirement for public bids to be made in the supra-regional scale, an example that provides a new basis for studies that intend to understand the tangle of layers produced in this geopolitical process of regional cooperation.
Following Acuto (2013, p. 480-481) within this rescaled configurations of state spatiality, national governments have not simply downscaled or up scaled regulatory power, but have attempted to institutionalize competitive relations between major subnational administrative units as a means to position local and regional economies strategically within supranational (European and global) competitive circuits of capital.

The rescaled configurations of state spatiality that have been consolidated during the last two decades have systematically undermined the nationalized forms of social and spatial justice that had been established during the Fordist-Keynesian period in western Europe. This rescaled landscape of market-oriented political regulation has generated new forms of socio-spatial inequality and political conflict that significantly limits the choices available to strengthen forces throughout Europe. In the current geo-economics climate, the project of promoting territorial equalization within national or subnational political units is generally seen as a luxury of a bygone era that can no longer be afforded in an age of globalized capital, lean management and fiscal austerity (Acuto, 2013, p. 481).

Urban management as a business in supra-regional and even on the international scale has been heavily structured by the European Economic Community which has developed quite a robust thematic network of cities governance. What in the supra-national scale seems to be a cooperative action towards collective improvements and benefits should resemble at the local scale too a deep competitive process which sometimes relativize citizens historically acquired rights related to each Nation-State. At this place benefits grow relating to capital gains in the global market.

4.1 The city as a right

From Lefebvre (1974), the city (the urban life) is socially produced. The city, unlike all other produced goods, consolidated as the greatest achievement of humanity, is made following the rule, which would be superimposed on the logic of exchange value. From the view of George Simmel (1996), corroborating with the notion of the city based not only on financial figures, as this would be cultural goods defined by an urban morphology related to the social organization of coexistence, the collective daily life.

According to David Harvey (2008), “the right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources (also human rights): it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city”. Or too and very aptly put by Patrick Geddes as he suggested in the early twentieth century,“the city thinks us. We think ourselves by thinking the city” (Geddes, 1915).
Patrick Geddes did not speak in right to the city, but he was the first thinker to speak on the world city. He worked all his life for the establishment of new networks between cities, which could be considered a positive virus that infects the city’s cooperation with the principles of the right to the city.

From Lefebvre the urban life in a city produced as a commodity is the essence of alienation. As a Marxist, Lefebvre was heavily criticized to speak about the alienation of places of encounter and exchange, alienation of life rhythms and time uses.

Perhaps, Lefebvre’s (1974) ideas about “The Urban Revolution”, his second book, which deals with the right to the city, continues to scare a lot of people, but not anymore the comrades of the Communist Party. According to the author the right to the city means to take control of the whole process of space production, that means not only by the participatory process to discuss projects, but transparency and accountability of the financial system that support the oeuvre.

The right to the city is not a positive right in a legal sense: neither Unesco nor UN Habitat have the intention to promote a new international legal instrument. In some way the right to the city seems to be replaced for governance principles that do not structurally transform the space production rationality. As an example we can see the “component rights and key priorities that make up the Right of the City in South Africa”, emerging from the Right to the city dialogues in Cape Town (Georgens and van Donk, 2012, p. 12).

FIGURE 2

In addition to a relative gain of rights, in this context what is seen is not the development of new forms of city production, but only the inclusion in the pre-existing forms of urban production of transparency, participation and social function property principles. These that culminate with accountability and democratization of the governance system and social participation.

But the deep democratic forms of production and appropriation of urban space, represented in part by the principles of social participation in both urban
planning along with democratic and accountability systems of governance need to be considered. Especially when in reality the principles that should guide from the very beginning the transformation of social relations of production space, can be achieved by allowing the whole of society to have ownership of the elements that govern this production. Thus directing the urban production in a diverse way that is pre-existing. Only in this way then can the city become an effective space of rights for all citizens.

Only in this way areas nowadays seen as informal could be assimilated such as city spaces. Thus be requalified following new development standards, different of those recommended by city planning manuals that taking the capitalist city (formal, functional and aseptic or homogeneous) as the only model of urban space production.

However, how we could talk about right to the city in a divided city? The capitalist city, as well as its manuals, techniques, methods and production practices elect and select places for the production of capital surplus. These are the “bright areas” as created by Milton Santos (1997). Areas in which the global forms of organization of the city are produced. Areas that receive heavy investment in science, technology and information, universities concentration sites, research centers, headquarters of corporations, infrastructure that allow for high-speed connections, accessibility and mobility etc. Spaces that are aimed primarily before the integration of global economies resulting in compression relating to space of time.

In contrast, there are “opaque areas” of the city, devoid of various conditions of urbanity, but where the compression of space of time also occurs. Differently, it should be noted, not exclusively or primarily in a vertical way, but first of all in a horizontal way and with greater solidarity. In the slums, the favelas, daily life is also permeated by technology, but the process of reification or objectification stumbles is confronted by intense forms of organic solidarity, necessary and proper where people are fighting for survival.

What we advocate here is that the social production of space must break with pre-existing patterns and insert the largest portion of the city, the slums, the favelas in its logic. We do not advocate simply for the end of the capitalist city, but to the appropriation of capitalist production structures of the city by all city residents.

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20. “Reification is a ‘special’ case of alienation, its most radical and widespread form characteristic of modern capitalist society” (Petrović, 1983, p. 462). “In the central and longest chapter of History and Class Consciousness on ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, Lukacs starts from the viewpoint that ‘commodity fetishism is a specific problem of our age, the age of modern capitalism’ (p. 84), and also that it is not a marginal problem but ‘the central structural problem of capitalist society’ (p. 83). The ‘essence of commodity-structure’, according to Lukacs, has already been clarified, in the following way: its basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a “phantom objectivity”, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people’ (p. 83)” (Petrović, 1983, p. 464).
Thus, the right to the city would again be discussed from the perspective of the right to use and appropriation of the city for all, without privileges or distinctions of any kind. The city would therefore be recognized as an achievement of humanity, not just as a distinct good, nor as an inert space for surplus capital reproduction.

In summary, and returning to the geopolitical aspects of cities and their international relations, two “cities” are presented and negotiated within cooperation networks. One is the city as a whole, as the greatest achievement of humanity, which participates through its utopias, culture, history and also by innovative, participatory and democratic processes. As well as the cooperation between cities build networks and new power structures sustained in a large part by a symbolic capital.

On the other hand we have the city that presents itself by their design and morphology, and that invariably excludes and segregates, showing their problems, their urbanity lacks concentration in portions of the city. To overlap these lack conditions the city is sold in a global market and the basic rights become urban services. As we see before, the citizenship is subtracted by the consumer ideal.

We believe that in joining the urban utopia, that motivates and which has led for more than a century the international cooperation processes of cities, to new forms of urban space production is the only way for the long term realization of the right to the city.

5 WHAT IS THE PATH TO A NEW CITY?

The question above should guide the research about the international agreements development of the future of cities, the greatest human achievement. Analyzing issues and international agreements about the city and urbanity conditions desired for the development of nations is a relevant matter as far as it can not only read the underlying utopia, but rather to review the agreements that preserve worldwide, the current urbanization patterns.

5.1 Global agendas – Habitat I – Vancouver 1976

In Vancouver the Nation States recognized that housing-shelter and urbanization are issues of global order and pointed out the strategic role of national governments in urban policy. The focus of the solutions was the nation state. It was a time of a strong nation state ideology (cold war and welfare state).

As a result of the Habitat I the creation of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS-Habitat) and the Habitat International Coalition (HIC), which continues to serve as an independent advocate for the Habitat Agenda, shows the intention of states at that moment to conserve the urban policy as a national issue.
At the time of the Vancouver conference, urbanization and its impact were barely being considered by the international community. The framework was the rapid and intense migration to the cities as well as increased longevity. The Conference was in agreement that the main cause of problems in cities was identified as migration.

It should be recalled that the Habitat I Conference also occurred during the Cold War, following heavy state intervention during the first world oil crisis in 1973, along with the remaining thirty glorious years of recovery from the post-World War. This scenario, is where the Nation States were pretty strongly impacted directly upon at the construction of the Conference, and also at the Vancouver Declaration and its Action Plan.

Following Alves (2001), states recognized themselves with an exclusive capacity to discuss the development. The non-governmental organizations, were presented in small numbers and almost all of the west did not have access to multilateral meetings contrary to the recommendations of public participation preview in this final text of the conference.

Habitat I resulted in the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements, which provides principles and guidelines for UN member countries and an action plan composed of 64 recommendations.

This first conference remains as the global condemnation of migration as the great villain of urban ills. And there seems to be no coincidence that from then an opened space for the socio-spatial segregation and profound differences in access to the city were justified. The peripheral housing estates still built with greater emphasis on so-called first world and exported as a model for other countries.

5.2 Global agendas – Habitat II – Istanbul 1996

After twenty years, at Habitat II in Istanbul, the minimal state model had already led the discussions. The accelerated urbanization process was again put forward and “new solutions” that were suggested by the participation of civil society and local governments, were widely recognized in the preparation of and during the conference.

The Nation State, rather than the “democratic”, brought organized society and local governments to the center of the debate as implicitly and sometimes explicitly as was necessary, to share the burden of rapid urbanization. The main agenda was the recognition of the right to housing, secured four years later, for example, in the Brazilian Constitution and in several other countries.

The second Habitat Conference was marked by a much more complex international scenario. Part of this complexity stems from the context of the Social
Conference of the United Nations in previous years, ushering in a period of intense mobilization of civil society diplomacy and recognition of the UN as the main problem solving global arena.

The Istanbul conference reaffirmed the commitments of twenty years prior (the main housing rights issue). It was the era for exacerbated neoliberalism. Istanbul seems to have served for the consolidation of the right to housing discourse, but not the practices that could ensure and make the grade. Nowadays we can see the roots to housing became only a merchandise, and the private sector, especially banks and funds, were the main beneficiaries.

The social conference of the United Nations was built as a system of conferences. In this way the deliberations of each of the conferences could influence others (Alves, 2001). Important concepts were incorporated in the final documents of the Habitat II, influenced by previous conferences, as more evidence and new concepts expanded in this moment of “sustainable development”.

At the Habitat II cities were considered as the drivers of global growth, and urbanization was an opportunity. Probably because of the lack of input by nations, the global capital established on the cities a new relationship between financial forces and spaces of accumulation.

Also, at this moment the world knew the strengthening role of local authorities and the recognition of the popular participation power. The right to housing policies inspired mainly banks and international agencies to work in close coordination with local governments.

But the new agenda and the new actors could be agreeing with the main goal of the agenda yet at the same time not necessarily agree with the process to achieve the goal. The housing rights learnt very quickly of the rapid deregulation of the housing market, land and financing. The complete privatization of national housing systems was advertised as a modern conception of governance with the public and private sectors exploring new forms of cooperation, in which the private sector plays an increasingly dominant role. Strategies to make slum upgrading projects more “bankable” include: retail banks, property developers, housing finance institutions, service providers, finance institutions, and utility companies.

International funds, which frame for instance the World Bank, began to address urban land around the world as a commodity. Shelters needed to be built on a very large scale, ending with the production of housing policies, a large set of urbanity conditions which guarantee access to multiple factors that we call city. Which means that a significant portion of the project and its implementation were not under the coordination of the residents, but rather to the contrary, and followed the banks logic.
At Habitat II the urban question is again posed as a question and a process on a global scale, but with local impacts, which therefore demanded the participation of local stakeholders in building effective practical results. This shift in understanding, which is close to the reality, can also be credited with the dominant view in the international arena about the “necessary” reduction of states size.

In other words, part of this strategy can be credited not only to a more enhanced understanding of the urban process, as had been stated at the end of Habitat I, but also as new world political order, in which the United Nation should respond not only to geopolitical issues, national security and other essential issues on a macro scale. Although being commendable, the greater inclusion of NGOs and local governments in the conference, it allowed neoliberalism to gain force pleading a participatory and democratic urban process.

In this sense, the Habitat II was instituted as the first UN conference to gather together the official program local authorities, NGOs, social movements, trade unions, local leaders and others with capacity to intervene formally, making suggestions and giving testimony; representing an unprecedented openness to other national and international stakeholders (Alves, 2001, p. 255).

In addition to the activities established in cooperation with the Action Plan Habitat II, many others are formed through independent partnerships establishing innovative and mutual mechanisms and instances of cooperation. Nothing in this case had been provided for the Resolution 47/189, which establishes the rules of the conference. Such development was the result of an intense national and international preparatory process in which various actors were involved (Alves, 2001, p. 257).

In general, the Habitat II Conference had an intense national mobilization. In Brazil, the preparatory process consisted of four thematic workshops21 to draft the National Report (Brasil, 1996) under the coordination of the Brazilian State Committee.

After the Habitat II the issues correlated to the urban process are extended. Following the intense national and international preparatory process an expressive number of cooperation processes between cities passed to mobilize governments and civil society to build new city networks. The effective inclusion in the debate of issues related to vulnerable groups being reinforced, the theme of social rights in the city and the right to the city.

Among other examples of this process, in Brazil, we would cite the post conference report publication called “Woman, Habitat and Development” (CIM, 1996). This document, such as other initiatives and processes that

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formed, discusses the resolutions of the conference to the women’s group, and also advances the participation of new international subjects, contributing to international law that were to become the subject of public discussion worldwide.

5.3 Global agendas – Habitat III – Quito 2016

Since the 1990s the UN has included urban settlements among the priority of global issues. It recognized that the centrality of global decisions is in cities and this implies to the consideration of urban problem solutions as a human right. From this perspective, local issues take on universal agreements, requiring collective treatment, through participation of diverse social actors in the formulation of public policies for urban development in dialogue with the international agenda.

Strategically, we must consider that the current economic and environmental crisis, which is becoming more and more extreme, as well as natural disasters, have intense and intimate relationships with the cities, whether as a space of energy consumption (a "black hole") or as the place of production command, the cities are the locus of geographic connections to the global system.

The recognition of human rights, here being understood as civil, political, social, economic, cultural and environmental, in the city and the very recognition of the right to the city, while a set of urbanities and access to services, defines ultimately the alternatives to a national project.

The Habitat III is the 1st post-2015 UN conference, this could mean a great opportunity to start implementing previous agreements that provide a framework for the conference decisions. In that way some themes gain a new approach. Urbanization for example is nowadays viewed as a source of development or a tool for social inclusion and equity. The agenda of human rights and minorities gains strength in city debates. And following the achievements from the past decade, Habitat III is being prepared in an ambiance where strong revision of the nation states role takes place.

In the same way a surrounding dispute about the role of local governments have also places in the preparatory process. Local governments have a strong organization, UCLG which is a “candidate” to be an agency recognized by the UN as a formal representative of a new force between nations. Also the proposal to create the Bank’s of Cities comes back to the debate.

In a social, environmental and human rights recognition scenario, which has helped in the strengthening of local government that has been constructed over the last twenty years, the right to the city pops up as a broad narrative. Albeit difficult
to assert in international rights, the right to the city gains ground by joining these agendas into a single formulation, under a kind of umbrella.

On the other hand, if we analyze the key topics of discussion at Habitat III we could imagine that neoliberalism urbanization is still playing an important role in the global urbanization process. Ideas such as to establish global planning associated with local governance, city and urban marketing, the governance of risk (resilience) and other forms of sectorial regulation contrast with general themes capable to regulate the whole city and give access to the use of space. Policies attached with land market and financial regulation in the city or mechanisms to strengthen the local power at the global scale, as the formal recognition of local government in the UN system, encountered greater difficulty than in the previous Habitat III debates.

However utopias are necessary and some authors and policy-makers speak of the creation of an international organization of cities, such as the International Labor Office. That would create a system of agreements between Nation-States with power to recourse at international courts, imposing parameters to ensure human rights in the city, as in the case of violations of the right to housing or forced displacement.

According to the UN preparatory process, the new geopolitics of cities are played by some major agents. In the first place, the member states of the UN. As is the same in all major UN conferences, the Habitat III is driven by the member states who only have the right to vote.

The Bureau of the Conference is formed by Chad, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador (co-chair and host), France (chair), Germany, Indonesia, Senegal, Slovakia, and the United Arab Emirates. Each of these countries nowadays plays a highlighted role in building the new urban agenda.

Sweden and Singapore, co-chairs of the Friends of Cities Group within the UN pushed for Sustainable Development Goal 11. Along with Canada, Israel, Nigeria, Mexico, South Africa and Spain are hosting regional and thematic meetings.

Some cities that are holding seminaries and conferences of preparation have also had an important participation in the elaboration of the New Urban Agenda. These being cities such as Barcelona, Guadalajara, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Mexico City, Montréal, Tel Aviv and Vancouver.

The discussions about the new geopolitics of cities has been to achieve it through different groups invited by the General Assembly of Partners: local and sub-national authorities; research and academia; civil society organizations; grass roots organizations; women; parliamentarians; children and youth; business and
industries; foundations and philanthropies; professionals; trade unions and workers; farmers; indigenous people; and media.

The strength of the General Assembly of Partners comes from the diverse nature and inclusive representation of its members, each bringing specialized experiences and knowledge to contribute to the final outcome of the Habitat III conference, New Urban Agenda. Therefore, the members of this special alliance will be important players in creating new milestones through enriching and shaping the processes related to sustainable urban development.

Among these we should mention the most relevant actors at the conference preparation process: Slum/Shack Dwellers International, Huairou Commission (women), United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) – Iclei – Local Governments for Sustainability – Network for Regional Governments for Sustainable Development (NRG4SD) – Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, the Habitat International Coalition (HIC), the Habitat for Humanity International – Communitas Coalition, the University of Pennsylvania, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Réseau d’Échanges Stratégiqques pour une Afrique Urbaine Durable, the New School for Public Engagement, the Colegio Nacional de Jurisprudencia Urbanística, the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, and then the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (special accreditation).

On the other hand it holds the partners of these efforts with, companies, banks and agencies such as the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Avina Foundation, the Inter-American Development Bank – World Bank, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the International Chamber of Commerce, the FMDV, and also the participation of the General Assembly of Partners (GAP) which has some powerful private organizations such as Arcadis, ERDF, GDF Suez, Fafarge, Siemens, Veolia, Isocarp, Zerofootprint.

Trust and investment funds, international agencies, banks and cooperation have emerged quickly over the last twenty years. Companies such as GTZ, KfW, Jica and AFD represent strategies of their countries of origin (Germany, Japan and France); the World Bank Group and the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), responding to multilateral interests; the Cities Alliance and FMDV, organized groups of interests; and the Foundations, such as Ford and Rockefeller, regularly finance the city.

It is usual that these organisms are backed by global agreements, such as the MDGs, SDG and Urban Agenda, to organize their investments. Thus, in the peripheral countries, the urban policy becomes hostage of international investments (criteria, projects, governance) established under the prime influence of specific groups, each one being hegemonic in their fields.
6 RIGHT TO THE CITY AND HABITAT III PREPARATION

There is no clear definition of what is meant by the right to the city, and the meaning changes profoundly between countries. Generally, Europe defending the recognition of human rights in the city. In African countries the right to the city can be understood as the right to establish relations from the rural areas to the city with the right to be in the city. Latin America in general stands in favor of the right to the city, with minimal understanding outlined in the World Charter for the Right to the City, but as we can see in the situation of Brazil the laws recognition does not necessarily assure the rights. The US by their turn have a historical position related to their law system against the recognition of a collective right as a universal right in the UN system.

The right to the city is then presented as a meta-discourse able to unify different and sometimes contradictory views. Its simple defense as an umbrella seems to provide little transformations of the city. In this generalist way the right to the city could already serve as a discourse that enables different uses and strategies to reinforce capital accumulation. Segregation mechanisms are commonly implemented under the cover of an idea of production of the common space, not necessarily public, but usually privileged areas with (in)visible boundaries that ensure urban segregation. Condominium urbanization or the city walls is an icon of this process.

In our opinion the right to the city is a flag to unify positions and bring together governments, ground movements, NGOs and universities around the social production of space, being the only way to ensure a contrary productive force to the exclusive accumulation of capital from the extension of multiple urban boundaries.

Different efforts are being made to ensure greater assertiveness of the concept of right to the city. Among them we could mention the following.

1) Manifesto for cities. The urban future we want – WWC.
4) State of the world’s cities – UN Habitat (2013-2014).
5) Regional and nationals rapports.
6) Feedback of States, Universities, NGOs, Networks on Habitat III Policy Paper Frameworks.

The first four documents are extensively discussed and prepared by various organizations and governments around the world. The other documents are being produced for the conference and as a subsidy for the drafting of the new urban agenda that will have the Zero Draft presented at PrepCon III to be held in July in Indonesia.
The process towards Habitat III includes the elaboration of 22 issue papers and the creation of ten policy units. The issue papers are a summary of documents that addresses one or more research areas, highlighting general findings, and identify research needs on topics related to housing and sustainable urban development. The Habitat III policy units bring together a high-level of expertise to explore the state-of-the-art research and analysis; identify good practices and lessons learned; and develop independent policy recommendations on particular issues regarding sustainable urban development.

Just by way of demonstration, below one sees a picture that summarizes an analysis that we made about the participation of 35 countries in the preparation of Habitat III.

By UN recommendations, countries should produce their national reports in the most participatory way possible, especially involving local governments, universities and social movements and should create a driving group of the preparation process.

**FIGURE 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>How the national state places local governments in relation to the UN?</th>
<th>If there are local governments participation on the international agenda, it happens in what way?</th>
<th>Participation or promoting participatory process</th>
<th>Was created a mechanism to stimulate, to document or to organize the participation?</th>
<th>Monitoring and evaluation Habitat II</th>
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(Continues)
How the national state places local governments in relation to the UN?  
If there are local governments participation on the international agenda, it happens in what way?  
Participation or promoting participatory process  
Was created a mechanism to stimulate, to document or to organize the participation?  
Monitoring and evaluation

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Cooperative way: political positions or competences</th>
<th>Advisory only</th>
<th>Consultative and deliberative</th>
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<th>Involving universities, policy makers and researchers</th>
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Sources: Annalise, 32 replies to the questionnaire of the special rapporteur on the right to adequate housing (2015); HIC (march, 2015) “Habitat III National Reporting Processes: locating the right to the city and the role of civil society” (42 pp).

Based on official country information and following these criteria we used green to show when the process was driven in a positive way in each country. The red represents the opposite, and the blank spaces show the lack of information that would allow state positions.

Above we can see that the countries with more shades of green are the top finishers in these areas, with Brazil being the only country that has a decentralized participatory process with deliberative characteristics. Countries such as France, Mexico, Germany, United States and Colombia seem to have followed more appropriately with the UN suggestions. But they did not produce verifiable participatory and multiscale structures for the preparation of the National Report.

Many countries however did not offer information and in most cases the proposition of policies, principles and information for the UN system takes place only via the technocratic State Nation.
France, in their turn, although it is a unitary state, reaffirmed in the preparation of its report a very decentralized vision of the political process underway. Three years ago the French government had established mechanisms and instruments for the realization of its principles. Regional and local participation in the construction of national and supranational agendas pushed French government actions to improve the preparation of local representatives in the Habitat III process.

Another important role is played by US, through whose technical discussions starting from the federal government sought to take the Habitat III discussion to states and cities. However this included the technical exclusivity of discussions, without the involvement and participation of representative entities of society.

There remain according to the documents that were analyzed, doubts about the leading role of Brazil in the participatory preparation of its national report, a fact that follows crediting the country at the negotiating table. As in other international conferences and negotiations on social and environmental areas, national commitments to local governments, characteristic of a tripartite federation, and more recently with the representative sector councils, brings a difference in the positions of the commonly identified negotiating only with the methods, techniques and theories of international relations of Nation States.

In turn, despite the exemplary construction process of the Brazilian national report, based on national commitment to local governments, characteristic of this tripartite federation, carry on with some doubts about the leadership role that this country, just as in previous social and environmental conferences and negotiations, could play on Habitat III. The ongoing relativization of previously acquired rights, represented by the dismantling of urban social policies, calls into question the previously clear positions of the country in defense of the right to the city, represented in the methods, techniques and practices employed in the construction of its national report.

6.1 The Brazilian report construction methodology

As recommended by the UN, the construction of the Brazilian Report (Brasil, 2015) sought to be as participatory as possible. Through the cities councils, initiatives of civil society organizations and local governments, as well as via the platform of participation and others, put actions into place by the federal and local governments, alongside the efforts of sectors of civil society to discuss the issue and propose referrals. The report followed the themes defined by the United Nations, but the theoretical and methodological approach as well as the analytical premises were built according to the participatory arrangements set out, being able to highlight the following assumptions for the wording:
• The right to the city emerges as the report foundation.
• The reporting format reflects the rules of the UN Habitat.
• The report should expose the segregation in the city, including gender, race, age, disability and income.
• The analysis should consider as a priority the metropolitan areas, as well as the regional dimension.
• The report should contain the advances of urban legal framework and mechanisms for social participation.
• The federal achievements and the local government’s implementation role should be highlighted.
• And finally, it should emphasize the participatory governance model.

The Brazilian report presents a scenario with a diversity of opinions from more than 2,500 people participating through technical meetings, seminars and via social participation platforms. The report was approved by the National Council of Cities, on September 17, 2015, and is currently published in Portuguese and English.

In this process it is necessary to highlight the participatory platform that Ipea developed and launched in December 2014, together with the Ministry of Cities (MCidades), the General Secretariat of the Presidency (SG-PR) and the Ministry of External Relations (MRE). The platform through which users were asked to follow a trail that shows, step by step, what the activities and mechanisms are of participation to receive contributions. The track has four steps as follows.

FIGURE 4

Step 1 – topics consultation
Step 2 – indexes consultation
Step 3 – national and regional conferences
Step 4 – report text discussion

22. See: <www.participa.br/habitat>.
Step 1: query the issues. This was held in the form of a questionnaire, through the VisPublica / Panel eIPPS tool, managed by the Ministry of Planning and accessible by link from the platform. The consultation was open in the period from December 5, 2014 until February 8, 2015, and a total of 984 people responded to it. These answers enabled to highlight the issues in the report and have access to information on cases and examples explored in the report.

Step 2 index discussion. After receiving on/via the platform, comments and suggestions about a list of index to be used in the report, the Ipea held a workshop to systematize the collaborations. At the end of this process a list was published of 66 indicators which moved to compose the Brazilian report.  

Step 3 workshop. From 23 to 25 February, in the auditorium of Annex I of the Palace in Brasilia, the national workshop about the Habitat III report gathered more than 1,400 people throughout the country (via broadcast and online participation).

The debates were structured on urban brazilian issues and brought direct contributions of the speakers and participants for the Brazilian National Report. The report issues were addressed by 27 experts and public officials, private and representatives of non-governmental organizations, universities and international organizations, divided into six tables: i) Old challenges, new problems; ii) Brazil and new global urban agenda; iii) International agreements: environmental agendas and cities; iv) Local governments: networks and international scenarios; v) Livelihoods and social inclusion in the city; and vi) The right to the city.

From this process and after the systematization of information and other contributions received, the Brazilian Report was drafted for the Habitat III. In other words, Brazil pointed out the feasibility of building a future agenda in a participatory manner recognized by the UN representative.

The Brazilian report is therefore the result of a process of social participation in the development of a international public policy agenda, with extensive discussion of the contents and methods of presenting the information, which makes it an important part of the Brazilian participation in Habitat III. The report, “which contains a soul”, reflects positions of both, government and society together as opposed to purely technical documents.

7 A NEW DIPLOMACY TOWARD A NEW CITY?

Facing the many advances and gains in the recognition of social, environmental and human rights, urban policies have been globally dominated in the last thirty years by neoliberal agendas reinforcing the city marketing process. Public actions and management models based on competitiveness and entrepreneurial logics have dominated the urban policy.

Occurring differently in each region or country, the production of the urban space is now intimately related and even overwhelmed to the logic of accumulation. The expansion of urban borders, including the symbolic ones, institutional mechanisms for public-private partnership, (de)regulation in the land market and financial system and the universalization of technologies allow the construction of new urban spaces or the requalification of many other areas within cities everywhere in the world. This process occurs in a coordinated and organized way, abandoning the local social participation creating exotic urbanization patterns and models.

Examples of cities in Africa, Asia, urban projects in Latin America, competition between public companies responsible for urbanization in the European regional scale within the aegis of supra-regional structures etc. are only a few cases to be analyzed in a scenario of deepened inequalities and socio-spatial segregation in the whole world.

If, for some people, the arenas of supra-national organization in the European Union can provide a powerful political tool in which progressive forces could once again mobilize social spatial policies designed to relieve inequalities from capitalism in this region (Dunford and Perrons, 1994; Brenner, 2004, p. 481), the unequal and combined development and unrestricted competitiveness both in companies and regional blocks and its members, does not guarantee that it will occur in the world.

Economically speaking, cities are the space for controlling the production and privileged place for consumption. Both have a strong relation with the urban design, built to ensure through circulation, the multiplication and accumulation of capital. As part of an unequal and combined mode of production, public and private planning and design of cities produce, therefore, “luminous” and “obscure” areas. In the city as a whole, these two different realities integrate the same circles in the urban economy (Santos, 1997).

We believe that the representation of each one of these areas in the cities’ diplomacy and in the formulation of the Urban Agenda will reveal the effective future reserved to the greatest achievement of humanity. The exclusivity or primacy in the decision arena of only one of these cities, the formal or global city, will deepen even more the inequalities, multiplying the spaces of contraposed privileges to vastness of poverty and weakness.
Analizing by their human condition, cities form geographical platforms that connect people with what is distinct, the differences. The city is the expression and the theatre of otherness. The more cosmopolitan are the cities, more connections between citizens are made possible in the world system. The global city of culture, knowledge, fashion design, financial capital, innovation etc. is also global today because of the connections established between minorities who oftentimes have their rights recognized abroad.

This scenario occurs not only because urban weaknesses are widespread in the world, mainly after the recent global economic crisis. This also happens because for the very first time we share the chance of accessing the same technology.

From the moment in which each smartphone connects a place in the world, the debate about urban problems can no longer be considered as a privilege of political and scholar restrict circles. Social movements produce networks in global scale with technical and structural capacities similar to the traditional social and economic circuits.

In terms of international cooperation of cities, in the last two decades, millions of cities are united to assure democratic principles, environmental quality, cultural agendas, technological development, security, peace and harmony among peoples.

The neoliberal logics has multiplied these possibilities once it has valued the role of local governments and entities, at least in what concerns the preparation and implementation of global agreements. If, one the one hand, globalization, when it is interesting for the capital, connects cities in solidarity networks, its global projects, on the other hand, create and develop urban fractures.

In-depth studies still have to analyze in details the framework of the diplomacy of cities. The initial information, however, shows how much influence the city networks received from the actors originating from traditional, hard, public or private diplomacy.

As evidenced in the initial mapping of the main institutions involved in the Habitat III preparation, this field is formed by the Nation States, directly or through the promotion of decentralized cooperation; through supra-regional governance, as shown by the role played by Europe; by multilateral organisms, investment funds, banks and promotion agencies and also by multinational companies. Still, there are social movements and NGOs that act timidly because they seem more elected than recognized in this process.

Finally, the city is a global business and it will not be otherwise. Once again the issue is the consumption object and resulting product of these actions. While “obscure areas” in the cities are not brought to the level of urban solutions, and are still seen as problems to be solved or, at must, urbanized, the world will not
effectively produce the same pattern of urbanity of its guidelines to the billions of people that will inflate the precarious settlements in the next decades, mostly in Africa and Asia.

Projects of urban scenography, upgrading of old industrial areas and waterfronts, besides interventions more and more spectaculars to world events and gaming, define an expressive part of the contemporaneous productions of urbanism, of the city marketing. Spectacular spaces of investment are created and people live inside these places competing for status, consumption, landscaping, etc. In these places the urban practice simulates the ideas of the “global city”. In this case, It would not seem inappropriate make use of the metaphor of the “non-places” (Augè, 1992).

These are, however, only areas of globalization, not the cities as a whole. These areas are configured as segregated homogeneous spaces that deny the co-existence of diversity within the differences.

The good news is that this frequently perverse logic is each day more clearly understood by social groups and organizations and also by the democratic governance of some cities and states. The development of the debate by social groups structured in international networks around this logic has strengthened the struggle for the international recognition of the right to the city. There is still the need to develop further researches that carefully map such processes.

Regardless contradictions, the fact is the cities are still the safe harbor of the civilizer process. Cities live, vibrate, communicate and allow us, above all, to communicate. Cities are cultural expressions; are historical achievements. The city defines us individually and also includes each one of us in a network of billions of citizens in the world that live with similar problems, desires, situations, solutions, and practices. To look deeply in the cities’ future is dealing with the future of human relations.

The search for global peace is, in the first place, the creation of peace in each neighborhood, the peace among different people in their daily life. The future of a healthier humanity requires the access to fresh food produced in the neighborhood, and sanitation for all. A world in which natural disasters are not transfigured in genocides of specific groups requires cities with adequate housing for all.

If prerogatives such as these are valid to the North, how should they be incorporated in the Global South? How to make it while respecting the ways of life, the autonomy of people, respect to the different social and spatial forms and valorization of identities?

The right to the city, understood as a principle to shape relations in the city and diplomatic relations of cities, can and should open the debate about the New
Urban Agenda. An agenda that can also guide the diplomacy in which cities and its different forms of social representation gain space.

A new geopolitics is in place, its exercise beyond well-known practices of competition and domination between countries and corporations requires the establishment of this new diplomacy. A diplomacy to be based on the reunion of different agents who represent the totality of interests of the city, minimizing the asymmetries between State, private-capital and citizens. A model capable of dealing both with the urgent climate changes and with the new challenges of solidarity coming from the technological development. At the same time, this effort should be marked in new urbanization patterns that allow the overcoming of old urban challenges of universal access to basic services that were never overcome.

A new urban agenda is emerging. Hopefully its contributors, organizers, negotiators and promoters fulfill the obligation of previewing the new instead of only creating news.

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COMPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY


**Geopolítica das Cidades: velhos desafios, novos problemas**


CHAPTER 7

CORPORATE CITY, INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: CHALLENGES POSED TO HABITAT III

Ana Fernandes¹
Glória Cecília Figueiredo²

1 INTRODUCTION
In a context of escalation of the corporate power worldwide, and of the acceleration of international initiatives pursuing to highlight alternatives to overcome the profound current social, political, economic, environmental, and cultural inequalities, we intend to analyze the processes of discussion and preparation towards the Habitat III Conference, as a complex arena of actors and interests and too their potentialities, limits, and gaps to ensure the right to the city.

2 HEGEMONIC PROCESSES OF THE CORPORATE CITY, LIMITS AND CHALLENGES POSED TO THE RIGHT TO THE CITY
Cities and metropoles had, at the dawn of the 21st century, a concentration of wealth and poverty, disputes and conflicts, and became increasingly characterized as corporate cities, that is, submitting to the hegemony of privatizing and globalized interests (Santos, 1990; 2000). Transmuted in growth machines, they progressively become the base and links through which broad processes of contemporary capitalistic accumulation are materialized, polarizing economic vitality and crises. The reconfiguration of spaces, regarding their hierarchy, and their economic rationales, opens broad perspectives of investment, with globalized and itinerant capitals that go around the globe, subjugating the living work, re-functionalizing the dead work, and producing gigantic construction sites.

Construction programs and projects of various types including: systems and networks of infrastructure and logistics, touristic complexes, productive and entrepreneurial arrangements, sports facilities, information and communication centers, landmarks, identity and culture clusters, play areas, and also thousands

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of residential, business and service units. New cities or urban agglomerations are now also increasing, bringing to the sphere of production a complex and collective space paradoxically guided by private investment rationale.

The role of real estate is evident and is growing within this context, in which private and gated land developments, are increasing and getting bigger and more complex in terms of the urban functions concentrated therein, earmark the landscape of the disperse and endless expansion of discontinuous urban walls. In turn, the city centers are newly proposed and anchored in the actual or intended expansion of specialized services and also to the real estate investment itself. This is with the expectation of attracting several streams of interest created by contemporary mobility, particularly those qualified by attributed income.

Multiscale policies, coordinated by the strict market rules and by the so-called financialized Post-Fordism,\(^3\) are based on several institutional, political and technical schemes, and on strategic formulations of urban and regional planning, pointing to the increasing intermingling between public action and corporate governance. Their presence, repetition and intensity point to a degree of generality that seems to concentrate globalizing principles of the corporate city – being more or less developed, and more or less articulated in function of the density of the social and political weaving of each reality – this being the urban policies implemented to attract investments: competitive insertion of the territory, increasing scales, fragmentation, accentuated use of public funds, indebtedness, the decisive role of the private sector, sequenced production of rules and regulatory mechanisms, public-private partnerships, visibility and selectivity of spaces, speculation, segregation, urbanistic enclaves, violation of rights, environmental devastation and the early obsolescence of the construction. The interpenetration of land, real estate, financial and marketing rationales, all of them complex, unstable, and disconnected from the territory, are all founding factors of this process (Fernandes, 2013).

Thus, the levels of accumulation, concentration, centralization of wealth in the private sector and its financial partnering – plus the fragility of the State and the crises administration – anchor the progression of corporate projects of urban space production. For their implementation, the role of international consulting companies is noteworthy as well as the new manners of the required regulation, in particular the public-private partnerships.

The elaboration of investment options for the corporate groups or even for governments in various scales highlights the role of the consulting companies, more or less internationalized, as intermediaries capable of indication towards the “good” way to the selection, effectiveness and profitability of the applied resources.

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3. Function of this process, Harvey interprets the contemporary financial crisis as the crisis of the urbanization mode. (Harvey, 2009)
Such companies, since the beginning of the new century, if not replacing, seem to vigorously operate side-by-side with the international financial institutions, particularly the IDB and the IBRD in the case of the poor countries. That is, they also use an empire of analysis and decision making formulas and methodologies with strong standardization and homogeneity features, since the principles of rationality of the corporate action are the same. Those new key players, having global expertise, are increasingly more present in the project formatting processes, regardless of the territory to be invested in and of the political profile of the client governments.

As a result, the adjustment between privileged (or strategic) locations, provision of land, programs to be developed, and funding of the operations is now dependent on complex and frequent processes of negotiation between the public and private spheres, intermediated by the globalized technique. Consequently, the formalization of the operation is generally supported by a legal and operational framework, where the structure of the State institutionalism or the instrumentality of its power is hegemonized and operated by big corporate groups. I.e., business grammar prevails.4

The public-private partnerships (PPPs) are a privileged and have increased in making these kind of investments. This gives rise to the construction of a specific legal universe, emphatically anchored in banking and financial expertise and the corresponding technical profile, in which the so-called operation modeling takes precedence as the essential requirement for this complex combination of fund and remuneration sources, institutions and hegemonic interests.

Mostly disconnected from the principles and instruments of regulating the right of the city, their legal validation is mostly performed by vertical procedures regarding a strict and functionalized sphere of the representative democracy. In Brazil, for instance, the law governing the PPPs5 stipulates that to bid a project, the minutes of the invitation to bid and the contract should be submitted to the public consultation through the official and mass-circulation of press, and electronic means, with thirty days to receive suggestions. However, nothing is done to ensure that the project itself is actually appraised, in view of the social impacts on the territory, which, in general are very significant, because of the space-time scale.

4. McKinsey & Company can serve as reference: it has more than 100 offices in different countries (three of them in Brazil – Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and São Paulo, advising local and state governments), where 127 languages are spoken, serving ninety of the one hundred biggest world companies, national governments, and other public institutions, “offering and implementing recommendations based on deep analyses, unique resources, and broad international experience”. Their decalogue on businesses firstly points out to the need of recognizing the importance of cities and groups of cities, focusing their strategies on such cities, instead of thinking about countries or regions. As the tenth topic, it indicates the need to getting the support there from key-stakeholders in governments, civil society and media. Available at <http://www.mckinsey.com>, accessed on: 20/08/2013.

Furthermore, the PPPs Guaranteeing Fund, according to this same legislation, has a private nature. To make it up, the State can mobilize its own properties, either domain properties, or those of special use. But, peoples common goods are also therein included, i.e., those goods intended to the indistinct use of everyone, such as the sea, river, street, square, roads, parks. That is, these goods might also be alienated to compose the PPPs’ fund.

If the PPPs, in their first version, were dependent on the government authorities’ initiative, they are increasingly being used in private projects, which subsidize the governmental administration in structuring the undertakings, which was regulated nationwide in 2015.  

Finally, the PPPs Steering Committees are generally vertical, being restricted to representatives of the State, and therefore with a very reduced social control, except for some exceptions.

Deepening this scenario, in December/2015, the Provisional Presidential Decree no. 700 was proposed in Brazil, aiming to expand the responsibility of the private sector within the perimeters comprehended by projects structured as PPPs, authorizing it to directly conduct land condemnation processes, which would substantially increase its power in the territories involved in those partnerships. Defeated for time elapse and social mobilization, the decree thought to point towards a movement that tries to expand and deepen the private role in the conception and operation of the public interest.

This set of rationales and strategies of the corporate way of operating urban interventions directly opposes the instruments of guarantee to the right to the city. Resulting from hegemonic interests, financialized accumulation regimen (Chesnais, 2002) and imperial operation manners, being antagonistic towards effective democratic forums of consultation and management and to open social participation. However, and not by chance, the Statute of the City – approved in 2001 in Brazil, and being recognized as a progress in the urban regulation principles and instruments that search for implementing the social function of the city and of property – is being submitted towards this new legal framework that, despite acting on the city, is actually disconnected from it, because of a regulation eminently restricted to the rationality of the economic order.

6. Decree n. 8,428, as of April 02, 2015.
7. The role of specific administrations in changing this relation is noteworthy. For instance, it is a positive change operated by the steering committee of the Agua Branca Urban Operation, in São Paulo, created in 1995, which since November 2013 has an equal representation of public authorities and civil society (one representative of non-governmental organizations acting in the region, one representative of professional, academic or research entities acting in urban and environmental issues, one representative of the businesspeople working in the region, one representative of the housing advocate groups acting in the region, and five representatives of residents or workers, two from the expanded perimeter and three from the Urban Operation perimeter. Available at: <http://migre.me/v2SXE>, accessed on: 23/02/2016.
That is, a vertical accentuation of the urban power in progress, with an overwhelming concentration of wealth worldwide, in a context radically pressured by social dissatisfaction and explosion, resulting from the accumulation of life-devouring experiences and experiences accumulated in the cities.

Within this scenario, what is the meaning of thinking a new urban agenda within the international sphere?

3 THE COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL AGENDAS AND THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE DECISIVE SPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The international dimension of the formulation of agreements, negotiations and guidelines between countries is a scale of power and policy of extended time horizons and strong hierarchy, with the protagonism of national governments and pluri-national action power groups. Strictly articulated with other scales – regional, national – and with reciprocal influences, different agents and interests converge there, with profound disputes and negotiations about the affirmation of commitments and rights, as well as their regulation and funding.

The United Nations remain being a decisive sphere of international relations, for being an institution that allows multilateral relations and an international culture. Peace and security, climatic changes, sustainable development, human rights, disarmament, terrorism, humanitarian and health emergencies, gender equality, governance and food production are in the current UN agenda (Naciones Unidas, 2015).

The most recent campaigns and topics addressed by the United Nations are related to the Rule of Law as well as to democracy, genocide prevention and responsibility protection, the holocaust, the Palestine issue, the Ruanda genocide, victims of terrorism, children and armed conflicts, the union for the end of violence against women, peace messengers, the millennium development objectives, climatic change, zero hunger challenge, and decolonization (op. cit.).

However, as emphasized by Herz (1999), if the United Nations is the relevant space to exercise the international policy, characterized by universality, it is also earmarked by problems such as intergovernmental inequalities, power asymmetry between countries or regional blocks, limited participation of the civil society, and the not so always active ratification of treaties.

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8. The United Nations were officially created on October 24, 1945, in the context of Post-Second World War, and the Letter of UN foundation was ratified by 51 signatory member-States. Currently, the UN, headquartered in New York City and having the South-Korean Ban Ki-moon as Secretary-General, it has 193 member-States, including Brazil, which are represented in the General Meeting that is deliberation organism. Along with the General Meeting, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Fiduciary Administration Council, the International Court of Justice, and its Secretariat are its main organisms. (La organización..., 2015) In 2015, the UN celebrated seventy years of existence, an occasion that is raising a debate about how contemporary the role of this organization is.
Consequently, the configuration of the UN decision-making process is increasingly pressured by the complex and inevitable global interdependency, by changes in world geopolitics, and by the distribution of power in the international system. In this regard, the perception of a deliberative unbalance between the General Meeting, in which all the countries take part, and the Security Council, restricted to fifteen members, five of which are permanent and entitled to veto. It is noteworthy, as well the lack of representation of non-governmental agents (Herz, 1999; Teixeira, 2005).

It is also worth mentioning as was observed by Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg (2005), that the ostensive escalation of political unilateralism since the September 11 terrorist attack (2011), seriously threatening multilateralism, the base of the UN system, contradicting the United Nations Letter itself. With the recent attacks that occurred in the city of Paris, in 2015, and in Brussels, in 2016, among others, this trend tends to worsen.

The UN privatization process is another limitation of this international system. This is a response to the United Nations funding crisis, in which this institution is getting increasingly closer to the private sector. The reduced funding of pro common wellbeing and human rights policies by member-states is walking side-by-side with the reformatting of UN policies based on corporate interests (Gonzalez, 2015).

Arias (2015), evaluating the UN performance on its 70th anniversary, which occurred in 2015, recognizes that this organization was passive or impotent in many occasions, not ensuring its main objective of keeping international peace and security, and preventing war. The deaths in Ruanda, the non-effectiveness of the Palestinian state, or the war in Syria show this reality clearly.

However, despite the UN imperfections and limits, it is a necessary organization, because its nature of being a universal discussion forum, with relevant services provided to mankind, such as issues regarding refugees and childhood (Arias, 2015).

The perspective and the challenge of an international agenda committed to the right to the city needs to consider such problems, deadlocks, and potentialities.

4 THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE AGENDA AND THE DEVELOPMENT ISSUE

The 21st century, after the so-called decade of conferences (Alves, 2001) – and also because of them –, points out to an intensification of the international agenda, either because of the developments of the economic globalization itself and its mechanisms of agreements and construction rules, or because of the movements of insurgency against and contestation towards the fable and perversity of its constitution (Santos, 2000). The engendering of the alternative world movement, since the protests of Seattle in 1999, and in Genoa, in 2001, as well as the creation of
the World Social Forum and its first meeting, in 2001, in Porto Alegre, express a context also shaped by the opposition to the imperial power system, to the radicalization of poverty and inequalities, and to the principles adopted for development.

The institutional international agenda will also be affected by such process. As early as 2000, 189 UN member-countries signed, with non-negligible symbolic value, the 8 millennium goals. Among which we find poverty eradication and the protection of those vulnerable interests, peace, democracy, and environmental issues. Several other constructions and initiatives will also be addressed.

Let’s focus, even though rapidly, on two of them, because of their nearly congenital proximity with the urban question: the funding for development issue and the issue pointing out the need of thinking of new developmental ways, both crisscrossed by issues of participation and the distance between discussion processes and formation of resolutions.

The first one, of how to obtain means to attain the goals that were internationally defined, guides the action of several countries, especially the poor ones. Nearly thirty years after its formulation, within the Unctad\textsuperscript{9} sphere, that is, the need of central countries having solidarity with other countries’ development, by transferring 0.7\% of their GDP to them, and with rare exceptions when this was actually done, it allowed for the creation of the International Conference on Financing for Development. Its first edition took place in 2002,\textsuperscript{10} being the definition of the means for implementing sustainable development regarded as a central and absolute need, and also as a way to ensure the safe and predictable access to funds, above all for those 49 countries considered as being the less developed on the planet. Thus, the Official Development Assistance, in a multilateral nature, is again discussed, having the Monterrey consensus defined that a percentage of the developed countries’ GDP should be invested to attain the internationally defined goals: 0.7\% in developing countries, and between 0.15 and 0.20\% in less developed countries, a goal that is still far from being achieved.\textsuperscript{11}

This regulation is fundamental insofar as the UN estimations show: in order to eradicate the extreme poverty from the world, additional funds would be necessary to the sum of approximately 100 billion dollars per year, only 0.01\% of the world GDP.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{9}United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, according to <http://migre.me/v2T75>, accessed on: 23/02/2016.
\textsuperscript{10}In Monterrey, Mexico, soon after the 3\textsuperscript{rd} UN Conference on Less Developed Countries, in 2001. The second International Conference for Development Financing was held in Qatar, in 2008, and the third one, in Addis-Ababa, 2015.
\textsuperscript{11}In 2009, only 05 of the 23 countries regarded as being involved exceeded the defined percentage of 0.7\% of their GDP to help development (Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands), the others varying between 0.55 and 0.10\% (for instance, Germany has contributed with 0.35\%, and the United States with 0.21\%) (Harack, 2011).
\textsuperscript{12}Evaluated at approximately 77 trillions of dollars. In turn, the investments required for projects of critical infrastructures (transport, energy, water and sanitation) are estimated in about 8\% of the annual worldwide GDP.
Beyond the issue of funds themselves, their purposes, ways of using them, and the decision-making processes are also a source of questioning on the part of some countries. To Brazil, it is essential to ensure that such funds—which many times address climatic change issues, which have their own sources of financing—are used to eradicate poverty, to fight inequality, to promote education, health and gender equality. The transparency of UN agreements with the private initiative to finance the sustainable development is also challenged in view of the increasing scale of association with private entities, and the inexistence of an effective mechanism for the accountability of such financing. At last, but not the least, a strong participation of the civil society is required, considering the need to overcome the asymmetries in the access to decision-making and the financing processes, as well as to focus on social and human rights and environmental issues.

The second issue, being the need of searching for new ways of generating and distributing wealth, is also being increasingly discussed since the 1970s, in several international meetings. Rio-92 emblematically states the commitment of pursuing a new developmental pattern, anchored in sustainability principles. The millennium goals in 2000 and the sustainable development goals in 2015 have pursued and still pursue to renewing and expanding this commitment. However, structural agendas and issues prevail both concerning the comprehension of such principles—which have been used mostly in a reducing, imaginal and mercantile processes—as in regard to the possibilities of their effective implementation.

In the preparatory process of the post-2015 agenda, again there emerges the affirmation of the integrated planning needed at aiming towards the territorial development, of decentralization processes and construction of local agendas, and too their developments in political terms, with focus on an increased participation, democracy, and transparency. In this regard, during the discussions taken place in Brazil, it is significant the affirmation of the need to expand the development pillars, including, in addition to the social, economic and environmental pillars, also the political and cultural dimensions. This means to search for ensuring a higher horizontalization of the decision-making processes and of the attainment of post-2015 agenda goals, either in terms of the relations between rich and poor countries, the expansion of the social participation horizons, or in the emphatic limitation of the increasing role that big corporations are taking in the process.

Not by chance, but after the approval by 193 countries, in September 2015, of the post-2015 Agenda, comprised by seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), and 169 targets to be accomplished up until 2030, several criticisms are being made directly to the fact that there has not been an effective progress towards

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13. For the post-2015 agenda, Brazil organized two consultations in 2013 (The World that We Want and the National Consultation post-2015), and published a document explaining Brazil’s position before the post-2015 agenda (Brasil, 2014).
facing the development model in progress, and the power structures which are part of it. Besides pointing out a democratic deficit of the UN itself, and of the social participation shortage in the process, the criticisms were also extended to the absence of resolutions facing the basic issues of the current development mode: submission of corporate actions to human rights milestones, regulation of private interests legitimated by restricted principles of neoliberal utilitarianism, control of financial capital flows around the globe (Pietricovsk *apud* Inesc, 2015). The non-appraisal of what can be attained at the end of the period of effectiveness of the Millennium Goals, the voluntary nature of the SDGs compliance by countries, in addition to the inexistent mechanisms for the accountability and transparency in the process, are also very much questioned.

The process of tension between agendas, countries, economic groups, civil society, would not be different with the city and the urban agenda.

5 THE UN-HABITAT PROGRAM AND THE NEW URBAN AGENDA

In the field of city and urban issues, UN-Habitat agency and its several programs are undoubtedly the central focus of the debate and of the activities regarding such issues. Although soon after the pioneer Habitat I was held in Vancouver, in 1976, an intergovernmental institutional structure was created in 1977 within the sphere of the UN – the United Nations Commission for Human Settlements, with the United Nations Center for Human Settlements performing secretarial functions –, only in 2002 were the United Nations Program for Human Settlements – or UN-Habitat formally created. As a fully-fledged program of the UN system, it handles the coordination center for the urbanization and human settlement issues. This decision highlights the urban agenda within the discussions of the international sphere, which will be translated by the biannual organization, ever since, of the World Urban Forum14 (Naciones Unidas, 2015; ONU-Habitat, 2012a).

Even before its creation as it operates today, and having already accumulated the organization of two International Conferences, the Habitat Program has, among its guiding principles, the Declarations adopted in such conferences (Declaration of Vancouver on Human Settlements – Habitat I and Declaration of Istanbul on Human Settlements – Habitat II and Habitat Agenda), the Declaration on the Cities and Other Human Settlements in the New Millennium (2001), as well as of course the Resolution of its creation, number 56/206 (ONU-Habitat, 2012a).

The international debates of the Habitat Conferences, comprising of a diversity of governmental and non-governmental social agents, to some extent help in defining the directions and twenty-year agendas of the UN-Habitat Program.

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14. Held in Nairobi, Barcelona, Vancouver, Nanjing, Rio de Janeiro, Napoli, Medellín. The 2016 event coincides with the Habitat III, in Quito, and the 2018 event will be held in Kuala Lumpur.
Such conferences impact and are impacted by the state policies of its member-states and by the experiences of their participants, as well as boosting the formation, circulation and/or diffusion of ideas and practices among governmental and non-governmental agents taking part in such events.

Therefore, advances based on an international agenda of the right to the city require the consideration of possibilities opened for such achievement, as well as to overcome some previously mentioned difficulties. This possible agenda needs to consider the UN modes of action, which affect its operational conditions.

The broader understanding of UN-Habitat as part of the UN System starts with the realization that its agencies and programs have a key role in configuring the international economic order. That is to say that its activities, through its agencies and programs, have developments in terms of the production of international standards, as well as to influence the definition of the state policies of its member-states, being present in over seventy national states, or even in the configuration of habits and diffusion of practices by other social agents, which are also influenced by the contents of such organization (Herz, 1999).

In this regard, the plans and programs of this organization are the key elements to be pushed for by the perspective of the right to the city. In the current strategic plan of UN-Habitat (2014-2019), the following seven priority action areas were defined: urban legislation, land and governance; urban planning and projects; urban economy; basic urban services; housing and improvement of precarious housing; risk reduction and rehabilitation; and research and development of capacities (ONU-Habitat, 2012d).

15. The UN System is comprised by the institution itself, but also by affiliated organizations, called programs, funds and specialized agencies. The programs and funds are financed through voluntary contributions, while the specialized agencies have mandatory quotas, in addition to voluntary contributions. UN-Habitat is part of the set of UN programs and funds, especially addressing issues regarding human settlements and urbanization processes. The UN-Habitat, responsible for the realization of Habitat Conferences, is the United Nations Program intended for settlements, having as a mission the social and environmentally sustainable promotion of villages and cities, aiming towards proper housing for everyone. This program has a catalyst function of the urban topics in the UN System and has been operating for nearly forty years in human settlements around the globe. The UN Habitat Program therefore takes a central role for the representation, at the international level, of the United Nations actions committed to the advances and expansion of the right to the city perspective (La organización, 2015; Nuestros..., 2012; Historia..., 2012).

16. UN-Habitat also has several initiatives and programs, such as the initiative Cities and Climate Change (CCCI), the Cities and Climate Change Academy (CCCA), City Prosperity Initiative (CPI), the City Resilience Profiling Programme, the Urban Planning and Design Lab (LAB), the Participatory Slum Upgrading Program (PSUP), among others (Iniciativas..., 2012).

17. The structure of UN-Habitat has a Government Council, comprised by 58 member-countries, elected in the Economic and Social Council of UN General Meeting, being responsible for defining the strategies and the policy, in addition to approving those programs to be executed. It is noteworthy that, currently, out of the 58 members of the UN-Habitat Government Council, six of the thirteen European chairs are vacant (<http://unhabitat.org/about-us/governing-council/>). The UN-Habitat secretary-general office is headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, and its executive officer is Joan Clos, former mayor of Barcelona (Sobre..., 2012). UN-Habitat also has four regional offices for Africa, Asia, Arabic Countries, and Latin America and the Caribbean, which try to implement its strategic plan in the proper manner regarding the particulars of each region. The UN-Habitat allows the adhesion of partners to the Habitat Agenda, comprising organizations outside the government committed to a sustainable urbanization and to the development of human settlements. The categories of partners are the local authorities, non-governmental organizations and grassroots organizations, unions, professionals, scholars and researchers, human solidarity groups, indigenous peoples, congress people, private sectors, foundations, financial institutions, groups of young people, and women’s groups (UN Habitat, 2015).
However, its direction combines goals contradicting each other, when trying to ensure that cities become inclusive places and, at the same time, “engines of economic growth and social development” (ONU-Habitat, 2012a).

I.e., to ally more social inclusion in the cities to the ways to how economic growth is being operated has been considered a paradox in several experiences around the world, because of its contradictory and excluding nature, signaling the existence of different tendencies and interests disputing within the sphere of UN-Habitat activities. The agenda of the United Nations reformation and democratization is therefore central. In this regard that the debate about the New Urban Agenda to be constructed in the Habitat III Conference (Quito, October 2016) can help in discussing, democratizing and (re)orienting UN modes of action in the fields of human settlements and of the current urbanization processes. The coming conference poses the possibility of critically appraising the UN-Habitat Program, affecting the conceptions and terms of its fields of action.

In this perspective, the (re)orientations of the UN-Habitat structuring and the architectures and accessibilities of its programs, projects, actions and campaigns, should be highlighted. Possible (re)definitions of such aspects should allow, among its mains criteria, its adjustment to the social and political demands for the right to the city, and the creation of conditions to advances and overcoming of urban and regional deficits and problems of the member-countries’ peoples, with priority to their vulnerable groups, while considering their needs and common issues. The call of the Habitat III Conference for the construction of a New Urban Agenda should be understood as an opportunity to update, deepen and advance the debate in terms of an international agenda of the right to the city.

6 FROM THE AMBIGUITIES TO THE NEED OF ACTIVATING THE RIGHT TO THE CITY IN THE NEW URBAN AGENDA

Put together in the second semester of 2013, the initial document of mobilization for the Habitat 3 agenda18 is based on the realization that the “battle for a better future will be won or lost in the cities”, therefore placing them in the center of the debate, and establishing the need to “forge a new urban paradigm”. It is an unequal document, with the same contradictory features already previously highlighted when trying to harmonize tensions resulting from structural disputes around the urban agenda and its manners of concretization.

Ever since then, tens of documents have been prepared and discussed around the planet by several collectives of different horizons and interests, trying to contribute to this formulation. In May 2016, one of the first summary documents of the process was released by UN-Habitat: the Zero Draft, which corresponds to a

preliminary version of the New Urban Agenda, to be debated and approved in the Habitat III Conference.  

The Zero Draft of the New Urban Agenda itself is also comprised by an aggregation of different propositions, conceptions and meanings, sometimes contradictory. A significant portion of this diversity is inherent to the amplitude and complexity of issues and challenges regarding the current context of cities and human settlements worldwide. However, with its multiple orientations and world perspectives, the document also reflects conflicts and disputes of interests and fields, involving national States and actors from different horizons.

That is why it contains disparate and contradictory statements, from the statement of a more radical perspective of the right to the city, Lefèbvre’s style, to the corporate and competition-excluding defense as one of its guiding principles. Thus, countless readings, articulations of meaning and orientations are possible for the actions of agents disputing the New Urban Agenda.

In view of this finding, it is primordial to debate the deconstruction of ambiguities of some decisive aspects regarding the production and enjoyment of the city, presented in the document. Even because some of those ambiguities can underpin backward mechanisms, undermining the New Urban Agenda itself in many of its progress possibilities in the field of the right to the city.

With this regard in mind, we have decided to get closer, and among other possible issues, to five sets of issues for containing inconsistencies regarding definitions, perspectives and implications in the field of the right to the city: sustainable development, economic growth, competitiveness and inclusion; informality addressed as the engine of growth, and fragility of the solidarity economic presence; the non-clarification of the social property function; the emphasis on the strategic planning and the problematic of the public-private partnerships.

6.1 Sustainable development, economic growth, competitiveness and inclusion: problems and inconsistencies

Already in the Preamble of the New Urban Agenda, we faced an old contradiction which crisscrosses the entire document. It is about the perspective of the New Urban Agenda pacifying the city, viewed as the engine of development, with a sustainable and integrating growth. Far from indicating a radical paradigm change, we are walking in circles in the discussion on the major limitations of “sustainable development”.

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19. For the time when this text was written, we worked with this first version, however very soon other versions should be available. Habitat III. Zero Draft of the New Urban Agenda. 06 May 2016. In the analyzed document, the contents of the New Urban Agenda are structured in three main items, namely, the “Preamble”; the “Quito Declaration on Cities for All”; and the “Quito Implementation Plan for the New Urban Agenda”. Available at: <http://migre.me/v2SVC>. Accessed on: May 10, 2016.
If there is a change of paradigm, which should instead not be welcomed but rather challenged by the New Urban Agenda, is the deepening and generalization of the cities (and settlements) of exception (Vainer, 2011).

We can also resume the criticisms to the concept of sustainable development which have been highlighted since the Brundtland’s report. This expression that seems to become magical, only for the declaration of good intentions, has not managed to generally overcome the conflict between economic growth and environmental protection, and not allying social development to that. The ambiguity of the term does not minimize, let alone overcome, the unbalance of the society X nature relation, even more expanded upon by the modus operandi of the current capitalistic production (Guerra et al., 2007; Muniz, 2009; Nunes and Garcia, 2012; Ponte, 2014).

The ideology of sustainable development has not managed to boost structural changes in the degrading dominant patterns of production and consumption. Its appeal to the “common future” and the metaphors of the accountability of “everyone” for the environmental crisis, as well as for its solution, minimizes major differences between nations, peoples, classes, ethnical and social groups, and the specific responsibilities of each agent (op. cit.).

More than restraining the development to the pace the ecosystem could support, sustainable development frequently looks like a strategy to keep capitalistic growth, subordinating the environmental issues to this logic (op. cit.). It is insufficient that this is supposed to be a key concept to guide the construction of the New Urban Agenda. Ignoring its limitations and not facing the crucial issues posed will lead to a weakened agenda that announces cities as places of freedom and respect to human rights, of opportunities for everyone, and where poverty is overcome.

Likewise, poverty eradication and inclusive growth are simultaneously highlighted. Here also there are latent conflicts, contradictions and difficulties involving this complex conciliation. The generic indication of job creation as an inclusive growth inducer does not qualify the terms of the implicated social relations. How then to ensure that job opportunities are comprised of decent jobs, with bonds that ensure fundamental rights and guarantees, in addition to a fair social sharing of resources and wealth? Which types of activities can simultaneously create opportunities for decent jobs, and configure parameters of land use and occupation that built up socially coherent cities and settlements, socially and environmentally fair, reverting processes of the degradation of nature, of segregation, territorial fragmentation and vulnerability of less empowered social groups?

21. “Quito Declaration on Cities for All” (op. cit.)
Those challenges increase when also addressing the issues of incentives to innovation and jobs, with no characterization of what would be the nature of such innovation. Innovation processes have been inherent to a capitalistic hegemonic rationale, which associates such processes to the creation of differentiations that generate productivity gains and profitability. However, such gains do not develop to the same extent into increased wages and expansion of social and workers’ rights. In contrast, most of the time, such innovations and the increased productivity correspond to mass dismissals, to sectors having no function and being deliberately made obsolete (Sennett, 2006).

Concerning the concept of those “cities and human settlements that we want,” it also advocates for high added value and high productivity activities. The corporate capitalistic operation already has the added value and the productivity increase as major guides. However, we know that the rationale of this production mode moves us away rather than approximates us to that common interest attributes desired by cities and settlements. Therefore, what type of activities and production manners are capable of living together and fomenting such attributes, basis for fair and democratic cities and settlements?

In terms of transformation perspectives, three principles are suggested for the New Urban Agenda. The first one relates urban equity to poverty eradication. The second articulates sustainability and including prosperity. And the third one points to ecological and resilient cities.

More explicitly, in the second principle we see again the difficulties of understanding the cities and settlements as a developmental “engine”, which could be conciliated with a “sustainable” and integrating growth. Here, the issues already posed about the limitations of the idea of “sustainable development” that crisscrosses the New Urban Agenda proposal continue to remain pertinent.

In this principle development, which articulates sustainability and including prosperity, the prevention of land speculation appears along with the encouragement to competitiveness and innovation. Again, the imprecision weakens a possible advance of the New Urban Agenda. Is it actually possible to harmonize the important fight to real estate speculation with the orientation toward the encouragement of competitiveness and innovation? Such an articulation shows to be incoherent, judging from the fact that, as an example, competitiveness and innovation are stressed in the highly speculative production and trading of the undertakings carried out by the civil construction industry and by real estate companies alike.

23. Topic “Commitments”, part of “Quito Declaration on Cities for All” (op. cit.).
The perspectives of implementing the New Urban Agenda are the key-tool for the national, subnational and local governments to attain sustainable urban development. Despite the central roles of the UN member-States in such implementation, this orientation in general lacks a more direct accountability of the big corporations, given their hegemonic activity in producing cities and territories. The adhesion and commitments of such agents for structural changes of strategies, projects and attitudes would be fundamental and decisive to increase the degree of effectiveness of the agenda.

There is still an important aspect to be highlighted in the approach to associativism. The activity of private businesses, along with the investment and innovation of the urban sectors, are acknowledged as the major engines of productivity, of inclusive economic growth, and of job creation. This generic acknowledgement does not differentiate the several scales and profiles of the agents and private companies, but rather praises all of them, and thus releasing from the responsibility those which activities have decisive consequences for the production of the picture of urban problems that has to be faced and overcome.

Also, in this regard, there is the orientation for the housing policies to obey a principle of economic effectiveness. Here, it is necessary to explain the nature of such effectiveness, considering that, in the lessons learnt from the housing policies of Brazil, Mexico and Chile, the election of neoliberal principles has led to a massive production of housing units that, in general, in addition to creating new urban problems, do not qualitatively respond to the demands for the rights to a decent house and to the city.

6.2 Informality as a growth engine and the absence of solidarity economy

Although informality is recognized as a key-issue to the city and a challenge for poverty eradication, it is discussed as an economic engine. It is an ambiguity that does not explain whether this economic valuation of informality includes its residents and workers. Here, there is the risk of informality opening up to a kind of economic growth that will make these people even more vulnerable.

On the other side, the perspective of Solidarity Economy is completely absent, while the generalization of the industries insertion and the attention to “local business communities” are affirmed. However, such local business
communities are not qualified for the type of agents and interests they comprise. That is, even the possibility of activating proximity economies and qualifying urban and regional centralities is not explicitly positioned.

6.3 Non-explanation of the social property function

The horizon posed to cities and settlements involves social function, and the social function of land, the right to housing, diverse and accessible quality public spaces, mobility, cities and settlements with no disasters, participatory, with empowered women, and qualified urban-rural bonds. Although we recognize the importance of this comprehension, it has alarming limits. One of them regards the fact that the social function is generically presented, or is restricted to land use destination only, whatever it is.

Undoubtedly, bigger advances toward cities and settlements that we want, require the incorporation of the principle of the social function of property as a guide of the New Urban Agenda. It is about strengthening the regimen of social property sharing in the constitution of cities and human settlements, denoted by high levels of land and real estate property concentration in the spaces pressured by processes of expansion of different natures. The fact is that noncompliance with the social property function, conditioned by the right to the city, hinders the access, the use and the production of territories and impacts mostly on the residents. Often, this is a condition that affects vulnerable large populations, preventing the enforcement of human and social rights, and decent life conditions.

6.4 The hegemony of the strategic planning ideology

The implementation of the New Urban Agenda should also contain three dimensions: the local-national cooperation, the strategic urban and territorial planning, and an innovative and effective financing milestone advocating, among other things, an association with the private sector.

The second and third aspects reflect a current context of generalization and a deepening of strategic planning (Castells and Borja, 1996; Arantes, 2000; Borja, 2000; Vainer, 2000; Mendes, Binder and Prado Júnior, 2006; Güell, 2007) understood as urbanistic mediation specifying the territorial dimensions of neoliberalism and its social challenges.

Judging from the recent Latin-American experience, the strategic planning ideology has been significantly guiding the state and private agents’ action in different levels, scales and policies, reinforcing a vigorous process of entrepreneurialism.

29. Topic “Our vision”, of the “Quito Declaration on Cities for All” (op. cit.).
30. Topic “Effective implementation: urban paradigm shift” of the “Quito Declaration on Cities for All” (Habitat III, 2016).
and privatization of cities, regions and public spaces. In the Brazilian case, this fact seems to be related to the constitution of the State of exception, characterized by the pair reduction of state autonomy and increasing autonomy of the market, induced by the financialization of economies and public budgets, as well by anti-policies of poverty functionalization (Oliveira, 2003). To Carlos Vainer, since the 1970s, a deep change of paradigm in the urban regimen toward what the author calls “city of exception” (Vainer, 2011) is being conceived, and in which Brazil is associated to the emergence of an entrepreneurial and neoliberal State, since the 1990s (Vainer, 2011).

The adoption of this paradigm structurally deceives the perspectives of the right to the city or a space development that promotes fair, compact, mixed and connected cities and human settlements, placed as a desirable horizon. When presenting the urban economy model based on the competitiveness among places, the logic of the territorial and urban entrepreneurship is again promoted, being socially harmful for submitting, in a generalized way, collectivities and the common heritage to the exchange value.

6.5 The Public-Private Partnerships

The expected collaboration of local governments with the private sector to implement the New Urban Agenda reminds us of the generalization of the Public-Private Partnership (PPPs) which, in the recent Brazilian experience, have implied the transference of a significant portion of the public budget to private corporations. Those corporations explore concessions of public services and works with no risk whatsoever, significantly expanding their profit margins, since the State is committed to generally millionaire pecuniary considerations. Furthermore, for being PPPs generally conceived outside the frameworks of the right to the city, a specific regulation in being elaborated, opposing the achievements in this field. As an example, in Brazil, as has already been said, the federal PPPs legislation is completely divorced from the process of construction of a democratic city, either in terms of land use and occupation, or in terms of public funds use, or even in terms of transparency and sharing of its management.

This functional vision is also spreading to the issue of public spaces, understood as attribute of value of private investments. In addressing the urban design and infrastructure for prosperity, the creation of green and public spaces is understood as a mere addition of value to be captured for new investments. Here, the risk is
of producing public spaces orchestrated by the privatizing capture of public and collective values.

**7 AS A CONCLUSION**

It is crucial to deconstruct ambiguities, contradictions and paradoxes that are part of the proposals under construction for a New Urban Agenda, explaining obstacles, interests and responsibilities that prevent the full activation of its possible advances. Unveiling and fighting hegemonic interventions can open a space of political indecisiveness (Laclau, 1996), capable of putting in place updated perspectives of the right to the city (Lefebvre, 2001) for the different cities and human settlements around the globe.

Looking at this, it is important to heavily stress some structuring issues which should be explained in the construction of the New Urban Agenda: a vigorous criticism to the hegemonic and harmful action of corporations, to PPPs, and its modus operandi should be aligned to the affirmation and decisive defense of social property function as the action regulation principle over the cities.

The expanded participation in the decision-making processes is another decisive issue, persisting as a fundamental demand for the democratization of the cities and human settlements production and management. However, it is necessary to move forward toward processes that are not reduced to pro forma mockery or rites. This is an even more relevant aspect when concerning the participation of civil society in the international sphere, where the presence of civil society agents does not reflect the range and diversity of the countries’ groups. In fact, there are little countries’ collectivities that have a degree of articulation and resource capacity needed to act, not to say, to take part in such a scale.

Convergent with the meaning of participation, there is the necessary spatial recognition of the diversity of agents that produce and live in the space. The consideration of the different social groups and of their specific and common demands is a key for the possibility of territorialization of urbanization policies that get closer to the perspective of the right to the city. Such perspective is not restricted to access the uses that exist in the cities and to formally consolidate social rights, rather it extends to the appropriation, coproduction and transformation of cities and territories by their residents.

In this regard, the ethnic and racial democracy issue is inevitable as a guide-value of the urban and rural horizon, with the fight against issues such as racism, prejudice, and discrimination, socially and institutionally directed above all against young black people, indigenous groups, women, transgender, homelessness, elderly, disabled, and other political minorities. Such deleterious and generalized attitudes articulate, superpose and structure the social-spatial inequalities that
characterize the urbanization processes. Thus, the debate about the specificities of violence and racial urban segregation should be central in the construction of the New Urban Agenda.

There is no doubt about the need for strong generalized mobilization to assume commitments and institutional (re) building, as well as to conceive actions that indeed represent advances in an international agenda of the right to the city, coherent with the challenges currently posed.

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**COMPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY**


CHAPTER 8

URBAN TRAJECTORIES: CIRCULATION OF IDEAS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AGENDAS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH – LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF HABITAT III

Jeroen Klink

1 INTRODUCTION
For some years, scholars, progressive planners and social movements’ leaders have contributed to consolidating a critical reflection on the contradictions of the developmental State territorial action and organization and the intertwined relationships between the State and the reproduction of an urban-metropolitan development standard that is unsustainable in Brazil. Despite the initial enthusiasm surrounding the approval of the City Statute and the development of a new generation of Participatory Master Plans (MP), recent assessments show the limited reach of such experiences. The MP has become mandatory for cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, as well as cities that are part of metropolitan areas, urban agglomerations, areas of special touristic interest and cities located in zones of influence of projects with significant environmental impact. According to the monitoring carried out by the Ministry of Cities, it is estimated that more than 2,000 plans were prepared or reviewed over the 2000s.

A decade after the Law was approved, in a first assessment of the City Statute that was prepared jointly by the Ministry of Cities and the Observatory of the Metropolises (UFRJ), Santos Jr. and Montandon (2011) argued that the results fell short of expected. Although many cities mentioned and incorporated urbanistic instruments in their Master Plan, few actually made use of urban strategies to use them. Moreover, the cases of cities that, in fact, not only regulated and enforced urbanistic instruments but also made it according to the premises of the social function of property were even rarer (Klink and Denaldi, 2015; Denaldi et al., 2015). Finally, other authors question the transforming capacity of the Participatory Master Plan itself (Maricato, 2010; Carlos Alessandri, 2005; Limonad and Barbosa, 2003).

1. Professor at Federal University of ABC (UFABC) – Program in Territory Planning and Management.
2. These authors analyze, for example, that in cities like Maringa (state of Paraná, South of Brazil) the PEUC ended up being used for the purpose of tax collection, predominantly in peripheral areas of the city where there is a lack of urban infrastructure.
The material result of the post-2003 scenario, marked by the allocation of a large amount of subsidized funds in the cities and by the institutional strengthening of (local) governments, was also below expectations. The situation helped strengthen the sense of impasse with regards to the political project of Brazilian urban reform.

However, one must relativize this feeling of malaise in the Brazilian urban planning field, particularly in light of the urban experience in the Global South. Despite the undeniable contradictions that mark Brazilian cities, the trajectory of the housing and urban policy and the experience of slum upgrading provide a reference for the international circulation of ideas and practices on the actually existing urban reform (i.e., under strong dispute by many interests and agents).

From this perspective we discuss in this chapter the limits and potentialities of the Habitat-III Conference and of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – currently under construction – to form an international alternative agenda, driven by the learning process that took place in the cities in the Global South in general and in Brazil in particular.

Until recently, the international circulation of conceptions on planning and housing and urban policy was roughly marked by the dependence on “out of place” ideas, according to which (post) modernist concepts originated from “central countries” – e.g. on the role of the Master Plan or strategic planning to major urban projects – served as an anchor for often contradictory experiences in the Global South.

We argue that the current situation requires a transformation in the paradigm of the international circulation of ideas on urban policy, in order to recognize the limits of dependence and the richness of interdependence. At the same time, interdependence requires the mobilization of social movements, reflective planners and the developing countries Academy as protagonists in the development of an alternative reading of the specificities of its housing and urban policy history, without discarding the relation of this history with the trends occurring on a global scale.

After this introduction, this chapter is divided in three complementary sections. At first, we present a brief overview of the critical reflection on Brazilian urban reform. Despite the relevance of criticism, we argue that social conflict does not over-determine the undeniable socio-spatial contradictions of Brazilian cities; Brazil’s own urban experience is also characterized by the “creative and innovative tension” brought by social movements, who well before the enactment of the City Statute contributed to constitute a more open and questioning urban reform arena. The trajectory of urban reform in Brazil is also relevant to a South-South dialogue, as we will briefly illustrate with the example of the India-Brazil-South Africa Intergovernmental Forum. In the second section, we present a preliminary analysis on the international circulation of ideas on planning and urban policy, and
on the transformation in the way in which this circulation occurs, that is, from a
dependent mode to a new standard marked by the interdependence of concepts,
narratives and models. Based on these ideas, we present, in the last section, the
Habitat-III Conference and the SDGs’ (Sustainable Development Goals) limits
and potentialities for the preparation of an agenda that takes into account the
specificities of cities in the Global South.

2 REVISITING BRAZILIAN URBAN REFORM IN THE LIGHT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO

In the international scenario, the Brazilian urban experience was established as
a social and institutional innovation benchmark (Ministério das Cidades and
Aliança das Cidades, 2010). The approval of the City Statute (CS), through the
Federal Law no. 10,257, of July 10, 2001, has raised expectations for change in the
direction of urban policy and management towards the construction of more just
and less environmentally predatory cities. The CS defines and regulates urbanistic
instruments to enforce the social function of urban property and to legitimize the
participation of society.

The new legal and institutional conditions would allow the municipality to
limit the right to urban land ownership and favor the democratic management of
cities. The municipalities could regulate and apply urban planning instruments
such as Compulsory Subdivision, Building and Use (Parcelamento, Edificação e
Utilização Compulsória – Peuc) of idle or underused land, the progressive Urban
Building and Land Tax, development exactions, the Special Zones of Social Inter-
est (Zeis) Special Areas of Environmental Interest (Zeias) and the Neighborhood
Impact Study (NIS), all of them considered strategic to ensure the right to housing
and to the city.

The law also determines that these plans must be developed in a participatory
manner. The “democratic management through the participation of the popula-
tion and of associations representing various segments of the community in the
urban development plans, programs and projects formulation, implementation and
monitoring,” (CS, Article 2, II) is one of the general guidelines of this law. Thus,
the Statute seeks to break the pattern of technocrat-centralized planning, which
until recently characterized Brazilian cities, and raises concrete expectations with
regards to a new generation of master plans that could gather together a broader
universe of actors, interests and agendas.

The post-2003 scenario was marked by institutional strengthening, reflected
in the creation of the Ministry of Cities in 2003, which concentrated the respon-
sibility for urban policy in its multiple dimensions (mobility and transportation,
sanitation, housing, urban planning, etc.). In the early years of its existence, the
The Ministry played a central role in various initiatives such as the creation of participatory councils on multiple scales, participatory development – via the councils – of the National Social Interest Housing System, capacity building and strengthening of municipalities in the preparation of local social interest housing plans and of participatory master plans, among other examples.

The creation of the Ministry also denoted the resumption of the presence of the Brazilian State in the sector after the disintegration of the National Housing Bank in the 1980s and the neoliberal prevalence in urban space in the 1990s (Klink and Denaldi, 2015). It is noteworthy that, until then, the housing and urban policy had been hollowed out and was the subject of continuous institutional changes (stop and go) in the organization chart of the federal government (Arretche, 1995). Moreover, the absence of a strategy of national development (which would go beyond the currency and inflation stabilization) ended up consolidating a process of decentralization due to absence (of central initiative) and of proliferation of a neo-localist competition between municipalities and states. The second Global Conference, Habitat-II, inspired by the ideological basis of the model of the protagonists-entrepreneurial cities (Borja and Castells, 1997), also emphasized the virtuous nature of urban trajectories in the new information society of the flows.

Secondly, with initiatives such as the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, or PAC) and the My House, My Life Program (Minha Casa Minha Vida, or MCMV), the federal government has now retaken its role in the allocation of resources, including those of the Federal Budget for urban development by means of promoting slum upgrading programs and the construction of housing units.

On the international scenario, the recent history of Brazilian urban policy is considered a reference in terms of democratization of the State (collaborative and participatory planning, strategic role of communicative rationality in the preparation of master plans etc.), market expansion through the social function of property and the right to affordable and well located housing, and, finally, the availability of grants to promote, following the general guidelines of federal policy, the access to the city for the less affluent classes (Huchzermeyer, 2003).

However, while this narrative about Brazilian urban reform circulated extensively on the international scale, spreading the idea of participation, social control, democratization of urban management and market expansion, the national debate has emphasized the aspect that effective changes in the cities since the 1980s have fallen short of the initial expectations with regards the urban reform. In general terms, this literature highlights three dimensions.

Firstly, there is the worrying empirical evidence. While we witnessed undeniable improvements in the distribution of income and the access to basic services,
a number of empirical studies reveal the continuity of a series of socio-spatial and environmental contradictions in Brazilian urban and metropolitan areas. The report on the State of Brazilian Cities, for example, shows that access to well located land and housing remains extremely uneven. In the economically more dynamic cities, characterized by relatively higher growth rates, neither family income nor wages paid in the productive sector follow the escalating land and real estate prices (Rolnik and Klink, 2011).

Secondly, a group of authors associated with the field of critical urbanism raised doubts concerning the effective capacity of transformation of the ideas of urban reform as a political project in Brazilian society, marked by structural inequalities and relations of power and patronage with the State (Rolnik, 2011). In fact, in the light of institutional strengthening, the democratization of the State and the proliferation of participatory-collaborative planning processes, as well as the increase in subsidized resources for social housing and the improvement of precarious settlements, the continued deep socio-spatial and environmental contradictions in Brazilian cities consolidated a sense of “deadlock of the Brazilian urban reform” (Maricato, 2011).

Thirdly, there is nothing inherent in the urban planning instruments that were constituted from the urban reform and the City Statute (Denaldi et al., 2015). Most discussions of the urban reform’s dilemmas did not give due attention to the fact that the regulation and use of this set of urban planning instruments are subject of intense dispute for hegemony on urban and housing policy between public and private actors. The consolidated evaluations of the Statute already showed that, despite the fact that many local governments mention the instruments that seek a greater leverage over land and property markets, they did not succeed in effectively implementing those instruments. Moreover, even considering the few municipalities which effectively lay hold of the instruments that were provided, they do not always do so in accordance with the aims of providing greater leverage over property speculation and of ensuring the social function of private property. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, tools such as the Peuc or progressive property tax can be used for the benefit of tax collection or for the promotion of real estate market dynamics, not always converging with the principle of the social function of urban property.

In order for us to also advance in the development of a wider debate on the international scenario, the national criticism regarding the Brazilian urban reform as summarized before should nevertheless be qualified.

It is undeniable that the initial expectations on urban reform were overly optimistic, especially with regard to the direct association between the presence of collaborative-participatory planning and urban instruments of control over the
land market, on the one hand, and the transformation of Brazilian cities towards a more fair and sustainable urban development pattern, on the other.

At the same time, the trajectory of Brazilian cities is not overdetermined by the impasses and conflicts that surround the built environment. This means that the structural contradictions of society and the neoliberalization and commodification of the urban space represent actual processes, but they did not close all the windows of opportunities present in Brazilian cities.

For example, a group of cities achieved progress in the implementation of urban instruments in line with the principle of the social function of property. In 2000, cities such as Diadema, Mauá, Santo André and São Bernardo do Campo, all of them located in the Greater ABC region in the southeast of the metropolitan area of São Paulo, defined some well located land as special areas of social interest (Zeis), which proved instrumental in expanding housing supply for the low-income population (Malvese, 2014). Cities like São Paulo and São Bernardo are nowadays also innovating considering the advanced stage in the circumscription and effective implementation of Peuc in conjunction with Zeis, thus seeking to operationalize the social function of private property.

The cities of the Greater ABC Region may be emblematic of these “differential spaces” of resistance and innovation. The insurgence of social housing movements, unions and associations of workers, together with progressive mayors, provoked by the unfolding process of neoliberalization and uncontrolled trade liberalization and its effects on regional spaces, represented not only a complaint about the contradictory spaces that were inherited from Brazilian developmentalism, but also a claim and a projection of a better urban-regional space, providing the right to housing, to the city (and to the appropriation of collective wealth produced by the city) and, ultimately, to life.

In a way, the neoliberalization processes themselves and the subsequent crisis of the developmental State turned “the ABC metropolis” into a privileged arena for mobilization around an alternative development project, structured through chambers and forums with community participation, and self-management programs for slum regularization and upgrading and for microcredit and the promotion of unemployed workers’ cooperatives, among other examples. The experience ended up triggering innovative forms of local-regional governance aiming towards collective production and the appropriation of the urban land, the city and their own daily life in the region (Rodríguez-Pose, Tomaney and Klink, 2001).

Finally, the precise filling in of the “really existing” Brazilian urban reform is also relevant to critically reflect on the limits and potentialities of a project with this profile in other emerging countries. Understanding the complexities of the Brazilian urban reform and its relevance to the Global South requires rooting them in a critical
reading about the selectivity of territorial organization and State intervention, without
losing sight of the innovative praxis from which social movements, such as housing
and workers’ organizations, have changed and will continue changing their destinies
in cities and metropolitan areas.

3 THE IBSA EXPERIENCE

In this sense, it is worth highlighting a particular experience of the Brazilian gov-
ernment in the South-South dialogue around the urban and housing agenda in
the specific context of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, a trilateral initiative between
India, Brazil and South Africa geared at the promotion of South-South cooperation
and exchange on various thematic areas defined in agreement between all parts.

At the 4th meeting of the Trilateral Commission of the IBSA held in Delhi
in July 2007, human settlements were identified as a potential thematic area for
cooperation and became the subject of a specific working group. During the 3rd
IBSA Summit held in Delhi in October 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was signed formalizing the Working Group on Human Settlements (WGHS)
integrated by the National Secretariat of Housing of the Ministry of Cities of Bra-
zil, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MoHUPA) of India,
and the National Department of Human Settlements (NDHS) of South Africa.

The objectives listed in the MoU for the trilateral engagement between the
three countries with regards to human settlements were the development of concepts
and approaches to address the issues of the development of human settlements,
establish technical cooperation through exchange of experts and experiences,
strengthen multilateral cooperation through joint participation in workshops and
the adoption of common national and regional positions; and promote cooperation
in areas such as training, capacity building and urban research, among other goals.

The IBSA WG on Human Settlements advanced on the exchange of experi-
ences, information dissemination and homogenization of concepts to start drafting
a common agenda (Wojciechowski and Klink, 2013). For example, the Forum
played an instrumental role in the exchange of experiences on the progress, con-
tradictions and challenges faced during the design and implementation of large
urban-housing development programs, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission and Rajiv Awas Yojana in India, the Capital Subsidy
Program in the post-apartheid period in South Africa and the PAC/PMCMV in
Brazil. It also organized seminars and workshops to facilitate the development of
a common vocabulary among members. The seminar “Cities, Human Settlements
and Development: Towards an agenda of applied research and public policies in
emerging countries,” organized in partnership between the Ministry of Cities and
the Federal University of ABC Region between the March 12-14, 2014, gathered
together professionals and academics from the three countries in order to discuss issues relating to the global urban agenda, practice guided learning and the development of training, networking and funding of urban and housing policies. At the end of the seminar, the partners agreed to carry out an initiative for joint research to support the training of professionals and capacity building applied and guided by practice, and the exchange of information and experiences in public policies and programs of slum upgrading.

Therefore, despite the challenges associated with garbled communication and circulation of ideas due to differential geography, political culture and history of the partner members of the Forum, a collective awareness emerged, at the same time, about some common traits between different experiences and the innovation that occurred along the trajectory of Brazilian housing and urban policies. This opened a real prospect for the circulation of ideas around a critical agenda on urban-housing policy that, at the same time, recognized the potential of a transforming praxis, driven by progressive local governments and social movements, as occurred in countries like Brazil. Therefore, it is worth reflecting on the real significance of this and other dialogues and South-South cooperation initiatives in order to generate a qualitative upgrade in the debates regarding the feasibility of an alternative Urban Agenda for Brazil and the Global South, and, consequently, for the Habitat-III Conference itself.

4 THE CONSTRUCTION OF AGENDAS AND THE CIRCULATION OF IDEAS ABOUT PLANNING: FROM DEPENDENCE TO INTERDEPENDENCE?

Back in the mid 20th century, a simple uprooting and transplanting transfer process could be justified by the belief in a single, “universally valid” pathway for human social development” (Healey, 2011, p. 191).

The above quote from Patsey Healey can be part of a more general review of this author about the way in which certain ideas on urban and regional planning and organization circulate internationally. In her view, the transfer and circulation of ideas on urban planning occur from a process of creating a narrative of origin, and transforming it into something “replicable”, as well as “landing” it in particular places, as opposed to others.

While a narrative of origin places the historical, socio-economic and political context of the experiments, its transformation filters “superfluous” elements and cuts to the core dimensions in order to ensure greater comparability and dissemination of the practices. Experiences such as participatory budgeting, which originated in

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3. For various reasons this approach has not yet materialized. The subject is beyond the scope of this chapter but there are two hypotheses for the lack of progress on this shared agenda. First, the displacement of the Brazilian government’s agenda from the IBSA Forum to the BRICS. The second hypothesis is related to the hollowing of South-South cooperation itself due to the slowdown of major economies that are part of the blocks, especially Brazil, India and China.
the city of Porto Alegre, and microcredit, which initially emerged in the context of rural areas of Bangladesh, are emblematic examples of the circulation of ideas. However, in the author’s view, these examples also show that in the very process of circulation there was a loss of transforming dimensions of power structures that marked the original experiments.\footnote{In the case of Porto Alegre the most radical features were related to direct democracy and breaking the technobureaucratic planning processes of public funds.}

Healey also points out that the process of international circulation of ideas has undergone changes throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, mainly due to the decrease of the essentialist narrative of a universal modernity and to the continuous development mediated by planning itself. Particularly, she argues that we witness a transformation from a scenario marked by certainties, linear narratives, comparability and re-applicability of experiences to a context of uncertainties, contingencies and a recognition of the geographical and historical specificities of place.

In a way, this challenges the very notion of transfer and circulation of ideas on planning and creates a dilemma: how to move forward in building a critical agenda on planning that recognizes the specificities of local experiences, but, at the same time, articulates the ability to learn from other countries members of an international community of planners, academics and social movements that are increasingly connected on a planetary (urbanized) scale? At the end of this section we shall return to this initial question.

Before that, it is worth dissecting the analysis of the circulation of ideas in the specific context of the Global South. Particularly, taking Healey’s analysis as a starting point, the modernist era consolidated a dependent pattern of circulation of ideas, from center to periphery, rooted in an essentialist view of re-applicability of planning from developed countries to the former colonies. Roughly, in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century we find two major phases in this trajectory of the circulation of ideas:

1) The period between the post-war and the 1970s, marked by what Brenner (2004) calls the spatial Keynesianism in the central countries. In this period, the modernist planning fits into a well-articulated narrative of scales and spaces of the national Welfare State. The design and the strategy of spatial Keynesianism, in order to ensure a certain socio-spatial cohesion, are articulated through a national State that reduces regional and urban disparities through regional planning agencies and urban policies that subsidize housing and urban services. Master plans and functional zoning serve to sort and organize a space for the sake of collective efficiency.

That ideology influenced the “national projects” that were being built, with different flags, in several emerging countries and former colonies. In this context,
the ideas of “the center” regarding the role of planning as a driving element of an efficient city within a national project found a relatively fertile ground. International development agencies and national projects of technical cooperation with the former colonies and other emerging countries also contributed to the establishment of a strong channel for the circulation of ideas, operated by scholars and professional planners working in foundations, consulting firms and universities in central countries.5

2) The post-1970s period, marked by the crisis in the standard of monetary regulation on a global scale and the process of neoliberalization and transformation in the spaces and scale of intervention of national States in the industrialized countries of the centre. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse in detail the spatial consequences of the neoliberalization process in central countries, following authors such as Harvey (1989) and, more recently, Brenner and Theodore (2002). In short, the “neoliberalization of spaces” shifted the modernist planning leitmotif, that is, from the guarantee of a degree of socio-spatial cohesion compatible with the maintenance of the system of accumulation through a national project of space control and organization and through the provision of grants and subsidies for housing and urban infrastructure, towards a mode of regulation that encourages the role of cities and urban competitiveness in a globalized economy.

There is extensive literature on how these ideas and practices on the role of urban planning and of the cities as “engines of growth and development,” originated in a context of productive restructuring in the center, migrated to emerging countries (Fernandes, 2001).

There are also innumerable examples of this “scalar turn” in central countries, and the way in which development agencies influenced the international circulation of ideas on the city-region as a new anchor of the (inter)national economy. In 1991, the World Bank used the concept “urban productivity” to analyze the strategic role of cities in a full context of fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries (World Bank, 1991). That policy paper set off a series of similar publications of other multilateral and bilateral cooperation agencies (UNDP, 1991). The second Global Conference Habitat-1996, held in Istanbul, also prioritized the issue of cities based on Borja’s and the “new” Castells’ ideas on the global and the local (Borja and Castells, 1997). In 1999, the Cities Alliance,

5 An emblematic example was the Bouwcentre, Dutch institution of capacity building and training created in the 1950s in Rotterdam, which was to become the IHS (Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies). The Institute created the so-called Dutch model, which was characterized by a multifaceted approach through: professional training courses offered in Rotterdam and targeted on technicians from emerging countries (for example, a five months course of housing, planning and construction); institutional strengthening and capacity building projects “in loco” in emerging countries; and consulting processes seeking to resolve specific problems in emerging countries. Currently, following a restructuring in the 1990s that resulted in reduced government subsidies, the Institute was absorbed by the Erasmus University in Rotterdam.
composed of an ensemble of bilateral and multilateral agencies, formed a central platform for cities. Its performance favors the creation of developmental strategies through cities (City Development Strategies) and the massification of slum upgrading strategies. The latest guidance reflects, from the funding agencies and (national and local) governments, a recognition of slums as new opportunities to generate income, employment and social capital.

The unilateral circulation of ideas, from the central countries to the periphery, contributed to consolidate the contradictions in the very development trajectory in emerging countries. It also locked the articulation of a more authentic thinking, in line with the specificities of planning in the Global South. The Brazilian case is emblematic of some trends that are also manifest in countries like India and South Africa (Roy, 2009; Pieterse, 2008).

With regard to the post-war period, for example, it should be noted that the Brazilian national developmentalism never paralleled the spatial Keynesianism. The first provided ideological legitimacy in favor of a project of growth, industrialization and the building of a nation-market, but has generated a series of social and environmental contradictions in Brazilian metropolises. The “favelas” or slums, precarious and informal settlements, found no place in the modern, functionalist city while the developmentalist project has appropriated the water, watersheds, and non-renewable resources as mere cheap inputs in the accumulation process mediated by the national government. Errors and (few) successes that have crept over the decades have consolidated a process that was followed and sponsored by the development agencies themselves (*learning by doing*, in the World Bank’s own language). This process was marked by the evolution from a strategy of unconditionally demolishing and removing the slums to a gradual State recognition of slums as a constituent element of an alternative urban praxis. Also pressured by social and housing movements, this evolution and maturation triggered State strategies to improve, urbanize and insert the slums in broader development projects. Therefore, the specificity of the Brazilian trajectory ended by rooting a slow and contradictory process of learning with the slum’s urbanization strategies, gradually articulated with the urban-housing policy itself.

As for the most recent phase marked by neoliberalization, the circulation of ideas in the central countries on the protagonist role of the cities and the major urban projects led to “platypus” adaptations in the Brazilian scenario. On the one hand, in the years of national-developmentalist collapse and the decline of the nation-State performance in 1990s, we have witnessed, in fact, the proliferation of narratives on the crisis of the modernist plan, the emergence of “new” forms of urban planning and the dispute between the cities on the world scenario of places. However, the consequence of the acute shortage of public resources that marked the
years of productive restructuring, in addition to the lack of leverage of the public sector itself on the land markets, was that the penetration of the “new” standard of planning, at least compared to the situation in central countries, was incomplete.

Moreover, in continental countries such as Brazil, it is clear over time that the national State has changed its organization and operation, but it continues strategic, both, as in the case of the 1990s, to trigger a Project of marketization and deregulation of spaces (rolling back neoliberalization), or to try to create the most appropriate institutions for the full operation of the urban markets themselves (rolling out neoliberalization).

Finally, post-2003, the resumption of macroeconomic growth favored a stronger role for the national State structured around a redistributive project driven by the allocation of voluminous subsidized financial resources for urban and metropolitan areas. Therefore, the specificity and complexity of the pattern of regulation and performance of the Brazilian State, at multiple scales, meant that the praxis as well as the ideas of Brazilian urban policy did not mechanically align with ideas on neoliberalization of urban spaces and the proliferation of neolocalist strategies in place in central countries.

In fact, the complexity of the Brazilian city, as an arena that is disputed by public and private actors with different projects and strategies (e.g. the urban renewal city, the city as a growth machine, the city as a privileged space for the collective production and appropriation of wealth and of life itself etc.), opens a window for a more authentic reflection, in line with the geographical and historical specificities of the contradictory role of the developmental state in urban and regional space, while recognizing their intertwined relationships with the thinking on urban policy and planning in the central countries.

This brings us to the question, mentioned at the beginning of this section, on the universalization and comparability versus the uniqueness-specificity of experiences and ideas on planning, which is the key element of Healey’s argument. Specifically, how to recognize the limits of comparability in the light of the specificities of narratives of origin that embody the experiences without, at the same time, disregarding the interdependencies, the structures and the assemblages surrounding the circulation of ideas on practices, instruments and planning. In Healey's view, this requires the improvement of “the idea of planning with the characteristics of as an universal contingency in continuous evolution” (Healey 2011, p. 191).

With this idea, Healey seeks to develop a new interdependent circulation pattern, arguing in favor of the emergence of an international community of reflective planners (inquirers). But will the reflective community of the “Global South” be
part of it? And how does the Habitat Conference open opportunities (or risks) for the interdependent circulation of ideas for the elaboration of a critical reflections on the agenda and a transformative praxis for cities in the Global South?

5 EPILOGUE: HABITAT-III, THE SDGS AND THE ALTERNATIVE AGENDA?

With regard to the dynamics of international discussions, the year 2014 marked the end of a cycle associated with the Millennium Development Goals and the opening of a new global agenda that sought to mobilize the international community around the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In fact, the articulation and design of this alternative agenda had already been outlined well before, which gradually consolidated an international “multi-scale” network composed of international agencies, private sector representatives and civil society organizations, national governments, technical institutions and universities, consultants and world leaders.

The emblematic example was the establishment by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network in 2012. The aim of this network is “to mobilize global knowledge and expertise to the resolution of practical problems for sustainable development, including the design and implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)”. The network is committed to supporting “the implementation of SDGs at the local, national and global scales.”

The organizational structure of the network includes, among other mechanisms, an academic advisory committee, a leadership council composed of members with proven knowledge about sustainability issues, representatives of the public sector, civil society, academia and the business sector. The network receives financial contributions from multilateral and bilateral organizations, businesses, foundations and national governments, among other sources.

It is undeniable that the progress of the discussions of the “international community” towards the sustainability agenda has gained momentum and legitimacy from issues such as global warming, the proliferation of natural disasters and the challenges associated with the energy matrix structured on non-renewable resources, among the most obvious examples with capacity of political and media mobilization. In addition, we have witnessed for a long time a growing association between the sustainability agenda and the dynamics of cities. For example, one of the eleven priority thematic areas adopted by the Sustainable Development Solutions Network mentioned earlier are the “Sustainable Cities: inclusive, resilient, sustainable and resilient.”

6. It should be noted that Healey makes use of a broad concept of (reflective) “planners”, which includes professional and academic planners as well as social movements and private actors involved and affected in the planning of the built environment.

and connected.” As we know, the narrative of origin that guided this agenda is not new and is related to the perception that cities concentrate a significant portion of economic dynamism, poverty and global environmental contradictions.8

However, the concept of sustainability is broad and can be filled in according to various projects and strategies. Therefore, there is nothing inherent in the manner in which the agendas of the environment and sustainability are articulated and related to the urban scale and the (re)production of urban and regional space (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003). In this sense, urban sustainability reflects an arena that is disputed by social and environmental movements and by public and private actors seeking to redirect it according to their own interests. Moreover, as Acselrad (2009) also states, ecosystems and cities are inextricably linked and are part of a hybrid environmental metabolism, labeled by him as “cyborg urbanization”:

In the city, society and nature, representation and being are inseparable, mutually integrated, infinitely connected and simultaneous; this hybrid socio-natural “thing” called “city” is full of contradictions, tensions and conflicts. Urbanity and urbanization capture those objects proliferating that Donna Haraway calls “cyborgs” (1991) or Bruno Latour refers to as “almost objects” (1993); they are intermediaries who embody and mediate nature and society and weave a network of endless transgressions and border areas (Acselrad, 2009, p. 100)

So in light of this framework, the SDGs provide challenges and opportunities for the preparation of an agenda for Habitat-III Conference, which is aligned with the specificities of the development trajectory of Brazil and other emerging countries and that recognizes the complexities associated with socio-environmental metabolism, the “cyborg urbanization” and with the disputed arenas and conflicts surrounding the urban and environmental agenda in cities in the Global South (Acselrad, 2009).

The challenge is that, at present, the narrative of sustainability that embodies the SDGs themselves is filled in by a representational framework that is structured around the concept of ecological modernization (Harvey, 1997). According to this paradigm, strongly inspired by the environmental sciences, ecological economics and systems theory, the problem (and the solution) of sustainability requires (systemic) adjustments in stocks and flows generated by the economic dynamics to ensure the ecosystems’ resilience and absorption capacity. From the 1970s, we have witnessed the ecological modernization emerge with strong appeal in the pragmatism of the agenda of multilateral and bilateral agencies, managers and environmental movements, as part of depoliticized approaches, such as the polluter

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8. “Today, 50 per cent of the world population live in cities and, by 2050, this share will rise to 70 per cent. Cities concentrate an extreme degree of deprivation and environmental degradation, with a billion people living in precarious settlements. At the same time, about 75 per cent of global economic activity is urban and, as the urban population grows, so will the urban share of GDP and investment on a global scale. See: <http://unsdsn.org>, accessed on: February 26, 2016.
pays principle and the shared-collaborative governance of environmental public goods. The very logic that constitutes the Sustainable Development Solutions Network is rooted in the paradigm of ecological modernization.

At the same time, the issue of sustainability opens opportunities and prospects for an alternative agenda based on different representations, such as political ecology or environmental justice.

The starting point of political ecology is the analysis of (material, discursive, cultural and symbolic) disputes around the distribution and access to environmental resources, through an epistemological perspective that values the unequal power relations and social, political and economic disparities in the production and transformation of nature and man (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003). The first generation of political ecology contributions incorporated a relatively static and deterministic view on scalar arrangements. More recent studies seek to engage better with a strategic-relational perspective, pointing out that disputes over ownership of forests, air, water and land are molded on the basis of an articulation, by various stakeholders, of multiple scales (Ioris, 2011).

The main argument of environmental justice, which has a narrative of origin coming from black and poor neighborhoods of American cities that were affected by multiple forms of pollution and environmental degradation, is the “uneven and combined” distribution of environmental costs over ethnic and racial groups and social classes. The approach evolved to broaden the scope and range of issues, including the debate on disasters, mobility and transportation and the location of Fordist-polluting industries at geographical scales beyond the city. The international circulation of the idea of environmental justice also triggered a growing recognition of the general and specific qualities of environmental dialectics in other countries, regions and cities.

Environmental justice and political ecology represent promising alternative narratives in order to re-politicize the sustainability agenda for cities in the Global South. These narratives also establish a dialogue with the contradictory legacy of developmentalism in urban and regional areas in general, and the contemporary challenges of articulating the environmental agenda with the urbanization and integration of slums in Brazilian cities in particular.

The different rationales that underpin urban and environmental planning have transformed cities and metropolitan areas in arenas of contestation in which public actors (local authorities responsible for environmental licensing and urban infrastructure, local governments, public housing and development banks etc.) and private actors (housing and environmental movements, companies and representatives of business associations, academics and liberal professionals etc.) dispute for hegemony over the right to fill in the sustainability agenda in accordance with
their own projects and interests. In this scenario, the meaning and direction of the sustainability project are much more open than it is suggested by the hegemonic paradigm of ecological modernization structured around the idea of adjusting stocks and flows. For example, the sustainability of water sources in cities is contested in the context of slum upgrading projects; of licensing restrictions for social interest housing programs; and of providing incentives to logistics and projects that generate jobs and income.

In this context, therefore, it is interesting for Brazil to articulate and guide a SDGs agenda taking different assumptions and narratives that underly the paradigm of ecological modernization, with a view to establishing an international community of reflective planners (and movements) that seek to insert issues of housing and urban and environmental planning in cities of the Global South into the global discussions on sustainability. Are we ready for Habitat-III?

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HYBRID SCALES OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION CAN SCALE-UP PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES?¹

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The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights (D. Harvey, 2008, p. 23).

1 INTRODUCTION: WHEN QUESTIONING THE WEIGHT OF SCALE

In the last decade, citizens’ participation to decision-making processes has been widely considered as a fundamental component of the construction of the Right-to-the-City. At the same time, the City has also been the main stage where the majority of the experiments of democratic innovations (DIs), which bloomed around the world during the same period, took place. Among these DIs are worth to be quoted participatory budgeting (PB), participatory urban planning and integrated development techniques, Agenda 21, the methodology of Public Debate, the Electronic Town Meetings and several families of Citizens’ Juries, Citizens’ Panels and Citizens’ Assembly which – in the last two decades – have been accompanying public decision making worldwide, hybridizing and adapting to different cultures.

In practice, the local authorities (and namely municipalities) have been the main institutional player involved in a process of extensive intensification of urban democratic regimes, opening their decision-making processes to the active engagement of non-elected citizens and social groups. In several cases, the decision of doing so is fostered by clever representatives of elected officials, aware of the need

¹. This article partially owes its reflections to the project “O Orçamento Participativo como Instrumento Inovador Para Reinventar as Autarquias em Portugal e Cabo Verde: uma análise crítica da performance e dos transfers” (funded by FCT with funding PTDC/CS-SOC/099134/2008 - FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-009255), and to a more recent project funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement “Enabling Multichannel Participation Through ICT Adaptations – Empatia” (687920).
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to renew governing methods in the “era of mistrust” (Rosanvallon, 2006; 2015), while – in other cases – it was the pressure of organized society which managed, from bottom-up, to convince institutions to open new solid spaces of social dialogue.

As a consequence of such a trend of participatory innovations mushrooming at local level, many scholars and activists argue that the small scale of those processes limits intrinsically their potential influence over the power relations that actually shape strategic choices of urbanization and influence structurally local development. Authors like Mark Purcell developed the concept of *Local Trap* exactly to define the tendency of researchers and activists to generalize a set of value-related assumptions as typically “inherent about the local scale”. It refers to a number of unwritten and invisible meanings that conflate with the “local” as a reaction and juxtaposition to the cultural framework built around the “global”. As the latter is associated with neoliberal capitalism, social injustice and frequent lack of democratization (or low-intensity of formal democratic regimes) a similar conceptual double bind is built around the local at different dimension: localization/democratization; community/local community; local people/local sovereignty; local development/community based development. More in general, “the use of the modifier “local” to stand in for more specific ideas such as “indigenous”, “poor”, “rural”, “weak”, or “traditional”, even though there is nothing essentially local about any of these categories.” (Purcell, 2006). Similar biases are visible also in the academic literature on Democratic Innovations and Urban Democracy, and constitute a silent ambiguity all throughout the debate on the Right to the City and its enforcement.

The question we’d like to focus on in this chapter regards exactly the actual capacity of localized experiments of DI to substantiate the right to the city: to enforce a new set of rights related to the condition of inhabitant of the urban space and to influence the power relations that actually underlie urbanization strategies and the related value creation and accumulation mechanisms.

Indeed, on one hand, it seems evident how the capital investments that transform urban spaces in world cities are always more dependent from decisional mechanism taking place outside the public domain and often at a scale that do not correspond with the physical stage where urbanization projects are implemented. On the other hand, the lower ties of the Public Sector are in general too weak to enforce new rights autonomously, without the support of higher administrative and political levels.

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This is true also where Nation-States already devolved and decentralized part of their power to other entities (as for example in the context of the European Union, where at least until 2008 decentralization has been a key concept of public sector reforms). We can use the definition of “asymmetric subsidiarity” to describe the framework of decentralization under neoliberalism, where the transference of competences do not correspond to an equal transference of funds to fulfill the new duties, often leaving Local Authorities exposed to indebtedness and progressive financialization.

As an example, it is meaningful to underline how much the budgets of municipalities worldwide are suffering from path-dependency illnesses, due to high interest in repaying debts and dependence from transfers by higher ties of the Government. In many cases, the only resource available for structural investments is represented by the urbanization fees: as a consequence, a dramatic spiral takes place, being that the financial autonomy of local authorities becomes dependent from the production of profitable spaces, and a vicious circle of speculation, with selling out and enclosure of commons.

As a consequence of such perverse trends, the scale of participation processes must be questioned in order to research and analyze their actual effectiveness. What should be the adequate socio-institutional scale of participatory innovations so to meet the basic political, social and economic needs and claims of citizens? Is the scale of participatory experiment a so really determinant factor in their success, or could the existence of networks and critical masses of local practices adequately compensate the trap of proximity?

From a theoretical perspective, political ecologists already de-constructed the socio-environmental nature of each geographic scale, including the scale of social participation and conflict. The wave of alter-mondialist social movements that characterized the dawn of the millennium can be recognized as a myth-poietic example of a “glocalization” of social claims. That strategy used the stage offered by localized mega-summits of globalized institution (as the WTO meeting in Seattle 99 or the G8 in Genoa in 2001) as a base to organize a counter-strategy able to make visible local issues as the widespread diffusion of OGM or the increasing exposition to debt of southern societies. Aside the self-organized social movements, the networking activity engaged a broader range of NGOs and institutional players in the organization of great participatory experiments known as Social Forums: a nebula of flexible and transversal participatory spaces able to connect the local dimension up to the global level, with the annual celebration of the World Social Forums (WSF) since 2001. Exactly in the context of the first WSF in Porto Alegre 8.

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in 2001, the practice of PB experimented in Brazil and Latin America has been for the first time diffused throughout Europe, thanks to the circulation of knowledge and practices allowed by international networks of activists and local authorities as FAL- the Local Authorities Forum for Social Inclusion.9

Similarly, in more recent international summit of the UN system (as in the case of Rio+20 in 2012) official consultative process are carried out by the organizing bodies with the double-faceted objective to raise and include in the institutional agenda needs and proposals from civil society, but at the same time to neutralize and weaken the more conflictual positions within social movements.

While these examples created strategic organizational references for social movement and activists on the global stages - based on the organization of counter mega-events – the picture is much more complex and differentiated when we research the development of systematic participatory practices at intermediate scales (between the local and the global). Narrowing down on concrete experiences of DI, it appears evident how until a few years ago it was almost impossible to imagine large scale systematic participation, although punctual cases existed in specific contexts, especially in terms of referendum, legislative bottom-up initiatives or other participatory specific initiatives. Nowadays, some participatory devices strongly affirmed their presence in the international panorama, especially at local level. They often move between institutionalization experiments and a strong use of information and communication technologies, being that – until now - the latter often weakened the social impact and the strength of participatory processes, because they contribute to reducing social dialogue to “light” consultation and mechanical summing of individual preferences. But attempts of scaling-up participatory innovations to larger administrative levels are growing up in quality and numbers. This happens, on one side, in parallel to the strengthening of the regional level as a meaningful space of government (especially within European Union or in Federal States elsewhere). On the other, it takes place in a framework where municipal powers are forced to merge or join forces into supra-municipal or intercommunal entities, as for example the new bodies established to govern metropolitan areas over the administrative boundaries of the municipalities. The latter are often weak in terms of legitimacy and lack of democratic recognition by part of their inhabitants.

Undoubtedly, the widespread diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the rapid development of collaborative technologies and related behavioral approaches opened a new range of possibilities, not only allowing a large number of people to participate in large-scale processes (as, for example,

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Popular law-making initiatives at national level), but also interconnecting different scales of participation, thus creating linkages between pre-existing processes and fostering the creation of coalitions able to broaden numbers while maintaining complexity and original diversity. As showed in Allegretti, Corsi e Allegretti (2016), in the last decade a wide range of experiences took place, which opened participatory spaces for constitution-making or deep constitution-amending beyond the role of traditional Constituent assemblies, being the cases of South Africa, Kenya, Nepal, Bolivia, Ecuador Iceland and Ireland among the most recent and radical. In such cases, the driver of the processes was mostly the need of sharing the setting of common fundamental values on which to base a national (or even pluri-national or, at least, multi-cultural) new legal framework. Other experiences have been related to the strategic option of sharing with inhabitants reforms which (as that of the electoral system in the case of the Citizens Assemblies experienced in British Columbia Province, Canada)\(^{10}\) would be very difficult to carry on if left to the self-reform capacity of the elected representatives, and their will to gradually give up to consolidated privileges.

### 2 A USER-FRIENDLY NOTE TO THIS TEXT

Under the perspective exposed in the previous paragraph, the present text wants to provide a small contribution to understand how the challenge posed by the scale of participatory processes can be gradually overcome through what Leonie Sandercock once called “a thousand of tiny empowerment” actions (2003).

For this reasons, the research question which inspires this essay is: at what extent and through what mechanisms city-based deliberative democracy processes can influence policy making at another scale than just the local government? Our hypothesis is that ICTs can play a pivotal role by offering the technical opportunity to scale up, but they also accentuate fragmentation and individualization of participation. In order to make their use effective, networks and organized groups are crucial not only when such actors play as “activators” of participatory dynamics at larger scales, but also when they act as “translators” between languages and cultures which are still not able to interact in depth. On this base, in the following paragraphs, we present two different cases in different corners of the planet and in different stages of development:

- The first case is that of Portugal, in its initial stages for constructing a Portuguese National Law on Participation. The latter has been advocated by some professional/research-oriented organizations, and is being pushed forward by a network of local authorities committed to experiment DIs (and especially PB), taking advantage of the availability of Collaborative

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\(^{10}\) See Fung et al. (2011).
Platforms, which created the opportunity for a capillary diffusion of such DIs.

• The second example, in a more advanced stage of its political history, is Taiwan. And it tells the story of Taiwan.g0v, a movement of civic hackers initially based in Taipei City, which has been able to scale-up its ambitions, and link the physical occupation of urban spaces with a capacity to claim a better and substantial democratization of local and national authorities.

The choice was that of giving value to two “silenced stories” of semiperipheral countries (Santos e Meneses, 2009) which rarely have been properly counted, at least up to now. From a methodological point of view, it is worth to underline that the researchers who authored the two narratives exposed in the next paragraphs have been – in different ways – active part of the movements described. Although not claiming neutrality in relation to the events, and choosing a description of the cases which start from their own experience as active agents, we tried to adopt a “reflexive” approach, taking care of other perspectives and critics that have been emerging along the last two years, especially in the blogosphere, and in other rare spaces of public debate.

3 THE PORTUGUESE SURPRISE: DRIVING ON CRITICAL MASSES OF EXPERIMENTAL ENERGY AT LOCAL LEVEL

Portugal is a small 10 million inhabitants country at the margin of European Union, which – historically – has always been acting as a bridge between the Old Continent and several countries in Africa and Latin America (Santos e Meneses, 2009). In the beginning of the Third Millennium, Portugal hosted some of the first European emulation of PB (PB), the participative device born in Brazil in the late 80s with the aim of giving voice and vote on public budgetary matters to citizens, with special attention to those which had been historically excluded from decision-making during the elitist and military regime which governed the larger Latin American country during the XX century.

Since 1998 the small city of Palmela (in the southern metropolitan area of Lisbon) had been at the forefront of innovation, experimenting a PB process which, despite being merely advisory, was deeply committed in reversing sociopolitical priorities, especially bringing to the center of public policies the voice of rural areas and their inhabitants (UCLG, 2014).

Palmela, soon emulated by other neighboring municipalities led by the same political forces (the CDU, i.e. a coalition of the Green and the Communist Portuguese Party), became not only the pilot of an important wave of municipal experiments of PB, but a recognized reference in the European
domain, thanks to its activism in the global network of Urbal Programme, which (between 2003 and 2010) dedicated a specific line of funding to support innovative experiments and mutual learning in the domain of local finances and PB (Cabannes e Baierle, 2005).

In Portugal, Palmela’s experience was much more controversial than abroad. In fact, it was considered by other political forces in the country as the most visible example of a “sectarian” ideological approach, incapable of affirming its values and usefulness for a larger conception of reforming governance in Portuguese cities. Around 2005-2006 it had already become an important flagship experiment used by social movements (and especially those linked to the alterglobalist vision of the world Social Forum) to point out the “true path to the future” for the renewal of municipal powers in Portugal (Sintomer e Allegretti, 2016; Tavares et al., 2015).

In this perspective, the claims and requests made by leftist parties in several municipal councils of Portugal for starting PB experiences in cities governed by the Socialist or the Socialdemocrat Parties, where often violently rejected. A mix of political tension against what was still seen as a “neocommunist blueprint” and a skepticism of colonialist origin about the possibilities of Brazilian creative political ideas to pave the path to DIs in Europe tended to suffocate the innovative energy that could have been spread by Palmela’s pilot and other municipal experiences.

### 3.1 Unblocking a “cul de-sac”

The year of 2006 represented a change of this situation for Portugal. In fact, the Center for Social Studies (CES) of Coimbra University together with In Loco, a NGO for action-research in sustainable local development, agreed in trying to intervene in this stuck situation. Following the pioneer studies on participatory democracy of Santos (1999; 2007), the two institutions decided to strengthen training on PB and develop a role of “cultural translation”, thus organizing an international event which could bring to Portugal experiences of PB from other European countries, which were trying to emulate and adapt the Brazilian device to different national and local contexts. The main merit of these two institutions was to understand that a sort of “restart from zero” was needed for the national debate on PB, through valuing what European continent had already produced in the field.

The central idea was that of strengthening networks and opportunities of mutual exchange, possibly stimulating new Portuguese cities to experiment pilot projects. Also, the researcher in the two institutions who engaged in promoting training and debates on PB tried to get funding, aware that when institutions are still skeptical about a novelty, they will barely invest politically and financially on it. Finally, they undertook a task of networking with other organizations of civil society,
seeing in PB an opportunity to strengthen relational capital and social organized fabric in a country were associativism is often weak, and participation is mainly conceived as a “top-down” concession by local institutions.

So, CES and In Loco started to propose free-counseling to the algarvian Municipality of São Bras de Alportel (for a two-track pilot of PB: one for school-children and the other for adults), taking advantage of an EU funding through the Communitarian Initiative “Equal”.

The image below shows a gradual complexification of the panorama of Portuguese PBs between 2002 and 2008, marked by the appearance of new experience which acted as pilots (and good practices) for new models of participatory budgets.

FIGURE 1

Mutual exchanges between Portuguese PBs

Lately (in 2007), In Loco and CES jointly wrote and coordinated a project called “OP Portugal”, or “Orçamento Participativo Portugal: Mais Participação, Melhor Democracia” (PB Portugal: more participation, better democracy”) within the same “Equal” Programme, through which they were able to provide national and regional training courses as well as tailored consultancies to more than fifty municipalities around Portugal. The project, implemented in partnership with three local authorities and the National Center for Training of Municipal Employees (CEFA), lasted until mid of 2009 and won a mention of honor among all the Equal initiatives, interchanging with other national Programmes as “Escolhas”, especially for what concerned PB for children and schools.
The new initiative gave visibility to PB experiments around Portugal and brought many ideas from other European experiments, starting to place Portugal on the world-map for a serious of innovations in the domain of PB. The project “OP Portugal” had five main outputs: i) breaking the silence and skepticism about PB in the two main parties (Socialist and Social Democrat) which run the majority of local authorities in Portugal; ii) creating a constructive environment of critics about previous PB examples, which could drive to experiments of larger quality and impact; iii) presenting PB as a versatile tool of governance which could dialogue with other participatory devices and the constitutional/legal framework of Portugal; iv) making PB a “subject of public discussion” (especially in the media, which elsewhere is very silent or hypercritical on the issue) and a common topic in training for technical staff and civil servant in Portugal; v) aiding the city of Lisbon to support the first co-decisional large-scale PB, so opening the way for many imitations around the country.

3.2 A new coagulation of experiments around the capital

As shown by figure 1, 2008 represented a new turning point full of challenges and promises for PB in Portugal. It must be noted, in fact, that the last output of “OP Portugal” project was very important in creating a wave of new pilot processes, many of which with the tendency to copy-paste Lisbon PB features without critically adapting them to the new contexts. Lisbon example – started with a shy experiment in 2007 - had a peculiarity, beyond the fact of being the first European capital with a co-decisional PB which reserved to citizens at least 5% of the capital budget for being object of deliberation and hierarchization by citizens. In fact, it was totally on-line initially (for facilitating feasibility and cost reduction), but soon the mayor decided to add face-to-face meetings, when monitoring underlined that a lot of citizens (especially the most vulnerable, the elderly and the not-alphabetized in ICTs) had been excluded from the first edition due to its internet-driven mechanisms. So, in 2008, Lisbon PB acquired not only national projection but also international interest, due to the networking commitment of CES and In Loco, and their desire to make Portugal more visible within a serious of international venues dealing with DI.

Among the latter, there were the International Observatory of Participatory Democracy, the UCLG Committee on Social Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Human Rights, the International Platform of PB and so on. In parallel, international institution as UNDP contracted Portuguese specialists to try to “export” and readapt the Portuguese experience in other lusophone countries as Cape Verde (lately the World Bank did the same with Mozambique).

Since 2007, an annual National Meeting of Portuguese PB was also organized, being hosted by different cities each year. And in 2010 it became a biennial
pan-iberic event, so to facilitate the cross-cutting dialogue between Spanish and Portuguese experiences of participatory democracy. Although PBs remained the strongest “core group” in the events, the network was opened to other typologies of DIs.

The two institutions who had been promoting the “new deal for Portuguese PBs” in 2006, which are well complementary in working between the world of academia and that of professional bodies and NGOs which help local authorities to manage innovations, always tried to maintain a “critical capacity” in relation to the experiments to which they had collaborated.

This was definitely visible in the case of Lisbon (Allegretti e Antunes, 2014), whose conduction of PB did not often give attention to quickly correct critical element which were emerging during the years. In this case, the excessive attention given to numbers (proposals, voters, volumes of resources) in relation to that recognized to the quality of proposals and deliberation became a negative factor for the expansion and the evolution of PB. Under this perspective, the absence of real spaces for careful sharing of visions and identification of commons to be defended and valued showed the risk to transform the process into a mere sum of individual preferences, i.e. in a sort of “concourse of ideas” (as Dias, 2014, defined it) with few spaces for more strategic thinking about “the city its inhabitants want”.

It must be also underlined that in the Lisbon PB – in line with the majority of European experiments (except some Spanish and Italian cases) – no special interest was devoted to issues related to social justice and redistribution of resources.

3.3 The phase of emulations, with the consolidation of a Portuguese PB model
During their solid collaboration through several different projects, In Loco e CES maintained a careful balance between national and international networking with the goal to keep attention alive on structural and conjunctural limits showed by concrete experiences, with the aim of guaranteeing a capacity of permanent self-appraisal of each city or local borough interested by participatory experiments.

![Logotypes of joint project carried on by In Loco and CES between 2008 and 2016](image)

Publisher’s note: Figure displayed in low resolution due to the technical characteristics of the original files.

So, some of the above mentioned critics were definitely incorporated and taken into account by new experiments of participatory budget undertaken 2-3 years...
after that of Lisbon, as in the case of Cascais, one of the larger and richest cities of Portugal, located near the sea in the metropolitan area of the capital. In 2011 Cascais (unlike Lisbon, governed by a center-right political coalition) decided to engage in PB, inserting it in the framework of its Agenda XXI Programme, as a part of a larger vision shared with inhabitants. The model of PB which was elaborated here valued mainly deliberative spaces, allowing citizens to present proposals only via participation in face-to-face meetings, although the phase of voting priorities is organized mainly through ICT tools (Internet, SMS, van equipped with computers which circulate around the whole municipal territory).

Cascais’ PB, especially after winning several international recognition as a “best practice”, opened the way to a new generation of Portuguese PBs, which include those of large cities as the capitals of Azores and Madeira (Ponta Delgada and Funchal), as well as minor municipalities like Agueda, Albufeira, Loulé, Alenquer or Caminha (the first which started to discuss also on revenues and not only on expenditures). This can be considered a “third generation” of Portuguese PBs (Dias, 2014), whose uniformity is much more critical and reflexive than the previous ones (the one of copy-cats of Palmela, between 2002 and 2007, and the one of copy-cats of Lisbon, between 2008 and 2011).

This aspect of reflexivity owe a lot to the two social institutions previously quoted, which continued their “evangelization work” about PBs offering a new umbrella-project called “OPtar: PB as innovative tool for reinventing local institutions in Portugal and Cape Verde? A critical analysis of performance and transfer” (between 2010 and 2013). The project, this time, was funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) as a space for reflecting on the direction taken by Portuguese PBs and elaborating new horizons around open challenges and correction of mistakes emerged in the first decade of their life.

Such a project, which aimed at the collective construction of a new direction for Portuguese PB on the base of an action-research approach in ten pilot-municipalities, has possibly been a useful driver for the change of pace of several participatory processes in Portugal. In fact, through local laboratories and several co-learning events, “OPtar” offered the opportunity of realizing a live overview of PBs in Portugal, helping auto-assessment and evolution of several experiences. The project made possible a diagnostic of Portuguese PBs (Alves e Allegretti, 2012), which gave proof of the short average life of experiences of first generation (revealing a 77% rate of death of the 77 experiments done between 2002 and 2013) and tried to explain its reasons, especially taking into account the ineffectiveness of consultative models, and their incapacity to produce a convincing image of change of traditional political culture (OPtar, 2014). At the same time, the project – while strongly dialoguing with national media (convincing them that PB is a topic which
deserves growing spaces of attention in order to strengthen its efficacy) – was the proper space to spread the interest for PB in the academic environment as well as in organized civil society (from the Portuguese branch of transparency International to small local community-based organizations). In such a new framework, the fast evolution of several PB experiences in Portugal is certainly due to a growing tissue of social activism which PB was able to agglutinate, functioning as a reference and a catalyzer for new struggles, oriented to claim new rights and more solid legal frameworks for enforcing them.

It is worth to point out that several radical movements also emerge in this panorama, often strongly criticizing Portuguese experiments of PB, as in the case of the collective Habita – Associação pelo direito à habitação e à cidade, and its newly-created network of movements for the right to housing and the right to the city. They started publicly criticizing PB for its lack of interest in being a tool for conquering social justice; for not being specifically oriented to measure of social inclusion and positive discrimination to the sake of vulnerable actors; and even more for being incapable of creating vision and scenarios of the desired city before engaging in prioritizing the funding to be given to single interventions often inspired to immediacy needs and competitions for resources among local lobbies.

The new tensions emerged during this slow evolution of umbrella-projects coming from bottom-up, to accompany a gradual political evolution towards new DIs, have been taken in the due account by the two “main drivers” (In Loco and CES) of the evolution of Portuguese PB, when (in 2014) they proposed to the Gulbenkian Foundation to support a project called “Portugal Participa”. The latter was approved with top-scored and even prolonged with new fresh funding until 2016. In fact, the new project had three important aims: i) taking advantage of the astonishing spreading of PB to make them dialogue with more invisible and less diffuse DI, which could be complementary and integrative of emerged limits and challenges of PBs; ii) creating a proper series of spaces for reflection and mutual learning between local authorities interested in experimenting participatory processes; iii) strengthening the legal framework through which citizens participation is intervening in political matters in Portugal, scaling up from the local to larger levels of administrative ties.

3.4 Betting on autonomous capacity of creating “virtuous circles” in sociopolitical cultures

In the above mentioned perspective, “Portugal Participa” was not only the opportunity for shaping a solid network of “Participatory Local Authorities” (RAP or “Rede de Autarquias Participativas”, with a specific best-practice award partially decided by citizens). In fact, it was also a space for collectively elaborating a Workbook of Recommendations to the National Parliament, which has been presented in
April 2016 in a public session to the major parties, the Minister of Administrative Modernization and the Presidency of the Portuguese Republic.

The Workbook is a guide of ideas given by the project partnership and the mayors’ network to members of Parliament and the National Government for them to think about legislative measures to reinforce citizens participation in all the range of local, regional and national policies in Portugal. But it has also been conceived as a funding charter of values for starting a large consultation to Portuguese citizens which could end in a process of co-writing of a bottom-up Proposal of Law to be presented to the Parliament as an autonomous Citizens’ Initiative of Law.

Several external factors made possible to scale-up the idea of involving Portuguese citizens not only in local policies and planning, but also in topics of larger width. One factor is related to a law which entered in force in 2013 local elections to introduce a limit of mandates for mayors, which generated a large shift in the age, political perspective and participatory sensitivity of many newly-elected local authorities, and eventually led to make the number of PB experiences to jump to 83 in the beginning of 2016. A second reason was the timeliness of the discussion promoted by “Portugal Participa” in relation to the need of hybridizing and complementing PB with other DI, both in terms of quality and institutional levels. In fact, such timely debate intercepted the 2015 national election campaign, and the critical mass of many innovative local experiences emerged in the previous 2 years convinced the Socialist Party to insert in its political proposal the idea of a first world experiment of PB at national level.

Once the Socialist Prime Minister Antonio Costa (ex-mayor of Lisbon, and initiator of its co-decisional PB) enter in office in the end of 2015, supported by the entire spectrum of leftist-progressive parties elected in the Parliament, he translated his party campaign promise of a national PB into the Government Commitments Plan, and started molding the structure for conceiving and shaping the first pilot process for the end of 2016. The “task force” dedicated to such experiment, seeded in the Ministry of Administrative Modernization and made-up of professionals who have been working for years in local experiments of PB in Portugal and elsewhere (including members of CES and In Loco), has a unique task, which will undoubtedly attract attention from all over the world, as proved by a background document presented by In Loco and CES members through “Portugal Participa”.

This task consists in avoiding to shape the national PB as a “fractal replica” of local participatory budgets at a larger scale, but needs to integrate and complement them (and foster their multiplication) focusing on three main goals which have been pointed out in the past as missing elements of local Portuguese PBs: i) the promotion of social justice; ii) the promotion of transparency in all State-related budgets (at all administrative levels), relating it not only to the amounts
directly discussed by people, but to the entire budgets, to be released in open data; iii) the construction of a space of deliberation which could interrelate the discussion on public expenditures with the debate on revenues (taxation, mortgage rates on debt, etc.).

The National level PB will possibly take advantage of the last project presented to the EU Commission by CES and In Loco (this time, together with other international partners), which is called “Empatia”, acronym for “Enabling Multi-channel Participation Through ICT Adaptations”. Such a project, funded by the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation line called CAPS, aims to transform the use of technologies until now experienced in Portuguese PBs with several visible limits. A concrete goal is that of structuring a platform which could make dialogue the top-down use of technologies proposed in many participatory government-led processes and several civic collaborative technological spaces which have been created, reshaped or conducted by social movements and group of civic hackers worldwide. At the moment, Empatia platform is imagined both as an important tool for allowing the scaling-up of PB at National level, but also to start the consultation for co-writing with inhabitants the Proposal of a Legislative Act which could frame the Right to Participation of Portuguese citizens, to which “Portugal Participa” offered a sort of basic Charter of Values and Recommendations elaborated with the aid of many of the municipalities that in the last decade have been in the forefront of experimenting participative processes in the country.

Obviously, this process of creation just started and is still ongoing, but what seems to us very important is the fact that it enrooted a large, dare and bold political commitment into a thicker evolution which not only started at the local level, but partially was originated bottom-up within a milieu of civil society organizations which devoted to participation their interest for action-research. The most important challenge of such a path is that of gradually rebalancing the asymmetry still existing between a political society which growingly showed interested to imagine elements of self-reform, and a civil society which until now proved less active than in its discourse in accepting the challenges offered by this transformation of political culture, in order to increase the social control on public policies and projects, and its pivotal contribution in moving to polities more oriented to social equity, to redistributive justice and to the protection and the co-govern of commons.

4 FORK THE GOVERNMENT: CIVIC HACKING FOR A PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN

Another different but somehow convergent story of collective action is that of Taiwan, another semiperipheral country, which is still not recognized as a legitimate State power the majority of world nations, due to its tense relation with the People Republic of China.
One of the most densely populated countries in the world, the island of Taiwan (formerly known as “Formosa”) has a population of around 23 million inhabitants, and a stable industrial economy marked by a rapid economic growth and industrialization where the high-tech industry plays a key role. A member of the World Trade Organization and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Taiwan is ranked highly in terms of human development, freedom of the press, health care, public education and economic freedom.

By 2012, Social Media had firmly entrenched itself in Taiwanese everyday life, when Facebook alone claimed 75% of online users. However, netizens remained pessimistic about the potential of existing social media outlets and portals to spark civic empowerment – or even engagement – online.

As the popular term “filter bubble” implies, Social Media tends to encourage impulsive, instant-gratified expression of emotional sympathy among like-minded individuals. However, real-world activism requires deepening this into bonds of empathy in order to enable shared reflections among individuals with diverse backgrounds. The challenges of online mobilization in Taiwan were five-fold (TH Schee, 2012):11

1) Nonprofit organizations’ social media exposure was ineffective and not proactive.
2) Individuals felt powerless to influence policies and politics.
3) Online participation could not translate into offline action or collaboration.
4) Open-source communities seemed to care little for social issues.
5) Digital divide prevented offline and online activists from collaborating.

The culmination of these problems is known in Taiwan’s social activism circles as 弱弱相殘 (“weak-weak cannibalism”). Among socially underrepresented groups and regions, mutual stereotyping and a lack of intersectional empathy often reinforced each other’s feeling of helplessness.

In this section, we would like to describe g0v (“gov-zero”), a civic movement by informed netizens toward participatory self-government. Borne out of frustration at the government’s blithe lack of transparency at the end of 2012, we have made these ongoing contributions:

1) By establishing participatory media channels such as News Helper, Congress Matters, and g0v.today during the Sunflower movement, we established ourselves as a popular and well-trusted civic media.

11. 2012-04-02 Hurdles of online mobilisation. Available at: <https://blog.schee.info/2012/04/02/mobilization/>. 
2) By crowd-producing definitive works such as dictionaries, welfare directories and contemporary history, we transform ourselves from passive consumers into effective agents for social justice.

3) By organizing regular hackathons and offering logistic support to social movements – virtual-reality recording, crowd-sourced reading list, real-time transcripts – we create shared cultural spaces that blends online and offline activism, enabling cross-regional mobilization through ICT interventions.

4) By constructing sites of social production modeled after open-source principles, we shape civic projects into communal grounds for learning and hacking alike, engaging contribution from schoolchildren and teachers outside the usual social activism circles.

5) By designing outreach programs on social issues such as labor rights, environmental rights and cyberspace rights, we form ongoing dialogues with established activists, promoting social awareness and online consensus-building through nation-level regulation deliberation platforms.

4.1 Background of the movement
Amidst popular unrest regarding speculative housing inflation, President Ma Ying-jeou made housing justice a key component of his 2012 re-election platform, and ordered Ministry of the Interior to commission a website on which people could find transaction records by street address. The site went live to a flood of requests and remained only intermittently accessible for the first few weeks. Three days after the launch, a team of four Google.tw engineers incorporated the Ministry’s data into their Real-Price Maps website, overlaying aggregated pricing information on Google Maps with a plethora of filtering features.

A week later, Minister Simon Chang (a Google alum himself) invited the remixers to a round table. However, after sensational media coverage pitted the team’s shoestring budget of NTD$ 500 against the official site’s “million-dollar disaster”, the relationship between the two soon turned sour. The incident came to a head on November 14, when the official site replaced all street addresses with image files, dramatically increasing the burden of crawling. The Real-Price Maps site closed shortly thereafter.12

While the Real Price incident was still unfolding, a new government production took the spotlight: a 40-seconds propaganda video titled “What’s the economy power-up plan?”. Devoid of information, the clip simply repeated the following refrain:

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12. Starting July 2013, the Ministry began offering biweekly limited-timeframe download of land price data set. As of July 2015, quarterly data is finally released as Open Data without restrictions.
“We have a very complex plan. It is too complicated to explain. Never mind the details – just follow instructions and go along with it!”. Met with incredulity and mockery, the video went viral as viewers on YouTube rushed to click “report abuse” in protest.

On Yahoo Open Hack Day 2012, an annual 24-hour event in which sixty-four teams show off their innovative creations. Infuriated by the controversial ad, four hackers made a pivot. They resolved to create a bird’s eye view of how taxes are spent. The resulting Budget Maps presented each agency’s annual spending in the form of geometric shapes of proportional sizes, inviting participants to review and rate each item’s usefulness. Calling upon citizens to “strike out rip-off spending”, the two-minute demo won NTD$ 50K in Hack Day prizes.

While demo-day crowds are known to quickly forget such projects, Chia-Liang Kao came up with an elegant hack to keep this one alive. He registered the catchy domain name g0v.tw, dedicated to citizens’ remixes of government websites. The Real-Price Maps thus became accessible at lvr.land.moi.g0v.tw before its shut-down – literally just one fingertip away from its official counterpart at lvr.land.moi.gov.tw; meanwhile, the Budget Maps lived on at budget.g0v.tw as the inaugural g0v project.

4.2 A chain of struggles opened by the Open-Space Hackathons (2012)
Modeled after participant-driven BarCamp events, the four hackers which has conceived the above mentioned counter-governmental website, named the new event “0th Hackathon of Martial Mobilization”, invoking a rebellious image from the 1949-era civil war. On December 1, 2012, civic hackers filled an auditorium and presented their projects, covering a wide range of government functions, including Congress, tenders, geography, weather, electricity, healthcare and many other areas. Lively discussion continued online at Hackpad and IRC well after the daylong event.

In support of the coding efforts, writers and bloggers formed a Facebook group copywriting on demand, offering their skills to any project that asked for assistance. Dissatisfied with the makeshift logo banner, designers would continue to work on several iterations of the logotypes, eventually completing a set of Visual Identity guidelines, which elevated g0v into an easily recognizable brand as visible in figure 3.

As the new projects continue online, writers and designers participating in g0v found that Facebook groups lacked essential features such as shared bookmarks and task tracking. On the other hand, popular tools for open-source software development such as Git, IRC and Wikis posed a high entry barrier for non-coder participants.
To address this issue, in January 2013, hack.g0v.tw launched the meeting point of online projects as well as face-to-face events. It combines several tools that form a cohesive space for coordination:

- **Hackfoldr** organizes all related links around a project into multi-level shared bookmarks.
- **EtherCalc** provides a scalable, multi-user spreadsheet with a real-time API.
- **People Registry** lets participants discover each other with profile tags for projects, issues, skills and interests, bringing bite-sized tasks with new contributors.
- **Web Chats** keeps daily logs with a distinct URL for each line, and introduces new users to IRC via web-based chatrooms. Every utterance is given its own permanent URL for future citations.

Owing to the diverse nature of the projects and participants, there’s a strong preference for lightweight, descriptive structures (“tags”) over rigid, prescriptive structures (“taxonomies”). Because much of our activities are face-to-face, we also favor real-time shared documents (e.g., Hackpad and EtherCalc) over revision-controlled, long distance collaboration tools (e.g., Wikis and mailing lists).

### 4.3 Engaging Online Activists (2013)

In addition to interests in Taiwan’s current affairs, g0v people have also been inspired by the massive upsurge of democratic activities in Europe, including, for example, Iceland’s constitutional referendum, Finland’s crowd-sourced legislation, Italy’s Five Star Movement, Germany’s Pirate Party, and other similar precedents. As g0v continues to work with the government for greater information transparency, these activities have presented clear evidence for the accumulated wisdom of online communities and their potential to shape public policy.

Accordingly, g0v participants have localized the online policy-formation system Liquid Feedback and have named it 動民主 (Dynamic Democracy).
The first trial took place on June 8, 2013. By the end of June, Dynamic Democracy team members held online meetings with representatives from the German and Italian Pirate Parties, and decided to systematically experiment with all existing voting platforms and incorporate pre-proposal discussions and post-performance tracking into the system, turning it into a “Foundation for Decision-making” (Basisentscheid) for online collaboration among policy groups.

In August 2013, Coscup – the most popular annual conference for Taiwan’s open source users, promoters, and developers – took place in Taipei’s International Conference Center, attracting a total of 1,800 registrants. Among its eight tracks, the Community Track featured seven presentations by g0v.

Traditionally, various major communities hold Birds of a Feather (BoF) meetups nearby on the evening of the opening day of Coscup. The g0v BoF adopted the slogan “Fork the Government and Build It Anew” and was held on the Ketagalan Boulevard. Participants dressed in white and joined 250,000 other demonstrators in the peaceful protest organized by the group Citizen 1985 over Corporal Hung Chung-chiu’s death, and the subsequent lack of transparency from the Ministry of Defense investigation.

Both Citizen 1985 and g0v had been emerging from grassroots movements that combine online collaboration with face-to-face meetings. Following the protest, we took the initiative to offer ICT support to Citizen 1985, providing anti-eavesdropping and distributed network encryption technologies. The two groups would eventually enter formal collaboration in October with the launch of the Big Citizen Is Watching alliance, working together on a series of congressional oversight projects.

With mutual recognition and trust with web-enabled activists, we were ready to scale out and engage established, long-time social activists. That opportunity would appear on March 2014.

### 4.4 Sunflower through Telepresence (2014)

In 2014, Taiwan was about to sign a cross-strait trade agreement deal with Beijing. The city of Beijing proposed a favorable term of trade – much more favorable than the world trade organization’s general terms – for Taiwan-based companies.

Normally, when Taiwan signs deals like that, there is a procedural line to follow: *i*) The Parliament must hold a hearing; *ii*) all the impacted industries must send representatives; *iii*) they would debate case by case and do an impact analysis. However, due to a constitutional loophole (Beijing is considered part of Taiwan in the Taiwan Constitution – along with Mongolia), in this case the Parliament did not follow the standard procedure for international agreements.
In fact, any agreement the administration signs with Beijing is seen as having the legal status of a domestic agreement, so excluding Parliamentary oversight.

By the date of this automatic expiry where the pact would automatically enter in force, protesters entered the Parliament and occupied it for 22 days, with g0v volunteers supplying Internet connectivity, broadcasting, transcription and translation platforms. Nicknamed the “0th Sunflower Digital Camp,” this ICT-enabled demonstration merged on-line and off-line struggles, once separated. It was the result of intense collaboration between hundreds of hacktivists, adding an important physical and material dimension to the insurgent actions.

With a secure, safe occupied area, the student occupiers performed a demonstration beyond the usual counter-power agenda. In fact, they were demonstrating in a “demo scene” kind of way: “How should we talk about service agreement like this?”. Led by professional facilitators, they first deliberated in the legislative building, then later on the street with help from NGOs. Environmentalists, unionists, and pro-independent activists all gathered occupiers – 500,000 on April 22 – and deliberated the topics they care about, reaching through millions of people through ICT telepresence platforms.

A few months after the Sunflower, Hong Kong’s Occupy Central forked the same system, improved by Code4HK, and again deployed the same crowd-sourced system for live broadcast, interactive maps, news and logistics support:

The political landscape has changed a lot after this events. In fact, people began to demand that political decisions could be set as the result of a deliberative democracy, not just regarding elected officials. By the end of 2014, Mayor Ke Wen-Je became the first nonpartisan elected Taipei City mayor, with a ICT-based campaign crowd-sourced from the same swift-trust principles.

The nonpartisan ex-Googler Minister, Simon Chang, also became the Vice Premier and orchestrated a nationwide agenda on open data and civic participation, through collaboration with g0v communities, adopting an “open data by default” principle for governmental ICT systems, culminating in Taiwan’s #1 place on OKFN’s 2015 global open data index.

4.5 Online-to-Offline Deliberations (2015)
The nation-wide shift to transparency and participation caught many people by surprise. The development of Taiwan’s government institutions (the public sector) as a top-down bureaucracy in the 20th century was the result of being under two authoritarian regimes. While the first Presidential election took place in 1996, old adages, such as “obedience is the foundation of responsibility”, were still in the minds of many public servants.
If we look back at policy-making in the previous era, we can see that the popularly elected leaders appointed administrators to set their agenda, and officials from each administrative unit and their think tanks drafted policies after soliciting public opinion. The policies were then passed in legislative meetings. However, what was called “public opinion” was usually limited to some representatives of trade unions, the mass media, and certain scholars and councilors. If the public were to directly participate, it was usually only in the form of street protests. In his book, Democratic Governance, Professor Chen Dong-Yuan wrote:

Listening to the voice of the people is like hearing the voices of the deities in that it must be communicated through special channels… Like in folk religion, it is easy for these interpreters to manipulate the message for their own purposes.13

However, as ICT-enabled movements in 2014 demonstrated, speed at which the public can form bonds of mutual trust in cyberspace has far outpaced the speed of the traditional method of policy-making. The government has no choice but to make room to include these voices – directly, requiring no special channels.

The 2014 “National e-Forum on Trade and Economics” was an early attempt at soliciting direct participation. During the offline forum, live comments from the net were projected onto a wall in the government building, and people were invited to submit written comments online.

However, only 29 comments were posted during the discussion from June to July, of which five proposals were countersigned by only three to five people. After the discussion period concluded, the government did not present any specific responses on this forum, and it eventually just faded away.

Because of this, Minister Jaclyn Tsai – who joined the administration in November 2013 from the high-tech world – appealed to fellow “civilian mediators” at the g0v hackathon to launch the vTaiwan project. The goal was to jointly establish a cross-sector, online-to-offline deliberation space for any laws related to cyberspace, starting with the closely-held company bill.

In January 2015, hacker TonyQ joined the administration from the open source community. With help from the “youth advisor council,” we collected public suggestions from start-up workers, investors, attorneys, and local governments. Through a live-streamed broadcast of the multi-stakeholder panel discussion and the release of the transcript, a list of specific recommendations was created by a working group of stakeholders, which the Ministry of Economic Affairs incorporated into the bill.

13. Regarding this, see: <https://goo.gl/4IqhAb>
When the Legislation then passed the law in June 2015, it was Taiwan’s first crowdsourced bill, with complete online record of negotiations and deliberations.

The key to the Taiwan model, today, lies in its “symmetry of attention.” As the policies are still in the stage of problem-identification, participants exert a greater influence. Not only have the ministries committed to give an official response within seven days to any question during discussion, but also the actual face-to-face meeting agenda itself was crowdsourced by online discussion. Through live streaming and remote participation, citizens can see how all stakeholders presented their views and how much effort they have invested in the process.

As vTaiwan went on to deliberate transnational issues such the regulation of the activities of Uber and Airbnb, this model was proven to be feasible. City-level governments took notice and introduced similar ICT platforms.

In September 2015, the Taipei City Government and the g0v community worked together to introduce the budget.taipei platform, an early experiment for the institutionalization of public participation. Within seven days after it went online, there were 113 comments received, and they were compiled and publicly responded to by various city agencies, while the policy-related information was made available.

New Taipei independent Mayor Ko Wen-je stated that only when the public gradually becomes familiar with open data – the same information that civil servants have access to – can citizens make meaningful proposals: “PB is part of my campaign. However, just making the city budget public is not enough. It also requires allowing city residents to fully understand the budget; only then can they participate.”

Soon after this, on October 14th, the proposal on the National Development Council’s join.gov.tw e-petition platform for “making cancer immunotherapy available and speeding up the use of new cancer drugs” obtained 5,548 counter-signatures to become the first accepted e-petition. Within a week, the Ministry of Health and Welfare met with the proposer to clarify the demands, and the record of the meeting was made public.

The related background information was released in November, and the specific responses to “establishing a regenerative medicine and cell therapy development council,” “drawing up a plan for relaxing the criteria for severe cancer patients to receive therapy,” and “speeding up new cancer drug approval” were released on December 14th, and subsequently signed into effect early 2016. The right of initiative given to citizens by the Constitution has been put into practice in a new way in the Internet age.

4.6 National Land-Use Planning in VR (2016)

With the landslide victory of Ms. Tsai’s presidential campaign highlighting “civic participation and open-source maker spirit”, 2016 started with a post-partisan political landscape: Simon Chang became the Premier during the January-to-May transition period, and the next Premier, Lin Chuan, was also a long-time non-partisan and respected professional. DIIs blossomed under this climate. The initial wave of participatory budget started with 7 local-level governments – including the Taipei City.

The right to the city, and the right to collaborate on the agenda of national-level zoning, were brought to the agenda for the first time, with the newly passed “National Land Use Act” offering legislative framework and a guideline based on participatory values. Such an innovative Law offered – years later – solid answers to some of the problems which had been at the base of the polity shift of the last year in Taiwan and the emergence of a strong ICT-based movement of civic activists.

While the “National Land Use Plan” has laid down the basic national control strategies and principles for sustainable land use, its substance still awaits being fleshed out by twenty forthcoming sub-regulations, a process that were traditionally subject to intense lobbying by local developmental and environmental interests.

The grassroot NGOs acted quickly to defuse the potential trap of region-based “weak-weak cannibalism.” Starting April 2015, a series of national land use workshops brought together parties who are interested in land use issues and ensure that their mutual exchange and cooperation can promote the future implementation of the “National Land Use Act”.

The workshop’s ICT telepresence substrate – Hackfoldr for bookmarks, Hackpad for transcripts, YouTube for record-keeping – now include VR recording of real-time participant interaction, taking nonverbal gestures online and enables a re-visit to the workshop at <http://beta.hackfoldr.org/NLUPA>.

Anecdotally, use of VR recording has improved the quality of discussion. With an omnidirectional camera, people feel secure that their nonverbal expressions will be taken into account, and so turned their energy on establishing rapport to the people in the same room. Compared to the traditional talking-head recording which promoted “talking only to the camera” demagogically, a genuinely shared laughter is felt much more clearly in VR. The popularity of VR headsets also presented a novel way for each region’s participants to “walk in the shoes” of different regions, and plan – in a shared, virtual space – on a shared decision theatre that allows stakeholders to present their alternate visions in an concrete, intuitive manner.
To illustrate the ICT-savviness among Taiwan's contemporary NGOs, we end this section with a snippet from the real-time transcript, spoken by the director of Citizens of the Earth Foundation, the long-time environmental activist LEE Ken-Cheng:

The key problem brought up by the southern group is on “translational interpretation”. This situation is particularly important for us today. With all kinds of transmission channels on Facebook, whether or not your content can attract your audience or trigger them to do something is very crucial. This problem involves the different generations. The kind of people that young people like us can appeal to are other young people. […] Another is the language being spoken. Those who have worked in the government or served as representatives have a better idea about how to communicate with the public and how to deal with people in the way they expect.

Second, everyone also brought up the cross-region sharing platform. It involves the “hackfoldr” that was just mentioned is used as a national platform or not. It has been used like this these past two days. Being able to include all counties and cities in this is a possibility. Having them all together allows us to observe and learn from other counties and cities. […] Each region has a contact person who can directly provide the contact information.

In conclusion, the demand in the first stage is about the gap between the central government and the local governments. The gap can only be bridged through open data and public participation. Can we all agree to go to our local governments and convince them to plan at a consistent pace? If everyone agrees to do this, we can organize the issue of information openness into a clearly stated demand.

This means that when the time comes, we have a well-defined issue to pressure the central government with. This will make it convenient to make bullet points for all documents on the existing channels of information. This is something we should be able to accomplish”.

The progression – from crowd-sourced Open Data to ICT-mediated mutual understanding; then to actionable agenda – seems today a natural and powerful one, and in stark contrast with just a decade ago. In the early 2000s, NGOs and governmental agencies often worked in the reverse progression: Fixed, slogan-based agenda; using ICT only for broadcasting and not listening; and opaque in their data production and requirements.

Taiwan has come a long way toward ICT integration. Indeed, this is something we should be able to accomplish.

15. See more: <https://g0v.hackpad.com/ep/pad/static/d6lANJhb2wY>.
5 SOME (OPEN) REMARKS
This short essay, divided into three parts (two of which are told by their protagonists) focused mainly on the following research question: at what extent and through what mechanisms city-based participatory processes can influence policy making at another scale than the local government?

With such a question in mind, we tried to focus on a specific face of the right to the city, intended as the right to participate and influence the decisions that regulate the production of urban space, even when: i) these are made at another scale that is not correspondent with the administrative boundaries of elected democratic institutions; ii) the kind of actors at play in decision making at supra-local scale are not limited to elected officials and institutions but include also a range of non-elected players (as for example private corporations, financial institutions or international organizations).

As is it possible to infer, answering to this question exhaustively and a generalizing the possible conclusion of this essay would require additional extensive comparative research able to include also other case studies. In fact, the two cases analyzed are extremely different in terms of cultural and institutional context, number and kind of social actors engaged, explicit and hidden objectives pursued by the various social component at play, and even tools put at work to reach the objective which animated the promoters of the described changes.

Nonetheless, in the narrative of the shifts which have been happening in the last decade in this two peripheral countries, it is not impossible to observe some common tendencies, centered on the role of hybrid networks in opening supra-local decision making processes and influence the agenda setting towards topics and issues regarding urban political life. In both cases, hybrid networks worked as activators and drivers of new participatory spaces, even if significant differences appear when the two cases are compared.

5.1 Network Players
The backbone of Portuguese network is composed by a limited number of structured actors: CES and other actors coming from the academic environment had a pivotal role in the diffusion of participatory practices from the first pioneer cases to a larger number of municipalities, together with the support of strong ONGs as InLoco. Then, the network has grown thanks to the direct activation of small and medium municipalities that reached a significant influence able to push national institutions to back them and open the possibility to promote participatory practices at national level. The model of the networks between local authorities has been developing in European countries along the last decade as a
reaction to public sector reforms that increased decentralization while at the same time reduced funds transfer, pushing the lower ties of the public sector to become the agent of dismantlement of public and common goods (what we called in the introduction “asymmetric subsidiarity”). This context introduced a new attention and sensitivity in local authorities (municipalities and parishes or boroughs in the case of Portugal) toward DIs as a mean to share with the citizenship critical and unpopular choices, while at the same time as a space to build coalitions to raise their claims at a higher level. Anyway, it is evident that the Portuguese case hasn’t been backed by an equal activation of less structured social actors as Social Movements or network of associations. Furthermore, ICT technologies did not appear to have been playing a specific progressive role in Portugal transformations. Instead, they were often used in top-down strategies of local or national institutions as a tool for proposing regressive governance models, unable to transform transparency and accountability opportunities into collective actions and aimed at substituting public deliberation with one-to-one “light” occasions of dialogue between citizens and single elected officials.

On the opposite, in Taiwan the progressive growth of the civic network followed a different path, and empowered through different tools. A core group of “champions” coming from the civic hacker world have been playing a central role as activators of a fabric of horizontal relations, which has not been so strictly linked to geographic delimitations since the beginning. We highlighted how the growth of the network reached the national level passing through distinct waves of engagement of the de-territorialized community of taiwanese hacktivists before and the social movement and organization of the civil society later on, while institutional players were engaged at the top of this expansive mechanism (when they did not try to step in with ridiculous and anti-productive actions). In this case, in addition to a greater initiative of non-institutional groups, the relational strategies mediated by ICTs enabled the active engagement of several individuals not necessarily linked to active groups or organizations.

5.2 Translation Mechanisms
The different nature of the two networks observed in the two narratives is reflected in different mechanisms of knowledge production and dissemination throughout the networks. We refer here to the kind of mechanisms of translation used, intended as the process though which “the identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the margins of maneuver are negotiated and delimited”.

In the Portuguese case, based on the strong identity of structured actors, translation seems to rely on consolidated mechanisms, where the research and the university have a pivotal function in elaborating a theoretical framework, proposing models of implementation to the institutional players, studying and evaluating cases of implementation and developing dissemination literature. Expert knowledge have been steering the process of translation, even if it must be highlighted the self-reflexive methodology in place in the Portuguese case, where i) the institutional actors have been actively engaged in the process of knowledge creation and dissemination; and ii) knowledge production have been influenced by the standpoint of researchers that, in many cases, have been also active change agents of the same processes they were studying.

Other important variables to take into account are the pre-existent translation mechanisms and knowledge transfer within the public sector, enabled by a common language and an high level of procedural standardization defined by explicit law provisions.

In the Taiwanese case, instead, translation mechanisms seem to have been more decentralized. At the core of this case there is a pre-existing common cultural framework of free culture movements.\textsuperscript{17} Such background enabled the progression from crowd-sourced collection of Open Data to ICT-mediated mutual understanding till the capacity to collectively set an actionable agenda able to influence policy makers at local and national levels. Nonetheless, also in this case it is important to recognize the role of expert knowledge in a translation mechanism based on data mining and the risks of power concentration in a limited number of super-skilled individuals. The risk that we could call as a sort of “nerd suprematism”\textsuperscript{18} was effectively reduced by a constant attention to maintain collective action plural and diffuse, so to counterbalance individualities emerging (generally with a highly positive role) during the process of cultural and political transformation. The agents of “counterdemocracy” (Rosanvallon, 2007) guaranteed a self-reflexive approach, through mutual control and respect of the differences between the “thousands of tiny empowerments” (Sandercock, 2004) that joined to compose the movement for change.

5.3 Territorial Outcomes
As it is almost obvious, the cases brought here to public attention confirm that the nature of the actors as well as the mechanism for translation carried out influence the outcome of each network and their capacity to incise in the modification of

\textsuperscript{17} L. Lessig, \textit{Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity} (Penguin Publishing Group, 2004), <https://books.google.it/books?id=1hs1GWwnx-wC>.

\textsuperscript{18} Collettivo Ippolita, \textit{Nell’acquario di Facebook} (Milano: Ledizioni, 2012).
institutional polity making with different intensity and scope. In the Portuguese case, waiting for the possible implementation of participatory processes at national scale, the main outcome regards the diffusion of participatory practices at municipal level, backed by national networks and institutions. While it can represent an advancement in terms of opening and inclusiveness of new participatory spaces, it is questionable the actual capacity to challenge the sectorialization and fragmentation that is commonly attributed in literature to experiences as PB. Furthermore, although some PBs showed the capacity to overcome a certain degree of inertia typical of public administration organization and gradually modify traditional bureaucratic institutional behavior, the pace followed by such transformation remains too tightly connected to the capacity of self-reform (although ‘under pressure”) of a political-administrative environment. Indeed, it is not possible to observe coalitional strategies able to quickly challenge the neoliberal tendency to privatization of public and common urban spaces and externalization of services, and open new solid spaces for communing strategies. At the same time, the growth of a new generation of inhabitants used to interact in institutionalized participatory spaces could lead to a significant efficiency of national level consultations.

In the Taiwanese example, framework and tools of free culture and civic hacktivism influenced the self-selection of the agenda’s topics, especially in the initial stage characterized by the massive use of “hackaton”’s model for citizen engagement (substantially shaped on barcamp models) and successively evolving in hybrid methodologies as in the case of Sunflower Camp. Nonetheless, with the expansion of the G0V initiative and the engagement of new groups of actors the agenda started to cover a greater range of topics, often following the trends existing in mainstream public opinion (ie by providing alternative opinions and sources of counter-information as in the case of the real-price incident). Finally, such a strategy reached the opening of a large scale debate on the “National Land Use Act”, a common topic in the debates on the right to the city, being able to create a common space for the interaction of an heterogeneous coalition of hacker, activists, social movements and organizations, including representatives from local and national governmental levels.

5.4 A contribution to re-signify participation?
As seen in these open concluding remarks, the differences between the two examples described here are dense and visible, both in terms of organization and outcomes.

Despite this, both open an important convergent space for a resignification of the conception of participatory processes. The reason is twofold. On one side, in fact, both cases invoke a reflection on the possibility to overcome the “local trap” through a variable geometry of transformations and alliances, which scale up from environments close to the everyday experience of citizens to a larger domain
of power relations. On the other side, in both experiences the promoters seem to have dedicated part of their work of “weaving networks” to the visualization of participatory processes as commons.

This has not been a simple work, as far as often DIs tend to be imagined by different actors as their own property (Smith, 2009), and so spoiled of their characteristic of a “third space” whose rules must be constantly renegotiated in public in order to maintain the participatory space as the pivotal driver of a chain of reconstruction of mutual trust between citizens and representative institutions.

In the two cases highlighted in this essay, it seems to us quite clear that the different organizations which have been playing a role of engine in trying to promote a shift in political culture have been acting with the awareness that, in order to avoid the “tragedy of commons” (Hardin, 2008) and produce meaningful and effective collective action out of an originally “dispersed” wish of citizens to be present and active in the public sphere, a careful attention to organizational matters and a constant “publicity” given to the spaces of rule creation is needed.

So, an explicit goal of the two very different movements that lead the struggle for strengthening and consolidating participatory decision-making spaces in Portugal and Taiwan has been that of constantly safeguarding the nature of these processes as “commons”, devoted to maintain an incremental approach to the accumulation of knowledge and the deepening of democratic intensity of relations among actors. Hence, the nature of participatory processes has been necessarily conceptualized as a permanent hybrid, where the presence of multichannel options - able to attract and commit different interested publics to undertake collective actions - has to be constantly conjugated with multiple goals to be pursued jointly. In such a perspective, attention was needed to safeguard the joint/parallel natures of participatory processes as spaces for building a civic pedagogy through learning by doing together, but also as an opportunity for recognition of differences within an equality setting, and also a space for acknowledgement of urban and social polarization and socio-spatial injustice and, thus, a driver for a struggle aimed to redistribution of powers in society.

In such a perspective, it is worth to notice how the described dynamics necessarily took place alternating moment of patience and impatience, acceleration and slowdowns, supportive actions and un-negotiable call for immediate changes in public institution behaviors. This alternation had (and still has) the aim of negotiate pragmatic reformism and the maintenance of radical horizons oriented by the awareness of the need to enforce soon many still unsatisfied components of the right to the city.

First of all, what was felt as an impellent need, was that of reconceiving participatory processes (especially those shaped by top-down actions in the form that
Ibarra, 2006, defined as “process by invitation”) in order to implement a concrete “centrality of citizens” in decision-making. In fact, in many case, it appeared only in the discursive plan, but had no correspondence in reality, which was marked by a “substantial marginality” of social actors in front of institutions which seem mainly engaged in trying to dominate and over-control participatory mechanism, to cherry-pick just their outcomes which can be considered more convenient for their hidden agendas and interests. From here, we can understand why the struggle to reform institutions an mechanisms of decision making in order to incide in a transformation of political and civic culture of both institutions and citizens has been considered (in the two case) as a priority, being imagined as a precondition for a large and more sustainable change of pace of policies able to embody new enforcement of the right to the city.

REFERENCES


1 INTRODUCTION

The development strategy of the United Nations (UN) entitled Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) acquired significant importance in Brazil between 2004 and 2014, during which five National Progress Reports were published.\(^3\) In addition to these reports, several other activities have been undertaken, such as five editions of the MDG Brazil Award (Prêmio ODM Brasil),\(^4\) which awarded initiatives by municipalities and non-governmental organizations that worked towards achieving the MDGs. Some states and municipalities also developed specific strategies for achieving the MDGs.\(^5\)

It can be argued that the success of the MDGs derived mainly from its conciseness and simplicity: eight general goals containing 18 measurable targets by means of 48 indicators. As a development strategy, the MDGs were easy to understand by the general public, unlike other development or monitoring strategies of the living conditions of a nation, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) with its microdata in the areas of income, health and education, and the Multi-Year Plans of the Brazilian government (Planos Pluri-Anuais) with its macrodata – in an extensive series, which structures a highly complex monitoring environment and that dialogues poorly with the realities targeted by the public policy beyond the intragovernmental scale.

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1. Senior Researcher Ipea.
2. Senior Researcher Ipea & PhD candidate – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
5. The states of Paraná and Minas Gerais, as well as the municipalities of Santo André, SP and Nova Iguaçu, RJ, for instance.
Thus, it is not yet clear whether the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), direct descendant of the MDGs, will have an impact equivalent to the MDGs on Brazilian society. If, on one hand, the SDGs innovated by offering a sustainable development perspective to a much wider range of aspects of life, on the other hand, they have become much more complex: there are 17 goals, which are broken down into 169 targets and 231 indicators.

The expansion of the scope of the SDGs vis-à-vis the MDGs is due in part to the fact that the MDGs were developed by means of a top-down strategy (from the UN to the member countries), while the SDGs were developed in quite the opposite way: bottom-up, with major involvement of national governments and civil society organizations, both in the international and domestic levels. Arguably the MDGs success ended up generating a strong interest in participating in the development of the strategy that makes up the SDGs.

In any case, it is understood that the knowledge gains from the Brazilian experience of the MDGs will be essential to support an equally successful application of the SDGs. These, in turn, demonstrate in their scope an enlarged attention, compared with the MDGs, to urban life conditions, which are also the subject of the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, whose third edition (Habitat-III) will be held in the city of Quito, Ecuador, in October 2016.

This is not a coincidence: the design of the Habitat-III Conference already falls within the framework of the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015. In this regard, we seek to extract from the MDGs and SDGs elements that can guide the discussion of the New Urban Agenda for the Habitat-III.

To this end, the subsequent section of this chapter starts recovering the memory of the international technical cooperation in Brazil, highlighting the successive changes in the geopolitical framework, as well as changes in the goals and forms taken by cooperative activities. Such changes and trends also had an impact on the genesis of the MDGs, which soon began to be enforced in Brazil, and it is important to highlight the commitments made by the Brazilian government, including Ipea – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Institute for Applied Economic Research), towards this development strategy. The process of reviewing and improving the targets and indicators of the MDGs in Brazil is reported here. The following section presents the SDGs strategy, which is also supported by the Brazilian government and already buttressed by activities aimed at making its monitoring feasible. The second section is concluded with an overview of the SDGs and a brief comparison between them and the MDGs.

The third section of this chapter is based on the recently published Brazilian Report for Habitat-III, and proposes to analyze the correspondence between the targets that are already established for the SDGs and the targets that may possibly
be included in the New Urban Agenda. It examines each of the six sections of the Report verifying the SDGs targets’ approach to the various aspects of urban life; and it asserts, where appropriate, whether it is convenient to mirror the SDGs or if it is necessary to move beyond this development strategy.

The last section presents some final remarks, including an appreciation of the Brazilian experience of the MDGs in order to forward the monitoring of the SDGs and, also, of the New Urban Agenda.

2 INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN BRAZIL, MDGS AND SDGS

2.1 The Evolution of the International Technical Cooperation in Brazil: from CSN to the SDGs

In Brazil, the relevance of international cooperation was boosted in 1942, with the country’s entry into the World War II, on the side of the Allied nations (United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union). In return, the US government supported the creation of Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN, the National Steel Company) and the Fábrica Nacional de Motores (FNM, the National Motor Factory).

During the 1950s and 1960s of the last century, Brazil began to receive international technical cooperation (ITC), however unsystematically. In the 1960s, the controversial agreements signed between the Ministry of Education of Brazil (MEC) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) deserve to be highlighted. Their goal was to establish agreements for technical assistance and financial support for Brazilian education. From 1964 to 1968, 12 agreements were made, covering from elementary school to higher education.

It is worth noting that during the Cold War most of the ITC was due to the current dispute between the two superpowers (the USA and the Soviet Union). During this period, which lasted 40 years (from the early 1950s to the late 1980s), the ITC represented, besides military cooperation, an important instrument in the struggle between the capitalist and communist blocs. This cooperation had an important role in world geopolitics, since, unlike the first two world wars of the 20th century, the conflicts between the two superpowers during the Cold War were caught in territories of other countries (in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa). Some argue that, during the Cold War, the ITC offer was primarily one of several mechanisms of political cooperation.

Starting with the Geisel administration (1974-79), the Brazilian government sought to reduce the political and military influence of the USA in the country. It is in this context that, in 1975, the Nuclear Agreement Brazil-Germany was signed. With this agreement, a wide range of technical cooperation projects was provided
by the Government of West Germany to Brazil. These projects contributed to the modernization and strengthening of national institutions such as the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO).

On this date, the Secretariat of International Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation (SUBIN) was created, under the Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency of the Republic (SEPLAN/PR). The SUBIN had the main function of coordinating the ITC received and provided by Brazil, except for the educational, scientific and technological ITC, which were assigned to the sphere of the Coordination of Higher Education Personnel Improvement (CAPES) and of the National Council of Scientific and Technological Research (CNPq), and the military ITC, which reported directly to the Presidency of the Republic and to the military ministries.

The SUBIN formalizes and enhances the mechanisms of the ITC received by Brazil: it creates an International Technical Cooperation Manual and two forms (the bilaterally received technical cooperation form [CTRB] and the multilaterally received technical cooperation form [CTRM]) that should be filled in by the institutions that aimed to receive bilateral or multilateral ITC. The application forms were analyzed by government experts who worked in related fields and then ranked in order of priority. After that, they were negotiated by the Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in bilateral Joint Commissions geared specifically towards international cooperation.

The main goal of the structure described above was to link the cooperation to be received by the country to the priorities set by the National Development Plans (PNDs).

In 1987, amid a dispute between the ministries of Finance and Planning, the SUBIN/SEPLAN was extinguished and lately replaced by the NUPEC/MRE, embryo of what was to become the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC, Brazilian Cooperation Agency) under the MRE. With this new application of the ITC, the priority given to international technical cooperation also changed: from an instrument for supporting national development to an element to support and facilitate the coordination of Brazilian foreign policy.

2.2 Towards an international technical cooperation directed to the neediest: the beginning of international technical cooperation for the benefit of regional and urban development

In the late 1970s, changes also occur at the global level. The establishment of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by former German Chancellor (1969-1974) and Nobel Peace Prize Willy Brandt, becomes a milestone of that period and of what came to be called the North-South Dialogue.
In 1980, the Commission published a report titled *North-South: a program for survival*, but better known as the Brandt Report (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980).

The Brandt Report presents a comprehensive analysis that can be summed up by the title of its introduction: “A Plea for Change: Peace, Justice, Jobs”. It consists of 17 chapters dealing with topics such as: the dimensions of development; hunger and poverty; population; disarmament; energy; industrialization and finance. It also features a program of priorities and recommendations for the international community. And it explains, for the first time, the need for developed nations to allocate at least one percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to official development assistance (ODA) as a way to eliminate hunger and poverty worldwide.

During the 1980s, changes were gradually introduced to the principles which had hitherto guided the ITC: the ills of the poorest nations began to be seen as deriving more from domestic structural problems than from the mere lack of financial resources or technology. This led to the idea that the necessary changes required (direct, on the ground) support, rather than just the allocation of technical and financial resources. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the ITC, more focused on institutional strengthening (capacity building).

In February 1986, on the occasion of the German-Brazilian Intergovernmental Negotiation on Financial and Technical Cooperation, the German Government expressed its interest that the future ITC program between both countries be focused on the areas of rural and municipal development, environmental protection and education and training.

In December 1986, in intergovernmental consultations carried out in Bonn, it was defined that the German-Brazilian technical cooperation would be structured through a program of urban-rural development integrated actions, having the segments of environmental protection, professional training and education as support areas. The Guidance Framework of the Viability of Economic Spaces for Low-Income Populations Program (PRORENDA) was prepared, on the Brazilian side, by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ipea, and, on the German side, representatives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

The PRORENDA’s Guidance Framework (Lima et al., 1987) was based on the guidelines of the First National Development Plan of the New Republic (IPND-NR) and the National Policy for Rural Development (PNDR), both produced in 1985, and comprised five categories: Small farmers; Low-income

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6. For those interested, see Lopes (2005) and Lopes and Theison (2006).
population in the urban periphery; Productive microunits; Environmental protection; and Research, education and training.

With PRORENDA, a new phase in the ITC received by Brazil began: instead of autonomous projects in a number of areas, the focus turns to the low-income population with a program that operates primarily in rural and urban development. According to its Guidance Framework, PRORENDA is “a new form of action (...) founded in a program geared to provide social facilities and infrastructure to the population with very low income and who are living in slums and peripheral settlements. Its execution will be the responsibility of municipal governments, a level of government that is the closest to the people, and thus, to the low-income communities. The investments will benefit simple projects of land tenure, housing improvements, infrastructure (drainage, sanitation and protection from landslides) and community facilities (kindergartens, schools, health centers, etc.) and combine resources of loans and grants. The actions will be oriented towards meeting urban needs, especially in the peripheral areas of big and medium-sized cities, where the low-income population is largely concentrated. They will include incentives to social investment in the areas of social housing, sanitation, transportation, education, health, nutrition and safety, which will be the responsibility of municipalities or metropolitan authorities, according to a strategy that maximizes job creation. The improvement of urban management will be sought by administrative and financial decentralization or by co-participation of citizens in the process of organizing the space” (Lima et al., 1987, p. 2).

With PRORENDA, a new strategy for ITC and urban-regional development would be pursued: while hitherto the government’s actions were intended to equip regions that were geographically delimited by homogeneous political and administrative criteria, such as the Industrial Districts Companies (CDIs), a new perspective was being sought, based on the demands of economically disadvantaged target groups. These target groups left behind their condition of objects aimed by government offers to become subjects that were able to articulate their own demands, thereby exercising their right as citizens.

The main objective of PRORENDA was to create functional economic spaces, where the first exchanges would take place internally, stemming and driven by the demands and necessities of the actual low-income population, encompassing primary, secondary and tertiary economic activities, including the credit sector. The economic space ceased to be defined geographically, but by the economic functions that exist within it. This provided a stronger, more dynamic linkage between urban and rural, as the rural areas provide the urban areas with their surplus production, and in turn demand urban goods and services.
PRORENDA, as designed and run for more than a decade in the states of Piauí, Ceará, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Bahia, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, enabled the spread of a new conception of urban and regional policy more focused on the welfare of low-income citizens than to the economic development of states and/or municipalities (Resende, 2007).

Another issue inherent to the ITC received by Brazil that is worth mentioning is the fact that, until the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, widely known as Rio 92 or ECO 92, most of the international technical cooperation was seen as “formal”, i.e., was devised for and implemented within the structure of the Federal Government and benefited public or parastatal institutions.

The pressure from donor countries and also from organizations representing the organized civil society led the Federal Government to gradually change this perspective. In 1993, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, advocated the need for more active participation from civil society in defining Brazilian foreign policy. The MRE began to incorporate representatives of organized civil society in the formulation of its policies, particularly when adopting positions for the Conference Cycle of the United Nations meetings (i.e. Rio, Beijing, Cairo, Copenhagen and Durban).

Another point to note is that part of the cooperation received in Brazil – the “informal” part – did not pass through governmental mechanisms, particularly those coming from international non-governmental organizations and directed at Brazilian non-governmental organizations. Some argue that this particular cooperation was the most relevant of all, for it substantially affected the democratization process in Brazil, by creating and maintaining civil society organizations that were politically involved in championing the reestablishment of the democratic regime. It should be noted that this form of cooperation has a highly relevant role for the operation of Brazilian non-governmental organizations, particularly those aimed toward guaranteeing rights.

2.3 Brazil and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) started being developed in 2001, just over a year after the Millennium Summit. Its main mentor was Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University. As Special Advisor to the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, he formed and coordinated 10 thematic groups that subsequently developed the structure of what came to be the MDGs: a set of eight goals, subdivided into 18 targets that could be measured by 48 indicators. Interestingly, according to Jeffrey Sachs, the objective of the creation of the MDGs was primarily to sensitize the richer nations to increase their Official Development Aid (ODA), which was being gradually reduced since the end of the Cold War. However, it
was in middle-income countries and in particular in Brazil that the MDGs have acquired greater relevance.

On October 31, 2003, a Presidential Decree creating the Technical Group for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals was signed. Supervised by the Civil House of the Presidency of the Republic, the group met once in late 2003 to get to know the MDG strategy and to develop mechanisms for its dissemination across the country.

On March 30, 2004, upon recommendation by the Presidency of the Republic, representatives of several of the United Nations System institutions met with members of the Department of Social Studies (DISOC) of the Ipea. They aimed to coordinate the preparation of the first National Progress Report of the MDGs.


The final document comprises eight chapters, each one addressing one of the eight MDGs. The chapters present information on the progress of the 18 targets established by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), measured by means of 48 indicators as proposed by the Program. The analysis covered the period from 1990 (base year proposed by UNDP) to 2002. The chapters also briefly mention the policies, programs and priorities of the federal government in each of the areas covered by the eight goals.

The 93-page Report had 10,000 copies printed in Portuguese and another 10,000 in English. It was launched in September 2004 in New York during the UN General Assembly. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has distributed a major part of the English copies to diplomatic offices abroad, since the Report provides an interesting perspective on the social advances achieved by the country during the previous decade.

As a result of its success – and also because of some criticism presented, in particular by representatives of civil society organizations – the second reporting process has been substantially expanded and was launched at the UN General Assembly in September 2005.

The second Report kept the eight goals set by UNDP. It incorporated new targets, more consistent with the national reality, in a process that came to be called
“tropicalization” of the MDGs; the number of indicators that measured the evolution of targets was substantially increased, with 61 additional indicators, which allowed to measure the evolution of the proposed targets with greater accuracy; and also incorporated an introductory chapter linking the MDGs to the protection of human rights. This chapter aimed to demonstrate that the eight goals were related to Declarations, Covenants and International Conventions already signed by Brazil (e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child).

In this new Report a number of figures, charts and tables were included, which addressed in a didactic way issues of interest to the entire society. As an example, the figures related to “Chapter 1 - Eradicate Hunger and Poverty” can be cited: “What are poverty lines?”; “Men and women experience poverty in different ways”; “What is hunger and malnutrition?”; “Food and nutrition security in Brazil: an original story”; “What is the Family Health Program”; “Government commits to eradicate slave labor”; “Indigenous people receive health care.” In addition, all governmental initiatives directly related to achieving the MDGs were listed.

The process of “tropicalization” of the MDGs, carried out after discussions with representatives of the United Nations System, ministries, Board of Social Policies (Câmara de Politicas Sociais), boards and commissions, kept the eight original goals, but changed or incorporated the following targets specific to Brazil:

1) Reduce to a quarter, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living on less than $1 PPP per day (replacing the original target 1 – Reduce by half, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of the population living on less than 1 dollar PPP per day);

2) Eradicate hunger between 1990 and 2015 (replacing the original target 2 – Halve, between 1990 and 2015 – the proportion of people who suffer from hunger);

3) Ensure that, by 2015, all children, from all regions of the country, regardless of color/race and gender, complete elementary school (replacing the original target 3 – Ensure that by 2015 all children, both sexes, complete a full cycle of education);

4) Promote, in the network of health facilities of the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS, Unified Health System), universal coverage for reproductive actions by 2015 (new target); and
5) By 2015, to have prevented the increase in the mortality rate from breast and cervical cancer, reversing the current trend (new target).

This document also achieved considerable impact, as well as the third report, released at the UN General Assembly in September 2007. It sought to improve the MDG strategy by attaching a CD that presented in detail the governmental initiatives that, in some way, positively impacted the achievement of the MDGs. This initiative was developed by the Secretariat of Planning and Strategic Investments of the Ministry of Planning (SPI/MP) in conjunction with the Ipea.

In 2010 and 2014, the fourth and fifth National MDGs Monitoring Reports were published.

The success of the National Monitoring Reports, as well as their dialogue with government initiatives that positively impacted the achievement of the MDGs, ended up influencing states (such as Minas Gerais and Bahia), municipalities (such as Santo André and Belo Horizonte) and even other nations (such as Argentina and Uruguay) to follow a similar methodology.

In Brazil, the success of the MDGs can be attributed to several factors, including the fact that its goals, targets and indicators were more understandable and easy to monitor than the macro objectives established by the Multi-Year Plan, at the federal level as much as at the state and municipal levels, as well as due to national monitoring reports that have become a relevant accountability instrument of the policies, programs and actions of the federal government.

In addition to the National Progress Reports, another important strategy that positively impacted the dissemination of the MDG in Brazil was the MDG Brazil Award: created in 2004, it has had five editions (2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013). Coordinated by the General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, together with the National Movement for Citizenship and Solidarity and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), technical coordination was carried out by the Ipea and the Escola Nacional de Administração Pública (ENAP, National School of Public Administration). Its main objective is to recognize and encourage social and environmental initiatives aimed at achieving the eight goals set out in the MDGs. These five editions received a total of 6,078 submissions for initiatives developed by local governments, universities and non-governmental organizations, with or without a profit motive, from all regions of the country.

The requirements for participation in the Award were: the contribution of initiatives for achieving the MDGs; the impact on the public served; community participation; existence of partnerships; potential for replicability; complementarity and/or coordination with actions of government, civil society and the productive sector.
Research conducted by Ipea (Peliano, 2016) clearly demonstrates that the Award had a highly positive impact among the winning initiatives, particularly the non-governmental ones. The evolution of these winning initiatives shows that most of them increased the number of partnerships, budget and the number of services provided to the public.

2.4 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The document produced by the Rio+20 Conference, entitled “The Future We Want”, proposes the creation within the UN of an Open-ended Working Group to develop a set of goals for sustainable development that are consistent and integrated with the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015.

On December 4, 2014, the United Nations General Assembly published the document A/69/700, entitled “The Road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet – Synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda.” This document included a preliminary list of the 17 goals that a year later would be called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The resolution approved by the 70th General Assembly of the United Nations, held in September 2015 (document A/RES/70/1), adopted 17 goals and 169 targets for the SDGs.

Since the Rio+20 until its formal launch in September 2015, the Government of Brazil was one of the main supporters of the SDG strategy in multilateral negotiations, to such an extent that, between June 29 and July 1, 2015, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) promoted the “Meeting of Information Producers Seeking the Post-2015 Development Agenda.” The main objective of the event, which was attended by much of the IBGE staff, several representatives of the Ipea and also other government institutions, was to deepen the assessment of the feasibility of previously discussed indicators (entirely feasible indicator; easily feasible indicator; viable indicator with some level of effort; weak indicator even with great effort; and non-existent indicator). It was also a way for the IBGE to prepare itself for the discussions on the SDGs Indicators held by the Inter-Agency Expert Group, composed of 28 countries including Brazil, which also represented the Mercosur + Chile.

The base year of the SDGs is 2016. Its monitoring process will show greater complexity than that of the MDGs, both because of the higher number of goals, targets and indicators, and due to the fact that there are broader goals or goals that can not be accompanied by measurable indicators.
According to paragraph 5 of Resolution A/RES/70/1,
this [the SDGs] is an Agenda of unprecedented scope and significance. It is accepted by all countries and is applicable to all, taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities. These are universal goals and targets which involve the entire world, developed and developing countries alike. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development (UN, 2015a, p. 3).

2.5 Brief comparison between the MDGs and the SDGs
The following comparison does not take into account the targets and indicators of both strategies, which in itself bears relevance due to the substantial increase in the number of targets (from 18 in the MDGs to 169 in SDGs) and indicators to monitor them (from 48 in the MDGs to a few hundred in the SDGs).

Still, in regard to the goals it is possible to detect similarities between the MDGs and the SDGs, which may facilitate, at least in part, their monitoring, since the national experience with the MDGs is considerable.

The “SDG 1 – End poverty in all its forms everywhere”, and the “SDG 2 – End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”, relate to the “MDG 1 – Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”.

The “SDG 3 – Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”, has similarities to “MDG 4 – Reduce child mortality”; “MDG 5 – Improve maternal health”; and “MDG 6 – Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases”.

But the “SDG 4 – Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”; resembles the “MDG 2 – Achieve universal primary education (in the case of Brazil elementary school),” in the same way that the “SDG 5 – Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” is very close to the “MDG 3 – Promote gender equality and empower women”.

The “SDG 8 – Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”, the “SDG 10 – Reduce inequality within and among countries” and the “SDG 17 – Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development” reflect an evolvement of the “MDG 8 – Develop a global partnership for development.”

Major changes occur in the environmental area: the “MDG 7 – Ensure environmental sustainability” unfolded into eight of the SDGs:
1) **SDG 6** – Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all;

2) **SDG 7** – Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all;

3) **SDG 9** – Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation;

4) **SDG 11** – Make cities and human settlements inclusive, secure, resilient and sustainable;

5) **SDG 12** – Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns;

6) **SDG 13** – Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts;

7) **SDG 14** – Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development; and

8) **SDG 15** – Protect, restore and promote the sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.

Finally, there is the “**SDG 16** – Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. This goal extends effectively the scope of the MDGs. It can be argued that this is due to an effort to minimize one of the main criticisms directed at the MDGs: the lack of a specific goal to address human rights and the strengthening of national governance processes.

The following table summarizes the correspondence between the MDGs and the SDGs presented above, and also seeks to establish links between them and aspects of urban life that have been examined during the preparation process for Habitat-III and that will probably be incorporated in a New Urban Agenda, which is the topic of the next section.
**FIGURE 1**

Summary table of correspondences between the Millennium Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals and chapters of the Habitat-III Report, which will inform the New Urban Agenda; the emphasis given to each of the SDGs represents greater or lesser correspondence between the themes in the Habitat III Report (as highlighted below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Millenium Development Goals</th>
<th>Sustainable Development Goals</th>
<th>Chapters of the HABITAT-III Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDG 1 - Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</td>
<td>SDG 1 - End poverty</td>
<td>Urban Demographic Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 4 - MDG 5 - MDG 6</td>
<td>SDG 2 - End hunger</td>
<td>Land and Urban Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 2 - Primary education</td>
<td>SDG 3 - Ensure healthy lives</td>
<td>Environment and Urbanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 3 - Gender equality</td>
<td>SDG 4 - Inclusive and equitable education</td>
<td>Urban Governance and Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 7 - Ensure environmental sustainability</td>
<td>SDG 5 - Gender equality</td>
<td>Urban Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 8 - Global partnership for dev.</td>
<td>SDG 6 - Water and sanitation for all</td>
<td>Housing and Basic Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG 7 - Environmental sustainability</td>
<td>SDG 7 - Energy for all</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG 8 - Global partnership for dev.</td>
<td>SDG 8 - Growth, employment and work</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG 7 - Ensure environmental sustainability</td>
<td>SDG 9 - Infrastructure and industrialization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG 8 - Global partnership for dev.</td>
<td>SDG 10 - Reduce inequality</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG 7 - Ensure environmental sustainability</td>
<td>SDG 11 - Sustainable cities</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG 8 - Global partnership for dev.</td>
<td>SDG 12 - Sust. consumption and production</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG 13 - Combat climate change</td>
<td>SDG 14 - Conserve oceans</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG 15 - Protect terrestrial ecosystems</td>
<td>SDG 16 - Peaceful societies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG 17 - Revitalize the GPSD</td>
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</tbody>
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Compiled by the authors.
3 FROM THE SDGS TO THE NEW URBAN AGENDA: POSSIBLE DIALOGUES

Initially, it must be considered that the SDGs, as well as their respective targets approved at the 70th UN General Assembly, provide a set of guiding principles for the New Urban Agenda. The following section presents an analysis of the correspondence between the targets of the SDGs and the possible contents of the New Urban Agenda, based on the Brazilian Report for the Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, Habitat-III (Ipea, 2016).

Referred to in short as “Habitat-III Report”, the document, reported by Ipea, was approved by the Conselho Nacional de Cidades (ConCidades, National Cities Council) on September 17, 2015, and by its Habitat Working Group, set up by the Administrative Resolution No. 29/2014 of the ConCidades. The Report’s structure included a template prepared by UN-Habitat, which should be followed by all Member States in the preparation of their national reports. On that account, the themes suggested by the UN serve as a starting point and, although the Report has been created based on the Brazilian context, the findings may apply, for the most part, to many other realities and constitute issues to be addressed in the New Urban Agenda discussion during the Habitat-III, in Quito. Such debates can also be anticipated to some extent, allowing us to compare the issues addressed in the Report with the content of the SDG targets.

As stated by the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 report on the Development Agenda, “the battle for sustainable development will be won or lost in the cities,” an expectation that led to the approval of SDG 11 and which, “recognizing the centrality of the urban issue to development as a whole, aimed at ‘making cities and human settlements inclusive, secure, resilient and sustainable’” (according to the presentation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Ipea, 2016, p. 11). Therefore it is expected, that “urban” themes gain centrality in SDG 11, something that can be verified to some extent, in the attempt to associate each of the ten targets comprised in SDG 11 (including the three targets related to the means of implementation) to the six chapters that comprise the Habitat-III Report: i) Urban demographic issues; ii) Urban and territorial planning; iii) Environment and urbanization; iv) Urban governance and legislation; v) Urban economy; and vi) Housing and basic services.

It is possible to identify the main “focus” of SDG 11 targets in the section of the Habitat-III Report that addresses housing, sanitation and basic services, issues which were already addressed in the targets C and D of MDG 7. Here it is worth drawing a brief comparison: target 11.1 of SDG 11 has remarkably expanded the scope in relation to target D of MDG 7, as shown by their respective formulations (in the fifth National Monitoring Report on the MDGs, published in May 2014; and in the case of the SDGs, according to the resolution approved by the 70th General Assembly of the United Nations; emphasis added):
MDG 7, target D: Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

SDG 11, target 11.1: By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums.

Moreover, in addressing housing along with basic services, target 11.1 of the SDGs includes the object of target C of MDG 7: “Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation.” It might also be observed that the improvement of water and sanitation services is contemplated in another SDG (that of number 6), whose targets provide advancements, both quantitative and qualitative, in regard to target C of MDG 7.

With this, an attempt to associate each target of the SDGs to the virtual themes of a New Urban Agenda should take into account not only SDG 11, but also all of the others that can show some correspondence. This exercise will now be carried out.

3.1 Urban demographic issues and the targets of the SDGs

The first chapter of the Habitat-III Report highlights the strong demographic growth in Brazilian metropolitan areas and in large cities, resulting from industrialization and, more recently, the exploitation of mineral resources and the advance of the agricultural and livestock frontier, as well as the location of major infrastructure works in the hinterland (Ipea, 2016, p. 29).

Rapid urbanization has consequences like the socio-territorial disintegration between neighborhoods and downtown areas (i.e. spatial segregation and fragmentation), and the increase in implementation costs and in those associated to the use of urban infrastructure; such processes have been observed not only in metropolises but also in medium-sized cities. At the same time, at the other end of the hierarchy of a still unbalanced urban network, there are a large number of small “cities” (actually, towns or villages) that do not have the capacity to implement local policies that could guarantee the social functions of property and of the city, as established by the City Statute (Estatuto da Cidade). To address this, it would be necessary, in addition to increasing access to basic services, to develop municipal management capacity, a point that is addressed in target 11.3 of SDG 11, as it proposes to improve the inclusive and sustainable urbanization and the capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable planning and management of human settlements in all countries. However, in the other targets of SDG 11 and in all other goals there is a lack of clear references to strengthening the functions of municipal planning and management, and thus it is understood that this issue needs to be further developed and detailed in a New Urban Agenda.

As for the other issues included in the first section of the Habitat-III Report, the targets of the SDGs provide a much more robust approach. Starting with the
Contributions of the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals to a New Urban Agenda

urban-rural connections, which were examined by the occurrence of situations where a population undertakes work-related activities that are opposed to the (urban or rural) characteristics of the zone in which they reside; or by different migratory movements between rural and urban areas, and vice-versa. In this case, the challenge of the New Urban Agenda will be to deepen and widen the scope of policies that build on complementarities and synergies between urban and rural areas, and which, in the case of the latter, contribute to the expansion of physical and social infrastructure, in order to eliminate the anachronistic view of rural as something of a synonym for stagnation. Besides target 11.1 (housing and basic services), examples of targets of the SDGs that can address this are target 11.2, emphasizing the importance of transportation systems that meet the urban-rural linkage, and especially target 11.a, on the means of implementation to “support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning.” The other demographic topics of the Habitat-III Report refer to specific groups: urban youth, the elderly and people with disabilities, and gender issues. Common to all these, targets 11.2 and 11.7 resonate: in the first, the importance of increasing mobility, especially by public and suitable transportation for people in vulnerable situations, women, children, elderly and disabled people should be highlighted; in the second, there is the specification of the same target groups for the provision of access to green areas and safe and inclusive public spaces. In addition to the SDG 11, targets of other goals are also aimed directly at the needs of these groups: for example, target 4.4 (professional education, decent work and entrepreneurship) is geared on young people (as well as adults); target 4.5 (eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to education of vulnerable people, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations) is oriented towards broad groups; and target 5.5 (ensure to women full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life), which, as it turns out, directly addresses the issue of integrating gender in human development. Of SDG 8, it is worth highlight target 8.5 (full and productive employment and decent work for all men and women, including young people and persons with disabilities, with equal pay for work of equal value) and target 8.6 (reduce the proportion of youth not in employment, education or training). Last but not least, the various targets in many of the SDGs, establishing commitments to reducing violence, are addressed to the public that is especially affected by public (in)security, as denoted by various indicators mentioned in Habitat-III Report, for instance the correlation between schooling, violence and imprisonment, which shows that especially young black males still experience and remain subject to serious vulnerabilities. Therefore, it can be expected that the New Urban Agenda, as regards to specific groups, will be more like an echo of these issues than introduce innovation to the SDGs, which already widely address the subject.
3.2 Urban and territorial planning, and the targets of the SDGs

The second chapter of the Habitat-III Report emphasizes changes in the institutional field (especially the creation of the Ministry of Cities and the ConCidades) and in the normative framework brought about by the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the approval of the City Statute in 2001, which elevated the municipal master plan to a central instrument of urban policy, and established it as the basis for the implementation of urban, legal and tax instruments (Ipea, 2016, p. 41). Several legislative advances were made in regard to housing and land tenure, sanitation, transportation and urban mobility, as well as to the identification of areas susceptible to natural disasters. Recent years have also shown an increase at the local level in the number of urban and territorial planning instruments. However, at least in the most dynamic areas of the country, there is somewhat of a gap between the formulation of laws and instruments of planning and management, on the one hand, and commodification and financialization processes, together with the increase in the value of real estate, on the other, which results in a low implementation rate of the principles of social functions of the city and property, as established by the legal framework.

The implementation of forms of urban planning that ensure sustainable cities (or that point to ways for reducing their unsustainability) is therefore a hot topic for the New Urban Agenda. However, as already observed with respect to the rapid urban growth, the SDGs provide a limited answer, restricted to a mention of the increase in the capacity for planning and management, according to target 11.3, which is associated to another topic that is addressed in the Report, that is, to increase the technical capacity to plan and manage cities.

A third topic that is also briefly touched upon refers to the improvement of the management of urban land in order to combat urban sprawl: it is clear that improved planning capacity, as well as the quest to provide adequate housing for all (with the necessary land reserve) and slum upgrading (as provided in target 11.1) work towards changing exclusionary urbanization processes. However, despite the existence of several targets under other SDGs dealing with resource management, including land management, there are no specific references to urban land, whose particularities will certainly demand careful attention in the formulation of a New Urban Agenda.7

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7. For these three topics, the Habitat-III Report presents several guidelines for a New Urban Agenda, including, among others: institutionalization of national policies on urban development and land use planning; technical, financial and institutional capacity building for decentralized planning; implementation of multipurpose technical records; articulation of urban policy instruments to promote the social function of property and the city; creation of incentives for municipalities that make these instruments effective; increase transparency of state actions, as well as institutional spaces of participation and civil society control over public policies; promotion of the effective use of instruments for preventing property speculation and to increase the access to land; monitoring of land conflicts; mediation and negotiation; development of specific and participatory urban expansion projects; formulation of specific policies for rehabilitation of buildings; etc.
There are still two topics that are addressed in the second chapter of the Habitat-III Report: the first one, relating to the increase in urban and peri-urban food production, is associated with SDG 11 (improve access to green areas) and SDGs 2 and 12, being more adherent to the aspects of production and distribution set out by the last two, as per target 2.3, relating to increasing agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, and target 12.3, which proposes to reduce food waste and loss both at the retail and the consumer level, as well as along production and supply chains. In this case, there is evidence that the “attention” given by SDGs to this issue is greater than its effective incorporation by urban and territorial planning in Brazil, although the theme is within the scope of other national policies.

Finally, the last topic relates to solving urban mobility challenges and is clearly associated with target 11.2, which is “multidimensional”, as it addresses both the issue of access to (safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable) transportation and that of infrastructure and road safety, in addition to its adaptation to the needs of specific groups. These form another set of priorities for the formulation of the New Urban Agenda, given the increase of the (individual) motorization rate in Brazil, concurrent with the increase in the absolute number of road traffic fatalities.8

### 3.3 Environment and urbanization, and the targets of the SDGs

The third chapter of the Habitat-III Report (Ipea, 2016, p. 57) addresses the degradation of the urban environment, which impacts the entire population but affect areas lacking infrastructure and urban services even more profoundly. It is understood that climate change does not only involve the expansion of the risks of natural disasters, but also that they are more likely to occur in areas of disordered urbanization, occupied by the most vulnerable part of the population.

Brazil has a National Policy on Climate Change, which encompasses, among its instruments, the National Plan on Climate Change comprising of various sectoral plans, notably the Transport and Urban Mobility Sectoral Plan for the Mitigation of Climate Change. In this sense, several targets of SDG 11 address the issue, including target 11.2, on the sustainability of transport systems; target 11.3, which calls for sustainable urbanization, and target 11.b, on the means of implementation for the “substantial increase” of the “number of cities and human

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8. On this regard, the Habitat-III Report is also particularly propositional, including guidelines for: adaptation of cities to universal accessibility; regulation of the uses of urban space to enable the reduction of travel distances and travel times; increase in the daily mobility index of the poorest; increased participation in active modes of transportation (walking and cycling) and clean technologies; promotion of policies for the integration of mobility and urban land use and occupation, in order to reduce the demand for mobility; integration of transportation modes, tariffs and fares; etc. Also in the topic “improving access to sustainable means of transport”, the Report lists a number of proposals such as: prioritizing investment in sidewalks and footpaths, crossings and footbridges; increase the share of public transportation in the modal matrix, and integrate the different transportation modes, motorized and non-motorized; invest in changing the energy matrix of urban transport; modernizing urban rails, with the implementation of electrical and light systems; establish regulatory policies for the use of individual transportation; etc.
settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters […]” by 2020 – all of which are strongly associated with the topic. If other goals are examined, the issue is also mentioned in the targets of SDG 13, which calls for urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, although it does not include specific targets for urban areas.

The previous topic can hardly be considered separately from disaster risks, since Brazil has recently been experiencing emergencies related to extreme weather events on an annual basis. So it is necessary to expand disaster risk management and monitoring efforts, in an integrated manner, starting with existing monitoring and alert systems. Disaster risks, in turn, cannot be dealt with in isolation from urban (target 11.3) and housing conditions (target 11.1), given that the recurrence of natural disasters is often the result of an exclusionary urbanization process, wherein people with no alternative have occupied unsuitable areas. Target 11.5 of SDG 11 specifically addresses the issue, calling for a reduction in the number of deaths and of people affected by disasters, including water-related disasters. Here, too, the means of implementation of target 11.b play a fundamental role, as mentioned previously; and lastly, SDG 1, which calls for the end of poverty, through its target 1.5 proposes to “build resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.”

The remaining topics, namely the reduction of traffic congestion and of air pollution, can be examined jointly, in view of a scenario of growth of the private vehicle fleet, which inevitably leads to an increase in the levels of air pollutant emissions, even if the individual emissions levels have been decreasing in Brazil due to the modernization of the fleet, and at the same time is unable to reduce travel times for the entire population, so ultimately the number of people with long daily commutes remains fairly stable at a high level. Although investments are being made to increase the supply and quality of public transport, it is necessary to expand their scope and ensure that they continue to be made in the long term, which is why target 11.2 needs be continuously monitored, as previously mentioned. Also, target 11.6 on the reduction of environmental impacts, with attention to air quality, has strong linkage both to traffic congestion and air pollution, and can be complemented by the observance of a more general target such as 3.9, which aims at reducing the number of deaths and illnesses caused by hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination.

3.4 Urban governance and legislation, and the targets of the SDGs
The fourth chapter of the Habitat-III Report (Ipea, 2016, p. 69) reiterates what has already been demonstrated in the second chapter with respect to the legislative and institutional progress of Brazil in recent years towards the recognition of
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rights and towards social policies. Still, the advances in urban governance should be acknowledged as regards the possibilities of cooperation between federal entities (municipalities, states and the Union), brought forth by the Law on Public Consortia (Lei de Consórcios Públicos), even if it still has little effect on urban and, in particular, metropolitan development policies, precisely where intergovernmental cooperation is most necessary for the exercise of public functions of common interest – a topic that is also set out under the recently enacted Metropolis Statute (Estatuto da Metrópole).

The observance of topics that certainly will be incorporated into the New Urban Agenda, such as the improvement of urban legislation, decentralization and strengthening of local authorities, and the improvement of participation and of human rights in urban development, may refer to the aforementioned target 11.3 of the SDGs. However, there exists a need to expound this target in order to adapt its monitoring process as per the recent experience of expanding the public sphere in Brazil, considering, for example, the various governance levels (intra-urban, regional and national), the mechanisms for direct popular participation (councils, conferences and public consultations), the course of action towards the realization of a national system of urban development (which articulates the legislation and establishes sectoral institutionality) etc. In this sense, other broader targets within the SDGs may be incorporated into the New Urban Agenda, such as those that prescribe the development of “effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels” (target 16.6) and that “ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels” (target 16.7).

The three remaining topics of the fourth section of the report call for individual examination: the first addresses the improvement of urban safety and security. In this case, the only target of SDG 11 that makes direct reference to the subject provides for the improvement of road safety and transport systems (11.2), and there is another target (3.6), with a broader domain that calls for reducing “the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents.” Of course, urban safety and security problems in Brazil are not restricted to this. There are targets of SDG 16 that relate to other aspects of public safety, such as “significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere” (target 16.1) and “by 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime” (target 16.4), the latter with special resonance to urban territories taken by the so-called “parallel power”. Not to mention situations of intense social vulnerability that are also addressed, and which prescribe in response to “end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children” (target 16.2) and “(...) ensure equal access to justice for all” (target 16.3), the latter of which concerns gender inequalities, for example. It is expected that the development of
a New Urban Agenda creates the opportunity for a comprehensive discussion on safety and security issues embedded in urban policies.

With respect to improving inclusion and raising social equity, the topic is referenced in the targets of the SDGs that attend to ensuring access for all to housing and basic services (11.1) and transportation (11.2). However, apparently other SDGs give a much more comprehensive approach to the issue, as social themes are detailed in various targets of SDG 1 (concerning the end of poverty) and SDG 10 (on the reduction of inequality within and among countries). As observed in regards to meeting the needs of specific groups, it can also be said that, with respect to social inclusion and equity, the New Urban Agenda should attend to mirroring the SDGs, rather than actually introducing innovations in this area.

The last topic refers to culture as a development driver of cities, in reference to the idea that making and inhabiting a city are, in short, cultural facts. It should be remembered that urban grassroots movements that call for the right to the city make use of cultural expression as their main form of resistance, giving new meaning to the city. It should also be taken into account that the notion of identity is prevalent in places with cultural spaces and movements, and therefore, the sense of belonging and community ties are strengthened and, in turn, violence is reduced.

As a result, qualifying the urban space should not be just a matter of infrastructure or services, but also a cultural issue. SDG 11 provides an answer to this question, although it deviates slightly from that which is being presented here, as it addresses only the protection and safeguarding of world’s cultural and natural heritage (target 11.4), which obviously does not comprehend urban cultural assets that have not acquired such a high status. Other targets – such as 4.7, which proposes to ensure that learners acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to promote sustainable development, including, for example, the appreciation of cultural diversity and the contribution of culture to sustainable development – also outline the issue, but the accuracy in establishing a linkage between culture and urban development in the New Urban Agenda will require additional efforts.

### 3.5 Urban economy and the targets of the SDGs

The fifth chapter of the Habitat-III Report (Ipea, 2016, p. 81) describes the general movement of formalization of jobs and of small-scale economic activities in Brazil, even in territories historically marked by informal labor relations. It also highlights

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9. It is important to note the existence in Brazil of robust information systems for tracking indicators that measure quality of life: both the Municipal Human Development Index (IDHM) and the Social Vulnerability Index (IVS) are continuously monitored, adding methodological refinements that characterize them as excellent sources of information on the situation of urban life in Brazil and therefore valuable references for the preparation of a New Urban Agenda.

10. In this regard, the Habitat-III Report defines this group as homeless people, those who live on the street, and which are given priority in programs like My Home My Life (Minha Casa Minha Vida) by municipal authorities, for example. The Report also expands the scope of basic services, encompassing, for instance, digital inclusion for all.
the public policy progress in the field of solidarity economy, in which the formation of cooperation networks becomes increasingly important as the costs of social reproduction and of social immobility escalate, costs that are already considerably high in peripheral areas of the city and in slums.

This is the chapter of the Report with less adherence to SDG 11, particularly in relation to topics such as support to local economic development and the creation of decent jobs and livelihoods, which have no clear correspondence with any of the targets of this goal. However, they adhere to targets linked to other goals, but without the “urban look” that covers SDG 11. This is the case of target 1.4, on equal rights to economic resources, including microfinance; target 4.4, relating to technical skills and entrepreneurship; and target 8.3, on “development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises”. In any case, the predominant impression is that these targets characterize a preference for individual values (skills, entrepreneurship etc.) to the detriment of cooperation between (micro) economic agents, which is not mentioned in the SDGs.

As for the strengthening of and for improving the access to housing financing, the topic is only addressed in SDG 11, whose target 11.1 refers to affordable housing. It is worth noting that other SDGs’ targets make reference to microfinance or microcredit, though housing (its improvement or adaptation to labor activity, for example) is not included among the intended uses. In Brazil, the expansion of the access to finance of housing units provided by the market is already a reality, and it would be essential to strengthen the sources of funding that are more permanent and less subject to curtailment, in order to ensure long-term continuity and the improvement and diversification of social interest housing policies, a theme that should be underscored in the New Urban Agenda.

Another dimension of the urban economy is focused on improving local municipal financing, with an emphasis on urban development funding, which, in Brazil, is related to the various responsibilities assumed by municipal governments since the Constitution of 1988. It is known that the fulfillment of such responsibilities has depended heavily on transfers of resources from other entities of the Federation, with a participation that is greater, the smaller the towns. To this topic there are few contributions in the SDGs: target 11.3 mentions the improvement of planning and management capabilities, without specifying resources to do so; the various targets of SDG 17 take a stand on the strengthening of the means of implementation and the revitalization of the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, and target 17.1 is clear as to strengthen the domestic...
resource mobilization. However, this and other targets of SDG 17 refer only to the national level, not addressing the federal allocation of resources to other entities.\(^{11}\)

Finally, on the topic of integration of the urban economy into national development policy, some “generic” connection can be established with target 11.a, on the means of implementation that could include multi-scale integrated planning, and which, in Brazil, would fall within the ambit of the incipient National Policy of Regional Development. It is also worth reflecting on the articulation of the local economy with global strategies of national development, something that is obviously beyond the scope of a New Urban Agenda.

3.6 Housing, sanitation and basic services, and the targets of the SDGs

This chapter (Ipea, 2016, p. 93) addresses topics associated with the “hard core” of SDG 11, especially set out by target 11.1, which refers to strategies for preventing the emergence of slums alongside slum upgrading, as well as access to adequate, safe and affordable housing and to safe drinking water, sanitation and urban drainage. As part of “basic services”, Habitat-III Report lists access to clean household energy sources (which are related to affordable, reliable and modern energy services, as set out in target 7.1) and access to sustainable transportation (as seen before, clearly related to target 11.2). Other targets of SDG 11 that are also related to the improvement of urban services include reducing the number of deaths and of people affected by disasters, and related economic losses (which can be achieved by measures like control of urban flooding, for example) and reducing the environmental impact on cities (by regulating emissions and effluents and by means of adequate waste management) – targets 11.5 and 11.6, respectively. However, impact on this field does not only derive from SDG 11, seeing there are also relevant references to equal rights over economic resources, ownership and control over land in target 1.4, with evident reverberations on the security of tenure in housing and the continued access to urban services. Sanitation, in turn, is dealt with in a number of other targets relating to adaptation to climate change (target 2.4), reduction of deaths caused by pollution or water contamination (target 3.9), universal and equitable access to drinking water (target 6.1) and access to adequate and equitable sanitation and

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\(^{11}\) The topic concerning the increase in local financing capacity received extra attention in the Habitat-III Report. With regard to the New Urban Agenda, the following guidelines could be mentioned, among others: making the allocation of resources, subsidies and intergovernmental transfers more equitable; rectify the creation of new expenditures and allocations to the adequate sources of revenue; perform progressive property taxation and capture land valuation; invest in reforming the tax collection system and in the infrastructure of tax collection offices; promote progressive charging of public services, distinguishing specific persons or groups in vulnerable situations; implement systems of public administration management that integrate tax and financial management systems; implement systems for sharing tax and management information; enable civil servants to deal with local financing themes; implement tools for social control of public revenues and expenditures; etc.
Contributions of the Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals to a New Urban Agenda

hygiene (target 6.2), improvement in wastewater treatment (target 6.3) and in water-use efficiency (goal 6.4).  

Hence, this chapter deals with overcoming old challenges, but which still require the attention of the New Urban Agenda. As already mentioned, the Habitat-III Report demonstrates that the past twenty years have provided a number of milestones of institutional courses of actions related to the provision of housing and urban services. However, these courses involved disputes which, at times, excluded alternative possibilities for service provision, and that deserve to be reconsidered and reassessed in the discussion that will follow. Here it is worth mentioning the housing policy, whose current configuration has been formulated by the Ministry of Cities in 2004, followed by the creation of the National System of Social Interest Housing (SNHIS) established by Law No. 11,124, enacted in 2005, as a result of the Popular Initiative Legislative Proposal No. 2,710/1992. The creation of the system, as well as of a national fund and its council, whose operation includes social participation and provides federal treatment to the issue of housing, providing for the accession of states and municipalities – and its local funds and councils – took place about thirteen years after the registration of the proposal, which was devised, in fact, four years before the Habitat-II Conference held in Istanbul. It should be remembered that the proposal included, as part of the system’s operating mechanisms, the transfer of resources from fund to fund, which could be regarded as evidence of institutional maturity, compared to the systematic chain of transfers from the Union to the states and municipalities. The proposal also relied on other sources of budgetary and extrabudgetary funds. The proposal also included the possibility of transfer of resources to nonprofit private entities arising from housing social movements. This was effected by an amendment to the law that created the SNHIS. Another instrument emanating from the SNHIS is the National Housing Plan (PlanHab), completed in 2009 and elaborated along with technical advisory and consultancy services and participatory bodies, making it possible to quantify the housing needs until 2023 and create multiple forms of service provision according to each particular urban and regional context.

At present, though, the federal government has chosen to prioritize the production of new housing units with the participation – or rather, under the leadership – of the private sector via the Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida (PMCMV, My

12. Habitat-III Report presents several contributions aimed at more positive results regarding the housing issue, such as the following examples, among others: durable interventions of slum upgrading, that maintain good living conditions over time; existence of alternative access to housing in and out of the slums; control and coercion of new land occupation and slum formation; social and technical work that provides effective responses to the needs of the residents, and collaborate with the valorization of individuals and their living space, contributing to ownership and maintenance of the interventions; land regularization in favor of families, through titling and public registration; implementation of the City Statute instruments to ensure the provision of public land for social interest purposes; requalification of buildings in disuse in the central areas, for the use of low-income families; set up funding programs and credit lines between federal entities aimed at combating excessive burden derived from the payment of rent; continuation and expansion of slum upgrading programs, technical assistance for rehabilitation of housing and provision of housing units in synergy with urban and land strategies; and compliance with national and international guidelines for involuntary displacement of families in a dignified manner and with housing alternatives.
Home My Life Program), whereby in theory it would be possible to reach sufficient production scales to meet the listed housing needs. Although PMCMV has introduced to the program a range of modalities aimed at different groups – including farmers and people represented by self-managed organizations –, the majority of resources has been used for the production of housing units via the market, with full ownership transferred to the resident/borrower, thus reducing the role of other forms of production, use and management of housing within the public policy.

The opportunity to develop a New Urban Agenda should, therefore, not only reflect urban policies as they are, but take into account the steps until the present and that the Habitat-III Report sought to recover and represent, as well as the steps that were only outlined or eventually forgotten, due to the changing scenario.

As for the targets of the Sustainable Development Goals, it is clear that they will provide overall relevant policy guidance in the elaboration of a New Urban Agenda, but they also show their limitations, which we tried to expose here and that should be overcome. One form of achieving this is by means of adequate indicators to monitor their progress, as explored in the next section of this analysis.

4 FINAL REMARKS

International Technical Cooperation in Brazil has showed progressive decentralization and inclusion of civil society, increased emphasis on institutional strengthening and a change in the status of the cooperation’s target groups, as they left behind their condition of objects of policies and became active subjects articulating their own claims and demands. These principles also guided the MDGs, and the experience in Brazil may contribute to new processes of dissemination and monitoring of other similar strategies, as is the case of the SDGs and also of the New Urban Agenda, which will emerge from the Third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat-III).

In the case of the SDGs, it is important to note that the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1 advises that there are targets for which it is not possible to establish indicators and that it is up to each country to establish national targets according to their specific realities. As for the Urban Agenda, we must also note that the systematic follow-up of its goals and targets is yet to be carried out, since this procedure was not used following the first two conferences (Habitat-I in Vancouver, 1976, and Habitat-II in Istanbul, 1996).

Examining the correspondences between the actual SDGs and a presumable New Urban Agenda, it appears that there are points where the latter may simply reflect what was set in the first, such as the provision of services to specific persons and groups, their inclusion and social equity. However, there are numerous issues of interest to Brazil that have not been covered in the SDGs, and which should be addressed in depth in forthcoming discussions on the New Urban Agenda, foregrounding the role
of urban planning in shaping (more) sustainable cities, which takes account of the complementarities between urban and rural areas, improves urban land management, and incorporates the issues of safety and culture in urban policies. On the other hand, it is worth noting the continuing relevance of increasing local financing capabilities and those related to municipal management, as well as education and training for their application – a theme which, as we have seen, has been addressed in the ITC agenda between Brazil and Germany since 1986.

Thus, the implementation of actions that address the following points is relevant to the success of the monitoring strategies for the SDGs, the New Urban Agenda and other development agendas:

1) Establish a common space of articulation between representatives of federal, state and municipal governments, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations System and other relevant stakeholders;

2) Gain the commitment of the actors listed in the topic above towards the implementation of a minimum common agenda;

3) Adapt or “tropicalize” the goals, targets and indicators to the national reality, so that they can be easily understood by civil society as a whole;

4) Make use of the strong advocacy capacity of the UN and its agencies; and

5) Other complementary actions, for example, a “SDG Brazil Award” or an award similar to the “Sustainable City”, to encourage compliance with the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda.

It is essential to consider that a possible trade off between the original monitoring proposals and others, more simplified, can be highly positive. In order to involve a greater number of stakeholders, it is fundamental that they, as much as society in general, assimilate quite easily what is being done. It is also important that, in addition to the evolution of the “snapshots” presented by targets and indicators, there is also a “film” with a plot that allows us to understand the aims being pursued and the plan to achieve them. The presentation and monitoring of goals, targets and indicators alone may be not enough. The development of a strategy involving many aspects, such as the five points foregrounded above, as well as others that may be outlined, is essential to ensure the success of agendas for effective measurement and monitoring of the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda.

REFERENCES


1 INTRODUCTION

Climate change has finally been incorporated into the world’s political agenda. Concerns with regards to a trajectory of accelerated change of the planet’s climate led to the ratification of a United Nations Convention on the subject, signed by 197 Parties (196 States and 1 regional economic integration organization) since 1992, when it was opened for signature.

As it respects national sovereignties, cultures and ways of facing problems, the reader will not find specific countries commitments on the subject of cities in the convention. Nonetheless, the documents that subsidize the decision making process in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are rich in information that can help the reader understand the importance of urban planning within the larger issue of climate change and why these issues can not keep being ignored when it comes to planning the future of cities. Guidance and more prescriptive documents for urban planning in a climate change context integrate the debate on a New Urban Agenda (NUA), which will be consolidated at the third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), in October 2016.

The strategic role of cities – both from a point of view of its potential to contribute to emission reductions and the need to adapt to this new reality – recognizing vulnerabilities, reducing risks and creating resilient infrastructures was the subject of a recent publication from the United Nations Program for Human Settlements (UN-Habitat, 2011). The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)\(^4\) has also highlighted the urban issue, particularly in its fifth, and most

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4. IPCC is an intergovernmental panel created in 1988 under the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Program (Unep), approved by the UN General Assembly to subsidize decision makers. It provides periodic update reports on the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, as well as adaptation options to such changes and the mitigation of the causes of these changes.
recent report, in which a full chapter, exclusively on urban areas, was included in the Working Group II contribution to the final report, focused on adaptation to climate change (IPCC, 2014).

In Brazil, there are some initiatives aiming at thinking and equipping the cities – with tools and capabilities – for this new reality of climate change. The National Institute for Space Research (Inpe/MCTI) has been designing future scenarios of climate change for Brazilian cities. The, now extinct, Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency (SAE/PR) coordinated in 2015 a study named “Brazil 2040: scenarios and adaptation options to climate change”, and the National Adaptation Plan was recently launched by the Ministry of the Environment, just to present some examples.

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the climate change issue, considering both the potential of damage that these changes may cause to cities and the possible contribution from cities to mitigate the problem.

The following section is on definitions required to understand the climate change issue. The subsequent section discusses the contributions from cities to the issue and how to prevent part of this impact. Section IV addresses climate changes implications for cities and ways to prepare for possible changes. Finally, Section V explores possible climate change scenarios for some Brazilian cities.

The conclusion discusses the importance of integrating this chapter’s subtopics with the topics of the Habitat III Conference, where it is expected that the climate change issue will be transversally integrated into the urban issue. It also highlights the availability of financing sources for facing climate change that can contribute to make it possible for cities to develop necessary interventions in essential areas such as sanitation, urban mobility and risk reduction.

2 CLIMATE CHANGES: CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

When the sun’s rays strike the earth’s surface, they can either be reflected or have their energy absorbed by solids and liquids present in this surface. When the energy is absorbed, the vibration of surface molecules intensifies; solids, liquids and gases expand and the vibration of the molecules transmits heat in all directions, including towards outer space. As there are gases in the atmosphere capable of absorbing and retransmitting heat from its molecules into the environment, even in the direction of the Earth’s surface, creating a back and forward movement, dissipation of this absorbed energy from earth to space is delayed. This phenomenon is called greenhouse effect. The gases that have this capability to absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of infrared radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface are called greenhouse gases or GHG.

Most of these gases occur naturally in the atmosphere and contribute to create earth’s environment, with the right temperature and the low thermal variation
that enables life. These are gases such as steam (H$_2$O), carbon dioxide (CO$_2$) and methane (CH$_4$). However, human activity has changed the concentration of such gases in the atmosphere, mainly by converting carbon stocks such as oil, coal and forests – into carbon dioxide, through combustion.

The rising academic debate on the possible effects on climate of a rising atmospheric concentration of GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide, led to the setting up of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (Unep). The concepts used in this chapter come from IPCC Glossaries (IPCC, 2001; 2014b).

Thus, in following section, focused on mitigation, we will be discussing what the IPCC has defined as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases”. So, when we address the general topic of “mitigation”, it means reduction of the source of the problems, not of its effects. Related to the effects, the term adaptation, subject of Section IV, is defined as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” (IPCC, 2014b).

Mitigation and adaptation have been, and still are for some, treated as disconnected topics with a trade off between them. The idea was that for one unit of resources invested in adaptation (“the remedy for the symptom”), there would be one unit of resources deducted to solve the problem at its origin, or for mitigation (the “healing from the source” – as discussed in Luedemann and Hargrave, 2010). However, we should bear in mind that climate changes caused by human activity are already happening and it is necessary to adapt to it, so adaptation and mitigation are two sides of the same problem and, therefore, they have to be dealt with together.

Thereby, building wind power generating units incapable of enduring high intensity winds in places where this is a likely scenario is an inefficient mitigation measure exactly because it lacks in adaptation as its towers might simply break. The same happens for hydropower plants built in places where the rainfall regime tends to become adverse or urban areas and transport systems in places where there are projected higher risks of floods, just to mention a few examples.

Regarding the costs of actions to face the climate issue, no regret policies are measures that would generate net social benefits whether or not there is climate change. No-regrets opportunities for greenhouse gas emissions reduction are defined as those options whose benefits such as reduced energy costs and reduced emissions of local/regional pollutants equal or exceed their costs to society, excluding the benefits of avoided climate change.
The concept of no-regret refers to the fact that there are interventions that improve some structures’ resilience to climate impacts or that reduce GHG emissions and, at the same time, optimize the use of financial resources.

*Resilience* is the capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning and transformation.

A little known concept outside the climate change debate is CCS (Carbon capture and storage). According to the IPCC (2014b), CCS is process in which a relatively pure stream of carbon dioxide (CO2) from industrial and energy-related sources is separated (captured), conditioned, compressed and transported to a storage location for long-term isolation from the atmosphere.

*Negative net emissions*, also according to the IPCC (2014b), “is achieved when, as result of human activities, more greenhouse gases (GHGs) are sequestered or stored than are released into the atmosphere”. By combining CCS techniques to biofuel production and consumption – whose carbon molecules are from recent photosynthesis, that is, from carbon dioxide coming from the atmosphere – it is possible to obtain negative net emissions.

An important concept used in this chapter, as it focuses on cities and urban investments, is the concept of *lock in*, meaning “a path dependence, which is the generic situation where decisions, events or outcomes at one point in time constrain adaptation, mitigation or other actions or options at a later point in time” (IPCC, 2014b). One example is a situation where there is an investment decision in road networks, with viaducts and other infrastructure systems that require high amounts of financial resources. Due to indebtedness and the impossibility of raising new funds for urban mobility after the implementation of that decision, adopting an alternative solution to transport passengers – one that has less environmental impacts – becomes unfeasible.

Future climate projections developed for Brazil’s Third National Communication to UNFCCC show a warmer climate for all South America until the end of the 20th century. The higher increases are estimated for the north and center regions of Brazil, for all seasons, also extending to east and south regions. By the end of the century, this heat peak can reach 8°C in the Amazon. Regarding rainfall, projections indicate a drier climate in summer for most of Brazil, particularly for the north and northeast regions, and an increase of rainfall for the south and southeast regions (Brasil, 2015c).
3 CITY CONTRIBUTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND POTENTIAL ACTIONS TO REDUCE IT

The World, and particularly Brazilian population is increasingly concentrated in urban centers. Human activities generate GHG in the process of supplying demands from this population, whether these activities are carried out within or outside cities. Urban planning and city management have, increasingly, a significant level of interference in future scenarios of climate change as they influence GHG emissions sources, directly or indirectly, in a very significant way.

As a reference, Brazilian total emissions in 2012 were 1,284 (Tera-grams, or millions of tons) of carbon dioxide and other GHG (converted in terms of the amount of CO2 that would create the same amount of warming). Seventeen per cent of these emissions come from burning fossil fuel for transport and mobility. Poorly planned cities, with several unoccupied urban spaces (due to real estate speculation); inefficient public transport systems; and an urban network connected mainly by roads contributed strongly to these trends.

In its fifth report, IPCC predicts that integrated urban planning, transit based development – to improve its connectivity, origin and destination accessibility, availability of alternative transportation options, including mass transport – as well as more compact urban formats – that favor cycling and walking as a transportation option – can together promote modal shift (IPCC, 2014a). This orientation, at a global level, can reduce transport related emissions by 20% to 50% compared to the 2050 estimates (even considering increases in demand for transport and mobility).

The perspective of GHG emissions reduction caused by changes in the cities and transport modal planning has an even higher technical potential of reduction. For countries that can potentially produce and use biofuels and that can produce electricity from biomass, it is possible to envision negative emission scenarios.

Negative emissions happen when vegetation with potential to be used in the energy sector absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through photosynthesis and, when it is used to generate energy, the carbon dioxide generated by combustion (and fermentation processes, in the case of biofuels) is stored through the use of CSS technologies. Applied to the urban context, this could translate into a modal optimization scenario, privileging electrical collective transport (metro, trolley or plug-in buses, etc.) and electric taxis. Electricity could be generated on the cities’ fringes with a very low level of emissions, due to the use of ethanol and bagasse, for example, capturing carbon dioxide through CCS technologies. Besides reducing GHG emissions, that would also dramatically reduce other polluting gases or indirect pollutant emissions that are nowadays responsible for serious public health issues in urban centers.

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5. The urban population in 2030 is expected to be more than 60% of the total population (Undesa, 2014). In Brazil, 2010 Census indicated an urban population above 84% and urban population is expected to increase compared to rural. Available at: <http://goo.gl/0ekYQy>. Accessed in: April 2016.
6. MCTI (2016). Estimativas Anuais de Emissões de GEE.
The positive impact from changes in the energy matrix regarding the cities operation can be intensified if there is an efficiency increase in energy usage. Besides mobility, several other city components compete for the same energy sources, such as buildings and street lighting.

There are several possibilities to improve the power grid and street lighting of cities, particularly with the installation of smart grids. These smart power grids feature a high degree of automation that improves, significantly, operational efficiency and performance. Also, they enable small providers to connect to the system, fostering the dissemination of renewable energy sources, as photovoltaic or aeolian generation systems, in perfect harmony with the power grid. Some cities have adopted simpler measures, such as the replacement of traditional bulbs, with high impact in electric power consumption.

As for buildings, there is a substantial work to be done in terms of environmental comfort and sustainable architecture. Natural lighting must be used at a maximum level, avoiding turning light bulbs on unnecessarily. The façades exposed to sunlight should be planned to receive light, to heat water and to generate electricity through photocells. Developing buildings in a bioclimatic sustainable way provides substantial reduction on emissions, and if we consider long-term gains, turns the investment feasible, as the necessary investment in planning and constructions will return in a reasonable length of time of use of the building.

However, as the user is normally not the same as the builder, public intervention can correct this distortion between constructors optimization choices and building users interests, in addition to potentially correct information asymmetries, by persuading users to choose more efficient edifications and by enabling these choices through financing and tax differentiation. Since 2003, the Brazilian government initiative “National Program for Energy Efficiency of Buildings – Procel Edifica” promotes the rational use of energy in buildings. Such initiatives, if mandatory for public buildings and/or if incorporated in municipal codes have an immense potential considering that the energy consumption of buildings corresponds to 45% of the country’s total invoiced consumption. A new building tends to last several decades, or even more than one century, and its inefficiency causes economical and environmental losses. Retrofit works aiming at a better energy performance are not always viable and, generally, imply in larger investments than those necessary during the construction stage. This lock in situation can only be avoided in a willingly way by the involved players or systematically by municipal powers, through command and control instruments, economic incentives, or both.

7. See: <http://goo.gl/E0NFSk>.
Cities, particularly the Brazilian ones, have plenty of lock in cases. If decisions of building bridges, tunnels, subway lines and other high cost urban interventions are taken without the appropriate planning and lacking integration with the overall urban functioning, these will not, probably, be easily reversed or corrected in a reasonable timeframe. Projections and future scenario exercises for Brazilian cities demonstrate that, beyond the classic matters of accessibility and integration to the urban fabric, inclusion of marginal areas and site setting, issues on resilience and emissions reduction/optimization have to be considered in the planning and execution of large constructions.

This integrated planning must include not only emissions optimization but, also, the optimization of travel time, of infrastructure access to all that need it to exercise their rights, as the right to urban mobility, as well as to establish resilience to possible climate hazards.

Classical mitigation policies include “carbon pricing”. In the cap and trade mechanism, for example, there is taxation on GHG emissions or an emission cap that can generate credits for reductions under the set goal or that can be compensated by acquiring credits for emissions above the defined cap.

This kind of policy is usually defined at federal or regional level, as local action for limiting emissions can cause what is known as leakage – emissions stop in one place to appear in another, having the same impact on the atmosphere and on climate. In addition to not contributing to mitigating climate change, this can also have an undesired impact on cities and regional development, as it is illustrated in cases of states competing for investments through tax exemption, in a sort of predatory competition.

However, there are some exceptions as the Tokyo’s reductions market, which is based on defining emissions caps for large commercial buildings and industrial facilities within the metropolitan area. This market is distinguished by the fact that it is, in reality, an energy efficiency project (at this moment, they use generic emissions factors that do not specify the energy or heat source; Icap, 2016). Tokyo’s market also focuses on companies’ competitiveness, by publishing a ranking of reductions results.

In Brazil there is already the legal provision of the Brazilian Emission Reduction Market (MRE), since law no. 12,187/2009, which created the National Climate Change Policy, was established. However, this market has not been regulated yet, thus there is no emission cap, of any kind, set. At state level, on the other hand, there was a proliferation of laws, some setting goals, some others openly programmatic and symbolic, i.e. with a commitment to the intention not to the result.
One of the main barriers to establish a carbon market in Brazil is the lack of knowledge of the federal, state and municipal governments on emissions by emitters. Currently, there is no national or sub-national policy in force to control emissions and that could create an emission reduction market.

Aiming at debating quantification methodologies for emissions (inventories) and at organizing sub-national initiatives related to climate changes, the Federative Articulation Center for Climate (NAFC)\(^8\) was created. Currently, this center congregates just state and federal governments, not having yet the capillarity to deal with municipalities or metropolitan areas.

At federal level, there is a project that analyses GHG mitigation options for key sectors of the Brazilian economy, funded by public funds and by the *Global Environmental Facility* (GEF)\(^9\) and implemented by the Brazilian government in collaboration with Unep. This project, called Mitigation Options for Economic Key Sectors, uses a calculated general balance model linked to sectoral partial balance models that feed one another creating a low carbon scenario that optimizes, in an integrated way, emissions reductions and economic performance (via emissions pricing). Therefore, the sector optimum, in this respect, is not the real economical optimum. The latter, in turn, depends on the interactions among the different sectors.

By optimizing emissions for the whole country economy, the project can reach scenarios of higher emissions for specific sectors, compared to previous sector studies. This happens because it is important to know the demand created between sectors, such as, for example, by the energy sector on the agricultural sector due to a possible need for biofuels (and in consequence the demand for energy from agriculture). Finally, this project also maps available and potentially available technologies in different scenarios that can be used to optimize GHG emissions.

To study possible options for mitigation and setting scenarios on solid knowledge bases are a precondition, but not sufficient, to build a future with less greenhouse emissions. The main barrier is to turn this optimized scenario, created by academic methods, into reality. Even if we set a scenario only with no-regret cost-effective actions there is a reason why they are not voluntarily implemented and we can assume that there is a transaction cost not identified in the theoretical exercise. The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation is expected to present the study’s results by the end of 2016. They have the potential of initiating debates among the federation’s entities on the strategy to be adopted for optimizing global climate change mitigation. That is because, as seen before, several actions are the responsibility of cities and states, whereas others are the responsibility of the federal government.

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\(^8\) Further information about NAFC on: <http://goo.gl/82vDVc>.

\(^9\) Multilateral fund for environmental sustainability actions.
It is unlikely that specific GHG reduction goals for cities will be discussed in Habitat III or in other forums, considering that most countries defend that emission reduction commitments are to be debated under the UNFCCC. What the New Urban Agenda presents as an innovation is a dialogue with IPCC guidelines starting on the principles it presents to the future of cities: compactness, connectedness, inclusion and integration. The planning and management of cities designed under these assumptions will lead to a more sustainable and less GHG emitter urban development.

A principle in the Framework Convention that developing countries are very fond of prescribes that the parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. Under the UNFCC, based on the principle of “common responsibility, but differentiated” a resource flux for climate change to be funded by developed countries, mounting to USD 100 billion per year, has been agreed on.

This resource will be managed by an autonomous institution, created for this purpose and called Green Climate Fund – GCF. As these resources can only be accessed by financial system entities to be accredited by national governments, it is paramount that local governments specify to federal governments which financial entities have better served their financing purposes.

City managers have to perceive resources from GCF as well as from the previous multilateral instrument – the Climate Investment Fund – CIF or other national funds resources, as Fundo Clima, in Brazil – as an opportunity to complement financing for infrastructure work that, besides solving sanitation and mobility issues, also reduce GHG emissions or make the cities more resilient to climate, as we will see in the next section.

4 CITIES IMPACTS, VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate changes do not happen linearly around the world and they can present opposite traits in different places, as such increased frequency and intensity of floods in a region at the same time that another region deals with gradual increase of drought. In both cases there is an increase of the system’s energy but, due, to the complexity of the climate system, the interactions with the physical environment and vegetation, manifest in different ways in different parts of the planet.
In many cases, it is expected that there will be a continuity in climate trends and an intensification of current episodes of extreme weather, thus trends of past meteorological data can help predict future impacts. However, as explained above, the complexity of the climate system interactions can lead to disruptive results, as hurricanes where they previously did not occur or a change of climatic data trajectory.

Climate scenarios and future impacts modeling are being used in current projections in order to anticipate the probability of occurrence of these events, to enable governments to act preventively.

Global climate modeling is a recently developed field, characterized both by the large number of natural variables in co-interaction and by the uncertainty on future behavior of anthropogenic variables. The most important of those are the ones related to greenhouse gases level on the atmosphere (Brasil, 2015c).

And this is one of the greatest difficulties faced by managers at the time of decision-making: is it reasonable to invest public or private resources in something uncertain? There is already consensus in the debate and literature that, even in the face of uncertainty due to the magnitude and the spatial distribution of the climate phenomena, it is necessary to take actions both to reduce the vulnerability and to increase the resilience of cities. Prognostics of impacts related to future climate change show trends that can guide adaptation strategies.

The most vulnerable cities are in developing countries. The accelerated urbanization process that took place in the 20th century caused a huge migration to cities. At the same time governments were not able to provide adequate public services and urban infrastructure. This process caused a considerable infrastructure deficit and a high level of occupation of high environmental risks areas. The result is extremely vulnerable urban communities mostly located in informal settlements already under the stress of climate variability and extreme climate events.

The existing sanitation deficit, including urban drainage, in these cities, is already a population vulnerability factor, regardless of climate change. Climate change leverages this vulnerability. Access to safe drinking water and sanitation, correct management of solid waste and rainwater drainage are a permanent agenda in big cities, which demand increased attention due to climate risks related to lack of investments.

In situations where there is an increase in projected rainfall or its concentration in episodes of heavy rain, it is necessary to think about drainage and water absorption into the soil in a different way. Similarly, other sanitation works have to be resilient to rain in order to prevent slurry or sewage overflow and drinking water contamination.
The same situation is true for precarious housing in natural disaster risk areas. The likelihood of landslides and floods alter in face of unfavorable climate prognostics, but there are already risks in the present situation. In these cases, investments are already entirely justified and they are also a social priority. There is, then, an already set climate change adaptation basic agenda for these cities, regardless of scientific knowledge or uncertainty level on climate predictions and related impacts.

Cities with a participative urban planning process, democratic management, adequate housing, sanitation services, as well as quality road systems and services of civil protection and defense, are inherently more resilient to most climate change impacts (Oliveira e Moreira, 2006 apud Brasil, 2016b).

Urban development policies can be one of the most effective city-related strategies of adaptation to climate change, mainly through a systemic approach to deal with current problems at the same time as they anticipate future problems. Studies on megacities, vulnerabilities and adaptation to climate change in the Greater São Paulo area (Nobre, 2011; Marengo, Valverde e Obregon, 2013; Martine, Ojima e Marandola Júnior, 2015; Brasil, 2015c) propose adaptation strategies to face a possible scenario of an increasing frequency of heavy rainfall and natural disasters of hydrometeorological origin, aggravated by the effect of city urbanization.

The study carried out by the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE/PR) consisted of identifying some adaptation strategies related to projections of scenarios worked on in climate modeling, going from simple measures such as risk warning systems to infrastructure projects such as the construction of dams and dykes. These strategies should serve as a reference for Brazilian society and public managers aiming at not only reducing any negative impacts but also seizing the opportunities that will arise. It is crucial that future climate prognostics are incorporated in the planning of urban infrastructure, not only to avoid lock in situations related to lifelong emissions reductions, but also because of potential costs of a poorly adapted structure. Similar to the paradigm of action versus inaction related to costs to prevent climate change, there is the paradigm of investing in infrastructure adaptation or paying the price of likely losses caused by climate factors on poorly adapted systems. As previously stated, infrastructure projects are typical lock in cases, as once a bridge is built it is very unlikely that there will be resources available to rebuild it or to rebuild its foundations to improve its strength.

IPCC AR5 report (2013; 2014) recommends disaster risk management and climate change adaptation to be a priority in all countries. Building capacities for cities to handle climate change is a structural condition for a coping plan on the issue. Brazil recently launched its first National Adaptation Plan, a set of eleven high-priority sector adaptation strategies for the country’s sustainable development.
These strategies discuss the main vulnerabilities and the management of each issue in face of climate change to present adaptation measures for increased resilience. In the Cities Strategy, a key aspect is the intersectoral and intergovernmental coordination. Within the Brazilian federative pact, municipalities have budget and tax autonomy and are responsible for developing urban policy.

The priority guidelines to promote adaptation according to the National Adaptation Plan are: *i*) promoting federative coordination; *ii*) including climate change adaptation in the rehabilitation of consolidated urban areas; *iii*) including climate change adaptation in promoting urbanization of precarious settlements *iv*) including climate change adaptation in social housing; and *v*) strengthening planning processes for urban expansion, aiming at preventing the occurrence of natural disasters and the emergence of risks; among others.

It can be said that the largest areas of Brazilian cities are already being affected by climate extremes, including heavy rains and dry periods, that can trigger natural disasters, such as floods, mass movements and drought. Assessing present vulnerability and the presence or lack of adaptation strategies to face these extremes can act as a test bed for defining future adaptation strategies, against a scenario of extreme rainfall and temperature increases.

### 5 CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS FOR BRAZILIAN CITIES

The planning and management of cities that are already being somehow impacted by climate extremes and rising sea levels requires strategies for decision-making. However, due to its multidisciplinary aspect, among other factors, it is difficult to select the appropriate approaches, methods and tools to conduct studies and, even more, to assess and compare them.

In the urban context, adaptation can still be seen as a new challenge, especially when incorporating it into the planning and management of cities. In other words, how climate temporal variability and uncertainties, as an example, should be considered in future climate projections and in the vulnerability assessment of the city infrastructure. Although studies on climate risks in cities are still limited, cities around the world are trying to evaluate the potential impact of climate change so they can adapt. According to the Second Global Research Program on Vulnerability, Impacts and Adaptation: Responding to Climate Provia, adaptation involves risk reduction, opportunities seeking and capacity building of nations, regions, cities, private sector, communities, individuals and natural systems to deal with climate impacts, as well as to mobilize this capacity through the implementation of decisions and actions.

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10. Provia is a global initiative that aims at providing direction and coherence at international level for research on vulnerability, impacts and adaptation. The Provia Secretariat is currently hosted by Unep in Nairobi. See: [www.unep.org/provia/](http://www.unep.org/provia/).
According to IBGE (2015), there are 5,565 municipalities in Brazil, most of them with less than 100,000 inhabitants. However, there are also the large urban centers which reached or passed 1.5 million inhabitants. Listed below are the largest Brazilian cities, that is, the most populous:

1 – São Paulo (São Paulo) - 11,967,825 inhabitants;
2 – Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro) - 6,476,631 inhabitants;
3 – Salvador (Bahia) - 2,921,087 inhabitants;
4 – Brasília (Distrito Federal) - 2,914,830 inhabitants;
5 – Fortaleza (Ceará) - 2,591,188 inhabitants;
6 – Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) - 2,502,557 inhabitants;
7 – Manaus (Amazonas) - 2,057,711 inhabitants;
8 – Curitiba (Paraná) - 1,879,355 inhabitants;
9 – Recife (Pernambuco) - 1,617,183 inhabitants;
10 – Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul) - 1,476,867 inhabitants.

To identify cities with vulnerable or natural disaster risk areas (of hydrometeorological origin such as floods, droughts and landslides), we used the methodology developed by Debortoli et al. (2015; 2016) and Camarinha et al. (2015). This methodology considers a combination of climatic, environmental and socio-economic data in densely populated areas now and in the future, with a spatial resolution of up to 20 km, by 2100. These future climate scenarios were derived from future climate projection downscaling from the global model HadGEM2-ES by using the regional model Eta for RCP8.5 scenario,\(^{11}\) that has little mitigation actions effectiveness, where emissions remain high (Chou et al., 2014a; b). This methodology allows mapping natural disaster risks occurring presently in Brazil, as well as researching how this risk may evolve in the future in the whole country.

In relation to flash floods, floods, and waterlogging, the country’s south region might suffer from a considerable increase in vulnerability in the future. Also the south and east of Mato Grosso do Sul state, the region of the city of Botucatu in São Paulo state and the surroundings of Campinas, also in the state of São Paulo; the border between the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais; the coastal strip from Sergipe to Natal, in the state of Rio Grande do Norte; the north

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11. RCP8.5 is the most extreme scenario for the fifth IPCC report between the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), scenarios that include temporal series of emissions and concentration for the complete set of GHGs, aerosols and chemically active gases, as well as use and coverage of land. Each RCP provides just one of the many possible scenario that would lead to its radiative forcing (8.5 W/m\(^2\)) by 2100 (RCP8.5).
of the state of Ceará, a portion of the state of Pará close to the border with the state of Amapá, the state of Acre and some narrow strips that cross the states of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo, mostly close to mountain areas. All these previously mentioned places can already be presently classified as at high or very high vulnerability and they also have a recurring historic of floods, fast floods and waterlogging with high impacts on its population and likely to become even more vulnerable in the future.

The regions worth mentioning in terms of getting more critical in the future are the center and southeast of the state of Santa Catarina, the east of the state of Paraná; the north coast of the state of São Paulo and the Mantiqueira mountains, particularly on the border with the state of Minas Gerais; and a small territory that covers the mountain region of Rio de Janeiro and the adjacent coast. These places are characterized as mass movement related disaster scenarios and there is strong evidence that there might be an intensification of occurrence of such disasters in the future. A large portion of Pará and the west of Maranhão states fit into the same context, probably having an even higher vulnerability increment, reaching a 30% increase. Cities along the coast from Rio de Janeiro to Rio Grande do Norte states were identified as being among the most vulnerable at this moment.

The largest cities in Brazil are along the coast, holding high levels of vulnerability to floods and mass movements. Additionally, rain extremes have risen in the last fifty years and they tend to increase even more according to future climate projections for these areas.

A larger number of cities will be vulnerable to drought in the future, particularly in the Southeast, Midwest and Northeast regions and the Amazon. Droughts as the ones registered in the Northeast in 2012 to 2015, in the Southeast in 2014/2015 and in the Amazon in 2015 exposed the vulnerabilities of cities such as São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, João Pessoa, Fortaleza and Manaus, where water shortage caused a water crisis. It is necessary to give thought now to adaptation strategies to be able to face possible future problems.

6 DEBATE: THE IMPORTANCE OF CITIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

As presented in the previous sections, cities have a strategic role in the discussion on climate change. On the one hand, changes in the design of cities, transportation modals and components of the urban fabric can directly impact reducing greenhouse gases production. On the other hand, cities, especially in developing countries, have a higher level of vulnerability and natural disaster risks. The last IPCC report, AR5 (2013, 2014), recommends national risk management and climate change
adaptation to be a priority for all countries. Habitat III, the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, includes the issue transversally in its agenda. It also highlights the main related issues in its Policy Unit 8 – Urban Ecology and Resilience – in which urban resilience, ecosystems and resources management and climate change and disaster risk management are treated.

In Brazil, as well as in other countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa, due to the degree of socioeconomic inequality and access to urbanized land, there is a strong correlation between urban poverty, irregular settlements and natural disaster risk areas. The planning of cities and of its infrastructure has to consider present and future climate issues. A good management of urban land use and occupation linked to investment in basic infrastructure are a first step for cities adaptation and vulnerability reduction.

In the Brazilian case, there are several ongoing studies, plans and policies. Since 2003, the federal government has been working close to the municipalities on urbanization programs for precarious human settlements and in preventing and eradicating risks, aiming at improving habitability conditions and its integration to the urban fabric. Since 2011, when the National Center for Natural Disaster Monitoring and Alerts (Cemaden) and the National Plan for Risk Reduction and Disaster Response were established, the country has an integrated policy on natural disaster risk management. The impact of climate change on the territory has been studied through scenarios from climate change and future impact models that allow analyzing trends and anticipating actions. The Ministry of the Environment is coordinating the adaptation policy following the National Adaptation Plan.

Some municipalities, such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, have also started similar actions. The mayor of Rio de Janeiro is currently leading a movement, with more than eighty large cities participating, to act on climate change. The movement is called C40\(^\text{12}\) and it has a natural disaster-monitoring center.

The Brazilian experience, at local or national level, can be a reference for other developing countries with a similar history and realities. Cooperation among nations and cities and cooperation among cities from Latin America, Asia and Africa to exchange experiences and information can be an important path to build less vulnerable cities for the poor. But there is still much to be done. Guidelines for cities for the next twenty years will be in the New Urban Agenda, outcome of Habitat III. With the guidelines and funding made available, it is expected that local managers and national governments will act together to build cities that are less vulnerable, more resilient, safer and with lower GHG emissions.

\(^\text{12}\) See: [http://www.c40.org].
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COMPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

Part 3
Social Inclusion: participatory democracy and the right to the city
1 THE CITIES WE HAVE

The cities we have nowadays in the world are far from being fair places. Regardless of their location in the globe, they are the clear expression of the growing inequality and violence suffered in our societies in which profit and economic calculations are more important than well-being, dignity, needs and rights of people and nature.

The concentration of economic and political power is a phenomenon that gathers exploitation, exclusion and discrimination in which spatial dimensions are clearly visible: dual cities of luxury and misery; gentrification processes that displace and evict traditional communities and low income groups; millions of houses and apartments than remain empty while millions of people don’t have a decent place to live; rural workers without land and land without workers, while this same land being subject to the abuses committed by the agribusiness’, mining and other extractive industries and large-scale projects.

Thus, the conditions and rules presented in our societies are condemning more than half of the world’s population to live in poverty. Inequalities are growing fast both in the so-called “developed countries” and in the “developing” ones. What are the real opportunities that we are actually presenting to the youth, if, as showed by the data gathered by the UN, 85% of new jobs in the world are created within the informal economy?

At the same time, the spatial segregation of social groups, the lack of access to housing, to basic public services, to adequate infrastructure as well as today’s housing policies are generating the material and symbolic conditions to favor the reproduction of marginalization and disadvantage of several sectors of the population. The less favored areas in the city (usually called “irregular and/or informal settlements”) are the home of at least 1/3 of the people living in the Global South. In most part of African countries and in some countries located in Latin America

1. This chapter is partly based in a paper published on The nature of cities (October, 2015) and also in: The just city essays – 26 visions for urban equity, inclusion and opportunity, edited by Toni L. Griffin, Ariella Cohen y David Maddox (2015). Available at: <goo.gl/gHbHl9>.
2. President of Habitat International Coalition.
and Southeast Asia such percentage can reach 60% or more, as in the case of Central Africa Republic, Chad, Nigeria, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Benin, Mali, Haiti and Bangladesh. It is also known that not having a place to live and a recognized address results in the denial of other economic, social, cultural and political rights (such as education, health, the right to vote, to access information and participation, among others). What kind of citizens and democracy are we producing in these divided cities?

Everybody knows that, especially during the decades of strict implementation of neoliberal policies (conceived during the Washington Consensus), many governments have abandoned their responsibilities concerning territorial urban planning, letting “the market” play free, leading to the private appropriation of public spaces, with almost no restriction when it comes to the real estate speculation and the generation of exponential profits. As a result, in almost all countries the price of land has multiplied several times while at the same time the minimum wage has remained practically the same (with a consequential reduction on real purchasing power), making the access to adequate housing impossible for a great part of the population, including those who have a formal job and a minimum wage established by law.

2 THE CITIES WE WANT: RIGHT TO THE CITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR ALL

2.1 Background and advances

The academic concept of the right to the city was initially formulated by the French sociologist and geographer Henri Lefebvre in the end of the 1960s, at a time when he was a professor at the University of Nanterre (we now know that it is not a coincidence the fact that the university was built near a slum that was inhabited, mainly, by immigrants – and it having been the cradle of the May 68 Movement). Conceptually, this collective and complex right implies the need to democratize both urban management and society, not only by providing access to the existing rights, but also transforming and renewing the city life. In this regard, one should recover the social function of property and implement the right of participation in decision-making.

At the same time, the advancement of popular urbanization was clearly visible in many Latin-American cities, as the product of the massive migration from the countryside to the city linked in particular with the national industrialization process that, with different rhythms and variances, was being developed in many countries during the interwar period.

The demands of access to land, housing and basic services were essential in the gradual creation of an urban reform movement which, inspired on the principles and advancements of the land reform, gained strength until leading, in the end
of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, to constitutional reforms such as the ones that took place in Brazil and Colombia. The social mobilization and practice of professionals coming from the architecture, planning, social service, sociology and law fields among others, as well as the territorial presence of religious institutions and the academic debate with regards to the tensions and concerns at that moment, were some of the key factors that have been translated into proposals for legal frameworks, institutions, policies and programs that aimed to link the urban policies’ guidelines with the demands for social justice.

In this regard, both the urban reform laws in Colombia (Law n° 9 from 1989 and Law n° 388 from 1997, respectively) and the “City Statute” in Brazil (Law n°10.257 from 2001) have established the social and ecologic function of the property and the city as guiding principles of the urban development. To achieve such goal, they include series of guidelines, tools and frameworks about the use of land, regulation of private property, legalization of land tenure, promotion of urban development and redistribution of collective costs and benefits of urbanization, as well as measures to assure the democratic management (participatory management) of the city and economic, taxation and financial policies related to territorial and urban planning.

Therefore, it is not by chance that in October 2000, during the World Habitat Day, more than 350 representatives from urban social movements, indigenous peoples and women’s social organizations, residents’ associations and housing cooperatives, and human rights activists from 35 countries gathered in Mexico City during a week to exchange experiences and build proposals to reach more inclusive, democratic, sustainable, productive, educational, safe, healthy, and diverse cities.

With the slogan “the city we dream about”, the first World Assembly of Inhabitants advanced producing inputs which were extremely relevant to the elaboration of the World Charter for the Right to the City, a process developed within the World Social Forum between 2003 and 2005. During the last decade, this document has inspired several similar debates as well as the elaboration of other collective documents about the city we want such as the Mexico City Charter for the Right to the City (2010). Meanwhile, many of these proposals were included in documents signed by national governments (among which we highlight Ecuador’s New Constitution, sanctioned in 2008), as well as by some international institutions (such as UNESCO and UN Habitat).

In parallel to these processes and many times as part of the dynamics that provide mutual feedback, local governments have created plans of actions, commitments and milestones among which the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City (2000) and the Gwangju (South Korea) Human Rights Charter (2012), should be mentioned.
A few years ago, the Ibero-American heads of States, in turn, decided to instruct their Urban Planning and Housing Ministries to “promote the enshrined Right to the City through the generation of public policies that assure access to land, adequate housing, infrastructure and social services and to sufficient and sustainable mechanisms and funding sources” (Santiago Declaration, 2007). Worldwide, the right to the city has also been resumed as the official slogan of the 5th World Urban Forum that took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, at the end of March 2010 and many of its fundamental principles were included in the Charter of Rio that was created at that moment.

2.2 The strategic foundations of the right to the city

Considering these processes, debates and documents as milestones, we understand that the chance of advancing toward a fair urban society is based on the following six strategic principles of the right to the city, as defined in the Mexico City Charter:

1) Full exercise of human rights in the city

A city in which all people (independently of age, gender, economic or marital status, ethnical origin, religious or political preference, sexual orientation, place of residence in the city or any other such factor) should be able to enjoy and realize all fundamental economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, ensuring dignity and individual well-being through equity and social justice.

To reach such a goal, actions prioritizing attention to individuals and communities with special needs and living in social vulnerability such as the homeless; people with disabilities or suffering from psychiatric disorders or chronic diseases; heads of low income families; elderly; refugees, migrants and people living in risk areas should take place.

National, regional and local governments should primarily take responsibility for the definition of legal frameworks, public policies and other administrative and judicial measures in order to respect, protect and assure these rights, in compliance with the principles of allocation of the maximum of available resources and no retrogression, according to the human rights commitments included in international treaties.

Many cities around the world such as Rosario in Argentina, Bogota in Colombia, Graz in Austria, Edmonton in Canada, Nagpur in India, Thies in Senegal and Gwangju in South Korea, among many others, have declared themselves as human right cities, overcoming specific programs and seeking to establish a human rights’ overarching framework in the daily life and public institutions. Of course they face many contradictions and challenges, but they also represent a vision and willingness that could well serve as an inspiration to other cities.
2) The social function of The City, Of Land And Of Property

The distribution and regulation of the territory should guarantee the equitable usufruct of the goods, services and opportunities offered by the city. In other words, it concerns the construction of a city prioritizing the collectively-defined public interest, assuring an environmentally-balanced and socially-fair use of the territory.

Legal, fiscal and planning frameworks should be implemented, with the necessary social control, aiming to avoid processes of real estate speculation and gentrification both in central and peripheral areas. This includes progressive taxation for empty and under-used plots, houses and buildings; obligations for construction, urbanization and changes in the use of land; the capture of urban surplus and land-value capital; land expropriation for the creation of special zones of social and cultural interest, in particular aiming to protect families and low income communities and groups in situations of vulnerability); concession of special use for social housing; special adverse possession and legalization of self-built neighborhoods (in terms of assurance of security of tenure and provision of basic services and infrastructure), among many other tools that are already in use in cities within countries such as Brazil, Colombia, France and the United States, among others.

The effective and constant use of these measures is obviously threatened by both the reaction of many large owners and real estate speculation and the lack of knowledge and/or extreme caution of public managers, and even of the cultural barriers that are built and reinforced by the discourses dominating the media.

3) Democratic management of the city and the territory

Inhabitants should be able to fully participate at decision-making, formulation and implementation of public policies and budgets, including territory planning and the control of urban processes. It concerns the strengthening of institutionalized decision-making spaces (and not only for citizen consultation) in order to realize monitoring, evaluation and reorientation of public policies.

This includes experiences of participatory budget (developed in more than three thousand cities in the world), evaluation of regional impact (especially from social and economic effects of public and private projects and mega-projects, counting with the participation of the affected communities in every step of the process), and participatory planning (including master plans, territorial and urban development plans, urban mobility plans, etc.).

Many other tools are being used in several cities, from the carrying out of free elections, citizen accountability, popular initiatives for law and planning (including the regulation for the concession, suspension and revocation of urban licenses), the revocation of mandates and referendums, to the creation of neighborhood and community committees, public audiences, negotiation roundtables and deliberative councils.
Many countries still have however, centralizing national governments (and in several cases not democratic governments) whose local authorities are appointed, not elected, and participatory processes in decision-making are inhibited. On the contrary, there are also important decentralization processes that delegate functions and responsibilities, but not public resources of technical and operative capabilities. Yet, the participation spaces that were created are in general subject to good will and political changes, becoming fragile and periodical.

4) Democratic production of The city and in the city

It refers to the productive capacity of its inhabitants, mainly of those coming from marginalized and low income sectors, promoting and supporting the social production of habitat and the development of activities of social and solidary economy. It implies the right to produce the city, but also the right to a productive habitat for all, opening possibilities for income generation for families and groups, strengthening popular economy and not only profit which is more and more monopolized by a few large companies (in general the transnational ones).

It is known that in the South, at least half of the inhabited spaces exist because of the initiatives and efforts of their own residents (including, in most cases, a protagonist role of women), with a minimum or no support from governments or other actors. In many cases, these initiatives still have to face official barriers and bureaucracies considering that, instead of supporting such popular processes, many actual regulations are ignoring or even criminalizing individual and collective efforts to obtain a decent place to live.

Nowadays, just a few countries – among them we should highlight Uruguay, Brazil and Mexico – have already established a system of legal, financial and administrative tools to support the so-called “social production of the habitat” (including the access to urban lands, credits, subsidies and technical assistance); but even in these cases, more than 90% of the budget is allocated to the private sector to build “social housing”, making it economically inaccessible to more than half of the population.

5) Sustainable and responsible management of common goods (natural, energetic, heritage, cultural and historic goods) of the city and its surroundings

Both inhabitants and governments should guarantee a responsible relation with nature, in such a way that it is possible that all people, families and communities live with dignity, in equal conditions, but without affecting the natural areas and ecological reserves, heritage, other cities or future generations.

As we know, human life and the life on urban settlements is only possible if we preserve all kinds of life everywhere. Urban life takes away most of the resources beyond the administrative boundaries of the city. Metropolitan areas, regions with
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Small cities, rural and agricultural areas, forests and watersheds are seriously affected by our behavior and urban lifestyle.

There is an urgent need to put into practice more strict environmental regulations; promote the protection of waters and rainwater harvesting; promote the use of technologies at an accessible price; prioritize multimodal and mass public transportation systems; assure the ecological production of food, the distribution based on proximity and the responsible consumption, obviously including reduction, reuse and recycling; among many other measures to guarantee long, medium and short term sustainability.

6) The democratic and equitable enjoyment of the city

Social coexistence should be reinforced through the recovery, expansion and improvement of public spaces aiming to allow encounters, recreation and creativity as well as social organization and the critical expression of ideas and political agendas. Lately, especially as a spatial and local consequence of neoliberal policies, great part of those spaces that are essential for the definition of urban and communitarian life have been neglected, abandoned, underused or, even worse, privatized: streets, squares, parks, auditoriums, multiuse rooms, community centers, etc.

The promotion of infrastructures and programs aiming to support cultural and recreational activities, especially those independently and self-managed with a strong participation of youth, low income groups and minorities is essential. Some of these measures are already in place in several countries, mainly as part of the implementation of community urbanization programs that, nevertheless, remain under the control of technical teams and usually prioritize physical aspects that lead to long and medium term public debt.

3 ACTUAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Therefore, there is no doubt that the right to the city brings elements that make the indivisibility and the interdependence of human rights more tangible. From the point of view of a concrete territory and the needs and aspirations of populations that suffer daily marginalization and spatial, economic, social, political and cultural segregation, this new collective and complex right poses challenges that overcome the fragmented academic thinking, professional specialties, and short term sectorial governmental action (mainly managed by electoral and partisan logics).

At the same time, it expresses the urgent need to democratize the decision-making spaces for the collective management of the common good, as an essential condition to achieve respect and realization of human rights for all.

For the judiciary sector, the challenge is not less than a truly change of paradigm. It is crucial to count on people and institutions that are committed with
the advance towards the development of a new urban law that resumes and makes prevail the principles of the right to the city. So far, there are plenty of documented cases in which urban rules and tools that require decisive State action regarding market regulation to achieve the common good—and in particular the needs and rights of vulnerable groups—have faced a lack of political will or even the rejection and bureaucratic obstacles from the judiciary system, leading to the violation of human rights of millions of people in many countries.

As exposed in this paper, the right to the city is much more than a slogan or a utopic dream. The analyzed background, advances and barriers require special attention considering the actual processes in the international scenario.

At first, one should remember that the commitments made by the national governments during the UN General Assembly that took place in September 2015 in New York, as part of the 2030 Agenda, include among the 17 Sustainable Development Goals one that can be considered especially urban: “Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable”. The identified goals, in which their fulfillment will definitely require an active role of all instances of government and of other actors in the society, highlight that until 2030, one should:

- Ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums;
- Provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, people with disabilities and the elderly;
- Enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries;
- Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage;
- Significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations;
- Reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including paying special attention to air quality and municipal and other waste management;
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- Provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, the elderly and people with disabilities;

- Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning;

- Substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated policies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels;

- Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings using local materials.

Secondly, the preparatory process for the III UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (known as Habitat III) that will take place in Quito, Ecuador in October 2016, means an opportunity to advance the more specific contents to what will become the “New Urban Agenda”. In this milestone, many civil society organizations and networks of local governments have been mobilized during the last two years, both in official spaces and in others independently promoted to deepen debates, evaluate advances and challenges, and build common messages and action plans for the next decades.

As an international network which has the privilege, but also the huge responsibility to have actively participated in the two previous conferences (Habitat I in Vancouver, in 1976 and Habitat II in Istanbul, in 1996), HIC (Habitat International Coalition) has made public its concerns and proposals and has articulated different voices since the initial steps of this process in Medellin 2014, united around three large axes:

a) the need to keep a holistic and integral focus of the territory, not only limited to urban areas, evaluating the implementation of the commitments assumed by different actors as part of the Habitat Agenda (1996);

b) the responsibility to adopt a transversal and imperative human rights focus, according to international standards and advances in different cities and countries in the last 20 years; and,
c) the strong demand for a wide and substantial participation of non-State actors in the debates and decision-making processes, giving special importance to the voices of groups and people who are traditionally excluded.

Such demands have been echoed and have become more specific in the work promoted by the Global Platform for the Right to the City (GPR2C), formed by more than 250 civil society organizations, social movements, academics and local governments networks, including the National Forum for Urban Reform in Brazil, the Latin-American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO/CLACSO), United Cities and Local Governments’s Committee on Social Inclusion, Participatory Democracy and Human Rights, Habitat for Humanity, the Huairou Commission, the International Alliance of Inhabitants, the International Network of Social and Solidary Economy (RIPESS), Women and Habitat Network, Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI), Street Net International, WIEGO (Women in Informal Empoyment: Globalizing and Organizing) and HIC, among many others.

This platform was formally created in November 2014, but the background of mobilization and advances for the right to the city dates back to the 1st World Urban Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001. As such, the GPR2C has actively participated in the processes towards Habitat III, both inside and outside the official spaces. Among its more relevant activities it is worth mentioning its involvement in the regional and thematic preparatory events as well as the inclusion of contents in several declarations and documents. Yet, many of its representatives have integrated the groups of specialists in the many policy units, responsible for the elaboration of basic content to the Urban Agenda.

At the same time, regional autonomous and coordinated regional meetings have been promoted in Latin America, Europe and Asia aiming to amplify the mobilization, the debate and the elaboration of common proposals, in such a way to advance the agenda for the right to the city on local and national scales. Several experience exchanges have been made, as well as researches, compilations and analysis of relevant cases and recommendation for public policies and tools for democratic urban inclusive sustainable planning and management.

At this point of the process, one can affirm that the draft of the New Urban Agenda includes a general mention of the right to the city and many of its essential components such as: an integral vision of the territory; the respect for human rights and gender equity; the social function of the land and the capturing of surplus and land-value capital generated by urban development (although without specifying its destination); the assurance of substantial citizen and social participation in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies and budgets; the need of a greater inter-institutional coordination inside and between the different government instances; the recognition of the contributions coming from the
informal sector to the urban economy; and the commitment with a sustainable and responsible management of natural, energetic, heritage and cultural resources. One should also highlight the role of subnational and local governments in the task of advancing towards more inclusive, participatory, resilient and sustainable cities.

However, some limitations and contradictions are also mentioned and we hope they can be debated and overcome at the expected dialogue and negotiation spaces before the approval of the final text during the Quito Summit. Among them, we highlight:

a) A mistaken comparison between the concepts of “cities for all” and “right to the city”, showing the lack of knowledge of the theoretical, legal, program and social practices’ advances organized in different places worldwide;

b) A view which is supposed to be focused on people, but is repeating criteria of competitiveness and of the creation of an environment suitable for business in different parts of the text;

c) Not mentioning enough, the need to end with forced displacements and promote and assure the security of tenure of the place of residence and land, with special attention to those in vulnerable and marginal situations;

d) The lack of recognition of the social production of habitat as an option not only feasible, but actually majoritarian in great part of the cities located in the Global South, which is capable of mobilizing a wide range of actors and financial and non financial resources that significantly contribute to the national, regional and local economy, and that requires a coherent support system through normative, financial and technical assistance’s specific tools;

e) A very limited reference to the social and solidary economy without mentioning its role today for the social cohesion and in the fight against inequality and the reduction of the ecological footprint;

f) A limited and contradictory view of the public space excluding great part of communitarian equipment and infrastructure and auto-managed projects, ignoring its political and educational dimensions, balancing it with the promotion of cultural (but only that) diversity with the generation of income and increase in the value of property.

If we critically observe this retrospective, some important questions arise: what is new in this Urban Agenda in comparison with the Habitat Agenda? What transforming vision of the future can it offer? How can we assure that these commitments will be fulfilled?
Hundreds of cities and communities are testing a multicolor scale of possible utopias to the construction of more solidary and fair territories, considering the commons and the respect to the needs and rights of future generations. Millions of people and local governments require, today, in the whole world, the deepening of the values of the participatory, direct and communitarian democracy as a path to build equality, well-being and the peace we all need.

Will the New Urban Agenda be able to achieve a relevant role in the creation of this reality?

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PARTICIPATORY AND DEMOCRATIC BRAZILIAN CITIES?
REFLECTION ON THE EVE OF THE CONFERENCE HABITAT III¹

Francisco Comaru²

1 INTRODUCTION
The Brazil of social and land dilemmas and impasses and of human settlements policies still needs to be properly understood and deciphered, despite the myriad critical reflections and researches that have been carried out. Within a few decades of the 20th century, the country ceased to be an almost strictly (postcolonial) locus of agricultural activities to pose as another emergent in the group of newly urban-industrialized countries, member of the BRICS and of the G20, with all contradictions that joining a type of late peripheral capitalism entails for nations from the planet’s southern hemisphere.

With over 200 million inhabitants and more than 85% of the population living in cities, the territories exhibit (and conceal) their deep inequities, worthy of the slavery period. As dramatic as the historical phenomenon of poverty and misery, social injustice and territorial inequalities that progressively emerge as priority themes in the field of applied social science, of urban planning, housing, mobility and transport, and environmental sanitation. Inequalities in terms of gender, ethnicity and race, age, mental health and socioeconomic condition that reign supreme and challenge even the most progressive public policies successfully implemented in the last decades.

¹. This text was created from the author’s experiences in participatory processes in Brazil as a researcher and advisor of social movements, as a member of the Ipea team of research fellows for the production of the National Preparatory Report for Habitat III (2014-2015), and also from the systematization of data for Oxfam Brasil (2015). The author thanks Roberta Amanajas for the ideas exchanged in the beginning of the production of this text, as well as Ipea researchers Renato Balbim, Cleandro Krause, Vicente, colleagues from UFABC Silvia Passarelli, Silvana Zioni, Ricardo Moretti, Jeroen Klink and undergraduate and graduate students who have participated in the organization of the Challenges Regional Seminar Seminário for Habitat III.

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Contextual and structural reasons, in addition to local, regional and global factors, lie at the root of the problem. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge the effect of significant setbacks and challenges that presented themselves on a global scale. According to the British aid and development agency Oxfam\(^3\), based on data from Credit Suisse bank the world has become increasingly inequitable in the past few years. Approximately 1% of the global population holds more than 50% of the planet’s wealth. And the remaining 50% of the world’s wealth is also unevenly distributed.

In the case of Brazil, after 20 years of military dictatorship and practically 30 years since democratic reinstatement, there is still a long way to go before we achieve full democracy. On the contrary, we find ourselves in a sort of standstill, amid a firestorm of economic and political contention with active or indirect participation of a wide range of actors and institutions: hegemonic or alternative media, the judiciary, the Ministério Público (public prosecutor’s office), NGOs, political parties, unions and syndicates, universities, social movements of various types and natures, among others.

The country of mechanisms and channels of direct social and popular participation, of participatory budgeting, of conferences on cities, on the environment, on health and education, of the municipal, state and federal councils, of public hearings and referendums must now overcome severe limitations to the real democratization of society.

In the article *Nunca fomos não participativos* (We have never been so participatory), Maricato (2007) draws attention to the recent advancements in several innovative mechanisms for direct participation and democracy, after the democratization process took place and the Constitution of 1988 was promulgated in Brazil. Thousands of municipal councils have been set up across areas like social service, education, health, environment, cities, housing, economic development, culture, among many others, mobilizing millions of people to discuss problems and potential solutions from their homes to schools, community centres and other social facilities.

It cannot be denied that a number of institutional and political advancements were made in terms of social and political mobilization and collective effervescence. The number of social movements, NGOs and institutions open to public, collective, social or community purposes has clearly multiplied in the last three decades.

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New generations of students and professionals have completed their education and training and now strive to act under a new institutional order that potentially (or pretensely) seeks to overcome a past marked by political, institutional and cultural authoritarianism.

Nevertheless, various authors and theorists of political and territorial policies have drawn attention to the fact that, despite these significant advances, so far we have only seen subtle transformation, in both a structural and structuring sense. The structures that determine the distribution of income, wealth, and political and economic power have changed very little.

There have been advancements in life expectancy, infant mortality and gross income. However, between 2002 and 2012 homicides rates for black and indigenous peoples have increased alarmingly, though they have declined for white and Asian peoples (Waiselfiz, 2014). Atmospheric pollution persists despite the efforts to develop new vehicle emissions technology by automakers, and road accidents represent the principal cause of death of cyclists and motorcyclists, constituting an intractable public health problem, with numbers similar to those in war-torn nations (Saldiva et al., [s.d.]).

Despite some institutional and legal advancements, such as articles 182 and 183 of the Brazilian Constitution, the City Statute and the Statute of the Metropolis, a deep, subliminal Brazil survives, one that persists unchanged well into the 21st century.

Thus, a number of issues can be raised in the debate that will take place in times to come. To what extent can the recent institutional advances of the last 30 years still produce changes in the panorama of immense social and territorial injustices and inequalities? To what extent have we reached a limit to the current political system? To what extent do major comprehensive reforms impact on the structural causes of injustices and inequalities? To what extent can the existing democratic mechanisms and channels be sufficient to respond to the challenge of a deeper, more profound process of democratization? Or better yet, to what extent do the most relevant key variables intersect or converge beyond local, regional and national arrangements, presenting themselves in the domain of the global struggle for democracy, the struggle for control over the construction and distribution of our own narratives, control over public and private funds, and also for the control and democratization of communication media?

Certainly this text does not aspire to find solutions to these or any other fundamental, overarching questions, but it does, at least, intend to systematize some recent ideas and debates in the field of democracy in the cities, based on a careful literature review, on empirical observations and on a discussion about the recent participatory processes in Brazil, in advance of Habitat III.
**2 URBAN CRISIS AND CRISIS IN PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES**

A central interpretation concerning the numerous causes for the processes of exclusion and segregation and for the precarious life conditions in Brazilian cities refers to the historical and structural fact that in our country wages paid to workers did not and still do not provide access to dignified housing via the formal housing market. It can also be affirmed “the housing cost was simply not included in the salary” (Maricato, 2015). In the words of Professor Francisco de Oliveira, Brazil urbanized itself in a process where housing was produced by way of “self-building as a means to lower the cost of reproduction of labor power” (Oliveira, 2006).

In addition to producing wealth for the capital during the week, the worker was forced to acquire a lot in a faraway location and build his house without a construction loan or any other form of financing, technical assistance, or even a building project per se in service-deprived places lacking urbanity. In parallel, or sometime later, he had to organize himself to fight for the “arrival of the city”, that is, for water, power, child care, health services, schools, public transport and so on, in a process of multiple exploitation and deep, systematic social injustice. Some claim that decade after decade of this process eventually gave rise to a type of *insurgent citizenship* (Holston, 2013).

The great number of removals, forced evictions and land repossessions – with numerous cases of violence and human rights violations – that have been taking place in the last few years somehow indicates the insufficiency, inadequacy or failure of housing policies and urban development policies in the country.4

It is important to note that the popular segments, organized in housing associations, unions and syndicates, social movements, housing movements, NGOs, collectives, forums and networks, have taken on a historical role, both from the perspective of institutional participation for monitoring and development of public policies in spaces and process like councils and conferences, and from the perspective of urban struggles that take place outside existing institutional channels, by means of public actions, political education, occupation of abandoned or vacant plots of land or buildings that do not fulfil their social function and the various types of manifestations and articulations that have emerged in recent times – including via political activism driven by social media and new participatory platforms, applications and other communication and information technologies.

The demonstrations that took place in June 2013 and became known as the *jornadas de junho* (June journeys) drew attention for their reach, scale and visibility. They started out as smaller-scale protests against the rise of public transportation

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4. See, for example, the Observatório de Remoções (Removals Observatory) website: <http://goo.gl/qwnCtS>.
fares in São Paulo, expanding with the adherence of collectives and movements that protested against the impact of the major global sports events (or mega-events) and was followed by a cascade-like spread and adherence by different types of collectives, movements and organized or unorganized individuals, which took to the streets of the main Brazilian cities – rooted in a broad spectrum of political and ideological perspectives.

On the other hand, in addition to large-scale mass phenomenoms such as these, the daily struggles involved in claiming and securing essential social human rights like housing, work, transport, sanitation and health and a healthy environment continue to be waged.

Behind the construction of this universe of peripheral cities carried out over time, individual and collective fights took and continue to take place along active resistance movements directed against the exclusion of the right to the city, in the Lefebvrian sense. Based on his studies on the peripheral areas of São Paulo, James Holston (2013) observes that such struggles and persevering processes of construction of peripheral cities, which remain at the margins of the State and separated from capital flows, have nonetheless enabled the attainment of a type of insurgent citizenship (Holston, 2013).

The majority of the working class, unable to reside in areas with basic public services and infrastructure, carried out silent, historical processes of resistance on the fringes cities in an insurgent way, constructing neighbourhoods, “selfconstructed peripheries, building houses, constructing a new sphere of participation to embrace concerns with inclusive citizenship and rights.” Insurgency distinguishes itself as “a process that is acting counter, a counter-politics that destabilizes the present and renders it fragile, defamiliarizing the coherence with which it usually presents itself. Insurgency is not a top-down process towards a future that has already been orchestrated. It effervesces from the past, where present circumstances seem propitious for an irruption.”

The study carried out by Earle (2012) on movements of struggle for housing in central areas of São Paulo and their actions of occupying vacant or abandoned buildings foregrounded the discussion of a type of transgressive citizenship, whose essence translates itself into a type of rebellion that questions historical social injustices, while it also seeks to demand rights that are protected by the laws of the country, by means of actions that somehow supplant the “order” and go beyond simple civil disobedience (Earle, 2012). It transgresses the capitalist “order” and the

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5. It is importante to note that, in this case, the Movimento Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement or MPL) played a prominent role in leading the mobilizations in São Paulo.
6. Predominantly via the World Cup Popular Commitees organized in different cities across Brazil.
principles of good conduct and respect for private property, to claim and demand the fundamental right to adequate housing.

As they find themselves engaged in the struggle for housing, the people, subjects or actors involved transform their daily lives into a permanent learning process: *into a school for fighting* (Barbosa, 2014). The rebelliousness of the homeless workers in the assertion of their rights is much more than the simple assertion of the aggregation or juxtaposition of laws and processes that have been well written and well constructed in theory. According to Barbosa (2014), the active participation in the many fronts of the struggle represents, directly or indirectly, a pedagogical process, whereby

“people collectively learn, where every subject’s history, their accumulation of individual learning and subjective life experiences are also important for the collective constructions of new subjects, which will emerge in the processes of claiming their rights” (Barbosa, 2014).

The passage from the drama of social deprivation and exclusion to the sphere of collective, unified struggle takes place through complex, nonlinear processes, through mutual identification of groups and collectives, mediated by the need to survive in a society where extreme scarcity and waste coexist side by side. They develop themselves at the heart of the social movements that mobilize concrete struggles, as forms of emergence of a class consciousness.

Though they have a number of inherent contradictions, these organizational and mobilization processes function as a concrete anticipation of that which is to be constructed, following Paulo Freire’s notion of the “inédito-viável”, or the “viable unprecedented” […] “a notion that embodies the belief in the possible dream and in the utopia to be realized” (Freire, 1992).

These permanent processes of collective assertion enable these collective subjects to pursue more extensive agendas, such as urban reform and the right to the city for example, moving beyond each family’s individual (and legitimate) need. As has been pointed out by Maricato many times, the permanent processes of resistance are the only possible way of taking the claim for the right to the city forward, and of facing the issue of land ownership and land reform (referred to as the “nó da terra”, or “knot of the land”). By embracing conflicts, subjects find each other in the centre of history, acting as protagonists of their own agendas and of their claims, and this understanding helps people to perceive themselves as subjects, and understand that their struggle for rights can move beyond the struggle for housing.

Far from playing down the importance of individual actions and initiatives in processes of resistance, there lies at the heart of various housing movements the perception that everyone is and lives in the same social condition, a class sentiment,
and that together people are stronger. *This pedagogical process, triggered from the core of the conflict, has enormous symbolic value, of subjects* (Barbosa, 2014).

However, if the rebelliousness of the homeless workers mostly stems from the clear perception of the top-down social injustices that have historically been committed, it is carried out within a pedagogical context of collective learning, wherein new subjects emerge from the process of asserting rights.

This way, numerous new forms of resistance and struggles have emerged in different parts of the country, where resistance efforts have been organized around the right to land for housing, against local real estate speculators, governments or international investors, or even (which has been quite common), all of them associated together.

Among recent examples from urban Brazil are the Izidora occupation in the periphery of Belo Horizonte that resists with the support of students and teachers by means of extension projects of public and private universities amid so many struggles. Housing movements in the central area of São Paulo express solidarity to and support each other, despite the historical fragmentation of the groups, and have support from NGOs and progressive academics. The foundation of the Forum Centro Vivo (Living Center Forum) in a period of explicit violations of human rights of the population residing in the central region of São Paulo is also another important example. In this sense, it is also worth mentioning the actions of the Defensoria Pública (public defender’s office) in partnership with human rights entities and movements on critical moments like repossessions and evictions. In the city of Recife, Pernambuco, the Ocupe Estelita (Occupy Estelita) movement raises solidarity by means of vigorous profusion and dissemination of information via social media towards countering the interests of the property sector, intent on radically transforming the city center in compliance with the avid interests of real estate capital investors and businessmen.

The Extension Project of the Observatory on Removals and Evictions and the Popular School of City Planning of the Federal University of Latin American Integration (UNILA) in Foz do Iguacu, Paraná, promotes cultural events, mobilizes students, makes postcards showing the faces of workers, presenting these common individuals to the tourists who visit the city, as a way of denouncing and making violations visible.

In Rio de Janeiro and in São Paulo, new actors and architects collaborate with popular planning for informal settlements vulnerable to forced removals, which, in the context of the sports mega-events that unfolded in the last few years have become negotiation instruments in the struggles for permanence in areas of unplanned settlements. Such cases include those of Vila Autódromo and Favela da Paz.
In this way, it can be observed that precarity and spoliation coexist alongside a proliferation of initiatives that, led by new actors and collectives, constantly renew themselves. In collaboration with the old actors and movements, these actors frequently seek subsidies and inspiration to deal with old and new challenges, and using a great deal of courage and creativity, surpass the more complex stages of the process of struggles that are yet to come.

3 PREPARATION FOR HABITAT III: THE APPEAL FOR PARTICIPATION, AMID SKEPTICISM AND HOPE

Brazil’s preparation process for Habitat III, or more specifically, for the mobilization of social and political actors, for general mobilization and for the harvest of subsidies to be used in the elaboration of the national report, unfolded from a set of initiatives led by the group coordinating the rapporter, composed by members of the National League of Cities, researchers from Ipea, grant recipients and collaborators who adhered to the process during its key stages.

The process of drawing up the Report began in the ambit of the National League of Cities, which elected a working group and invited Ipea to act as its rapporteur. The Report was created with on-site as well as virtual activities that involved the interactive participation of approximately 2.5 million people.

Two seminars were conducted, both in a relatively traditional format. The first took place in São Bernardo do Campo at the Federal University of the ABC (where ABC stands for Santo André, São Bernardo and São Caetano, municipalities of the large metropolitan are known as Greater São Paulo). Participants included actors from the metropolitan region of São Paulo and representatives of municipal governments, from the Inter-municipal Consor- sortium of the ABC, from urban movements for housing struggles, for transport and mobility, organizations and collectives, in addition to scholars and academics.

The one-day seminar was organized in such a way that spoken presentations and debates about the nature of current urban problems and the main challenges to overcome them were held in the morning session. The afternoon session had groups of debates on specific topics like generation of employment and income, conflicts related to land and removals, the actions and political engagement of art and urban culture groups and collectives, among others.

The second seminar took place in Brasília, and resembled a national meeting due to the organization of a series of panels whose members included speakers, lecturers, moderators, and debaters. The event took place at the Annex of the

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8. The Habitat III Seminar on Challenges developed from a partnership between the Federal University of the ABC and Ipea, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.
Presidency of the Republic building (named *Palácio da Alvorada*, or “Palace of Dawn”), and took on an official character with the presence of federal government representatives from various areas and sectors responsible for the country’s urban issues, such as social assistance and welfare, environment, transport and mobility, environmental sanitation, urban law, economic development and regional development, among others.

In parallel to these presential meetings aimed at the exchange of ideas, concepts and discussion of empirical cases, a system of transmission and dissemination of data and information was implemented, as well as a public consultation process by means of an online virtual platform, which enabled the compilation of public opinion polls, with input from thousands of people on key aspects of housing and urban development in Brazil, in general and also regarding specific regions.

This enriching and innovative preparation process for the Habitat III Conference points to deep and essential reflections: the online platforms occupy a crucial role for encouraging debate and (virtual) mobilization over urban issues. However, considering the profound differences between cities and their populations, it is worth questioning its reach and actual limitations.

The platform certainly enabled participation, or some form of virtual interaction with individuals who otherwise could not have participated in the meetings of the League, or even in the seminars. The potential use of platforms of this kind urgently needs to be further explored and, more importantly, the possibilities and limitations understood so as to avoid being overcome by naïve or oversimplified processes or panaceas for the resolution of complex problems, in view of their dimension, nature and scale.

On top of the number of visitors or interactions, we must also analyze what is the degree and quality of participation provided by systems of online information and communication technology. In this respect, there is still much to investigate concerning the budding field of virtual participation.

On the other hand, though the traditional model of collective debates held in seminar and workshop format obviously offers a number of advantages, in a country with continental dimensions it also demands reflection on our part about the possibilities and limitations, and even about its true potential for “social capillarity”. It could be said that the mobilization of approximately two thousand people undoubtedly contributed to the systematization of data and information by the technical team, comparing and contrasting technical, academic knowledge with popular perception and knowledge of the problems, of potentialities and of public policy responses that seek to produce solutions. Qualitative data is useful for shedding light on and analyzing results and findings based on secondary sources and quantitative data.
4 BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

The recent reflections about the apparent or real crisis of Brazilian democracy, or the crises of the representation system, have much to do with this general assessment still to be carried out. The crisis of the system of representation is certainly related to the crises faced by cities, namely the urban, social and environmental crisis. When millions of people take to the streets, squares and public spaces to voice their insatisfaction and claim social rights, it is a sign that something inadequate, to say the least, is happening to the public policies aimed at social well-being. The oligarchic state, the oligopolies that control the mass media and the ever-present representatives of economic interests and of the rentier elite in the major cities of the country have far greater influence than can be imagined.

Participation (and above all, democracy) that we seek to build, from our point of view, cannot derive from processes that contribute to the construction of a culture of consensus that repudiates old and new conflicts. As states Jacques Rancière (2014), “peaceful oligarchic government redirects democratic passions toward private pleasures and renders people insensitive to the public sphere,” based on a (pseudo) democracy, which, paradoxically, legitimates the power of a minority to govern and retains the conduction of economic and political power.

It is a very peculiar time for United Nations Habitat III Conference to take place, in regards to the challenges faced by those who push for a higher level of democracy in the formulation and implementation of housing and urban development policies, ultimately ardent advocates of a territorial democracy.

Many problems pertain to the poorest countries in the world, others pertain to the so-called middle-income countries, and still others relate to high-income countries, generally located in the northern hemisphere. Social and popular participation in public policies for housing and urban development, and above all for the democratization of cities can be considered a fundamental principle that concerns all cities of all nations that strive for the maintenance or construction of some type of civility and to overcome the inequities and inequalities, land injustices and barbarism.

The challenge becomes even more Herculean as we consider that, differently to what is imagined or propagated in some circles, democracy is not desired by all, on the contrary, it is hated by many, as argues Rancière (2014). Especially actors, individuals and groups concerned with perpetuating themselves through privilege, accustomed to exercise the mastership of thought.

Hence the importance of reflection on the power of popular movements and of social movements, as they radicalize their actions, questioning the status quo by means of insurgency or by transgression, in processes that are also pedagogical,
filled with learning experiences and confrontations, supported in some way by those who have learnt to share with anyone, the equal power of intelligence, in order to elicit engagement in the face of complexity, courage for the construction of more fertile grounds for democracy, and thus, a more realist perspective (and one less deceptive, naïve or superficial) on the construction of more joyous cities.

REFERENCES


Chapter 14

The Right to the City as a Key Issue for the New Global Urban Agenda

Nelson Saule Júnior

1. On the Relevance of the Right to the City to the New Urban Agenda

Since Habitat I, the first United Nations Conference on Human Settlements which took place in Vancouver in 1976, there has been mounting international concern about the consequences of urbanization and the increase in the number of people living in urban areas. By 2050, the world’s urban population is expected to double, with a matching rise in the number of people living in informal settlements. This is a matter of serious concern. The third United Nations Conference on Human Settlements – Habitat III, to be held in Quito, Ecuador in 2016, represents an unprecedented opportunity for international agencies, national, subnational and local governments and various parts of society to draw up a new agenda for an increasingly urban world, one that may offer new directions and develop perspectives for the construction of fairer, more inclusive and democratic cities.

From a human rights perspective, we consider this to be an excellent opportunity for the right to the city to be used as a paradigm for the New Urban Agenda that will be adopted at the conference. A number of strategic elements need to be considered in relation to this right, including comprehension and its components, its territorial extent and the responsibilities and obligations which are part of this right.

For the development of such strategic elements, we should consider the theoretical contributions of Henri Lefebvre to the rapid rise of social movements in France in the 1960s, and the collective visions that were created across international and regional boundaries, all of which have been translated, in particular, in the following documents:

- European Charter for Human Rights in the City – Saint-Denis, 2000;
- World Charter for the Right to the City – World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, 2005;

1. Professor of Urban Law Graduate Program at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo. Research Coordinator on Right to the City – Polis Institute. Coordinator of the Global Platform for the Right to the City. International Relations Coordinator of the Brazilian Institute of Urban Law (IBDU).
• Mexico City Charter for the Right to the City, 2009;
• Rio de Janerio Manifesto on the Right to the City – World Urban Forum, 2010;

In addition to these references, two countries have included aspects of the right to the city in their legislation: Brazil, with the City Statute (also known as the Brazilian Federal Law on Urban Development), and Ecuador, in its National Constitution.

An important contribution to the topic is the official document which has been circulated prior to the Habitat III Conference entitled Political Unity 1 Right to the City and Cities for All, to which I had the opportunity to contribute as a member of the specialist group set up by the United Nations. This document offers key elements for the formulation of the strategic pillars of the right to the city, its conception and definition, and also the necessary actions for its implementation.

These antecedents have created favorable conditions for the New Urban Agenda with the adoption of the right to the city, a comprehensive territorial dimension to human rights and their application to cities and human settlements, embracing change in the current predominant urban design so as to reduce social and spatial injustices and promote equality, social inclusion, political participation and a decent life for all inhabitants.

The New Urban Agenda which is being discussed must recognize that in order to meet current and future commitments it is essential to link social inclusion, participative democracy and human rights to cities and their surrounding rural areas, helping them to become more inclusive, just, democratic and sustainable.

In this sense, the right to the city emerges as an embracing collective right of the present and future inhabitants of cities, to be adopted in the New Urban Agenda as a central topic for an effective integration of public policies to promote social inclusion and governance and the democratic and participatory management of cities.

2 ON THE CENTRAL THEMES OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY FOR THE NEW URBAN AGENDA

The right to the city has been the subject of much international debate since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. At the time, there already was a good understanding of the need to match the agenda for the environment with an urban agenda. At this conference, a Treaty – Towards Just, Democratic and Sustainable Cities, Towns and Villages was drafted by a working group of representatives of civil society, including representatives of the Habitat International Coalition – HIC, the Brazilian Forum for Urban Reform (FNRU), and the Continental Front of Community Organizations (Fecoc).

The fundamental principles set out in the Treaty are the right to citizenship, understood as the participation of urban residents in the decision-making process and control over their destinies; the democratic management of citizenship;
and the social functions of the city and of property, here interpreted as the socially
just use of urban space, so that citizens appropriate the territory, which in turn
democratizes the spaces of power, production and culture within the guiding
parameters of social justice, within environmentally sustainable conditions.

In the last decade, progress towards the New Urban Agenda was made at the
World Social Forum, which established the World Charter for the Right to
the City, the Local Authorities Forum in Saint-Denis, which led to the creation
of the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City and
the World Urban Forums, convened by the United Nations Human Settlements
Programme – UN-Habitat.

The right to the city in the World Charter is understood as the right to the
equitable use of cities within the principles of sustainability and social justice.
It is regarded as the collective right of the inhabitants of cities, especially of vulnerable
and marginalized groups, that confers upon them legitimacy of action and
organization, based on their uses and customs, with the objective of them exercising
their full right to free self-determination and to an adequate standard of living.

The Charter considers as a city every village, town, capital, locality, suburb,
municipality or hamlet that is institutionally organized as a local governmental
unit of municipal or metropolitan character, be it urban, semi-rural or rural.
The city is understood as a culturally rich and diversified space that belongs to all
of its inhabitants.

In preparation for the Habitat III Conference, discussion that has been
taking place in working groups made up of expert policy units, especially those
that focus on the right to the city and cities for all, and at thematic and regional
conferences. An important collective advocating the adoption of the right to the city
in the New Urban Agenda is the Global Platform for the Right to the City, whose
members include the following organizations: Action Aid, Fundação Avina, Habitat
International Coalition, International Alliance of Inhabitants, Cities Alliance,
United Cities and Local Governments – UCLG, United Nations – Commission
on Human Rights, Huairou Commission, Women in Informal Employment:
Globalizing and Organizing – Wiego, Shack/Slum Dewellers International – SDI,
Fundo Global para os Municípios (FMDV – Global Fund for Cities Development),
Instituto Pólis, Brazilian National Forum for Urban Reform, Women in
Cities International, Techo, Intercontinental Network for the Promotion of Social
Economy Solidarity – Ripess.

The discussions have focused on a number of key issues to the right to the city:
recognition as a human right, its territorial extension and legal protection, the
obligations and responsibilities to promote this right and its positioning within
international human rights legislation and principles as a whole.
2.1 On the understanding of the right to the city as a human right

The approach to the right to the city as a human right. The first is that it is a collective and universal right of urban dwellers to use, occupy and produce the city that encompasses third and fourth-generation historic rights such as the right to the environment and to sustainable development, to cultural heritage and to common goods such as water.

The second approach aims to characterize and codify the rights of city inhabitants which already form part of countries’ internal systems for the protection of rights which should be safeguarded by local governments, such as the right to cultural and religious freedom, the right to political participation, the right of association, assembly, and to protest, the right to access and domestic and urban public services, to education, to work, to housing, to health, to transport and public mobility, to culture and leisure. In establishing the obligations and responsibilities related to these rights, the European Urban Charter (European Union, 2008) also recognises local government as the level of government with the greatest institutional, political and economic capacity to act. Within this understanding, the right to the city can be characterized as a principle or legislative frameworks for the promotion of urban policies.

The general consensus in these discussions and documents is that the protection and promotion of the right to the city, both in principle and as a legislative framework for urban policies and also as a collective and diffuse right, are responsibilities that are particularly relevant to local governments, as the level of government that is closest to citizens in urban situations. There is general agreement on the necessity to recognize in the New Urban Agenda that local governments must have greater institutional, political and economic power and capability if they are to promote this right.

2.2 On the territorial reach of the right to the city

The discussion centers on the right to the city as being limited to urban residents, questioning if the right to the city is a right that extends only to the people and communities in urban areas, ensuring them adequate living conditions, or if it also applies to the inhabitants of rural areas.

On this issue, a general consensus has emerged in discussions that the right to the city embraces both the people and communities in urban areas and those in rural areas and peri-urban areas, ensuring all an adequate quality of life.

In Policy Unit 1’s submission to Habitat III on the right to the city, this issue is dealt with in the following way: the right to the city as a diffuse right may be exercised around the metropolis, city, village or town that is institutionally organized as a local administrative unit at the district, municipal or metropolitan level. It includes both the urban space and the rural or semi-rural surrounding areas that
make up its geographical territory, given that the object of legal protection is the protection and promotion of the city as a common good, and that its constitutive elements are already incorporated in international agreements on the environment and in international norms for the protection of cultural heritage.

### 2.3 On the object of legal protection by the right to the city

Bearing in mind that all human right which is recognized in international, regional and national systems for the protection of human rights result in a legal and judicial protection of a good with economic, cultural or social value, or of that of fundamental human needs such as food, housing, health, education, work, or even that of a use or custom such as, for example, family or social grouping. The point at issue is exactly what good, interest or need the right to the city aims to protect and promote in the legal and judicial sphere.

There are two approaches to this in current discussions. One considers that the right to the city is not to be the object of legal protection, that it should be considered more as a principle or legislative framework that generates a requirement for the protection and promotion of a range of individual human rights for the inhabitants of cities, addressing their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

The second approach, to which we subscribe, is that of the right to the city should be the object of its own legal protection, which is that the city is a common good that has broad legal protection both as an artificial environmental common good (built environment) and a material and immaterial cultural asset (which encompasses the form of use, occupation and construction of the city and the forms of social and cultural coexistence of its inhabitants). In this case, the right to the city is a diffuse right that can be protected and legitimately claimed in the administrative and judicial spheres.

The notion of the common good stems from the premise that the survival and coexistence of values, traditions, habits, customs, and all of their material and immaterial projections in the socio-historical reality of civilization can be defined as absolute goods for which fundamental rights exist which, in order to be protected, require that adequate public policies and protective instruments be developed and implemented. This issue is central to the understanding of the right to the city and to the rationale that this is already an existing right, considering the notion of common good that is the result of a phenomenon of necessary economic, social and territorial cohesion, which involves the natural and built assets of a civilization and are thus fundamental to it, and which, by way of parliamentary and democratic political decisions, effectuate themselves in judicial systems linked to the protection of such assets which are congruous with human nature in its social and moral, aspects.
It is important to emphasise that, in the legal protection of the city as a common good, we must extract the concept of the city as a common good from international human rights law, as well as from those that deal with the protection of the environment (in the case of cities, immaterial environmental assets, also called built environment) and cultural assets (in the case of cities, both material and immaterial assets), all of which are components of the city that we aim to protect and promote by means of the right to the city.

In Policy Unit 1 discussions of the right to the city and cities for all, the following city components were identified as part of the common good: the city as inclusive citizenship, fulfilling its social functions, with quality public spaces and cultural diversity, in a common ecosystem that respects the rural-urban linkages and interactions.

The definition elaborated by a group of specialists for the Habitat III Conference and set out in the Policy Unit 1 discussion of the right to the city and cities for all adds to the notion of the right to the city as a diffuse right that is based on international human rights law in the field of civil, political, economic and cultural rights, and on the diffuse human rights regarding the protection of the environment and culture. The definition of the right to the city adopted by the Policy Unit 1 is as follows:

The right to the city is the right of all inhabitants present and future, to occupy, use and produce just, inclusive and sustainable cities, defined as a common good essential to the quality of life. The right to the city further implies responsibilities on governments and people to claim, defend and promote this right. The city as a common good contains the following components:

- **A city free of discrimination** on the basis of gender, age, health, income, nationality, ethnicity, migratory condition, or political, religious or sexual orientation.

- **A city of inclusive citizenship** in which all inhabitants, whether permanent or transitional, are considered as citizens and granted equal rights; e.g. women, those living in poverty or situations of environmental risk, informal workers, ethnic and religious groups, LGBT persons, the differently abled, children, youth, the elderly, migrants, refugees, street dwellers, victims of violence and indigenous peoples.

- **A city with greater political participation** in the definition, implementation, oversight, and budgeting of urban policies and spatial planning in order to strengthen the transparency, effectiveness and inclusion of the diversity of inhabitants and their organizations.
• A city fulfilling its social functions, that is, ensuring equitable access for all to shelter, goods, services and urban opportunities, particularly for women and other marginalized groups; a city that prioritizes the collectively defined public interest, ensuring a socially just and environmentally balanced use of urban and rural spaces.

• A city with quality public spaces that enhances social interactions and political participation, promotes socio-cultural expression, embraces diversity, and fosters social cohesion; a city where public spaces contribute to building safer cities and to meeting the needs of inhabitants.

• A city of gender equality which adopts all necessary measures to combat discrimination in all its forms against women, men, and LGBT people in political, social, economic and cultural terms; a city which takes all appropriate measures to ensure the full development of women, to guarantee them equality in the exercise and fulfillment of fundamental human rights, and a life free of violence.

• A city with cultural diversity, which respects, protects, and promotes the diverse livelihoods, customs, memory, identities, expressions, and socio-cultural forms of its inhabitants.

• A city with an inclusive economy that ensures access to secure livelihoods and decent work for all its inhabitants, that gives room to other economies, such as solidarity economy, sharing economy, circular economy, and that acknowledges the role of women in the care economy.

• A city as a system within the settlement and common ecosystem that respects rural-urban links, and protects biodiversity, natural habitats, and surrounding ecosystems, and supports city-regions, city-town cooperation, and connectivity.

Based on the definition above, the right to the city is a diffuse right that establishes the city as a collective space that belongs to all inhabitants, containing two essential dimensions:

1) Legal protection: In many jurisdictions, the seven dimensions mentioned above already have legal protection, but these, in combination, can create diffuse rights, for example, protection of natural environments (for example, of the forests, parks, rivers) creates a diffuse environmental right; protection of material and immaterial cultural heritage (for example, of buildings, monuments, artifacts, ceremonies) and diffuse cultural rights; public space may be protected for its social and cultural purposes; historical and popular neighbourhoods may protect the memory and the identity of those who produced it, for example, Italian immigrants in São Paulo.
The entitlement to diffuse rights: Rights holders are groups of people with common interests, also called collective interests. Such interests go beyond the individual, embracing the protection and preservation of the environment in a sustainable and well-balanced manner. Ownership can be exercised by representative groups of citizens that work by means of consolidated participatory processes, e.g., housing associations, NGOs. In many jurisdictions national, regional or local laws already protect these different dimensions.

### 2.4 On the obligations and responsibilities arising from the right to the city

In discussions about the right to the city, a critical point continues to be the recognition of the right in national legal systems, and if it will lead to greater obligations and responsibilities to national States, considering the attributions of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers. Also under discussion are the difficulties of specifying the legal and judicial obligations that arise from the right to the city.

If the New Urban Agenda adopts the understanding that the right to the city does not have its own object of legal protection, and can be characterized more as a principle or legislative framework for setting a regulatory mark in urban policy, new legal or judicial obligations for national States, as the object of legal and judicial protection are the individual or collective rights that already exist in the field of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental rights.

If, however, the understanding of the right to the city that is adopted is that of a field of collective and diffuse rights, where the object of legal protection is the city as a common good, the objective becomes the generation political, institutional and administrative capacities rather than new obligations for the local authorities and a strengthening of the protection and promotion of the inhabitants’ social and cultural interests.

This, in turn, enables the creation of new institutional public spaces and of new legal and administrative instruments, or the reformation or renovation of the existent ones both in the administrative and judicial spheres, for the promotion of urban public policies. For example, whereby the right to the city may be claimed so as to increase the number of public spaces in a city, as a requirement for the construction of real estate developments and for the subdivision of urban land. Or for the egalitarian representation of women and of LGBT people in public spaces with democratic and participative styles of management in cities.

Among the points of consensus on the obligations and responsibilities towards the right to the city is the notion of shared responsibility. As this right pertains to the field of diffuse rights, the responsibility for the protection and promotion of the right to the city is shared among local authorities and the cities’ inhabitants and civil society organizations.
The Charter-Agenda for Human Rights in the City (UCLG, 2010) establishes, in item II, point 3 and 4, that the city’s inhabitants have the right to take part in local affairs, according to their abilities and means.

They participate in the decisions that affect them and express their opinions towards other individuals and groups in a spirit of tolerance and pluralism. City inhabitants take on the local policy in terms of the common interest, for the benefit of the community.

In Policy Unit 1, the definition of the right to the city leads to the understanding that this right entails that the responsibility for claiming, demanding, defending and promoting this right lies with local governments and inhabitants.

The World Charter for the Right to the City contributes with the specification of the obligations and responsibilities related to this right under the terms of articles XVIII and XIX, whereby:

1) Cities should adopt all the necessary regulatory measures, in an adequate and immediate manner, to assure the right to the city for all persons, in conformance with this charter. Cities should guarantee the participation of nine citizens and civil society organizations in the regulatory review process. Cities are obligated to use up to the maximum of the resources available to them to fulfill the legal obligations established in this charter.

2) Cities should provide training and education in human rights for all the public agents related to the implementation of the right to the city and corresponding obligations, in particular for functionaries employed by the public bodies whose policies influence in any way the full realization of the right to the city.

3) Cities should promote the teaching and socialization of the right to the city in all educational centers, universities, and through the communications media.

4) Cities should establish, together with their inhabitants, evaluation and monitoring mechanisms through an effective system of right to the city indicators, with gender differentiation, to assure the right to the city based on the principles and norms of this charter.

5) Cities should regularly and thoroughly monitor the degree of respect upheld for the obligations and rights enunciated in this charter.

Article 19 deals with the forms of violation of the right to the city as follows:
1) Violations of the right to the city are constituted by the actions and omissions, legislative, administrative and legal measures, and social practices that result in impediment, rejection, difficulty, or impossibility in the:

- implementation of the rights established in this charter;
- collective political participation of all inhabitants, including in particular women and social groups, in city management;
- fulfillment of the decisions and priorities defined in the participative processes that form part of city management;
- conservation of cultural identities, forms of peaceful coexistence, social production of habitat, and the forms of manifestation and action of social and citizen groups, especially the vulnerable and disadvantaged, based on their uses and customs.

2) Actions and omissions may be incurred in the administrative field in the elaboration and execution of projects, programs and plans; in the legislative sphere through law enactment and control of public resources and governmental actions; and in the legal sphere in trials and decisions on collective conflicts and court decisions in relation to issues of urban interest.

2.5 On the right to the city as a preexisting right

The question of whether or not the right to the city is a preexisting right based on international agreements and norms for protection of human rights is a critical point in the discussions about the recognition of the right to the city in the New Urban Agenda.

There is an understanding that, due to the fact that international norms do not expressly address the recognition and the definition of the right to the city, this right could not be adopted in the New Urban Agenda even if it is not an international convention that does not generate obligations to the national States. Due to this position, the understanding of the right to the city is referred to at best as a principle or legislative framework for the implementation of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights.

The second understanding, to which we subscribe, is the right to the city as a preexisting right in international human rights norms because the object of legal protection of this right is the city as a common good, which, due to this characterization of city as a legal asset has already been afforded protection in the agreements and international conventions for protection of common goods, especially those pertaining to environmental or cultural assets.
The Right to the City as a Key Issue for the New Global Urban Agenda

In the national legal marks, we can highlight the City Statute (2001) and the Constitution of Ecuador (2008), which contain a legal definition of the right to the city. In Brazilian law, items I and II of article 2 of the City Statute (2001) defines the right to the city as a general legislative framework designed to guide urban policy towards bringing the full development of the city's social functions and urban property.

The right to sustainable cities is understood as a right to urban land, housing, environmental sanitation, urban infrastructure, transport and public services, as well as the right to work and to leisure for present and future generations, and also as democratic management by means of popular participation and the participation representing various segments of the community in the formulation, execution and of the development of urban projects, plans and programs.

This definition encompasses the understanding of a diffuse right that includes the right of present and future generations, adopting by analogy the definition of sustainable development, which includes the right to an environment that must be preserved for the present and future generations.

Articles 30 and 31 of the the constitution of Ecuador define the right to the city as follows:

Art. 30. Persons have the right to a safe and healthy habitat and adequate and decent housing, regardless of their social and economic status.

Art. 31. Persons have the right to fully enjoy the city and its public spaces, on the basis of principles of sustainability, social justice, respect for different urban cultures and a balance between the urban and rural sectors. Exercising the right to the city is based on the democratic management of the city, with respect to the social and environmental function of property and the city and with the full exercise of citizenship.

The right to the city means capacitating the inhabitants of cities in order to increase their capacity to access urban resources, services, products and opportunities to improve their lives in the city, which in turn implies effectively enabling public involvement and participation in local policy decision-making.

In both cases, it calls for a reinforcement of the role of women, and of marginalized groups such as the poor, urban informal workers, ethnic and religious groups, LGBT community, the differently-abled, children, young people, elderly people, migrants, displaced homeless people and street dwellers.

In the regional ambit, we can highlight the European Charter for Urban Right, which, in item 4, addresses the elements of the right to the city as a collective right as follows:

All persons are entitled to a healthy, safe, settled, pleasant and stimulating living environment. The physical form of cities, particularly the nature of housing in its
wider neighbourhood setting, plays a key role in the development of a high quality urban environment. This is achieved, at least in part, through protection of residential areas against air, water, soil and sub-soil pollution; the creation of environmental protection and buffer zones, parks, gardens and allotments; diversion of heavy traffic causing disturbance; the supply of a variety of cultural and sporting facilities. Citizens needs to be given full opportunity to express their ideas and influence decision-making in respect of the form of their surroundings and any changes that may occur to it.

The definition of the right to the city as an existing human right is based principally in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. We can highlight as a fundamental principle Article 4, point 4, of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions from 2005, which lists the activities, goods and services to be protected.

Articles 1 and 11 of the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage are also key fundament as they enable the States party to this convention to submit to the World Heritage Committee an inventory of property forming part of the cultural and natural heritage, situated in its territory and suitable for inclusion in the list of world heritage. Examples of cities included in this list are: the City of Potosí Bolivian (2014), Old City of Jerusalem and its Walls (1982), Ancient City of Damascus – Syrian Arab Republic (2013), Liverpool – Maritime Mercantile City United Kingdom, Great Britain and North Ireland (2012), Historical Town of Zabid, Yemen (2000) and Old City of Sana’a, Yemen (2015).

Also fundamental are articles 2 and 11 of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, which also enables the legal protection of cities considering the urban and rural areas. Examples that are already included in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage are: the cultural space of the Yaaral and the Degal, Mali (2008); the village of Palenque de San Basilio, Colombia (2008), Fiesta de los Patios, Cordoba, Spain (2012) Majlis, a cultural and social space, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar (2015).

The right to the city is therefore an existing diffuse human right of the present and future generations of inhabitants of cities to occupy, use and produce just, inclusive and sustainable cities as a common good, based on an extensive and analogous interpretation of the abovementioned conventions.

3 KEY ISSUES OF THE RIGHT TO THE CITY IN THE NEW URBAN AGENDA

Considering that the approach to the right to the city in the New Urban Agenda for contributing to the integration of strategic themes and necessary actions in the coming years for the development of just, inclusive, democratic and sustainable cities and for a harmonization of its recommendations, principles, definition, component, coverage, obligations and responsibilities and forms of implementation, the key messages should be the following:
The right to the city as a collective/diffuse right of the present and future inhabitants of cities should be adopted in the New Urban Agenda as a central issue for an effective integration of public policies to promote social inclusion and governance and democratic and participatory management in cities.

The right to the city as a new paradigm that provides an alternative structure for rethinking cities and urbanization.

To recognize in the New Urban Agenda that the right to the city should be understood as an existing collective and diffuse human right based on an extensive interpretation and analogical reasoning of the city as an intangible environmental asset (built environment) and tangible and intangible cultural asset according to the abovementioned international conventions.

To establish in the NAU that the approach to the principles, concept, coverage and responsibilities of the right to the city is fundamental to guide the revision of the national urban legal marks for purposes of incorporation of this right as a guiding element of urban policies.

To adopt in the NAU the pillars, comprehension and forms of implementation of the right to the city as established in Policy Unit 1 Right to the City and Cities for All.

To adopt in the NAU the notion established in the Policy Unit I: the right of all inhabitants present and future, to occupy, use and produce just, inclusive and sustainable cities, defined as a common good essential to the quality of life. The right to the city further implies responsibilities on governments and people to claim, defend, and promote this right. The city as a common good contains the following components: a city free of discrimination; a city of inclusive citizenship; a city with enhanced political participation; a city fulfilling its social functions; a city with quality public spaces; a city of gender equality; a city with cultural diversity; a city with inclusive economies; a city as a system within the settlement and common ecosystem that respects rural-urban linkages.

To adopt in the NAU the notion that the right to the city may be exercised across the entire metropolis, city, village or town that is institutionally organized as a local administrative unit with districts, with municipal or metropolitan character. It includes the urban space, as well as the surrounding rural or semi-rural surrounding areas that make up its territory.

To adopt in the NAU the notion that entitlement to the right to the city as a collective and diffuse right may be exercised by representative groups of dwellers, residents’ associations, NGOs, such as Public Defender’s Office and Public Prosecutor’s Office (in Brazil?), for example.
Obligations imposed to governments and inhabitants include: collective political participation of inhabitants, women and social groups in the management of the city; compliance with decisions and priorities defined in the participatory processes that make up the management of the city; maintenance of cultural identities, forms of peaceful coexistence, preservation and expansion of public spaces, preservation of neighbourhoods and urban spaces where low income communities and vulnerable social groups reside, based on their uses and customs.

To adopt in the New Urban Agenda the establishment of an international observatory for the right to the city as a global instrument to gather information (that is, best practices, legal structures, case studies) and promote the right to the city, as well as the International Forum on the Right to the City, with the aim of bringing together all interested, relevant and committed groups to push for the right to the city (including global organizations, all levels of government, civil society and the socially responsible private sector).

The constitution of a task force by the United Nations as of 2017 to develop and launch awareness and mobilization campaigns in the regions and countries for the implementation of the New Urban Agenda, as well as for the elaboration of periodic reports of the New Urban Agenda in the regional and national ambit (every three years).

The right to the city is a new paradigm that provides an alternative structure for rethinking cities and urbanization, for the effective application of the principles of social justice and equity, of the effective enforcement of human rights, with the preservation of the natural environment for the present and future generations, and with the consolidation of democratic and participatory governance of cities.

It converges the enforcement of all internationally agreed human rights with the 2030 Agenda – Objectives for Sustainable Development and the commitments of the Habitat Agenda and adds a new dimension to the New Urban Agenda based on the understanding of the city as a place that strives to guarantee a dignified, fulfilling life to all inhabitants.

The approach of the right to the city in the New Urban Agenda contributes to a harmonization of all its fundamentals, principles, definition, components, coverage, obligations and responsibilities and forms of implementation; as well as providing the key elements for a possible future convention and for the legal urban marks of the national States vis-à-vis this right.
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ANNEX

1 INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Racial Discrimination (1968);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979);
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989);
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1997);
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951);
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), on the universality and indivisibility of human rights.

2 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CITY AS A COMMON GOOD
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005);
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972);

3 REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS
American Convention on Human Rights (1969);
European Convention on Human Rights (1969);
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981);
4 NATIONAL LEGISLATION
Estatuto do Cidade – Brasil City (2001);
City Statute – Brazil (2001);
Constitution of Ecuador (2008);

5 DOCUMENTS
Habitat Agenda (1996);
World Charter for the Right to the City (2005);
Rio de Janeiro Manifesto on the Right to the City (World Urban Forum, 2010);
Global Platform for the Right to the City Action Plan and Thematic Axis (2014);
Gwangju Guiding Principles for a Human rights City (2014);
European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City (Saint-Denis, 2000);
Mexico City Charter for the Right to the City (2010);
Global Charter-Agenda for Human Rights in the City (UCLG, 2011);
Río Declaration on Environment and Development (1992);
Towards Just Democratic and Sustainable Cities, Towns and Villages (1992);
European Charter for Women in the City (Barcelona, 2004);
Charter for Women’s Right to the City (Barcelona, 2004).
1 INTRODUCTION

The main topic of this paper is to explain why it is so difficult to make public policies reach those most in need. Historically excluded from opportunities due to social and economic reasons (issue that will not be further developed here) the poorest and most vulnerable people, who most need the actions of the State, are also those that are least able to access such actions.

Be it due to the issue of location, because peripheral places have more precarious conditions for the installation of public equipment and service teams, or due to issues of material and informational conditions that are needed to access such services (transport, awareness of rights, information about supply, etc.), those citizens are the ones who least manage to obtain what public authorities should provide them with.

Based on the experience of the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan”, this paper is developed in three supplementary parts that help understand the barriers to accessing public policies and ways in which to overcome them: i) institutional trajectory of the specific public policies of the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” (BSM); ii) a more detailed description of the actions performed within this Plan, including its results and impacts; and iii) conclusions and lessons-learned from the execution of this Plan. This paper portrays the presentation made during the preparatory debates for the third United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development – Habitat III, with additional reflections that support the contents of that discussion.

2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE “BRAZIL WITHOUT EXTREME POVERTY PLAN”

It was the long history of social struggles that converged into the creation in Brazil of the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger – MDS. Created in 2004, by the former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, it was the result of the
merging of three important areas in place in the Federal Government: the Ministry of Social Assistance – MAS; the Extraordinary Ministry of Food and Nutritional Security – MESA; and the executive coordination of the Bolsa Família Program – PBF, which up until that moment had been under the Presidency of the Republic. The Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger took place as the main ministry responsible for the coordination of the social policies during the Lula and Dilma administrations (2003-2016), being in charge of the coordination of the Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan, as we will describe throughout the text.

2.1 Social Work:

Brazilian social work regards the professional field comprised by a broad set of social activists, who for decades have been struggling to ensure rights to the most vulnerable people in economic and social terms. As difficult as the recognition of such rights themselves, it was the battle for the institutionalization of public policies that would actually put such rights into practice through the actions of the Brazilian State. This includes the work to create shelters for the elderly and the homeless, sheltering children and adolescents in trouble with the law, the work with people who have undergone violence of different kinds, but who are not able to be taken care of in their own homes and require attention from the State, among other actions.

In historical terms, in Brazil, the sheltering of people in vulnerable situations goes back to the time of the colonial era when churches and elite families did it privately. Over the years, some of those “services” started to be provided by public authorities, in a non-organized and heterogeneous way. Since it was a “voluntary” action (thus non-obligatory), the methods, reach and selection were defined at the discretion of its executor, either public or private. Much was done in the name of charity, not representing an action of effective transformation of the social conditions of those people.

The first attempt to create a national body that coordinated actions of social work throughout the entire country, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Assistance, dates back to the 1970s. However, its major achievement took place in the 1980s with the political opening and the consolidation of many rights in the Federal Constitution enacted in 1988. It was with the Constitution that social work was strengthened and became part of the government obligations toward its citizens. Under the title of Social Security, art. 203, it was defined that:

“Social work shall be provided to those in need of it, regardless of their contribution to social security, and aims to:

I – protect the family, maternity, childhood, adolescence, and the elderly;

II – provide support to children and adolescents in need;
III – promote their integration into the labor market;

IV – provide habilitation and rehabilitation of disabled people and the promotion of their integration to the community life;

V – guarantee a minimum wage of monthly benefit to the disabled and to the elderly who prove that they do not have the means of providing for their own maintenance or to have them provided by their family, as stipulated by law”.

Hence, an important legal framework was established in the field of social work in the form of public policy, which, in turn, opened a new chapter for its realization in the years that followed. With the challenge of ensuring the universalization of such services provision, the regulation of the supply with a minimum quality control was also on the horizon. Most of the network under formation to provide such services was not under State control, but needed to be kept in line with the minimum service principles. A clear example is the elderly shelters that, up until today receive complaints with regards to mistreatment on the part of the service provider entities. The same is true for the disabled, for the homeless, or for the children and adolescents. Without a minimum service standard, abuses were always difficult to control.

Up until the mid 1990s, social work moved around different spaces within the federal sphere, from the Ministry of Inland, through the Ministry of Social Action and the Ministry of Social Welfare. The creation of the National Secretariat of Social Assistance (SAS) happened only in 1995 inside the Ministry of Social Welfare and Assistance (MPAS).

The concretization of the Organic Law of Social Work (Loas, 1993), with the functioning of the National Council of Social Work (CNAS), the National Fund of Social Work (FNAS), the National Social Work Plans (PNAS), were important advances in the consolidation of such policy. Another important breakthrough was the decentralized network, with the federation entities, with funds, councils and plans spread throughout national territory.

However, despite being inaccurate, it is possible to say that up until the end of the 20th century, a decade after the Constitution was approved, a great percentage of municipalities had no supply whatsoever of assistance services, or the coverage of security programs intended to that population. Even counting with the partner private network, a great deal of the municipalities did not have any type of service.

In President’s Lula administration, this gap was prioritized with several strategies to promote the implementation of equipment and service teams on the part of States, Municipalities, and the cooperation with partner entities. In 2003, the Ministry of Social Assistance was created, and it was merged with the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger in 2004.
However, when the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” was launched in 2010, some municipalities continued lacking supply on social work services. The BSM was not directly responsible for solving this historical problem, but has clearly served as an opportunity to structure the supply in the neediest regions. Further in this paper, the new strategies created to expand the supply, as well as to create new service modalities and to reorganize the services, will be described. Such strategies and supplies were only viable because of this history of struggles, accumulated strength and guaranteed supplies, because of this field of public social work policies.

As an example, according to table A15 of the Habitat III Report,² 96% of the Brazilian municipalities report to have some service for the elderly. Even though a significant part is still private or is the result of charity, there is a base being installed in the cities and now a challenge remains to organize them as a policy. To what extent can urban territorial planning and the access to equipment and infrastructure contribute to organize the network of social protection to the elderly? How can spatial organization contribute to the quality of life of the elderly in the cities, ensuring not only the access to social services, but also to the urban space of social interaction, with security and quality? These are the issues that connect the trajectory of the BSM formation with what was the object of discussion in Brazil’s preparation to the Habitat III, and can be used as examples for the constant perfecting of public policies.

2.2 Fight against hunger and extreme poverty

The fight against extreme poverty and hunger is another important chapter of Brazilian history. Comprised by social activists outraged with the life conditions of huge numbers of Brazilians, this movement started back in the 1940s with Josué de Castro³ and the publication of his geography of hunger in the country.⁴ Other outstanding thinkers and activists were fundamental in the trajectory that managed to call attention to the problem in national and international spheres, including it in the public agenda.

However, if recognizing the problem is important, a much tougher step is to be able to develop actual solutions to solve it. Hunger is a very complex problem, because it is within the private capacities of citizens (to access food) and the market and State conditions to supply it in an ensured and accessible way. In a country marked by deep inequalities in all of its aspects (regional, rational, gender-related,

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3. (1908-1973) Medical doctor, geographer, social scientist, politician, and Brazilian activist in fighting hunger in the whole world, he was the Chairman of FAO Executive Council, and the author of several reference works examining the mechanisms that lead to the structural hunger situation in the world, and how to fight it. See: <https://goo.gl/wclyfX>.
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etc.), hunger has also been potentiated as a mechanism for political and social control. The contradiction is heightened considering Brazil’s prominent role in worldwide agriculture, as one of the countries with the largest farmable area.

In the 1990s, Herbert de Souza, known as Betinho, launched the Action of Citizenship against Hunger, extreme poverty and for Life. This action was given international attention, placing the hunger thematic on the national agenda once more, and beginning a process of political mobilization that transcended governments and political parties. It provided the necessary pressure to create, in 1993, the National Council of Food Security (CONSEA – which was extinct in 1995, but recreated in 2003), a council that coordinated Federal Government actions regarding the theme – as well as an important place for civil society participation in the formulation and control of such initiatives.

In executive terms, there are several actions performed by public authorities in the field of fighting hunger. These include: nutritional actions of the Ministry of Health, charitable actions in the field of social work, supply regulation and price control initiatives in the Agricultural field (particularly of Family Agriculture), qualification programs in Education, among others.

Beginning with the electoral dispute in 2002, the citizenship campaign is resumed, and President Lula assumes the fight against hunger as his major administration commitment. At the start of his administration, he created the Extraordinary Ministry of Food and Nutritional Security – MESA, a the executive body responsible for ensuring his main campaign promise:

“If, at the end of my administration, each Brazilian can eat three times a day, I will have accomplished the mission of my life” (Lula, 2003, our translation).

Along with MESA, the Zero Hunger strategy was launched and became known worldwide, being the seed for the Bolsa Família Program, which will be further discussed in this article. It is noteworthy that this extraordinary Ministry was also merged into the MDS in 2004, along with the task of fighting hunger in the entire country.

If we check out the discussions in the Habitat III Report, one of the main issues posed in the new urban agenda is the access to fresh produce. This implies a change from the industrialized food base to another local production-based more natural one. To that end, food should be produced nearby urban centers, an interesting aspect addressed by the BSM based on the experience of the Food Acquisition Program described in this article. This debate is based on overcoming

5. See: <https://goo.gl/fSa0IY>.
6. “Se, ao final do meu mandato, cada brasileiro puder se alimentar três vezes ao dia, terei realizado a missão de minha vida”. See: <https://goo.gl/7UMKKE>.
what Josué de Castro has called “hidden hunger”, which exceeds the access to food and enters the reign of quality, the access to all the vitamins, minerals, etc. That is, even if a person is eating, it is possible that this is not enough to make him/her healthy. As a result, obesity trends are soaring in the urban environment.

### 2.3 The Bolsa Família (Family Allowance) Program

The Bolsa Família Program is an conditional-cash transfer (CCT) program created in 2003 to fight poverty and inequality in Brazil. To access benefits, the beneficiary low income families (income below R$ 154.00 per capita per month) need to ensure that their children are attending school, and that some health measures are regularly accomplished. They also need to be within the number of available vacancies for the Program in their municipality, calculated through population estimates based on census data. It is the biggest Latin American income transfer program, with nearly 50 million people directly benefited by it.

In addition to having incorporated some disperse programs already existent in the Federal Government (Gas Allowance, Milk Allowance, among others), but which were not proportional to the population in need, the program showed several conceptual and operational innovations that have changed the conditions of State action in this field. Starting with the worldwide famous brand, which helped the entire population, especially those who are most deprived, to understand their rights. Undoubtedly, one of the major barriers to access the State is the lack of knowledge, and this program’s campaigns were exemplary in terms of feedback.

The centralization of the payment of the benefits directly into the account of the families was another innovation that expanded the Federal Government’s management capacity in executing the program. Having a public bank, the Caixa Econômica Federal, as a partner meant that the operations of all the beneficiaries were conducted by means of monthly payrolls processed by the MDS, and paid by direct deposit into the account of each recipient. This payment, made via a Magnetic Card, allowed the recipients more mobility, and gave the government more control. Therefore, the structure designed to manage this broad set of banking operations made viable the biggest income transfer program ever done in the country, which directly benefitted more than 54 million residents (one fourth of the total population).

Added to that, a common database has been established for all the operations and beneficiaries. The Unified Registry for Social Programs (CadÚnico) became a large repository of administrative data for those people with an income below 1/2 of the minimum wage in the country. This means that half of the Brazilian population was registered and monitored based on this databank.
The idea of creating a unified database for the social programs came up before the Lula administration, but with the implementation of the PBF it was necessary to expand and improve upon it, to the point that the final version bore little resemblance to its original design – we started with a register with less than 4 million entries to one with over 20 million families. The range of the registered data increased the program control and inspection capacity, achieving an international excellence in this field. However, beyond the formal portion, it also expanded the possibilities of appraising and planning this and many other social policies. Such instrument was key for the success of the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan”, creating a mapping and priority reference for more than 30 different programs and actions.

An example more directly related to the specific aim of Habitat III can be observed in the housing policies. The relation established between the BSM and the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program was very interesting. One of the actions which will be further described in this article, the active search, has shown the need for social policies to be cross-sectional to deal with their high complexity problems. Above all in areas where there is poor access to urban conditions, where entire populations live irregularly, it was strategic to have a register (and a team of registering agents) capable of identifying such people. i.e., based on this information, and the articulation of this with other programs, many people could leave true poverty ghettos.

The availability of data on the poorest population also increased the possibilities of debating other rights and services. The access to public transport, culture, education, and the free access, started to be based on the available data, within the perspectives of ensuring such services to those enrolled with the CadÚnico. This generated a series of federal bills, as well as initiatives on the topic in the subnational sphere, all of them using the CadÚnico as a data source and selection criteria.

The PBF also had a system of decentralized monitoring and management throughout the national territory provided by the social work network. In the 27 Federation Units and in nearly all the Municipalities, social workers’ teams took part in the decentralized management of the program. With local committees, registration systems and meetings with families, the whole registering of beneficiaries, the completion of CadÚnico forms, and support to the families in complying with the conditions were the responsibility of a broad network of professionals.

8. Brazilian housing program intended for several income ranges, but with specific ranges for popular housing. The criterium for the definition of the range are the following: the property location – in the city or in the countryside – household income, and value of the housing unit. See: <https://goo.gl/3y5ZG9>.
However, the network mobilization did not end with the Assistance. The health and education teams were also activated to ensure the good functioning of the PBF. It is estimated that over 32 thousand public servants in all the federation entities actively took part in this operation.

This process of expansion and integration of networks was deeply related to the rising levels of professionalization in public management. Both in regards to qualification (whereby the action of qualifying was broad and permanent) and to the development of routines and technologies of information exchange between public policies networks, the BSM had major benefits in the improvement of the conditions of the service provision by the public service itself.  

At last, the conditions of the CCT. When it was proposed that the benefit should be contingent on the compliance of conditions, serious doubts about its validity were raised. Questions were made regarding the principle, since a right should not be conditioned, as well as the validity of its application (many believed that the health and education public systems could not absorb the demand of the program monitoring).

The conditions showed themselves to be essential in expanding the guarantee of other rights. More than pushing families to comply with it, the conditions assumed the role of mapping shortages of the Brazilian State supply in the fields of Social Assistance, Health and Education (with the CadÚnico registrations, they went beyond that). Thus, it is possible to say that the Bolsa Família has reoriented the services and priorities with focus on the locations of the poorest people, generally those more deprived of the presence of the State.

The PBF ended up being a supplementary synthesis of the fight to end poverty and of the guarantee of the rights of social assistance. And, with the creation of the MDS, this program was key to be added to the two trajectories of struggle, in the Ministry that became the coordinator of the actions to fight poverty in the whole Federal Government.

2.4 The MDS
The Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger, created in 2004, assumed the main role of social field coordination in the government. By linking up social work demands with the fight against hunger, a set of Brazilian contradictions that needed to be addressed and resolved in these fields also came together. The urban world, approached by specific cases of poverty in the cities, and the rural world with its needs due to historic isolation and the lack of public attention; the outskirts, posed as central because of the concentration of exclusion, as opposed to

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the centers where poverty fights for its inclusion. Throughout the whole country, facing the reality of regional and local inequalities, between State and municipal capacities given their scales and location. And those people already included and who try to maintain their often not very prosperous living conditions, with excluded groups that fight for different types of inclusion. Not to mention the traditional peoples and communities, gender, race, color, and age groups. All those dimensions were posed as challenges once the ministry was created.

In 2010, from the condition of synthesizer and organizer, the MDS was taken to the condition of the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” coordinator. A short term Plan, with clear goals and several agents, whose complexity and history will be explained below.

3 THE “BRAZIL WITHOUT EXTREME POVERTY PLAN” – DESIGN AND CHALLENGES

The “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” was launched in fulfillment of the motto of the newly elected administration of President Dilma Rousseff: “A rich country is a country without poverty”. The BSM was an articulated suite of actions and programs intended to face a major challenge: to overcome extreme poverty in 4 years.

Different to what used to happen with most of the actions of the State, when created with a defined time horizon, this plan had a validity deadline, a horizon by which it was necessary for the whole of it to be successful, for the plan to succeed. The accomplishment of individual goals for each action or program would be insufficient for the miserable people to overcome extreme poverty.

To that end, it was firstly essential to agree on a single concept of poverty, the so-called multidimensional poverty. Not only the families that did not have money (income or properties) were considered poor or extremely poor, but also those people whose life conditions were regarded as precarious. In this aggregation, several variables were included, such as the access to consumption goods, in addition to the access to rights and public services in general.

Based on a predefined diagnosis (new studies were not demanded, the assumption was that the areas know their difficulties, they only do not have conditions to overcome them), multiple variables in the government databanks were crossed, including official statistics (PNAD and IBGE Census) and administrative records (CadÚnico and other available databanks of social policies). An aggregate of general information was consolidated, with the possibility of opening for national, regional, local and individual diagnoses in regard to these crossed variables. In addition, the “face” of Brazilian poverty was unveiled, allowing to adjusting priority demands for each type of specific mapped population. Indicators, such as public equipment with which most of the users were benefited in the social programs,
were broadly used when it was observed that such variable was a valuable proxy\textsuperscript{12} for the reorientation of policies.

To that end, the Unified Registry was strategic, ensuring that a good diagnosis could support the mapping and location of poverty. It was discovered that the hardcore of Brazilian extreme poverty was comprised by black people (71%), from the Northeast region (60%), and mostly children with ages between 0 and 14 (40%). Such picture varied according to the region, State or Municipality, and the Plan was capable of showing in detail the features of each of them. The CadÚnico became a structure shared by more than 30 federal actions and of other federate entities. Based on it, reports were produced (Mostafa, 2016). The “BSM in your municipality” and “BSM in your State” empowered the social areas of the State and Local governments in discussing their priorities. Considering that it was a national definition and with guaranteed funds, Mayor and Governors started to pay more attention to this set of programs than before the BSM. Based on the national call produced by the Plan, it created a national movement transforming the priorities of public authorities in the most diverse locations.

Within the Federal sphere, with this diagnosis available, it was possible to carefully select the set of programs and actions that would be part of the Plan. Given the guarantee that the funds would be earmarked in this execution (they could not be used for contingencies), a competition ended up being created between public bodies for their inclusion in the Plan and to be earmarked as a priority.

It was also very important to define the MDS as the BSM coordinator body. Since it was a novelty to have a “sectoral” body\textsuperscript{13} coordinating an inter-ministerial action of the scale of the Plan, it was important that this Ministry could face restrictive positions coming from the Ministries of Finances and Planning. On the other hand, since a sectoral body did not use to have such a power in the government decision-making process, it imposed to other participants of the plan specific conditions to honor their commitments. Clear goals were agreed on with all the bodies that have programs and actions in the plan, which followed a relatively strict time schedule of execution monitoring meetings. The coordination structure, with hierarchy among bodies, was also key in the BSM design, along with the incentives given to ensure its realization.

\textsuperscript{12}Proxy is a statistical concept for indicators that “approximately” serve as reference for others. In this case, not all the poverty is manifested by the number of beneficiaries, but there is a broad and significant set of public equipment that corresponds to the concept.

\textsuperscript{13}It is a jargon in the Federal Public Administration to define as central those bodies with influence and veto power in the decision-making process. The sectoral bodies are responsible for specific themes of the Government. Ministries related to finance, budget, planning or the Presidency of the Republic used to have a higher capacity of interfering with the others’ decisions.
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The Plan obliged the Brazilian State to rethink its actions, prioritizing groups 
and places with higher poverty concentration. In this reorientation, universal 
actions were also included, when the universality was seen as a goal which allowed 
for new supplies to be prioritized in more deprived regions.

The BSM was built on three axes (aggregates of programs and actions): 
i) guarantee of income, ii) productive inclusion, and iii) access to services. 
Having the poverty map described as the base, those axes were materialized in 
strategies intended to increase the opportunities in several dimensions to increase 
income (benefits and opportunities) and to improve life conditions (supply of services). 
More than 100 actions were listed in this plan, executing a total of more than 
R$ 100 billion in 4 years.14

This was possible thanks to the use of agile mechanisms of execution of 
already existent policies that were adapted to the purposes of the plan: fund-to-fund 
transfer structures in policies where they already existed; mobilization of public 
policies systems, taking advantage of the already existing capillarity in their 
networks, such as the Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS), National System 
of Food and Nutritional Security (SISAN), Unified Health System (SUS), and the 
entire educational network in their various levels. The BSM influenced even those 
systems, given the prioritization proposed to attain the objective of overcoming 
extreme poverty. With many actions performed, the most significant one being 
the so-called Active Search.

With the mobilization of all public servants of this set of public policies 
networks, a joint effort was done to “find people living in extreme poverty”. 
One of the major challenges of working with such a population is that their exclusion 
conditions frequently made the State oblivious to them. A big campaign was 
performed based on the idea that “from now on, the poorest people will no longer 
have to run after the State, but rather the State will have to run after poverty” 
(Minister of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger, Tereza Campello).15 
In addition, based on it, several mechanisms of register integration, visit routines, 
and means of control were modified and developed to materialize the search for 
the poor by the State. Over 1.3 million citizens that had until then been unknown 
were found and guided to access their rights. This is one among so many examples 
through which new means of operation, new actions or priorities were materialized 
based on the Plan.

14. USD 40 billion (by that time). 
15. BARROCAL, 2011.
Therefore, with a well defined common purpose (overcoming extreme poverty), and a clear time span (4 years), the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” has shown that with political decisiveness and coordination capacity, the State can reach the most in need with its public policies. The results were overwhelming, as we will see as follows:

3.1 Rural and urban productive inclusion
There were several results from the BSM in the field of productive inclusion. However, even more impressive than the results are the changes performed in the State structure to make them possible. There are multiple examples.

The Food Purchase Program (PPA), created in the administration of former President Lula, was the window opened in the government market for the participation of the small rural producer. As known, the State is one of the biggest institutional consumers in the country, purchasing on a daily basis millions of goods and products for its own consumption and for the people. From meals in hospitals, universities, children day-care to meals offered in schools, army battalions or even the coffee in public divisions, the daily consumption of this machine is huge. However, for bureaucratic reasons, the acquisition of such goods was consolidated through a public bidding – a regulated, transparent (in theory) and clear procedure to allow for free competition among companies interested in selling to the public. To simplify the procedure, the decision is historically to buy in big volumes, reducing costs and time for the acquisition. As the result, the State has created a concentrated market of suppliers specialized in supplying with scale and expertise to win the bureaucratic rite.

In practical terms, the market concentration also resulted in the creation of several cartels in the whole country, which monopolized many of such supplies, sometimes agreeing on prices and results, not always ensuring the best product for the lowest prices. To face these market reserves aiming to open them it to new suppliers interested in supplying to the State was itself a big challenge.

However, the political decision made by the Government was not only to open the market, but also to create specific mechanisms to allow small local producers (places nearby to where people consume the goods) to also supply to the state demands. The PPA was created, a simplified mechanism of food acquisition started by the National Supply Company – CONAB, and then spread throughout all the federation entities.

The PPA has mediated the interest of the small producer, who got a new market, with the interest of local people, who started to consume better quality food. More than that, it allowed the diversification of purchases, providing for given regions the common goods consumed in their food culture (in national biddings, cookies
and soft drinks were common because of the easy access and distribution). In addition, it resulted in reduced prices of such food for the State due to competition.

There is a whole chapter of discussion about the risks implied in national biddings, many times delayed or cancelled by the State. However, beyond the risk, there were huge advantages for public authorities, the small producer and the local population with the innovation of such mechanism. The PAA was already a successful program when the BSM was created, but there was still a set of potential partners that could be involved, and were involved after the plan.

Another initiative for income generation in the rural world, based on the Plan, was the creation of the Rural Technical Assistance Network – ATER. Another major demand from rural producers was the support to improve their production, and with the creation of the Rural Technical Assistance Network they started to have access to specific technologies for their crop. Even the application of specific technologies for certain climates via Embrapa (Brazilian Company of Agricultural Research), which used to prioritize large-scale agriculture and methods for seed maintenance were taken to the small rural producers.

In addition to the productive issue, a significant portion of the Brazilian poor rural population lived in the dark. More than 15 million Brazilians did not have access to electricity. This means not having light at night, but also not being able to properly preserve food in refrigerators, or even to enjoy other activities with the use of power. Also created during Lula’s administration, the Light for All (Luz para Todos) was an electrification program that made electric power available to the whole population. Already in progress before Dilma’s administration, with the BSM this program was intensified to ensure electric power to all those who did not have access to it.

The same took place with regards to the access to water. If light was a problem, what to say about droughts? A chronic and historic problem in Brazil, the lack of access to water had never been actually included in the State agenda to be solved. The Water for All (Água para Todos) program was created during Lula’s administration. Moreover, the goal of delivering one Million Cisterns was exceeded after the implementation of the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan”. In addition to ensuring drinking water for more than 1.1 million families, it allowed hundreds of thousands of small producers to have water to improve their production – from crops to cattle breeding. That is, for the poor rural world the program has qualitatively changed the scenario, and for the first time in Brazilian history the semi-arid region could face drought with no deaths, nor migrations.

16. The Water for All Program was based on the historical experience of the Semiarid Articulation (ASA), a social movement of struggle against drought that had already developed the technology of cisterns. The Federal Government, in partnership with such movement, managed to replicate the experience, expanding its reach. <https://goo.gl/V4EhW4>.
There is still a broader set of initiatives created in this field such as the credit of *Fomento* or the *Bolsa Verde* that were benefits created to gather efforts for fighting rural poverty with sustainable development. Such initiatives are better described in the reports of the programs management, whose references are presented at the end of this paper (Brasil, 2015).

In the cities, efforts were carried out in other fields. There are countless examples of initiatives intended to expand the rights of the people living in extreme urban poverty. Differently from the rural world, in which the issue of their own production is key, in the cities the professional qualification or the supply of services are the better opportunities.

Under such circumstances, the Pronatec – National Program of Technical Education, was an important initiative to democratize the access of the low-income population to professional qualification. Historically focused on the supply to middle class workers, with full middle school education (high school equivalent) and in transition of jobs, the Pronatec helped the poorest people facing the barriers to access professionalizing courses. From the looks to the material conditions, the program managed to facilitate the access of such population and help it get a better position in the job market. As a result, over 6 million men and women workers graduate from several courses and in different expertise fields. Among the innovations, beyond the prioritization of vacancies, timetables were changed to facilitate the students’ attendance to the courses; snacks and allowances for transportation were provided; and a whole sensitization work was performed with the teachers’ involved to welcome those groups who were different from the usual students in terms of their language and looks. The importance of such an initiative, for those who change jobs or get their first job, was clear at each graduation ceremony performed throughout the country. The profile of course attendants, converging with the poverty face diagnosed at the beginning of the plan, showed the success of the efforts made. More than 65% were women, 47% were young people between 18 and 29 years of age, and 53% were black people in more than 3,500 municipalities.

Also in the urban productive inclusion, an important effort was done in the bureaucratic field of enterprise formalization. The regulation of a new legal entity for economic enterprises had a great impact on the poorest population – the Micro Individual Entrepreneur – MEI. It was huge the impact of such a measure on the people, which allowed to regularize 5 million economic initiatives, which until then had been informal. Of those, nearly 25% were done by people registered in the CadÚnico (in other words, families with an income level below half the minimum wage per capita), and 10% were citizens participants of the *Bolsa Família* program (below ¼ of the minimum wage per capita in the family). That is, once again the thesis according to which poor people do work, work a lot, and only remain poor because they earn little money was evidenced (BRASIL, 2014).
The MEI became an important base to firm economic initiatives and to allow breaking the poverty circle by transforming such initiatives into formal enterprises with access to the set of promotion policies in place for those workers – credit, assistance and social guarantees.

The last exemplary front in this field was the expansion of the Crescer credit program. This program of facilitated conditions for Oriented Productive Microcredit has reached more than 10 million operations, of which 1/3 was done by people participant of the Bolsa Família Program. Another indication that the poor work and want to work, and that they only lack the means to do so.

### 3.2 Access to services

The same process of institutional innovation also took place in the field of access to rights and services. In Early Childhood Education, mechanisms were created to induce the supply of day-care centers in municipalities where the poor had less access. The MDS, in partnership with the Ministry of Education, developed a mechanism to supplement the provision of Day-Care centers in those Municipalities, when the expansion of such provision was performed according to the map of the most deprived regions as per the indicators developed in the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan”. With this, the logic of day-care centers supply was inverted, prioritizing places where the lowest income population lived, expanding the availability of such services to that population. Again, different from the traditional logic through which public authorities expand the supply to places where they are easier to install (generally, central regions with higher purchasing power), the poor could witness the expansion of vacancies where they were needed.17

A similar mechanism was used to expand the provision of full time Education, a modality created during Dilma’s administration, to use public education facilities during periods when they used to be vacant, with activities supplementing school activities. Besides keeping young people busy, reducing the risk of idleness and releasing the parents for other activities outside the home, this was also responsible for increasing learning opportunities for those children and young people. The initial provision of vacancies was restricted to the facilities with better installation conditions (asphalt, electricity, piped water, sewerage, regular land, etc.), therefore the least poor. The application of an induction mechanism reversed this trend already in the years following its expansion. Of the 58 thousand schools that offered the service up until the end of 2014, more than 35 thousand had most of the students registered in the Bolsa Família program (therefore, poor).

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17. It is noteworthy that in many regions, middle class families filed complaints in court to allow their children to have access to the vacancies intended for the poorest. The judicialization of the vacancies was an important obstacle for the implementation of the Plan in this field.
Despite having been created outside the BSM, the *Mais Médicos* (More Doctors) program ended up included in the Plan because of its capacity of generating medical service supply where it didn’t exist before. The use of CadÚnico data and indicators, the articulation between the Unified Health System and the poverty data, allowed the program to be successful in reaching the people most in need. The same happened with the provision of Social Assistance services, which also went through several innovations with important results. Among them, the main one is perhaps the creation of 1,256 mobile Teams of Assistance that started to see families outside the fixed Social Assistance facilities, such as the CRAS and the CREAS (Reference Centers). To support his work, new assistance equipment were also created, as the boat CRAS that took the service to riverside regions with no land access.

### 3.3 Guarantee of Income

Innovations were not only done in the productive inclusion and in the access to services. If between 2004 and 2010, when the *Bolsa Família* program was created, the priority was to register and include families in the benefit (the number of beneficiaries increased to as much as 14 million families), between 2011 and 2014, with the BSM, adjustments in the benefit payment were made to effectively overcome poverty. Many families even received funds, but their income remained below that one characterizing extreme poverty in Brazil.

Among the several improvements of the *Bolsa Família* Program, two are noteworthy. The creation of a Benefit for pregnant and breast-feeding women ensures a higher attention to families with newly born children requiring more attention. Thus, the priority care for those new generations was ensured from conception to birth, important years for the body formation.

It was also diagnosed that for many families the PBF benefit was not sufficient for them to overcome the extreme poverty line defined for the program. Therefore, the Benefit to overcome extreme poverty was created to ensure that the *Bolsa Família* rules did not restrict the beneficiaries to crossing this line. Such changes were fundamental for those 22 million people who left extreme poverty in the period of the Plan.

It is obvious that the mere inclusion of beneficiaries in the consumption market is insufficient to effectively improve their life conditions. The rationale of the market itself, concentrator and centralizer of economic activities, is not an inclusive mechanism, even for those who want to work. However, receiving the benefit, in addition to improving the consumption capacity of the family, also proved to be an important mechanism to improve local economic conditions. If it is true that poverty is concentrated in the outskirts and in isolated places, the funds injected in the local economy by those benefits brought about major advances to the communities.
Such hypothesis was tested and proved right. The multiplying effect calculated for the benefit is nearly 1.78, that is, for each USD1.00 spent by a beneficiary, more than USD1.78 circulate in the economy. This implies a mechanism of income distribution among individuals, but also shows a facet of the economic opportunities distribution in spatial terms. Somehow, economic development was much better distributed after the program.18

3.4 General facts
Beyond these results, the MDS also managed to gather the impacts of the set of policies carried out. As it had a Secretariat specialized in appraising and monitoring its policies in place (the Secretariat of Evaluation and Management of the Information – SAGI), it was possible to monitor the execution and the consequences of the Plan as a whole.

Some of these results obviously derive from actions precedent to the start of the BSM. Yet it was important to record them to demonstrate the dimensions of each factor in the achievement of the results.

An example of this was to observe the reduction in child mortality due to some diseases whose causes are directly related to poverty. The 46% drop in the number of deaths of 0 to 6 year old children because of diarrhea, and 58% because of malnutrition, which is directly related to the Bolsa Família Program, certainly calls attention (Brasil, 2014).

There was also a major reduction in the number of heads of household with no education whatsoever. While, this figure was reduced by 24% in the whole population, among the 5% poorest people the reduction was of 36% for the number of people with no education in those families. Out of these, 138% more people have completed fundamental education (6 to 14 years old). The increased school attendance of the poorest children has resulted in the reduced difference between age-school year, with the average population of more than 36%.

Amidst the poorest, the access to water went from 60% to 80%, along with improvements in the sewerage system. In terms of electric power, the increase was from 84% to 97% amongst the poorest, with a consequent increase of 68% in the number of families possessing refrigerators and freezers.

The World Bank has developed an indicator called “chronic poverty” to multi-dimensionally analyze the access of poor people to proper life conditions in a given country. This summary indicator considers the income and other poverty dimensions in a weighted manner.

18. Ipea, 2016. p. 81. In discussing urban economy, there are affirmations about the importance of the territory in materializing public policies and their integration.
Considering the “chronic poverty”, the reduction of inequalities in Brazil during the 4 years of the BSM is undeniable, in all its analyzed dimensions (Januzzi, 2015). And if such inequalities (regional, per color, urban and rural) were reduced as the result of this set of policies, it also becomes clear that such a reduction could have happened before should there be political decisiveness and technical competence for its accomplishment. Consequently, the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” proves that it is possible for the State to act more inclusively, provided that there is determination to that end in the State machine, as we will further discuss.

4 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS-LEARNED

The “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” brings about important lessons-learned that should be systematized to be understood and applied in other contexts. Upon being presented as a successful experience of coordination and execution of a multisectoral set of actions with a common purpose, the experience accumulated by the Plan is broad.

The first topic perceived as a success factor was the determination of horizontality in the public action. Since its conception, even with defined hierarchies, the BSM stressed the management shared with partner bodies. Based on a voluntary adhesion, when each partner has offered its possibilities of execution, there was a side-by-side commitment of all the involved bodies. To that end, the existence or creation of proper execution instruments, duly diagnosed according to their capacity to deliver the committed goals, were fundamental. Since the Plan defined a political priority coming from the Presidency of the Republic itself, the clear definition of this public action coordination ensured that the MDS had information and commitment on the part of the other participants, as well as the later had access to the proper financial and political resources to fulfill their pacts.

And such pacts were not only agreed on between federal bodies, but also with all the federate entities. Somehow, from the signal nationally given, a true joint effort to overcome extreme poverty took place throughout the country.

From an internal point of view, the existence of teams available to serve the partners during the Plan execution was essential. The creation of the Extraordinary Secretariat to Overcome Extreme Poverty (SESEP) in the MDS, and the functioning of its multiple Situation Rooms with goals and updated data of several public policies were key for this implementation. Such management capacity has also created a permanent feedback system to the bodies and decision-making structures of the government itself, including the Presidency of the Republic. With information, it was possible to ensure that public recognition was given to each goal accomplished, and therefore the sharing of the generated political capital with all the agents
involved in the joint effort. With the clear delegation of the role of Coordination to the MDS, and its empowerment before central management bodies of the Plan (Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finances, and Chief of Staff Office), more than R$ 110 billion\(^{19}\) of the budget were executed in the 4 years of the BSM, with a commitment rate of 95%, and a payment rate of 88%, on average.

Apart from the Plan management instances, the transparency and the means to access information were also strategic to maintain the legitimacy of the actions in progress. There was a permanent availability of portals, bulletins and other means of access to information.

Whether the legacies resulting from the BSM will be permanent or not is a question to be answered by history. The discontinuity of the actions performed, the disruption of the public policies in progress, or even removing the priority of the fight against poverty from the government agenda, can possibly occur, and might be prejudicial to the maintenance of accomplishments.\(^{20}\) Furthermore, structuring variables, such as the minimum guarantee of resources, but that keeps people isolated living on the outskirts might not be a perennial and transforming action, a fact that will be evidenced in the coming years.

The BSM was the result of the synthesis of social struggles that came together inside the Brazilian State, and materialized in an action plan. It is possible to understand that we have left the fight against hunger and arrived at the goal of overcoming poverty, and this passage is part of the trajectory of the struggle of the excluded people for more rights. Perhaps it is this trajectory and the maintenance of pressure through struggles that are the main mechanisms to prevent setbacks, and to ensure even more advances in this field of the access to social rights. The BSM proves that it is possible to rethink the State with more inclusive actions, provided that there is political decisiveness and concrete priority in this regard. As well as the motto of the Plan, we can reflect that if “the end of Extreme Poverty is just a beginning”, there is still a long way ahead to build a fair country. Undoubtedly, in addition to contributing to material transformation of the reality of tens of millions of people, the accomplishment of the “Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan” in itself is a demonstration that this path is possible.

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19. USD 40 billion (by that time).

20. One of the most perverse effects of a successful public policy is it losing importance in the national agenda. If, when elected, President Lula regarded poverty as a public opinion topic, upon finishing her mandate, President Dilma no longer had the public opinion concerned with this subject. Therefore, it is necessary to understand this relation between the popularity of an agenda and its resolution capacity to keep its priority. The Brazilian inequality which has significantly dropped in the analyzed period is still far from being anywhere close to that of central countries – however, the topic is no longer on the public agenda, and it is increasingly difficult to realize policies with that aim.
REFERENCES


The manuscripts in languages other than Portuguese published herein have not been proofread.
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