The field of regional planning has special interest for a review of technical assistance in Greece. For one thing, it is one of the fields in which OECD's own technical assistance to Greece has been heavily concentrated, the other being the programming of education. In addition, the regional planning efforts in Greece thus far have been relatively self-contained and the results relatively clear, so that evaluation can be somewhat more precise than for projects which cover a very small part of the national economy, whose effectiveness depends on a host of external factors and whose impact is buried in a welter of events and forces affecting the result, such as training trade union leaders or a productivity center.

As the term is used in this evaluation, regional planning has three main aspects. It means first of all the preparation of development plans for particular regions (city, depressed area, state, province, or other political and geographical subdivision) as a separate economy. Secondly, it means testing the consistency of regional plans with each other and with the national plan. Third, it means putting "space tags" on projects in the national

( ) The author wishes to express his obligation to members of the Regional Service in Greece and of the OECD. In particular, he wishes to express his appreciation for the help of Mr. Giulio Fossi, of OECD, whose unique experience with both the Sardinia and Epirus projects make him a gold mine of information on the subject. It should be clear, however, that the analysis and views presented below are those of the author alone and do not commit anyone else connected with regional planning in Greece to the same interpretation and conclusion.
plan, with two objectives in mind: (a) to assure the best possible location of industry and (b) to reduce gaps in productivity and income among various regions in the country. All three types of regional planning are included in the stated objectives of the Greek Government.

**History of Greek Regional Planning**

Planning for regional development is of rather recent origin in Greece. It was not until 1957 that the Greek Government took formal steps to launch a process of systematic regional planning. In that year the Government decided to participate in the European Productivity Agency project for the creation of "trial and demonstration areas". This Greek venture followed on the heels of a similar project in Sardinia, undertaken by the EPA on the request of the Italian Government. Thus the decision to establish a trial and demonstration area in Greece represented an acceptance by the Greek Government of a programme already established by EPA/GREC, (1) and the Greek team was in a position to benefit from the earlier experience in Sardinia.

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(1) In 1956, the Italian Government elaborated a development scheme covering the period 1954-64. A special programme for the development of Southern Italy had been launched in 1950 and a Special Agency, the "Cassa per il Mezzogiorno", had been established to implement it. A comprehensive regional development programme was to be elaborated for the whole of Sardinia. The GREC and the Italian Government then decided to use the island to experiment with new and more effective methods of technical assistance, designed to secure more popular participation. The results of the experiment were to be applied subsequently to the whole of Southern Italy and to other European regions having similar characteristics. Those responsible for setting up the trial and demonstration area in Sardinia found that no comprehensive development programme had been elaborated, and that there was no specific regional investment programme to which technical assistance could be directly related. The "Pilot Project" for Sardinia was started nevertheless, as the regional development programme was in the process of being elaborated and was to be ready "very soon". The pilot area was 170,000 hectares, including 41 communes, with a total population of 110,000 inhabitants. It had been selected as approximately representative of the rest of the island (28% was plains, with a part having irrigation possibilities, 45% was hills and 27% mountains). The GREC was accorded responsibility for the management of the pilot area through an International Committee.
After an initial exploratory mission provided by the EPA/OECD, the province of Epirus was selected for the first regional development planning operation. A "trial and demonstration area" was selected within the region of Epirus, consisting of the districts of Konitsa, Zagori and Paraclemos. The EPA mission recommended that the two operations be undertaken simultaneously; the elaboration of a general plan for the economic development of the Epirus region and the setting up of a trial and demonstration area "which would constitute a kind of trial and practical application laboratory for the regional plan". The general idea was to raise productivity and living level in the zone enough to demonstrate the possibilities for developing the whole region of Epirus, as an alternative to depopulation of the region by emigration.

The "Epirus Project" was started in 1958, financed from Greek Government funds, on the basis of a programme elaborated by a National Committee for Epirus, comprising representatives of the various public and semi-public Greek organisations, under the general sponsorship of the Ministry of Co-ordination. Programme implementation was entrusted to a special project staff (about 45 persons, most of them in the field), in cooperation with all the competent Government Services, and under the guidance of an Executive Committee located in Jannina (the chief town of Epirus).

In contrast to the Sardinia project, where foreign experts accounted for a large proportion of the total effort, the technical assistance contribution in Epirus was a small fraction of the total investment of human and capital resources, in accordance with the wishes of the Greek Government.

The role of EPA was in fact limited to supplying the following technical assistance, at the request of the
Greek authorities:

(a) A group of three international experts to follow the elaboration and implementation of the programmes. The group held two or three meetings a year until 1960, then once a year till 1962.

(b) The provision of experts and consultants, the organization of study visits abroad, an exchange of experience with the Trial and Demonstration Area in Sardinia.

(c) A permanent adviser, who was also the permanent representative of the Organisation in Greece (domiciled in Athens and visiting Epirus periodically), until 1960.

Regional Planning and OECD Reports. The initial report of the OECD team included an inventory of the natural resources and the economic and demographic situation of the region, an indication of the basic elements of a regional plan, and a suggestion of the methods to be applied in the elaboration and execution of the regional plan. This initial report also included suggestions for immediate action to be undertaken in the first trial and demonstration zone.

With regard to the fundamental elements of the regional plan, this first report indicated some priorities with regard to investment in the region. It regarded as particularly essential the establishment of transport and communications facilities for the region, the extension of electrification, some irrigation and flood control works, some land reform, and re-orientation of agricultural activities in the three "natural sectors" of the region: in the irrigated sector, intensive cultivation of fruits and vegetables and production of beets and other fodder for livestock; in the
foothills, the progressive replacement of sheep and goats with cattle; and in the mountain areas the expansion of forestry. It also suggested the development of pig husbandry, with strains adapted to the conditions of the region, improved marketing facilities, progressive industrialization of the region through the creation of establishments to process agricultural products, better transport facilities (especially roads) and the development of tourism. The importance of education, including vocational training and the popularization of technological progress, was also emphasized.

During 1958, the assistance provided through the European Productivity Agency consisted of the continuous presence of one high-level planner and the occasional presence of another, supported by a group of international experts, including a number of Greeks. The Central Committee for Epirus held several meetings during this period to consider the studies made by the experts. During 1958 and 1959, the EFA provided an experienced Italian expert, who put together a detailed survey of the entire region and made some recommendations for the preparation of the regional plan. He had the assistance of three Greek economists.

During 1959, the Greek Government itself obtained directly the assistance of a team of economists from the Italian organisation Svimex, which had the major responsibility for preparing plans for the Italian South. The national development plan prepared by this team was submitted to the Central Committee, and to the international experts, at a meeting held in Athens in June 1960, for application at the regional level.

The activities of the EFA/OECD in the field of regional planning resulted in the inclusion in the 1960-1964
Five-year Programme for the Economic Development of Greece of a brief section on regional development policy. The Chapter on regional development in the National Plan was very short and presented no data. Meanwhile, experts concerned with both the Epirus Development Plan and with the trial and demonstration area, had to work without any guidance in the form of a regionally disaggregated national plan. However, the national plan did commit the Greek Government to a policy of regional development which would reduce the gaps in productivity and income among regions. It stated that:

"The regional development effort has been directed towards an integrated growth of the less-developed regions of the country. Epirus was chosen as the first region for such an intervention. The effort undertaken by the Government, within the present programme, to eliminate the obstacles which hinder a balanced growth, among the regions of the country, is directed, on the one hand, towards furthering the development of immediately productive activities, and on the other, towards securing the formation of the required fixed social capital in the various areas."

By the time the five-year programme was prepared, it had been decided to extend regional development activities to Western Peloponnese. Some time later, Crete was added as a third area for a concentrated effort in regional development.

Actual operations began in the trial and demonstration area considerably before the implementation of any formal, comprehensive plan for the region as a whole. The Planning and execution of projects for the trial and demonstration area benefited from technical assistance from UNESCO as well as from OECD. OECD consultants included an expert for sociological village studies, two experts on fruit trees, one for forestry, and for adult education, two for public health, one for cheese production, one for community development and two for handi- crafts. The length of their missions varied considerably and in most cases were not beyond two or three months. They were
not set up as a "team". The general planner provided by OECD remained available for the work on the trial and demonstration area, and three agronomists were also provided by OECD. A city planner, a fisheries expert and a mechanical engineer (for a téléférique) completed the team.

While the general planning for the whole of Epirus was still continuing, public investments were already being undertaken in the pilot zone. In 1960, in the first report of the experts of the European Productivity Agency (OECD), the team felt able to write:

"The work accomplished by the trial and demonstration area since its origin is remarkable, as much in its orientation as in the results obtained on the spot. We can congratulate without reservation the executive committee which has assumed the responsibility, as well as its Director, and the combination of services and agencies which have collaborated in the success of this undertaking."

The report takes note of various kinds of investment made in the infrastructure, both physical and human. In the field of transport and communications, the report states:

"The zone has established its programme of road communications and the chronological order for their undertaking, completed studies of several hundred kilometers of roads and particularly difficult traces, and had launched by the 1st June, 1960, the opening of several dozen kilometers of mountain routes destined to "free" the villages of Zagori, until now deprived of any other means of communication than donkey paths."

In the field of energy, the zone had installed some power lines and created some new centres of energy production, while electrifying several dozen villages. In the fields of irrigation and sanitation, the zone had surveyed and executed the irrigation of several hundred hectares on the plains of Konitsa, as well as at Sitaria, Castania and Pighis. It had made studies for the irrigation of 3,000 hectares in the district of Pavacalamos-Doliana, and this project was under
way under the auspices of the agricultural services. Irrigation surveys of 75 mountain villages had also been made. By the end of 1960 fourteen of these had been completed, while 26 more were expected to be finished in 1961 and the remaining 35 during 1962. In the field of education, the zone had reformed and modernised the agricultural school Anagnostopoulos at Konitsa, had organised an extension service for the whole of the zone and had constituted in the various communities agricultural associations for technological progress, and had created 22 adult education centres with help from UNESCO. OECD helped to develop modern methods of education in the centres by providing a visual aid specialist. In the field of agriculture, the zone authorities had organised the preparation of the soil and the reorientation of cultivation in the Knitsa plain, in view of the expected irrigation. They also made some installations and demonstrations of the effects of irrigation. It had encouraged technological progress in the whole zone for fruit trees, horticulture, and animal husbandry.

It was recognised from the outset, by both foreign experts and Greek authorities, that preparation of plans for the trial and demonstration project was handicapped by the lack of any plan for the region as a whole, and by the lack of a national development plan broken down by regions. Given the difficulties of area planning in the absence of regional planning, the interest of the Greek authorities seems to have shifted gradually away from the trial and development area as such to planning for Epirus as a whole. The preliminary five-year programme was approved in April, 1960. This plan, however, consisted essentially of aggregative projections, similar in nature to those in the five-year programme for the
country as a whole. The Greek authorities apparently felt that it was important to translate this programme into sets of specific projects as quickly as possible. This situation led the OECD experts for Epirus and the pilot zone to write in their second report of 8th May, 1961:

"A Regional Planning Department was set up in September 1960, and a scheme is in hand to form a central committee for regional development with a possibility of prolonged action with the authorities through an advisory body to be formed from it. The result has been a gradual change in the significance of the trial and development area in the planning scheme as a whole. Although originally intended to serve as an example, it will in future be only one element in the general scheme."

The OECD experts lamented the tendency to extend to other areas in the Epirus region the kind of activities which had already been undertaken in the trial and demonstration area. The common features of projects for the area and for the Epirus region as a whole, they pointed out, accentuated the tendency to extend to all comparable areas in the region the activities then under way in the demonstration area. They added:

"The experts recommend that such extensions should be strictly exceptional and limited to cases of necessity so that trial and demonstration activities can remain chiefly concentrated on the area."

The experts then stated a general principle, indicating their approach to the relationship between the trial and demonstration project and the regional development plan:

"It is, in fact, necessary to the success of this demonstration that the area should all the time show definitely more progress than the neighbouring sectors, as rapidity in results in proportion to the methods adopted and the means employed is the essential feature of this demonstration."

In May 1962 the senior planner and two new OECD experts paid a visit to Epirus, including the trial and demonstration area. Following the lead of the Greek Govern-
ment, the team at this stage laid its emphasis on the regional development plan, and had relatively little to say about the trial and demonstration area. Indeed at this point the OECD exports expressed some reservations about the trial and demonstration project:

“It was, however, clear from the start that Epirus was not sufficiently self-contained unit for the activity of a trial and demonstration area to take full effect, or even to be of any use in certain fields, such as industrialisation or tourism. The circumstances compelled the organisation for administering it to go beyond these limits and extend its activity to the whole province.”

However, they did feel that the pilot zone “can continue to serve as a laboratory for the development of the region in many spheres”. They suggested several studies: comparative cost-benefit analyses of irrigation systems on holdings of different structures; a study of ways of spreading knowledge of irrigated farming; comparative studies in the selection and yield of livestock breeds; methods of consolidating re-grouping holdings and determining the most economic size of farm, depending on the nature of the soil; the adaptation of co-operative methods to suit the prevailing outlook of the population; adult education; ways of spreading knowledge about balanced nutrition; and the possibilities of rural handicrafts, etc.

**Results in the Pilot Zone**

These recommendations led to a new agreement between the Greek Ministry of Co-ordination and the OECD for the OECD financing of a study by a Greek economist, with three assistants, of the results of the trial and demonstration project to date. This agreement was made at the beginning of 1963 and resulted in a report which was completed in December, 1963. This report, while coldly factual, is none-theless highly revealing.
Gross capital formation in the zone during the years 1957 to 1961 amounted to 165.7 million Dr., or about 125 per cent of the average gross domestic product during the period. In other words, gross investment averaged about 25 per cent of gross domestic product during these years. However, as may be seen from Table ..., there was a rapid acceleration of the rate of investment from slightly less than 8 million Dr. in 1957 to 60.2 Dr. in 1961. In the latter year, gross investment was about 45 per cent of gross domestic income. Thus a more than seven-fold increase in investment yielded only an 8 per cent increase in income.

Taking the aggregate increase in income over the whole period in comparison with aggregate capital formation, the incremental capital output ratio is about 16 to 1. Some 70 per cent of total investment went into the agricultural sector, and two-thirds of total investment was public. For an investment programme with this pattern, an average incremental capital output ratio of 16 to 1 must surely be one of the highest on record.

The Agricultural Bank itself extended credits in the zone on a considerable scale (See Table I). Indeed, credits extended to 12 villages in the zone (by the Delvinaki branch) were more than thirteen times as much as credits to 38 villages in the same area but outside the zone.
### Table I
**Loans and Grants given by the Agricultural Bank**

**Branch of Delvinaki during the period 1957-1962**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pilot Zone (1)</th>
<th>Outside the Zone (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural construction</td>
<td>1,269,770</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Cons</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horticultural and flower</td>
<td>75,693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultivation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beehives</td>
<td>39,778</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk containers</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for cheese factories</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies for agricultural</td>
<td>280,392</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction (through interest</td>
<td>62,125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,978,778</strong></td>
<td><strong>300,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) 12 villages are included in the Pilot Zone
(2) 38 villages are included in the area outside the Pilot Zone

**Source:** Agricultural Bank, Delvinaki.

The trial and demonstration project did not stop the flow of emigrants from the region. Between 1956 and 1960, the total labour force of the zone fell from 16,435 to 16,102. There was little structural change; 87% of the active population was engaged in primary production in 1956 (agriculture, animal breeding, and forestry), 87% in 1956 and 84% in 1960. There had been a modest increase in the numbers engaged in cottage and handicraft industries and transport, and a significant increase in the employment on construction projects, from an estimated 685 to 1,659. This increase reflects the direct impact on construction employment of public investment in the zone. On the other hand, there had been a decline in numbers engaged in services. The gross income of the zone had increased by 8% at constant
prices between 1956 and 1961. The income in the primary sector where most people were engaged increased only by 7% over the five years. Gross income originating from other sectors than agriculture increased by 15%. Crop production increased by slightly less than 3% in terms of value, livestock production by 2%, forestry production by 11%.

Levels of Living

Since raising levels of living in the zone was one objective of the project, the study included some efforts at measuring changes in levels of living. Total consumption increased more than production, because of emigrant remittances and because the very presence in the region of rather large scale governmental activities provided opportunities for increases in consumption in excess of the local increase in production.

Emigrant remittances were the major factor. The total value of cheques cashed through the Post Office Savings Bank in the zone increased from 8.9 million Drs. in 1956 to 13.1 million Drs. in 1961. Foreign cheques, however, increased from a mere 16,000 Drs. in 1956 to 2.8 million Drs. in 1961. There was also a substantial increase in the total volume of deposits in the branches of the Agricultural Bank and Post Office Savings Bank in the zone, presumably also largely as a result of emigrant remittance, but possibly as a result of increased public activities in the region as well.

The increase in real income has been reflected in a higher level of living. An improvement in the pattern of food consumption is indicated by a 17 per cent decline in consumption of wheat, accompanied by a 70% increase in fish consumption.
Other items such as coffee, sugar, olive oil, etc. also show significant increases. It appears, however, that a part of the explanation of the increase in meat consumption is that the farmers slaughtered and ate cows provided to them by the Regional Service as a basis for building up a herd. The numbers of cows provided was not sufficient to make a significant difference in family output; the cost of feed was excessively high; milk prices were low in comparison; and the difficulties of marketing from that isolated spot virtually insuperable. Also of interest is the remarkable increase in wine consumption — 44 per cent over four years. Neighbouring villages, starting from a level of wine consumption per capita slightly more than half of wine consumption in the zone in the best years, suffered a decline in wine consumption in the four following years. It is possible that the larger numbers of persons coming from outside the region to do work in connection with the development plan may account for some part of this increase of wine consumption.

No great change took place in housing conditions over these years. Water supply improved, in the sense that water flow to the villages was increased, but in terms of actual installations of water pipes and taps in individual houses, the improvement was much less marked. In the field of power, the major result was the electrification of eleven villages. There has been no clear improvement in health conditions. There has been a significant increase in the number of radio sets, (although less than in neighbouring Pogoni) and in subscriptions to newspapers. Here again, we find a reflection of the increase in income, over and above the increase in output, resulting from emigrant
remittances and expenditures on the project. Thus in a period when investment was concentrated in the public sector the main improvements in living level have come through purely private channels.

**Comparison with Pogoni**

It is of interest to compare these results with developments in the neighbouring region of Pogoni, where no such trial and demonstration project was taking place. There, the increase in gross value of crop production over the same period was 3%, while livestock production increased by 45% and forestry production by nearly 10%. Thus total income in Pogoni rose by 21.5%, as compared to 8% for the demonstration zone. Taking gross agricultural income alone, which is more nearly comparable, the increase in the demonstration zone was 7.1% while in Pogoni it was 13.4%.

**Pogoni as a Control Area**

The selection of an appropriate area for comparison with the pilot zone similar enough in character to the zone to be an effective "control" and, at the same time, statistically manageable, is no simple task. In the first place, the zone itself has a range of conditions that is hard to reproduce in any nearby area of similar size. Paracalamos, with its relatively fertile plain, has land which is 23.2 per cent arable, while 40.3 per cent is in pasture and 30.4 per cent under forest. Arid and mountainous Zagori has only 3.3 per cent of its land arable, with 38.6 per cent in pasture and 52 per cent under forest. Few other areas can reproduce the special circumstances of Paracalamos. For the zone as a whole, 6.7 per cent of the area is arable land, 41.2 per cent is pasture, and 44.2
per cent of the area is forest. Pogoni was selected, mainly on statistical grounds, because its pattern of land use is similar to the average for the zone: 8.0 per cent arable, 64.9 per cent pasture, and 20.9 per cent forest.

From the statistical and administrative point of view, as well, the pilot zone is somewhat awkward unit. The entire Nomos is divided into four prefectures: Dodoni, with its centre at Jannina; Konitsa, with its centre at Konitsa; Metzovo, with its centre at Metzovo; and Pogoni, with its centre at Delvinaki. The zone, however, is an aggregation of villages cutting across the borders of prefectures. The zone includes 72 of the 236 villages in Dodoni, all of the 40 villages in Konitsa, and none of the villages in Metzovo. Pogoni has 32 villages.

While recognising the difficulties of finding a better control zone, however, some caution is required in interpreting the comparison between Pogoni and the pilot zone. From almost any point of view, Pogoni has a very special and peculiar economy. Basically, Pogoni is a much less productive area than the zone. However, because of a long tradition of emigration and emigrant remittances, the actual levels of living in Pogoni have been relatively high. Before the war, Pogoni lived almost entirely on emigrant remittances, and as far as one can judge, lived rather well. Emigration was then mainly to the United States and to other parts of Greece, particularly the Athens region. In the villages of the zone, on the other hand, large-scale emigration is a relatively new, post-war phenomenon. From this small, thinly-populated area of Pogoni, 1,200 emigrants have recently gone to Germany. Many emigrants come back to the village, after having accumulated some savings, and live in the village as
pensionnaires. This process has been going on for generations, and has led to a significant amount of capital accumulation in the village. This capital accumulation has permitted some improvements in agricultural methods.

Another factor of considerable importance is that in Pogoni, the average size of holding is increasing, as a result of a combination of circumstances peculiar to the area. Between 1956 and 1960, the size of the flocks and herds was increasing. 1960 was a peak year. However, in recent years, the combination of rising wages of shepherds, as the labour supply was diminished by emigration, and rising rents of land, together with the relatively low prices for milk, wool and meat and difficulties of marketing with the extremely poor transportation system, has resulted in livestock raising becoming unprofitable. As a consequence, the farmers are slaughtering their animals or selling them to other areas. The number of sheep has declined from 75,000 in 1961 to 60,000 in 1963, while the number of goats has fallen from 25,000 to 15,000 in the same area. Thus, what appears in the statistics as real income is really a kind of capital consumption, as the size of flocks and herds is diminished through slaughter and sale.

It may be, however, that this trend will reverse itself, through the "remembrement" of land. There has been a considerable turnover in land ownership, with the number of buyers only one-third of the number of sellers, indicating that some farmers are systematically increasing the size of their holdings. Cultivation of flocks of 50 to 60 sheep (which has been the average size) is no longer profitable; but with larger herds the livestock raising may become profitable again.
The use of emigrant remittances as working capital has resulted in some increase in yields per acre. Recently, the farmers have been keeping their lambs instead of killing them as they had done in the last two or three years. The need for some cash to make the voyage to Germany has contributed to the decumulation of flocks. The Agricultural Bank has made loans — 1.5 million Drs. in a single year — for the purchase of land. In the zone, however, this kind of process of "remembrance" is not yet taking place, because emigration is on a relatively small scale and the possibilities of aggrandizing land holdings are much fewer. The credits extended by the Agricultural Bank in Pogoni for all purposes are a small fraction of those in the zone.

It is also clear that incomes in Pogoni are affected by central Government activities in the central village which indeed has some of the aspects of a small town. The central town of Pogoni is the headquarters for an entire district, with the district offices of the Agricultural Bank, Ministry of Agriculture, and the like. This fact has resulted in construction of new office buildings, housing, and the like. By the same token, Delvinaki has some importance as a market. All these factors could easily have contributed to the increase in the income of Pogoni during the years 1956 to 1961, in a way that makes it not strictly comparable with the neighbouring areas in the pilot zone. Konitsa, the central town of Konitsa, has some of the characteristics of Delvinaki, but has considerably less of the aspect of "provincial capital".
Evaluation of the Trial and Demonstration Project

It should be pointed out, however, that the investment was high only in comparison to the rather low per capita income (about $138 per year on the average for the period). The average annual investment amounted to only $30 per head, which would not be a high figure in an advanced country. It should also be noted that the investment is calculated in financial terms, and not all of this capital expenditure accrued as income in the region. Surveys of experts, equipment purchased from outside the region, etc., are included in the investment figures, but do not constitute part of the regional income.

However, even when such allowances are made, the project must be accounted a failure in terms of its demonstrations effect. It is, of course, possible that the investment will result in more significant increases in income sometime in the future, as roads and power lines are completed, irrigation systems connected with farms, and the like. But a demonstration effect cannot be obtained through the publication of statistics showing improvement over a 20 year period. A demonstration project, by definition, must bring a visible and rapid result.

It must also be said that the trial and demonstration area did at least introduce the idea of regional planning to the Greek Government and the Greek people. It has resulted in the establishment of an organization for regional planning which may bring better results in Epirus as a whole, or in the other two regions where the Regional Service is now operating, Peloponnesus and Crete.

It appears that the zone was selected because
it was a kind of "stratified sample" of all the representative conditions of the entire region of Epirus. It has some districts on the plains, some mountainous areas, and some other areas in between. It was hoped that on the plains, at least, quick results could have been obtained sometime in the future, as roads and power lines are completed, irrigation systems connected with farms, and the like. But a demonstration effect cannot be obtained through irrigation. However, the regions seem to have been badly chosen from other points of view. The area is extraordinarily isolated. Albania lies to the North, with a closed frontier. To the East are high mountains. The only communication is South to Janina and then to the West. However, even the connections with Janina are very poor, since the roads are inadequate.

It also appears that the investment plan was implemented too slowly. Road plans were not well organised, and the region is still not properly connected with either East or West. There are a number of half-finished roads, power lines and irrigation channels instead of a few finished projects in each sector. The Regional Service was apparently unable to resist altogether the pressures of local politics, with the result that there are many partly finished projects scattered throughout the zone instead of a few completed projects in selected villages. Also, the composition of the team of experts — without any reflection on their individual competence — seems to have been badly designed. There was no regional survey which would indicate what might be the most promising field of development. In particular, there was no effort to assemble the relevant statistics before launching the
development programme. The missions made by economists or agricultural economists were much too short to be truly effective. Finally, as is now recognised, the planning and execution of development for the zone was insufficiently co-ordinated with plans for the region and for the nation as a whole.

The district of Zagori, except for the wooded areas on the other side of the mountain range, is clearly hopeless from the standpoint of increases in basic production. Zagori has depended largely on emigrant remittances, and remote villages high in the mountains have astonishingly high levels of living (especially in terms of housing) in relation to the infertility of the surrounding country-side. The constant ebb and flow of emigrants has not only brought an inflow of financial resources, but of culture and civilization as well. One village with 150 people high in the mountains, with practically no roads, completely isolated, has produced 27 teachers plus a number of doctors and engineers, etc. The doctors and other professional personnel used to work for a clientele across the Albanian border. Zagori is a region where the possibilities of tourism are considerable but the project did little to promote it. The landscape is overwhelmingly beautiful, the villages are charming, with a great deal of excess capacity in high standard housing. The summer climate is close to ideal, and there are such points of interest as early 15th century monasteries, 17th century churches and the like. In one or two villages there are already arrangements for taking care of tourists in the homes of residents. The houses are spacious, well designed, spotlessly clean and have a great deal of charm. The residents
of this village count heavily on the completion of the improved road as a means of increasing their incomes. They are also much interested in the proposed téléphérique across the gorge, although it is not clear how the téléphérique would contribute to productivity or income. It seems to be designed rather to free the remote villages on the other side of the gorge.

Planning for Epirus as a Whole

For the Epirus region as a whole, in 1954, regional development was still essentially in the planning stage. As stated above, the first report of the OECD experts, dated May, 1957, recommended improvements in transport and communications, electrification, flood control and irrigation, improved land tenure, progressive substitution of cattle for other animals, improved marketing, progressive industrialization in the form of processing agricultural projects, development of tourism and education, including "popularization of technological progress". Some organizational proposals were also made, including a National Commission for the Planning of Epirus and the establishment of some kind of regional organization for the implementation of plans. These proposals did, in fact, lead to the establishment of the Central Committee for Epirus at Athens, and a Regional Committee located at Jannina.

The first development programme for Epirus was published in May 1960. This plan was essentially a series of projections for the different sectors of the Epirus economy, after the fashion of the National Plan, together with an investment budget. A total increase in
income of 9.5 per cent per year was projected. The growth of agricultural income was estimated at 7.5 per cent, while manufacturing output was to grow at an annual rate of 13.7 per cent and services at 9.9 per cent. An increase in the cultivated area, irrigation of other areas, and mountain investment, especially re-forestation and control of erosion, were among the projects proposed. The consolidation of 13,000 hectares of scattered land holding was also suggested.

In the field of industry, stress was laid on the conservation of fruit and vegetables, processing of agricultural products, establishment of modern abattoirs, dairies (especially cheese production), handicrafts and tourism. The necessity of building up the infra-structure, particularly roads, airlines, port installations, telecommunications and power, was also emphasized. Importance was attached to education and training as a means of raising productivity. Thus, the programme followed rather closely the recommendations of the OECD experts in their first report. However, this Ministry of Co-ordination programme never achieved official status, and has not served as a guide for the actual operations of the operating ministries in the region.

In their third report the OECD experts recommended a review of the programme, a more systematic study of the industrial potential, and evaluation of results achieved in the pilot zone. This report also included a plea for irrigation with sprinklers rather than small canals, a very detailed programme for the development of tourism. Some proposals for community development and rural housing were also made.
Peloponessus

The second Regional Service to be established was in Peloponessus with headquarters at Patras. The Patras Regional Service Office has a relatively small staff as compared with Jannina, but one which includes Greek officials with training and experience well suited to the work now under way for the assembly of a regional plan. In the office of the Regional Service, the work is still essentially in the survey phase.

An agreement was reached between the Greek Government and the U.N. Special Fund for the provision of a team of foreign experts to assist in the preparation of an economic development programme for West Peloponessus. Indeed, it appears that the initiative for the project came from the FAO itself, and that in effect FAO "sold" the project both to the Special Fund and to the Greek Government. The project was related to the FAO Mediterranean Regional Project, and in Rome, at least, was viewed as a larger scale "trial and demonstration" project. It differed from the Epirus pilot zone, however, not only in the size of the unit but also in its quality; instead of seeking a "representative" region, FAO chose one which is relatively prosperous and which has relatively good prospects for development. This contract was granted to the Food and Agricultural Organization, a fact which has resulted in a very heavy weighting of agricultural specialists in the team. The project manager, a distinguished botanist, arrived in Greece in April 1962. The team has included for varying periods experts on animal husbandry, pedology, forestry, farm management, tree crops, vegetables, marketing, citrus fruits, irrigation, cheese and dairying industry.
The team has had no industrial economist. An industrial expert was added to the team in August 1962 and he remained with the project for over one year. No general economist has been a permanent member of the team, but in September 1963 and in the summer of 1964 an economist paid brief visits to the project. Towards the end of the project, a transport economist was added, together with experts on food processing and marketing, a medical statistician, and two agricultural economists.

At time of writing (July 1964) the work of the Special Fund team was nearing completion. General surveys of natural resources had been completed, including micro-sector studies of various branches of agriculture, forestry and industry, a detailed examination of the structure and potential of areas selected as focal zones, with plans for the development of pilot projects in the area. A general study of water resources had been undertaken, together with studies of land use, horticultural production and potential, composition of farm income, marketing of agricultural products, animal husbandry, forest potential, and an industrial census. A substantial volume of reports and recommendations had been submitted to the Ministry of Co-ordination. Possibilities of tourism were studied by Doxiades and associates, while the Technacon Organization made a study of transport and communications.

The team recognizes that certain areas in West Peloponessus will receive less investment than others, but at the same time has stressed the importance of raising the general level of income and employment outside the areas chosen for concentrated investment.
For this purpose, they have been investigating possibilities of integrated farm development in Southwest Messinia and the integrated development of water resources, soil conservation, crop production, pastures and forests in the Dapni-Arvania water shed. An effort is being made to determine the combination of enterprises which will maximize farm income in each of the main agro-climatic zones, with and without irrigation. Industry is being studied as a "stabilizing factor in rural areas", and the modernization and regrouping of existing industries is being examined. (1) A soil survey is under way, together with a forest inventory, a land use survey and a study of dairy industries. Plans have been drawn up for a traffic census, in order to determine the market orientation of Peloponnessus products. A project for analysis of movement of underground water has been suggested. Finally, the Centre of Economic Research is studying demographic movements in Western Greece, including West Peloponnessus.

There are four major problems in the operations of the West Peloponnessus team. First is the manner of its original organization. As suggested above, the choice of the Food and Agricultural Organization as the contractor for the Special Fund Project in West Peloponnessus results in a bias towards agricultural surveys and a plan emphasizing agricultural improvement. In effect, the decision to turn over the contract to FAO meant a prior decision that the future of the region lies in the direction of agricultural improvement.

Secondly, the division of the region between West and East has handicapped the functioning of the team.

The line demarcating the region is essentially a rainfall and vegetation line, and reflects the agricultural bias in the original planning of the project. In terms of movements of the labour force and of markets, the division of the region in accordance with this vegetation line is extremely inconvenient. For some purposes, the group has been compelled to redefine their region, so as to incorporate complete statistical units. This problem was aggravated, during the life of the project, by extension of the responsibilities of the Regional Service in Patras to cover Southwest Epirus, thus increasing the discrepancy in the definition of the "region" by the two teams.

Third, the FAO team is not well integrated with other planners. For example, the plans prepared for the port of Patras apparently count on the port serving as a major outlet for citrus fruits; the view of the FAO team, however, is that the region is not well suited to production of citrus fruits. There has been little consultation between the Technocon Team and the FAO-Special Fund team on transport development for the region. More serious is the inadequacy of the co-operation between the regional service and the FAO team in the same area. Some members of the Special Fund team have had no counterparts at all. In the case of some of the others, counterparts have been appointed, but contacts have been infrequent. The fact that the Regional Service is planning for the whole of Peloponnesus and the Special Fund team only for West Peloponnesus has complicated the problems of collaboration between the two groups.

Partly because of the difference in the area covered, partly because of physical separation of the two offices, partly because the Greek Government was unable to
provide a complete set of counterparts and partly for other reasons the work of the FAO team has never been satisfactorily co-ordinated with that of the Regional Service at Patras. Each group has gone its own way, done its own work, prepared its own plans. This situation was able to continue because there was no organization in the central government that could assure integration of the work of the two teams.

The Regional Service is constructing its plans on the assumption that 70,000 people now engaged in agriculture in Peloponessus will be moved out of agriculture by 1974; only in this way can the target of doubling per capita income in agriculture by that year be attained. This target is modest enough; it would mean that farm incomes would be 85% of those of unskilled workers in Patras industry, instead of 60% as it is today. Once again, therefore, the real problem is to find alternative occupations for the surplus agricultural population, while size of holdings is increased and technology and product-six changed in agriculture. The technical assistance programme, however, has provided virtually no help in the determination of where and how these new jobs might be created, and no guidance on this matter is provided by the central government.

The most serious problem of the Special Fund project, however, has been the lack of guidance for the Special Fund team from the Ministry of Co-ordination in Athens. This problem is not specific to Peloponessus but is true of Epirus as well. The Regional Development Section of the Planning Division of the Ministry is insufficiently staffed and cannot brief the Special Fund group properly. It has not been able to provide rough
guide lines relating the potential of the region to plan for the national economy as a whole. In the absence of a regional breakdown of the national plan it was impossible for the Special Fund Team to translate the projections of the national plan into possible regional budgets. The disparity in the scale of technical assistance provided to West Peloponessus and to other parts of the country also creates a serious problem for the planners in the Ministry of Co-ordination. They naturally want to make use of the work of so highly qualified a group as a Special Fund Team, but the absence of similar teams in other parts of the country means that the Central Planning Office will have great difficulty in appraising the merits of the recommendations made by the Special Fund Team relative to projects that might be proposed for other regions instead.

**CRETE**

The Regional Service for Crete was established in October 1962, and is the most recent of the Greek Regional Services. The initial staff consisted of a director, who is an agronomist, and three assistants. Subsequently, five economists, one engineer, a second agronomist on loan from the Ministry of Agriculture, specializing in animal husbandry, and three statisticians, provided by the Central Statistical Service, were added. In contrast to the method of operation in the other two regions, regional planning for Crete has begun with general surveys, including the building up of regional statistics to provide a profile of the region. Some difficulties were experienced in acquiring a collection of statistics
adequate for this purpose, but these are being assembled.

Since Crete, like the other lagging regions, is heavily dependent on agriculture, the planners for Crete first constructed an agricultural investment programme. Irrigation projects have been surveyed for three districts. One of these includes 25,000 hectares, in comparison with the 30,000 now under irrigation. Completion of this one project, therefore, will nearly double the irrigated area on the island. Work has also begun on a selection of 60 "pôles de croissance" (centres, or growing points) which will serve — and perhaps eventually empty — surrounding clusters of small villages. The centres will be provided with roads, schools, water and electrification. One of these 60 centres will be chosen as an initial "trial and demonstration area". It will be selected in the hope of providing early and significant results.

At the moment, the island has no modern roads and high priority is attached to the establishment of a basic road system. Electricity needs and potential are being studied by the Public Power Corporation. A French Corporation (Société Générale pour la Planification) has undertaken an industrial survey now nearing completion. Emphasis was placed on the processing of agricultural products, preservation of food and vegetables, olive oil, use of karobs, and similar small industries. A study of tourism was undertaken by the Ministry of Co-ordination itself.

The launching of actual projects was delayed by the continuing political crisis from June 1963 to the spring of 1964. Before projects can be executed, they must be accepted by the Government and finance must be provided. Some irrigation projects were under way by mid-1964.
Until 1964 the Crete Regional Service had received no help through the official technical assistance programmes. In February of that year, however, arrangements were made through OECD to provide a team of Israeli regional planners, to work with the Regional Service in Greece. The team is comprised entirely of experts having experience in regional planning in Israel. As in the other two regions, the team is heavily weighted with agricultural specialists. The chief of the group is an agronomist. He is supported by one more agronomist, one agricultural economist, a pedologist, an hydrologist, a fruit expert and a statistician. There is no industrial economist and no general economist. One industrialization expert undertook a short mission to Crete, but like the SOGEP team he confined his studies to the processing of agricultural products. A third agronomist, physical planner, and a livestock expert have also come and gone, while a citrus fruit expert is expected.

Relations between the Israeli team and the Regional Service have evidently been good and co-ordination is continuous and close. In contrast to the team in Patras, the Israeli team occupies offices in the building of the Regional Service. However, some members of the team complain that they have "no real counterparts", partly because of language difficulties. The agricultural economist spends much of his time in Athens, with the intention of co-ordinating the work of the group with national planning at the center; but in the absence of any regional planning organization in the central government this means in effect consultation with the regional planner provided by OECD.
As in the case of Epirus and Peloponessus, the agricultural experts soon discovered that there was no way of obtaining satisfactory levels of rural income without substantial emigration from the agricultural sector, on the order of 30,000 families. The real problem therefore, is to find alternative occupations for these people. There are some processing industries, some social overhead investments, and some services that clearly belong in Crete, which can provide job opportunities. There remains a balance, however, that must either leave the island or obtain work in industries deliberately established in Crete, rather than elsewhere, to provide employment in Crete. Here the team is severely handicapped both by the lack of a national policy on location of industry and migration, and by the shortages of industrial and economic expertise on their team.

Both the regional service and the OECD team are giving high priority to a perspective plan for the island, setting forth the broad framework for potential development of the region. However, the foreign group feel that they cannot proceed far with detailed planning for the island as a whole without more guidance from the central government regarding national plans. Instead they have also chosen a kind of "trial and demonstration area" for detailed planning.

However, they are following the Peloponessus rather than the Epirus example in choosing the "model village"; that is, rather than trying to assemble a "representative sample" of the whole island, they are choosing an area where the size of holdings is relatively large and the prospects for development are relatively good.
The fragmentation problem is worst in Crete of all Greek regions, and consolidation of holdings into a model village, introduction of irrigation and improved pasture are major aspects of the planning for the pilot zone.

Conclusions

It is of course always easier to be critical in retrospect than it is to foresee in advance exactly what should be done. Moreover, economic development has been a particularly fast-moving field; the accumulation of knowledge regarding the problem and the process of development between 1956 and 1964 has been substantial. Not a few theorists and practitioners were willing in 1956 to resort to a counsel of despair, sometimes graced with the term "project planning), the essence of which was, "let us get something - anything - done!". The state of knowledge in the field of regional development planning was, if anything, still worse than in the field of national development planning.

It must also be said that the Greek or foreign development economist or official, eager to launch the process of regional planning in Greece in 1956, would have been hard put to decide where to begin. Not only was there no Regional Service and no regional planning division in the central government; there was not even a national development planning division or a Centre of Economic Research to which such efforts might be attached. The information which would have permitted a rational design for regional planning in Greece was lacking. Under these circumstances, and confronted with the appalling poverty of the backward
areas of Epirus, it is not surprising that the sponsors of the pilot zone should have fallen back on a "get something done" approach. However, one form of progress is making mistakes and profiting by them; it would be most unfortunate if the trial and demonstration project in Epirus did not have at least this beneficial effect.

Rationale of the "pilot zone" approach

Just what the sponsors felt would follow from a successful trial and demonstration project is not now altogether clear. There seems to have been some idea that the launching of "planning from below" would lead ultimately to some planning from above — the establishment of the requisite organizations for development planning at the regional and national levels. In this anticipation the sponsors were to a degree correct. There seems also to have been something of the community development idea, although in fact the majority of projects were not "community" projects in the strict sense but were rather investments by the central government. There was something of a rural social work approach — "the people are poor, they must be helped". As a "demonstration", it was probably hoped that the project would lead to a spreading of "develop-mindedness" and "technology-mindedness" among the population of the entire region, providing a psychological framework within which many things could subsequently be done.

There may also have been something of the "pôle de croissance" concept behind the project. A growing point or leading sector, however, must by definition be one that can generate spread effects to the rest of the country, accelerating the growth of the entire national
economy, or at least of the entire region, in this case the whole of Epirus. The pilot zone project did not meet these criteria. Neither the scale nor the form of the project were such that its successful execution could be expected to generate, in itself, significant increases in investment, income, and employment throughout the Epirus region. Rising incomes in the zone would have brought only negligible increases in demand for either consumers' goods or capital goods produced elsewhere in the region. It is likely, given the pattern of income-elasticities of demand of interregional trade, that the impact of rising incomes in the zone would have been fold more in the Athens region than in other parts of Epirus; but the scale was such that the effect on the Athens region would not be noticeable.

In terms of the analytical framework laid down in Chapter 1, it is now possible to say in retrospect that it is fortunate that the pilot zone was not a spectacular success; for if quick and dramatic results had been achieved, the pilot zone would no doubt have been followed by similar experiments in neighbouring areas. The misallocation of human and capital resources would thereby have been aggravated. If one looks at the Greek economy as a whole, and considers the "investment in human resources" policy that is appropriate to Greek conditions and opportunities, it is clear that Greece should aim at a slowly increasing population, combined with rapid industrialization and not migration out of the poorer agricultural regions into the industrial centers. It is equally clear that the pilot zone, with the possible exception of Paracalamos, would be high on any list of areas selected for such reductions in total population. It would not have been necessary to compel anyone to move; the emigration was already taking place, and continued despite the large
investments in the zone. One of the reasons for the better success with raising per capita output and income in neighbouring Pogoni was precisely the pattern of emigration, emigrant remittances, capital formation, credit extension and land consolidation (permitting a shift to more productive agriculture, substitution of sheep for goats, etc.). With the hindsight now possible, it would seem that a similar development policy would have been more appropriate to the pilot zone as well. Indeed so long as the population and the product-mix remain essentially what they are, the pilot zone can never be anything but poor.

All this is not to say that rural electrification, improved transport, and irrigation may not make a substantial contribution to raising agricultural productivity in Greece. But by their very nature, these are projects of a kind which must be planned and implemented on a national scale. Roads built within a small pilot zone and ending at the borders, for example, would be patently absurd. The same is true of electric transmission lines. Irrigation projects might be planned in terms of regions, but since Greece is a country in which irrigation might add to total agricultural output of all major regions, priorities for irrigation projects must be determined on the basis of a national plan.

Even the "institution-building" contribution of the project should not be exaggerated. It is true that there is now a Regional Service in Greece, and that regional planning has been extended to three areas. But it is also true that in the middle of 1964, seven years after the launching of the pilot zone project, regional planning in Greece was still in a most unsatisfactory state.
Except for the work done by one foreign expert provided by OECD, there was no real regional planning operation in the Ministry of Co-ordination in Athens at all. The regional planning division of the central government had for all practical purposes disappeared. The three regional planning operations were proceeding with very limited contact with each other and virtually no contact with the central government. In Epirus the contribution of foreign experts had effectively ceased. In Peloponessus the FAO-Special Fund team was completing its work, in essential isolation from the Regional Service of Peloponessus as well as from the central government and the other two regional planning operations. All three operations were severely handicapped by the lack of directives from the centre and the absence of a national policy regarding regional development, including location of industry, emigration and internal migration. It had become clear in each of the three regions that there was no solution to the problem of agricultural poverty except the movement of large numbers of people out of agriculture. But where were the surplus farmers to go? Only a few could be absorbed in industries clearly belonging in the regions themselves and clearly viable. Others could be absorbed by establishing industries in the region that could just as well or perhaps better be established elsewhere. But what was the government policy in this regard? No one could say, because regional planning at the national level had not proceeded to the point where government decisions on these questions could be made on sound grounds.

It had also become clear that the stated goals of the Government were mutually inconsistent. A high rate of growth for the national economy, reduced emigration and
narrowing gaps in output and income among regions could not be simultaneously attained. Rates of growth in the three regions as high as those projected for the national economy could be attained only through large scale movement out of the region — so long as locational advantages for new industries in other regions were respected. But high rates of growth in the national economy would mean continuation of the tendency for output to grow much more than employment; no conceivable rate of investment in the leading region could create employment opportunities at a rate sufficient to absorb all the people that must be moved out of agriculture in the lagging regions if growth of per capita income there were to keep pace with (let alone exceed) that of the leading region. The only solution would be continued large-scale emigration from the country as a whole. Yet even here there were limits; if emigration continued with the same pattern in terms of age-groups and skills, growth of the national economy might soon be limited by shortages of younger workers with some industrial skills.

In short, it seems safe to say that the "planning from below" approach to regional development in Greece, which started with the pilot zone and unfortunately still characterizes the work in the three regions, has delayed the finding of a solution to the problem of poverty in the lagging regions of Greece. In this respect one can even say that the pilot project did considerable and lasting harm.

There has also been a failure to learn from experience regarding the composition of regional planning teams. In each of the three regions the approach has been to give emphasis to agricultural improvement, and accordingly to weigh the team heavily with agricultural experts. In
each region the agricultural experts have soon discovered that there is no way of raising agricultural productivity to adequate levels — adequate, let us say, to prevent further widening of the percentage differential between incomes of the region and of the leading region without significant reduction in the number of farmers. No one would deny the importance of improving agricultural techniques and the product-mix for the majority of the population that will remain in agricultural occupations for the next few years in the lagging regions; but the simple truth is that the real solution for these regions lies outside of agriculture. Yet the expertise provided in the field of industrialization — the key to success in all three regions, whether the industrialization takes place in the region or outside it, with net emigration from the region — has been totally inadequate in relation to the expertise provided in the field of agriculture, in all three regions. This fact, together with the lack of personnel in the central government to find an answer to the core question of where industrialization can best take place if national objectives are to be achieved, has meant that much of the work of a substantial number of highly competent Greeks and foreigners in the regional development field is largely wasted.

Conclusions Regarding Technical Assistance

The technical assistance so far given in the field of regional planning and regional development in Greece has not yet led to effective regional plans being constructed or to significant regional development. This is not due to incompetence of any individuals or group of
individuals, whether within the Planning Division or the Regional Service of the Greek government or within the Technical Assistance teams. Rather, the failure reflects a situation far too common in the field of technical assistance and economic development: highly competent individuals and groups, scattered among a variety of technical assistance agencies and a number of government departments in the host countries, fail, through lack of proper coordination to produce the results of which they are clearly capable.

A mistake seems to have been made in the programming of technical assistance, in the field of regional planning development. The high-level manpower needs of the Regional Planning Section of the Ministry of Co-ordination to permit effective use of work done in the field were not met. It is not altogether clear whether this misdirection of resources resulted from reluctance on the part of the Ministry of Co-ordination to request high level assistance for the Athens office, or from a failure on the part of the donors to appraise accurately the true technical assistance needs in the field of Regional Planning and Development.

The experience with regional planning in Greece illustrates several general principles with respect to technical assistance. The first of these is that Technical Assistance of any kind can be most effective within a framework of integrated economic development programming by the host government. In cases where the expertise available domestically for such programming is inadequate, the first requirement of technical assistance is to fill this gap. The first
obligation of the host government for effective use of technical assistance in that they should request the high level advisory experts to assist in the preparation of realistic economic development plans. In the case of regional planning in Greece this procedure has yet to take place. In the absence of an over-all economic development programme covering the whole economy, and appropriately broken down into regions and sectors, technical assistance of the sporadic kind which has been provided is likely to fail or to be slow in having its impact. Another danger in such haphazard arrangements is that resources may be invested in response to the interests of local pressure groups, without any clear view of true net advantage to the nation as a whole.

In sum, none of the three aspects of regional planning is being effectively carried out in Greece. Yet given the basic research done in the Centre for Economic Research, the Ministry of Co-ordination and elsewhere and given the expertise available domestically as well as through Technical Assistance Programmes, Greece is a country where all three aspects of regional planning could be carried out with a high degree of competence and effectiveness. It is to be hoped that during the next few years, both the requests for technical assistance and the technical assistance provided will be more appropriate to Greek needs in this highly important field of economic development.