

# **CRISIS OF HEGEMONY: MILITARIZATION AND BRAZIL-UNITED STATES RELATIONS (2015-2022)<sup>1</sup>**

Livia Peres Milani<sup>2</sup>

A relevant portion of the literature on International Relations observes a crisis within the liberal international order, marked by various elements, including the relative decline of the United States and the rise of other global powers. In reaction, the United States is attempting to redefine its hegemony in the global sphere and in Latin America, increasing its defense spending, promoting aggressive rhetoric, new economic programs, and the reaffirmation of defense cooperation and the importance of the Southern Command in its foreign policy. This article questions whether there is a process of militarization of the United States' foreign policy and how these changes impact military relations between Brazil and the United States. Through this discussion, the article contributes to the analysis of the United States' reactions to the growing presence of external powers in Latin America. The article is grounded in exploratory and qualitative research, primarily conducted through bibliographic review, consultation of databases, systematization, and collection of information from official websites of the Brazilian and U.S. governments. It is concluded that the process of militarization of US foreign policy involves changes in the implementation of security assistance and indicates a deepening military relationship between Brazil and the United States.

**Keywords:** hegemony; Brazil-United States; militarization; security cooperation.

## **HEGEMONIA EM TEMPOS DE CRISE: MILITARIZAÇÃO E RELAÇÕES BRASIL-ESTADOS UNIDOS (2015-2022)**

Parte relevante da literatura de relações internacionais observa uma crise da ordem liberal internacional que perpassa elementos diversos, entre os quais o declínio relativo dos Estados Unidos e a ascensão de outras potências. Em reação, os Estados Unidos buscam reformular sua hegemonia no âmbito global e no espaço latino-americano, com ampliação dos gastos em defesa, um discurso agressivo, novos programas econômicos e reafirmação da cooperação em defesa e da importância do Comando Sul no âmbito de sua política externa. Considerando tal contexto, este artigo questiona se existe um processo de militarização da política externa dos Estados Unidos e como estas mudanças impactam as relações militares entre Brasil e Estados Unidos. A partir desta discussão, o artigo contribui para a análise sobre as reações dos Estados Unidos à crescente presença de potências externas na América Latina. O artigo tem como base pesquisa qualitativa e exploratória, conduzida predominantemente por meio de revisão de bibliografia, consulta a bases de dados, sistematização e coleta de informações em páginas oficiais dos governos brasileiro e estadunidense. Conclui-se que o processo de militarização da política externa dos Estados Unidos envolve mudanças na implementação da assistência em segurança e que há crescente aproximação entre Brasil e Estados Unidos no âmbito militar.

**Palavras-chave:** hegemonia; Brasil-Estados Unidos; militarização; cooperação em segurança.

---

1. This article was produced with funding from a scholarship granted by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel – Brazil (Capes), under the Strategic Postdoctoral Program, process nº 88887.964784/2024-00.

2. Capes postdoctoral fellow in the Graduate Program in Human Rights at Tiradentes University (Unit) (Process no. 88887.964784/2024-00); researcher at Grupo de Estudos de Defesa e Segurança Internacional da Universidade Estadual Paulista (Gedes/Unesp); and researcher at Instituto Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia para Estudos sobre os Estados Unidos (INCT-Ineu). E-mail: livialpm@gmail.com. Orcid: 0000-0003-4300-205X.

## HEGEMONÍA EN TIEMPOS DE CRISIS: MILITARIZACIÓN Y RELACIONES BRASIL-ESTADOS UNIDOS (2015-2022)

Una parte relevante de la literatura sobre Relaciones Internacionales observa una crisis en el orden liberal internacional, marcada por diversos elementos, incluido el declive relativo de Estados Unidos y el ascenso de otras potencias. En reacción, la potencia busca reformular su hegemonía en el ámbito global y en América Latina, lo que se refleja en mayor gasto de defensa, retórica agresiva, nuevos programas económicos y la reafirmación de la cooperación en defensa y la importancia del Comando Sur en el ámbito de su Política Exterior. Considerando este contexto, este artículo se pregunta si existen nuevas facetas de un proceso de militarización de la política exterior de Estados Unidos y cómo estos cambios impactan en las relaciones militares entre Brasil y Estados Unidos. A partir de esta discusión, el artículo contribuye al análisis de las reacciones de Estados Unidos ante la creciente presencia de potencias externas en América Latina. El artículo se basa en una investigación cualitativa y exploratoria, realizada predominantemente a través de revisión bibliográfica, consulta en bases de datos, sistematización y recopilación de información de páginas oficiales de los gobiernos de Brasil y Estados Unidos. Se concluye que el proceso de militarización de la política exterior estadounidense implica cambios en la implementación de la asistencia en seguridad y que hay un creciente acercamiento entre Brasil y Estados Unidos en la esfera militar.

**Palabras clave:** hegemonía; Brasil-Estados Unidos; militarización; cooperación em seguridad.

JEL: O19.

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/rtm37art4>

Data de envio do artigo: 31/3/2025. Date de aceite: 1/4/2025.

### 1 INTRODUCTION

The tendency toward the relative decline of the United States and the rise of China has long been noted by authors from different perspectives within the field of International Relations (Arrighi, 2007; Layne, 2012; Schutte, 2020). China's growth was initially perceived with suspicion in the United States and prompted significant domestic debate. More recently, with the expansion of Chinese trade and investment, the perception of a threat has become a consensus within the U.S. political mainstream, which appears unwilling to accept a hegemonic transition. China, for its part, while reaffirming its intentions for peaceful development, has implemented large-scale projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, further expanding the external reach of its capitalism.

In this context, the National Security Strategy released by the Joe Biden administration states that “the PRC [People's Republic of China] [...] is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective” (United States, 2022a, p. 8). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strategic Concept also reinforces the notion of a Chinese threat (NATO, 2022; United States, 2022b, p. 1).

Latin America is not exempt from these global developments (Bernal-Meza, 2020a; Paz, 2012). While not the central theater of confrontation, the region may serve as a counterweight for China to U.S. power projection in the Indo-Pacific (Bernal-Meza, 2020b). The expansion of Chinese capitalism in the region has occurred primarily through economic means, with the Asian power becoming the main trading partner for certain South American countries, a significant creditor, and an important source of direct investment (Schutte, 2020; Myers and Wise, 2017). The United States, in turn, seeks to reassert its hegemony in a traditional sphere of influence.

The U.S. response has taken at least three forms: i) adopting aggressive rhetoric that, in dialogue with regional countries, frames China as a “malign”, “imperialist”, and “predatory” actor; ii) announcing economic programs to support private investment in the region; and iii) enhancing security cooperation, with an increased role for the Southern Command in its regional actions. This article contributes to the analysis of the rearticulation of U.S. hegemony by examining how security cooperation manifests in Brazil-United States relations.

Accordingly, it investigates how the United States has acted regionally in a context of great-power competition. The working hypothesis is that there is an ongoing process of militarization in U.S. foreign policy toward the region. The analysis proceeds in two steps: first, by assessing the budget and structure of U.S. security assistance and cooperation directed toward Latin America; and second, by examining military relations between Brazil and the United States. The temporal scope covers the years 2015 – when the Brazil-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was ratified – through 2022, marking the end of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential term in Brazil.

The Brazilian case is relevant, first, due to the country’s economic and military significance in the region: it has the largest market, the largest armed forces, and the highest military expenditure. Brazil thus plays a strategic role in the U.S. hegemonic recovery strategy. Berg (2022), an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), describes Brazil as one of the pillars for success of the U.S. strategy in the context of hegemonic competition. Second, much of the existing analysis of the U.S. military presence in South America focuses on Colombia (Vaicius and Isacson, 2003; Tickner and Morales, 2015), with comparatively fewer studies on Brazil. This is understandable, as U.S.-Colombia military cooperation is more intense and longstanding, while Brazil-U.S. relations are more ambiguous and military contacts tend to be less public.

This article draws on qualitative, exploratory research, conducted primarily through a literature review, consultation of databases, and the systematization and collection of information from the official websites of the Brazilian and

U.S. governments. The next section discusses the concepts of hegemony and militarization and contextualizes the crisis of the liberal order. The second section examines U.S. security assistance and cooperation data for Latin America to assess the militarization process. Finally, the third section investigates U.S.-Brazil security cooperation.

## **2 CRISIS OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER, HEGEMONY, AND MILITARIZATION**

The intensification of great-power rivalries and the international dispute over models of political and economic organization, together with a series of other elements, constitute a global situation that has been characterized as a crisis of the liberal international order and of U.S. hegemony (Babic, 2020; Sanahuja and López Burian, 2020). Babic (2020) situates this crisis as an interregnum – a long-lasting crisis that generates uncertainty and instability – and argues that it should be analyzed in its own right in order to understand the dynamics of the contemporary international order.

To understand the present moment as one of hegemonic crisis, a brief comment on this concept is necessary. The notion of hegemony was developed by Antonio Gramsci to analyze class relations within the domestic sphere and is understood as a form of domination in which worldviews converging toward supremacy are constructed, involving force and consent in a dialectical manner (Gramsci, 2007). Cox (1981, 1983) adapts this conception to the field of International Relations, arguing that international hegemony is grounded in the expansion of the worldviews of the dominant classes of a core country and entails the construction of world orders.

Thus, “economic and social institutions, culture, and technology associated with national hegemony become patterns for external emulation” (Cox, 1983, p. 171, our translation). The military sphere matters for hegemony not only because of its relevance for the application of coercion, but also because security cooperation – joint exercises, the provision of training, the export of weapons and related technologies – is one of the means through which a particular vision of how armed forces should be organized is exported (Rouquié, 1984; Wendt and Barnett, 1993).

The contemporary crisis of hegemony in the liberal international order consists of both material and ideational aspects. In the material dimension, the relative decline and deindustrialization of the U.S. economy, as well as the loss of prominence of international financial and trade institutions, are noteworthy. In the ideational dimension, the U.S. dominant class has faced growing difficulties in legitimizing its rule, both domestically and internationally – as evidenced

by the emergence of challenges to U.S. leadership in the global order and the strengthening of far-right political movements in the core countries of this order (Babic, 2020; Cooley and Nexon, 2020; Stahl, 2019).

Furthermore, this is a multifaceted and multidimensional crisis, which Babic (2020) theorizes as comprising three levels: i) the global political economy, which encompasses structural changes; ii) the interstate level, representing relations between the domestic and the international; and iii) the societal level, which covers internal changes and the contestation of the common sense underpinning U.S. hegemony. This article focuses on the second level.

Like Babic (2020), Ceceña (2005) also proposes a division for analyzing the dynamics of hegemonic contestation. For the Mexican author, there are two levels: the level of competition, which refers to disputes among different states within the core of capitalism; and the systemic level, which refers to challenges to the capitalist mode of production itself, encompassing the actions of social movements and revolutions. In the first case, capitalism as such is not necessarily in question, but rather its “internal modalities of domination” (Ceceña, 2005, p. 39). This article examines U.S. reactions aimed at restoring its hegemony within the liberal order in response to China. It therefore deals with the level of competition and disputes over modes of regulation, not with threats to capitalism *per se*.

The disputes between China and the United States can be characterized as rivalries between different types of capitalism (Hung, 2020; Xing and Bernal-Meza, 2021). In this context, there is no proposal for an alternative to this mode of production, although there are different proposals for regulating it. Thus, China’s economic growth and greater political prominence are among the components of the crisis of the international order and of U.S. hegemony, even though they do not represent a challenge to the capitalist mode of production itself.

U.S. reactions to these processes take various forms. In the discursive sphere, Washington has sought to portray China – and other rising powers – as aggressive and has proposed reorganizing international politics around the categories of “democratic” and “authoritarian” states (United States, 2021a). This rhetoric has been present since Biden’s presidential campaign and intensifies the depiction of China as a rival, which was already a feature of the previous administration.

In Latin America, “authoritarian” countries are understood to be those that align with rising powers and pursue a foreign policy of contestation toward the United States. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela stand out in this regard – labeled the “troika of tyranny” by Bolton (2018) and excluded from the 2022 Summit of the Americas on the grounds that they were not considered democracies by Washington. The U.S. dominant classes fear that countries in the Global South – especially in Latin America and Africa – may choose to follow a modality of

capitalism with greater state intervention, incorporating what Americans perceive as a “Chinese model,” understood as increased state involvement in the economy. Supposedly, this would lead to greater Chinese influence over these territories (Xing and Bernal-Meza, 2021).

In Latin America, the U.S. quest to recover its hegemony involves isolating governments critical of its dominance. Venezuela has faced strong U.S. pressure, especially since 2019, when Washington unsuccessfully attempted to promote regime change and overthrow the government of Nicolás Maduro (Bolton, 2020; Ceceña and Rodríguez, 2018). Elsewhere, Washington continues to cultivate relationships with domestic actors favorable to its dominance, working to position them politically (Penido and Stédile, 2021).

The Southern Command has emerged as one of the main actors urging swift action to contain China, reiterating the narrative that the Asian country’s economic presence constitutes a challenge to the United States in the region (Romano, 2020; Milani, 2021; Ceceña and Rodríguez, 2018; Lajtman, 2020). In the view of Ceceña and Rodríguez (2018), this situation forms part of a process of regional militarization driven by the United States. These authors define militarization as: i) the pursuit of military solutions to various types of problems; and ii) the rise of a political conception marked by the division of the world into friends and enemies (Ceceña and Rodríguez, 2018).

The concept of militarization encompasses preparations for war but also “the penetration of military values into the organization of the social structure, through their reproduction in educational, political, and media institutions, among others” (Forner, 2020, p. 48, our translation). In the field of foreign policy analysis, militarization is understood as a process by which the military increases its influence over decision-making and the implementation of international strategies. Farrow (2019) describes this process as also related to the neglect of the State Department, which has lost prominence to the military over recent decades – a trend that was accentuated during the Donald Trump administration.

### 3 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: MILITARIZATION?


The hypothesis of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy should be approached with caution. Indeed, since 2018 there has been an increase in U.S. military spending compared to the years corresponding to the second Obama administration, according to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri) (table 1).<sup>3</sup> However, this increase does not bring military spending back to the peak reached in 2010.

---

3. Available at: <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>.

Vidal and Wietchikoski (2022) compiled data on the U.S. Southern Command's base budget, showing that, during the Trump administration, the base budget increased compared to the previous administration. Yet, as with global spending trends, the second Obama administration was a period of overall budget decline. Data on the Southern Command's base budget do not cover all resources allocated to the combatant command, and the Department of Defense does not release detailed breakdowns of its total budgets. For fiscal year 2022, Congress approved a base budget of USD 202 million (McInnis and McGarry, 2022).

FIGURE 1  
**U.S. military expenditures (2001-2021)**  
(In millions of constant dollars)



Source: Sipri Military Expenditure Database. Retrieved Dec. 1, 2022, from: <https://milex.sipri.org/sipri>.  
Author's elaboration.

However, while total military spending was rising, there was a tendency toward stagnation in international security assistance – both globally and for the region – beginning with the first Trump administration. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the budget proposal for fiscal year 2018 – the first submitted by the Trump administration – would have reduced assistance to the region by thirty-six percent compared to the previous year (from USD 1.6 billion to USD 1.1 billion)<sup>4</sup> (Meyer, 2018).

The proposed cuts included security assistance accounts, affecting the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which aims to fund the purchase of U.S. military equipment, and the International Military Education and Training (Imet) program, which funds the participation of foreign military

4. These figures correspond to the budget for development, economic, security, and military assistance supervised by the Department of Defense or Usaid. Amounts transferred directly by the Department of Defense are not included.

officers in courses and training programs in the United States. Ultimately, the U.S. Congress allocated more resources for international assistance to Latin America than requested, bringing it closer to the amounts disbursed in previous years (USD 1.7 billion in fiscal years 2018 and 2020) (Meyer and Gracia, 2019; Meyer and Martin, 2021). Biden proposed an increase in assistance to the region, including security assistance through Imet and FMF (Meyer, 2022).

Although there has been no increase in spending, the militarization of international assistance is linked to changes in its management. Traditionally, security assistance is supervised by the Department of State, and the funds are allocated to this department, which coordinates the programs – even if implementation may occur through the Department of Defense. However, since the 1980s, and especially after 2001, a portion of security assistance funds has been implemented directly by the Department of Defense, with less congressional oversight and less public disclosure of data, which are absent from the databases of the United States Agency for International Development (Usaid) and the Department of State (Isacson, 2005). Reports presented by the CRS describe this process as follows:

congress has increased DOD [Department of Defense] authorities and resources to conduct security cooperation activities partly because of DOD's unique capabilities and partly because of the perception that the traditional security assistance programs overseen by the State Department lack the flexibility to respond to evolving security threats. The expansion of DOD authorities and resources may have had some unforeseen consequences, however, potentially hindering Congress's ability to formulate and exercise effective oversight of U.S. foreign assistance policy in Latin America and the Caribbean (Meyer, 2017, p. 15).

Many Latin American and Caribbean countries receive training, equipment, and other support from DOD [...]. The U.S. Southern Command asserts that these security cooperation programs allow the United States to remain engaged with partner militaries and help these militaries identify and respond to shared threats, such as transnational crime and the malign influence of external state actors [...] (Meyer, 2022, p. 19).

The 2018 CRS report, as well as the 2019 edition, expressed concern that the stagnation of international assistance administered by the Department of State could either signify an increase in aid channeled through the Department of Defense or result in a decrease in U.S. influence (Meyer, 2018; Meyer and Gracia, 2019; Meyer and Martin, 2021). The Center for International Policy<sup>5</sup> has sought to monitor U.S. security assistance, including funds allocated directly through the Department of Defense. According to this database, there were


---

5. Center for International Policy. Security Assistance Monitor (SAM). Available at: <https://internationalpolicy.org/programs/sam/>.

fluctuations in the security assistance provided to different Latin American countries during the Trump administration, following a period of steady declines. Thus, if it is possible to speak of militarization, it primarily refers to an increase in the military budget and in the role of the armed forces relative to non-military means of exerting external influence, such as development assistance and traditional security assistance. The military has become more directly involved in cooperation with the region, while the Department of State's prominence has declined. However, the budget allocated to the region shows that it still does not constitute a priority within the scope of the great power's defense policy.

FIGURE 2

**Security assistance to Latin America, including resources via Department of Defense (2001-2022)**  
(In US\$ 1 million)



Source: SAM/Center for International Policy. Available at: <https://internationalpolicy.org/programs/sam/>.  
Author's elaboration.

At the same time, China is presented by U.S. Southern Command military officials as a threat, or an international security challenge, even though the Chinese presence in the region is primarily economic. Containment of China is added to perceptions of crime, terrorism, and migration as security threats (Milani, 2022; Vidal and Wietchikoski, 2022). As part of the strategy to contain China, U.S. military officials propose expanding “partnerships” with their Latin American counterparts, viewing them as essential for the United States to remain the “partner of choice” for Latin American countries in the field of security cooperation (United States, 2022).

Romano (2020) interprets this situation as an intensification of an imperialist posture, in which the United States seeks to legitimize its dominance

through a rhetoric of new Cold War and competes for common sense and markets with emerging actors in Latin America. Thus, the militarization process is also linked to the perception of military relations as a means of containing China and constructing it as an enemy. The pursuit of military partnerships therefore becomes one of the ways in which the United States seeks to reshape its hegemony during a period of crisis in the liberal international order.

There are specific procedures, regulated by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, that govern the allocation of resources under the “security assistance” category. Among these requirements is that the investment must be justified in terms of its contribution to the national interests of the United States and must align with the National Security Strategy (NSS) as well as with country-specific plans, referred to as integrated strategies. This is a vertical formulation intended to promote U.S. interests and values – as explicitly stated in the doctrine (United States, 2017a).

Moreover, assistance is not the only way to expand military relations. Security cooperation is a broader category, defined by U.S. military doctrine as comprising interactions, programs, and activities conducted jointly with foreign armed forces that aim at “[...] building relationships that help advance U.S. interests” (United States, 2017a, p. 11, our translation). Activities that do not involve the transfer of resources, that are intended to promote mutual trust, or that provide U.S. military personnel with information and knowledge of the operational environment are also officially defined as forms of security cooperation. Security cooperation is justified by its utility in building partnerships between U.S. military personnel and those of other countries, which is understood as important for advancing U.S. interests (United States, 2017a).

Thus, security assistance and security cooperation is one of the ways in which hegemony is exercised, as it seeks to expand U.S. worldviews and interests, while also contributing to their legitimization. Latin American militaries are influential domestic actors and, more broadly, have a historical record of engagement with the United States. Interactions between U.S. and regional militaries date back to the two World Wars and intensified after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, when the United States created specific training programs and joint exercises. This process is linked to U.S. support for anti-communism during the Cold War and the formulation of national security doctrines (López, 1987; Rouquié, 1984).

Contemporarily, in light of the perceived Chinese “threat,” these contacts are the ones the United States seeks to reinforce through security cooperation. The next section analyzes how security cooperation between Brazil and the United States has manifested in recent years.

#### 4 SECURITY COOPERATION AND BRAZIL-UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS

In the case of Brazil, military relations with the United States have become more relevant in recent years, as the relative importance of other powers grows in areas such as trade and international politics. The integrated strategy developed by the U.S. for Brazil in 2018 indicates that the United States was interested in increasing defense cooperation and viewed relations with Brazil as important for promoting regional stability (United States, 2018, p. 5). Brazil and the United States were described as “natural partners” due to being the largest democracies and possessing the largest armed forces in the Americas (United States, 2018, p. 5, 13).

However, the description of the integrated strategy for Brazil overlooks tensions in the bilateral military relationship, historically marked by significant limitations. The CRS report provides a more accurate depiction of the bilateral relationship, noting that “repeated efforts to forge a close partnership have left both countries frustrated, [...] as their occasionally divergent interests and policy approaches have inhibited cooperation” (Meyer, 2025, p. 1). In other words, Brazil is not a traditional U.S. ally.


In recent years, Brazil has been considered by Usaid as an upper-middle-income country and is not a traditional recipient of development or security assistance. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to foster other forms of bilateral engagement. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are viewed as countries capable of providing technical cooperation to their neighbors and, therefore, less dependent on international aid, making other forms of cooperation possible (Meyer and Gracia, 2019).

In recent years, the United States has sought to strengthen security cooperation with Brazil, starting with the negotiation process of the DCA, signed in 2010 and ratified in 2015. The DCA is an umbrella agreement which, although it does not impose specific commitments on Brazil, provides for the conduct of joint military training and exercises. During the same period, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was also signed and ratified, aiming to enhance the security of confidential information sharing.

At the time of signing these two agreements, the general orientation of Brazilian foreign policy did not reflect a trend toward closer ties with the United States. On the contrary, the aim was to increase autonomy and diversify partnerships (Trinkunas, 2016; Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). This approach, which included considerations regarding technology transfer in defense, led Brazil to choose to procure weapons from European countries, highlighting partnerships with France for submarine production and with Sweden for fighter jets. As shown in figure 1, between 2010 and 2021, the United States remained

the main individual supplier of armaments to Brazil; however, when combined, European countries accounted for the largest share of weapons systems supplied to the country.

FIGURE 3

**Arms transfers to Brazil (2010-2021)**

Source: Sipri Arms Transfers Database. Retrieved from: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>.

Author's elaboration.

Obs.: The figures represent the Sipri trend indicator values (TIVs) and are expressed in millions.

Beyond arms procurement, Brazil's global foreign policy orientation was combined with efforts to expand defense cooperation at the South American level, exemplified by the creation of the South American Defense Council within Unasur. This represented a pioneering initiative to discuss defense-related issues, involving respective ministers and notably excluding the United States (Vitelli, 2016; Vitelli and Milani, 2019).

At the same time, Brazil deepened ties with other emerging countries, which together formed the BRICS. The forum has notable internal limitations, such as a lack of convergence in the strategic objectives of its members and focuses primarily on economic and political issues rather than defense. Engagement with emerging countries – particularly China – was driven not only by foreign policy decisions but also by the increasing importance of China to the Brazilian economy, as it became the country's main trading partner and a significant source of foreign direct investment (Marra et al., 2021; Schutte, 2020). In other words, Brazil's approach to China reflected material incentives and structural transformations in the liberal international order, notably the relative decline of the United States.

Nevertheless, during the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff administrations, Brazil continued participating in U.S.-led security cooperation

activities, which became increasingly institutionalized. For example, since 2013, Brazil has taken part in all editions of the Panamax military exercise organized by U.S. Southern Command (appendix A). Brazil also engaged with the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), as evidenced by a Brazilian serving as president in 2006, a position previously held only by Americans (Brasil, 2020b).

In 2012, the Brazil-U.S. Defense Industrial Cooperation Dialogue was created, aimed at fostering collaboration between the Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense (United States, 2012). In 2016, the initiative was restructured as the Defense Industry Dialogue, incorporating public and private sector representatives to increase bilateral defense trade and technological cooperation (United States, 2017b).

Thus, Brazil showed openness to security cooperation with the United States during the Lula and Rousseff administrations, while simultaneously maintaining a general policy of diversifying partnerships and pursuing autonomy. This ambiguous context shifted in 2016, after the removal of president Rousseff and the rise of Michel Temer, toward a policy of rapprochement with the United States. However, the structural economic importance of China for Brazil continued to pose constraints, a situation unchanged by the rise of right-wing governments (Marra et al., 2021). Meanwhile, U.S. concern over China's growth expanded, intensifying efforts to reassert regional hegemony.

In 2017, a joint exercise took place in Brazil with participation from the U.S. Army, called AmazonLog, described as a "Multinational Interagency Logistics Exercise led by the Brazilian Army Logistics Command, unprecedented in South America," held in the tri-border area of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (Brasil, 2017a). The exercise simulated a humanitarian crisis and included military personnel from Brazil, Colombia, Peru, the United States, and other countries in smaller numbers or as observers (Brasil, 2017b).

The administration of Bolsonaro was particularly significant in terms of intensifying Brazil-U.S. military relations. According to Ruvalcaba (2021), the overlapping terms of Trump and Bolsonaro corresponded to an overemphasis on defense within bilateral relations, making it one of the most prominent topics in presidential speeches. The first year of Bolsonaro's government demonstrated a clear trend of rapprochement with the United States in security cooperation.

In 2019, during Bolsonaro's first official visit to the United States, it was announced that Brazil would be designated a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), formalized in July (United States, 2019a). This status is a symbolic presidential declaration that can facilitate arms exports. Following this designation, discussions began on a potential Brazil-NATO partnership (United States, 2021b). In September 2019, the U.S.-Brazil Strategic Partnership Dialogue was inaugurated, with

defense and security cooperation as a key pillar, reflecting the importance of these issues in bilateral relations (United States, 2019b). That same year, Brazil assigned a general as Deputy Commander for Interoperability at U.S. Southern Command, responsible for liaising between Brazil and the combatant command (Meadows, 2019).

Also in 2019, Brazil joined the State Partnership Program through an agreement with the New York National Guard, aimed at building relationships through bilateral training activities between U.S. state guards and foreign militaries; Brazil was the last South American country to join (Goldenberg, 2019; Meadows, 2019). That year, Brazil also hosted the Atlantic phase of the Unitas exercise, a multilateral naval exercise coordinated by U.S. Southern Command since the 1960s (Meadows, 2019).

In 2020, during a visit to the United States, Bolsonaro signed the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation in Defense (RDT&E) Agreement and visited the headquarters of U.S. Southern Command, marking the first Brazilian presidential visit to the command (Brazilian [...], 2020). The RDT&E, signed by Brazil's Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense, establishes general rules and procedures for future defense RDT&E cooperation agreements. In 2021, with Biden's inauguration, high-level interactions between the two presidents decreased. Nevertheless, military relations remained unaffected, as the U.S. administration sought to enhance interoperability among U.S., Brazilian, and partner forces (Meyer, 2022, p. 18). That year, two bilateral military exercises were conducted: one in the U.S. in February and another in Brazil in December.

The February training took place at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, with 203 U.S. Army personnel, 21 Brazilian Air Force members, and participation of the KC-390 (Moury, 2021). The Brazilian delegation chief emphasized the exercise's importance for reviewing doctrinal documents, such as field manuals and instructions (Moury, 2021). The exercise in Brazil, Southern Vanguard 22, aimed to enhance readiness, interoperability, and security in the Western Hemisphere, with plans for repetition until 2028 (Taeckens, 2021). The U.S. Embassy in Brazil described it as "the largest joint military exercise on Brazilian soil since World War II" (United States, 2022c, our translation).

Finally, in 2022, Brazil participated in Exercise Tradewinds, coordinated by U.S. Southern Command and focused on defense and security in Central America. Brazil routinely participates in other U.S.-led multilateral exercises, such as Unitas and Panamax. However, participation in Tradewinds was unusual, and the reasons for Brazil joining an exercise in a traditionally U.S.-dominated area remain unclear (appendix A).

Therefore, in recent years, interactions between Brazilian and U.S. military forces have increased, particularly through joint exercises. This trend contributes to the U.S. effort to reformulate its regional hegemony, given Brazil's centrality in Latin America, while ensuring U.S. national interests and transmitting its vision of how armed forces should be organized and what threats the region faces.

## 5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This article discussed the militarization of U.S. engagement in Latin America as part of its efforts to restore hegemony during a period of crisis in the liberal international order. The investigation proceeded on two fronts: first, by examining the budgets and structure of U.S. security assistance and cooperation in the region, and second, by analyzing the case of Brazil-U.S. military relations.

Considering the structure of U.S. foreign policy, it is observed that, although there is no overall increase in spending on security assistance, the Department of Defense has gained greater prominence in the country's foreign policy, and rival powers are increasingly framed as "threats". The militarization of U.S. foreign policy toward the region can thus be understood in two ways: i) the increased involvement of the military in coordinating assistance and cooperation with the region; and ii) the emergence of a militarized narrative that presents China as a threat.

In the case of Brazil, military relations with the United States have experienced a period of strengthening and growth, at least since the ratification of the DCA, which envisioned increased training and joint exercises. Following this, additional bilateral agreements were signed, and bilateral joint exercises commenced. Until 2016, this process was combined with a foreign policy seeking greater autonomy; after the impeachment and, particularly, during the Bolsonaro administration, Brazil implemented a foreign policy characterized by deference to the U.S.

The reaffirmation of Brazil-U.S. military ties occurs in a context in which China has become increasingly relevant to the Brazilian economy, while the hegemonic power faces difficulties in directly responding economically. During a period of political willingness to enhance bilateral cooperation, security cooperation was strengthened. This military rapprochement occurs despite material incentives – commercial and investment-related – that encourage Brazil to diversify partnerships and engage with China. Security cooperation thus emerges as a tool for the United States to resist losing regional influence and to pursue a reconstitution of its hegemony.

Security cooperation matters not only because of the application of force, intrinsic to the institution, but also as a means for the U.S. ruling classes to export worldviews and institutional models. It also functions as a response to interstate competition, which increasingly characterizes the contemporary international order and forms part of the broader crisis of hegemony at both global and Latin American levels.

## REFERENCES

ARRIGHI, G. **Adam Smith em Pequim: origens e fundamentos do século XXI**. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2007.

BABIC, M. Let's talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis of the liberal world order. **International Affairs**, v. 96, n. 3, p. 767-786, 2020.

BERG, R. C. **The future of U.S.-Brazil security cooperation: opportunities presented by Brazil's major non-NATO ally status**. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 15 July 2022.

BERNAL-MEZA, R. Introduction: understanding China-Latin America relations as part of the transition of the world order. In: BERNAL-MEZA, R.; XING, L. (Ed.). **China-Latin America relations in the 21st century: the dual complexities of opportunities and challenges**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020a. p. 1-27.

BERNAL-MEZA, R. Conclusion: China and Latin America in the global political economy: the development of a new core-periphery axis. In: BERNAL-MEZA, R.; XING, L. (Ed.). **China-Latin America Relations in the 21st century**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020b.

BOLTON, J. **Remarks by National Security advisor ambassador John R. Bolton on the administration's policies in Latin America**. Miami: NSC, 2 Nov. 2018. Available at: <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-administrations-policies-latin-america/>.

BOLTON, J. **The room where it happened**. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020.

BRANDS, H.; BERG, R. C. The return of geopolitics: Latin America and the Caribbean in an era of strategic competition. **Jack Gordon Institute Research Publications**, v. 37, p. 26, 2021.

BRASIL. Câmara dos Deputados. **Projeto de Decreto Legislativo nº 1.446-A, de 2001**. Autor: Comissão de Relações Exteriores e de Defesa Nacional. Relator: Deputado Marcos Rogério. Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, 2001.

BRASIL. Exército Brasileiro. **Amazonlog 2017**. Retrieved July 13, 2017a, from: [http://www.eb.mil.br/amazonlog17/noticias/-/asset\\_publisher/BsJDxIc4XCbS/content/escola-de-comando-e-estado-maior-do-exercito-amazonlog-2017/8032597](http://www.eb.mil.br/amazonlog17/noticias/-/asset_publisher/BsJDxIc4XCbS/content/escola-de-comando-e-estado-maior-do-exercito-amazonlog-2017/8032597).

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Amazonlog: começa em Tabatinga (AM) maior exercício de logística humanitária do Brasil. **Gov.br**, 8 nov. 2017b. Available at: <https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/noticias/ultimas-noticias/amazonlog-comeca-em-tabatinga-am-maior-exercicio-de-ajuda-humanitaria-do-brasil>.

BRASIL. Presidência da República. Decreto nº 10.220, de 5 de fevereiro de 2020. Promulga o acordo entre o governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o governo dos Estados Unidos da América sobre salvaguardas tecnológicas relacionadas à participação dos Estados Unidos da América em lançamentos a partir do Centro Espacial de Alcântara, firmado em Washington, D.C., em 18 de março de 2019. **Diário Oficial da União**, Brasília, 6 fev. 2020a. Available at: [https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil\\_03/\\_ato2019-2022/2020/decreto/d10220.htm](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2020/decreto/d10220.htm).

BRASIL. Ministério da Defesa. Histórico da RBJID. **Gov.br**, 30 dez. 2020b. Available at: <https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/rbjid/rbjid/historico-da-rbjid>.

BRASIL; ESTADOS UNIDOS. Acordo entre o governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o governo dos Estados Unidos da América referente a projetos de pesquisa, desenvolvimento, testes e avaliação (acordo RTD&E). Miami: Ministério da Defesa; Department of Defense, 2020. Available at: <https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decleg/2022/decretolegislativo-16-20-abril-2022-792549-acordo-pl.pdf>.

BRAZILIAN president visits Southcom. **U.S. Southern Command**, 8 Mar. 2020. Available at: <https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2105124/brazilian-president-visits-southcom/>.

CECEÑA, A. E. Estratégias de construção de uma hegemonia sem limites. In: CECEÑA, A. E. (Ed.). **Hegemonias e emancipações no século XXI**. São Paulo: Clacso, 2005. p. 35-55.

CECEÑA, A. E.; RODRÍGUEZ, D. B. Dominación capitalista y geopolítica continental. **Revista de Estudios Estratégicos**, n. 6, p. 53-72, 2018.

COLETTA, R. della; VARGAS, M. Por veto a Huawei, EUA acenam com parceria militar do Brasil na Otan. **Folha de S.Paulo**, 5 ago. 2021. Disponível em: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2021/08/por-veto-a-huawei-eua-acenam-com-parceria-militar-do-brasil-na-otan.shtml>.

COOLEY, A.; NEXON, D. **Exit from hegemony: the unraveling of the American global order**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.

COX, R. W. Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory. **Millennium: Journal of International Studies**, v. 10, n. 2, p. 126-155, 1981.

COX, R. W. Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. **Millennium**, v. 12, n. 2, p. 162-175, 1983.

FARROW, R. **Guerra contra a paz**. São Paulo: Todavia, 2019.

FORNER, C. N. **O Departamento de Defesa e a militarização da política externa estadunidense, de Bush a Obama (2001-2017)**. Tese (Doutorado em relações internacionais) – Universidade Estadual Paulista, São Paulo, 2020. Available at: <http://hdl.handle.net/11449/193494>.

GOLDENBERG, R. Signing ceremony formalizes New York and Brazil partnership. **U.S. Southern Command: news**, 15 Mar. 2019. Available at: <https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/1786676/signing-ceremony-formalizes-new-york-and-brazil-partnership/>.

GRAMSCI, A. **Cadernos do cárcere**: Maquiavel – notas sobre o Estado e a política. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2007. v. 3.

HUNG, H.-F. The US-China rivalry is about capitalist. **Jacobin Magazine**, 7 Nov. 2020. Available at: <https://jacobin.com/2020/07/us-china-competition-capitalism-rivalry>.

ISACSON, A. Closing the “seams”: U.S. Security Policy in the Americas. **Nacla Report on the Americas**, v. 38, n. May, p. 13-17, 2005.

LAJTMAN, T. Trump y la renovación del militarismo imperial en América Latina y el Caribe. In: ROMANO, S. (Ed.). **Trumperialismo**: la guerra permanente contra América Latina. Buenos Aires: Celag; Mármol Izquierdo, 2020. v. 1. p. 37-63.

LAYNE, C. This time it's real: the end of unipolarity and the “Pax Americana”. **International Studies Quarterly**, v. 56, n. 1, p. 203-213, 2012.

LÓPEZ, E. **Seguridad nacional y sedición militar**. Buenos Aires: Legasa, 1987. (Colección Nueva Información).

MARRA, A. T. L. et al. Relações Brasil-China no governo Bolsonaro: da ideologia ao pragmatismo. In: MARINGONI, G.; SCHUTTE, G. R.; BERRINGER, T. (Ed.). **As bases da política externa bolsonarista**. São Paulo: Editora UFABC, 2021. p. 229-250.

MEADOWS, K. L. Unitas LX kicks off in Rio de Janeiro. **U.S. Southern Command: news**, 19 Aug. 2019. Retrieved July 13, 2019, from: <https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/1937909/unitas-lx-kicks-off-in-rio-de-janeiro>.

MCINNIS, K. J.; MCGARRY, B. W. **United States Southern Command (USSouthcom)**: IF11464. Washington, D.C.: Southcom. Available at: <http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/news.php?storyId=2256>.

MEYER, P. J. **U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean**: trends and FY2017 appropriations. Washington, D.C.: CRS, 8 Feb. 2017. (CRS Report, R44647). Available at: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44647.pdf>.

MEYER, P. J. **U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean**: FY2018 appropriations. Washington, D.C.: CRS, 9 May 2018. (CRS Report, R45089). Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45089.pdf>.

MEYER, P. J. **U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean**: FY2022 appropriations. Washington, D.C.: CRS, 7 Feb. 2022. (CRS Report, R47028). Available at: [https://www.congress.gov/crs\\_external\\_products/R/PDF/R47028/R47028.2.pdf](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47028/R47028.2.pdf).

MEYER, P. J. **Brazil**: background and U.S. relations. Washington, D.C.: CRS, 2025. (CRS Report, R46236). Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46236>.

MEYER, P. J.; GRACIA, E. Y. **U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean**: FY2019 appropriations. Washington, D.C.: CRS, 1 Mar. 2019. (CRS Report, R45547). Available at: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45547.pdf>.

MEYER, P. J.; MARTIN, R. L. **U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean**: FY2021 appropriations. Washington, D.C.: CRS, 7 Jan. 2021. (CRS Report, R46514). Available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46514.pdf>.

MILANI, L. P. US foreign policy to South America since 9/11: neglect or militarisation? **Contexto Internacional**, v. 43, n. 1, p. 121-146, 2021.

MILANI, P. U.S. hegemony in Latin America during an age of challenges: the perception of threats by the U.S. Southern Command. **Latin American Perspectives**, v. 50, n. 5, p. 1-17, 2022.

MOURY, T. Brazilian service members take part in operational exercise in the US. **Diálogo Américas**, 10 Feb. 2021. Available at: <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/brazilian-service-members-take-part-in-operational-exercise-in-the-us/>.

MYERS, M.; WISE, C. (Ed.). **The political economy of China-Latin America relations in the new millennium**: brave new world. New York: Routledge, 2017.

NATO – NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. **NATO 2022 Strategic concept**. Brussels: NATO, 2022.

PAZ, G. S. China, United States and hegemonic challenge in Latin America: an overview and some lessons from previous instances of hegemonic challenge in the region. **The China Quarterly**, v. 209, p. 18-34, 2012.

PENIDO, A.; STÉDILE, M. E. (Ed.). **Ninguém regula a América:** guerras híbridas e intervenções estadunidenses na América Latina. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2021.

ROMANO, S. M. (Ed.). **Trumperialismo:** la guerra permanente contra América Latina. Buenos Aires: Celag; Mármol Izquierdo, 2020.

ROUQUIÉ, A. **O Estado militar na América Latina.** 1. ed. Santos: Alfa Omega, 1984.

RUVALCABA, D. M. La política exterior de Estados Unidos hacia Brasil: cambios y continuidades en la administración Biden. **Relaciones Internacionales**, v. 94, n. 1, p. 141-169, 2021.

SANAHUJA, J. A.; LÓPEZ BURIAN, C. La nueva extrema derecha neopatriota latinoamericana: el internacionalismo reaccionario y su desafío al orden liberal internacional. **Cojuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South**, v. 11, n. 55, p. 22-34, 2020.

SCHUTTE, G. R. **Oásis para o capital:** solo fértil para a “corrida de ouro”. Curitiba: Appris, 2020.

STAHL, R. M. Ruling the interregnum: politics and ideology in nonhegemonic times. **Politics and Society**, v. 47, n. 3, p. 333-360, 2019.

TAECKENS, J. Bilateral military exercise Southern Vanguard 22 begins in Brazil. **U.S. Southern Command**, 7 Dec. 2021. Retrieved 13 July, 2022, from: <https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2865017/bilateral-military-exercise-southern-vanguard-22-begins-in-brazil>.

TAYLOR, I. BRICS in Africa and underdevelopment: how different? In: CHRISTENSEN, S. F.; XING, L. (Ed.). **Emerging powers, emerging markets, emerging societies:** global responses. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. p. 162-184.

TICKNER, A. B.; MORALES, M. Cooperación dependiente asociada: relaciones estratégicas asimétricas entre Colombia y Estados Unidos. **Colombia Internacional**, n. 85, p. 171-206, 2015. Available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/colombiaint/11631>.

TRINKUNAS, D. R. M. H. A. **Aspirational power:** Brazil on the long road to global influence. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.

UNITED STATES. White House. **Fact sheet:** U.S.-Brazil Defense cooperation. Washington, D.C.: 9 Apr. 2012. (Statements & releases). Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/09/fact-sheet-us-brazil-defense-cooperation>.

UNITED STATES. Joint Chiefs of Staff. **Security Cooperation**. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017a.

UNITED STATES. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil. **Declaração conjunta: Diálogo da Indústria de Defesa Brasil-EUA (DID):** segunda reunião. Washington, D.C., 2017b.

UNITED STATES. Department of State. **Integrated Country Strategy: Brazil**. Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2018. Available at: [https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICS-Brazil\\_UNCLASS\\_508.pdf](https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICS-Brazil_UNCLASS_508.pdf).

UNITED STATES. White House. **Designation of the Federative Republic of Brazil as a major non-NATO ally**. Washington, D.C.: White House, 31 July 2019a. (Memorandum). Available at: <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-designation-federative-republic-brazil-major-non-nato-ally/>.

UNITED STATES. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil. **U.S.-Brazil Strategic Partnership Dialogue**. Washington, D.C.: 2019b.

UNITED STATES. Southern Command. **Posture statement of Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command, before the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress House Armed Services Committee**. Washington, D.C.: Southcom, 30 Jan. 2020. Available at: [https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SASC%20SOUTHCOM%20Posture%20Statement\\_FINAL.pdf?ver=2020-01-30-081357-560](https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SASC%20SOUTHCOM%20Posture%20Statement_FINAL.pdf?ver=2020-01-30-081357-560).

UNITED STATES. White House. **Interim National Security Strategic Guidance: renewing America's advantages**. Washington, D.C.: White House, Mar. 2021a. Available at: <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.

UNITED STATES. White House. **On-the-record press call by National Security Council senior director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez on official travel to Brazil and Argentina**. Washington, D.C.: White House, 2021b.

UNITED STATES. White House. **National Security Strategy**. Washington, D.C.: White House, Oct. 2022a. Available at: <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf>.

UNITED STATES. Department of Defense. **Fact sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy**. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2022b.

UNITED STATES. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil. **U.S.-Brazil high level dialogue 2022: National & Regional Security**. Washington, D.C., 2022c.

UNITED STATES. Southern Command. **Statement of general Laura J. Richardson commander, United States Southern Command before the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress**. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Southern Command, 2022d.

UNITED STATES. Department of State. **U.S. Relations with Brazil**. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 9 Sept. 2024. (Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet). Available at: <https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-brazil/>.

VAICIUS, I.; ISACSON, A. The “War on Drugs” meets the “War on Terror”: the United States’ military involvement in Colombia climbs to the next level. **International Policy Report**, p. 1-19, Feb. 2003.

VIDAL, C.; WIETCHIKOSKI, L. U.S. hegemony in Latin America: the Southern Command as an instrument of consensus and coercion. **Contexto Internacional**, v. 44, n. 3, 2022.

VIGEVANI, T.; CEPALUNI, G. A política externa de Lula da Silva: a estratégia da autonomia pela diversificação. **Contexto Internacional**, v. 29, n. 2, p. 273-335, 2007.

VITELLI, M. G. Comunidad e identidad en la cooperación regional en defensa: entendimientos en conflicto sobre pensamiento estratégico en el Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano. **Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval**, v. 2, n. 2, p. 233-260, 2016.

VITELLI, M.; MILANI, L. P. Regionalismo sudamericano en tiempos de redefiniciones: el Consejo de Defensa de la Unasur y la crisis del regionalismo posliberal y poshegemónico. **Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política**, v. 28, n. 2, p. 35-60, 2019.

WENDT, A.; BARNETT, M. Dependent state formation and Third World militarization. **Review of International Studies**, v. 19, p. 321-347, 1993.

XING, L.; BERNAL-MEZA, R. China-US rivalry: a new Cold War or capitalism’s intra-core competition? **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, v. 64, n. 1, p. 1-20, 2021.

APPENDIX A

RESPONSE TO ACCESS TO INFORMATION REQUEST

Content

Summary

Brazil’s participation in multilateral exercises promoted by Southcom

Text

I would like to obtain information about Brazil’s participation, since 2010, in the multilateral military exercises Unitas, Tradewinds, and Panamax promoted by Southcom. In which editions of these recurring exercises did Brazil take part? How many military personnel were deployed? To which branches of the Armed Forces did they belong?

Prezado(a) Cidadão(ã),

Ao cumprimentá-lo(a) cordialmente, reporto-me ao pedido formulado por Vossa Senhoria de NUP 60110.001393/2022-77, de 19 de maio de 2022.

Após consulta ao órgão do competente da administração central deste Ministério, o Serviço de Informações ao Cidadão (SIC-MD) apresenta, abaixo, informações no que tange às ações desenvolvidas na alçada do Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas (ECMFA) do Ministério da Defesa.

| Nome da operação | Órgãos envolvidos                     | Participantes                         |
|------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| PANAMAX 2013     | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | MB - 15; EB - 17 e FAB - 05.          |
| PANAMAX 2014     | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | MD - 07; MB - 10; EB - 14 e FAB - 03. |
| PANAMAX 2015     | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | MD - 06; MB - 08; EB - 09 e FAB - 04. |
| PANAMAX 2016     | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | MD - 06; MB - 07; EB - 13 e FAB - 06. |
| PANAMAX 2017     | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | MD - 06; MB - 10; EB - 14 e FAB - 11. |
| PANAMAX 2018     | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | MD - 10; MB - 17; EB - 22 e FAB - 13. |

(Continues)

(Continued)

| Nome da operação  | Órgãos envolvidos                     | Participantes                                                                                                                                               |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| PANAMAX 2019/2020 | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | A partir deste ciclo, o exercício passou a ser bianual.<br>Não foi realizado no ano de 2020 pelas restrições sanitárias em virtude da pandemia da covid-19. |
| PANAMAX 2021/2022 | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | Exercício previsto para ser executado em agosto de 2022.                                                                                                    |
| TRADEWINDS 2022   | Ministério da Defesa e Forças Armadas | MD - 02; MB - 05; EB - 02 e FAB - 02.                                                                                                                       |

MID: Ministério da Defesa

MB: Marinha Brasileira

EB: Exército Brasileiro

FAB: Força Aérea Brasileira

Cumprе esclarecer que as informações relativas aos exercícios PANAMAX e TRADEWINDS foram elaboradas com base nos relatórios dos respectivos eventos.

Os dados relativos ao exercício UNITAS são de responsabilidade da Marinha do Brasil. Portanto, diante do exposto, e de acordo com o art. 15, § 1º, inciso IV, do Decreto nº 7.724, de 16 de maio de 2012, caso haja interesse, este SIC-MD sugere que V. Sa. faça 1 (um) novo pedido, encaminhando-o diretamente ao SIC do Comando da Marinha (CMAR), por meio da Plataforma Fala.BR (falabr.cgu.gov.br).