DISCUSSION PAPER

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BRAZIL'S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: EVOLUTION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

Israel de Oliveira Andrade
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BRAZIL'S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: EVOLUTION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES[1, 2]

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ABSTRACT

Based on a state policy perspective, this paper seeks to present the path of Brazil's participation in United Nations (UN) peace operations, from its genesis in 1947 to the present day, with the intent to comprehend whether there is a progressive and evolutionary pattern in these engagement efforts, and which would be the main challenges, contributions and future orientations to the country in this matter. To this end, in a first moment, the text will bring a conceptual discussion regarding the different definitions and understandings on peace operations. Subsequently, we will analyze the evolution of UN peace operations throughout its 70 years and the Brazilian positions during this period. In a third moment, we will present final considerations, identifying the upcoming challenges and the main possible perspectives for Brazil to engage in future peace operations. The intention, therefore, is to ascertain whether peacekeeping operations, as an instrument of international politics aligned to the guidelines of Brazilian defense and foreign policies, should continue to be supported by Brazil or if new reorientations are necessary as a national strategy.

Keywords: peace operations; Brazil; United Nations; MINUSTAH; UNIFIL; peacekeeping.

1 INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) peace operations emerged in the post-1945 context as a new instrument for collective security, to promote the creation of a stable international environment. Since the first UN mission in 1947, the United Nations Special Committee for the Balkans (UNSCOB),[1] Brazil has been ready to engage, through military, police and civilian personnel. This path continues today, with the Brazilian presence in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) being the main example in quantitative terms.

As a phenomenon of international politics, UN peace operations have evolved from a more traditional approach, marked by peace agreements and ceasefire strategies among the parties involved, to a complex and multidimensional perspective. Such approach is characterized by political, social, economic, cultural, legal, and civil society issues, and often includes the use of force beyond the self-defense, formerly considered illegitimate. Throughout these changes, Brazil has also sought to adapt and integrate this new emerging multidimensional attitude into its actions. In this sense, the beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed a broader engagement of Brazil in peace operations (such as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH and UNIFIL), which is translated into the increase in the number of deployed troops and in the number of missions that receive Brazilians. This also reflects a stance toward the security-development nexus, the recurrent participation of Brazilian force commanders, and the proactive performance of diplomacy regarding these missions.

It is important to consider that Brazilian participation in peace operations is legitimized as a state policy by official documents, such as the National Defense Strategy (END) and the Defense White Paper (LBDN). Even so, there are concerns to be taken into account, such as the challenge on the use of force, the foreign policy principle of inviolability of sovereignty, the commitment of the Brazilian image as a peaceful actor, and the low domestic engagement on the subject. The situational context makes this discussion more relevant, given that in November 2017 Brazil was officially invited by the UN to send troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization

1. Although UNSCOB is not exactly considered a peacekeeping operation, it was the pioneering mission in the UN efforts to send a multinational force, on behalf of the organization and the international community itself, to contribute to international peace and security.

Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).[2] In short, clarifying Brazil's historical trajectory on the issue is fundamental to setting its future course and aspirations regarding peace operations.

Based on this brief contextualization, the text is divided into four sections, including this introduction. The second section will have a conceptual focus, presenting the various definitions and understandings of operations oriented to making, maintaining, imposing and restoring peace. In the third section, we will analyze the Brazil's seventy-year history in UN peace operations, in order to point out its contributions, signal the challenges faced, and identify the patterns of its participation. Finally, in the fourth section, we will present final considerations, upcoming challenges and the main prospects for Brazil's future engagement in peace operations.

Thus, this paper aims to present the path of Brazil's participation in UN peace operations, from its genesis in 1947 to the present day. By analyzing the evolution of UN peace operations over these seventy years and the stance of Brazil during this period, we seek to assess whether there is a progressive and evolving pattern to Brazilian integration to peace operations, and what would be the main challenges, contributions and future guidelines for the country in this context. Hence, the objective of this text is to examine whether peace operations, as an instrument of Brazilian foreign policy aligned with defense policy directives, should continue to be promoted, or whether new realignments are needed as a national strategy. We argue that, although Brazil may face challenges and obstacles should it engage in new, highly complex peace operations, it has been continuously advancing in this field, contributing to reinforce national interests and projecting the country on the international scene.

2 CONCEPTUALIZING PEACE OPERATIONS

UN peace operations, which have gained importance since the late 1940s, can be considered one of the main instruments of international politics used to ensure compliance with Article 1 of the United Nations Charter:

2. In the official invitation, the UN Secretariat requests 750 Brazilian military personnel to join the mission in the Central African Republic. The response deadline that the UN gave Brazil was December 15, 2017 (Amaral, 2017). After two postponements, in April 2015 Brazil responded that it would not send troops but would remain at the disposal of the UN to participate in future missions.

> to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace (UN, 1945).

The idea of *collective security* gained prominence after 1945, when interstate war was no longer recognized as a legitimate means of action. This period witnessed the emergence of collective international actions to safeguard peace, preventing *acts of aggression* by dissident states and supporting fragile states. The maintenance of peace, in this collective sense, no longer depends on each state by itself, nor on balances of power acting in equilibrium, but on a collective that must act by means of an intervention rationale, with specific actions and the perspective of correcting anomalies in the established order (Rodrigues, 2013).

There are numerous interpretations and definitions of peace operations; they vary in their operational focus, breadth and purpose, and include peacemaking, peacekeeping, robust peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding, multidimensional operations, etc. In a broader sense, in this paper, it is understood that peacekeeping operations are a tool endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and "used by the international community to administer complex crises that threaten international peace and security" (UN, 2008, p. 6).

Peacemaking is intended to manage and resolve conflict by diplomatic means, such as mediation, negotiations, good offices, etc., in order to achieve peace agreements or ceasefires among the parties involved (UN, 1992b, p. 20-12). Among the peacemaking measures mentioned in Article 33 of the UN Charter, there are negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agreements or agencies. The UNSC is also part of the conflict resolution process (UN, 1945).

Peacekeeping, in turn, refers to operations to maintain peace, with the presence in the field of UN troops, known as the Blue Helmets, which include military, police, and civilian personnel. These operations require i) consent of the parties involved; ii) impartiality; and iii) non-use of force, except in self-defense and defense of the

mandate;[3] these principles are often referred to as the *holy trinity* (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004).[4] As defined by the 2008 document "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", known as the Capstone Doctrine, peacekeeping can be defined as:

> a technique designed to preserve the peace, even when fragile, where combat has been interrupted, and as an aid in implementing the agreements reached by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping evolved from primarily a military model of observing ceasefires and separation of post-war forces among governments to incorporating a complex model with many elements – military, political and civil – working together to help form the bases for a sustainable peace (UN, 2008, p. 18).

Peace enforcement involves the use of coercive measures, including the use of military force, when authorized by the UNSC. These military interventions by one or more governments in a third state aims to cessation of violent conflict and restoring international peace and security. The legal mechanism that allows operations to impose peace is Chapter VII of the UN Charter, whose Article 42 states that the UNSC "can carry out, by means of air, land and sea forces, *any action it deems necessary* to maintain or reestablish international peace and security" (UN, 1945, Article 42, emphasis added).

Finally, it is worth mentioning the *peacebuilding* missions, whose purpose is to promote sustainable pillars for peace and development in a given country. A concept forged by Johan Galtung (1976), peacebuilding attempts to reach the deep causes of violent conflicts from a structural perspective, which includes disarming violent factions as well as strengthening the political, social, economic, cultural, and legal spheres of civil society (UN, 2010). This perspective of engagement in peace operations was also strongly influenced by the notion of human security and the promotion of universal human rights (Krause, 2009).[5] In the words of Roland Paris, peacebuilding is defined as:

3. Allowing the use of force in defense of the mandate is a recent change in the context of peace operations, admitted only at the beginning of the 21st century.

4. Within the context of peacekeeping, the robust peacekeeping is characterized by the UN as belonging to a "grey zone", since there is the use of force, but only on a tactical level and with the consent of the host country of the operation. Thus, although they seem similar, robust peacekeeping should not be mistaken for peace enforcement, as provided for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN, 2008, p. 34).

5. The concept of peacebuilding was officially integrated into the conceptual framework of the UN based on the 1992 document "An Agenda for Peace", promoted by the then Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (UN, 1992b).

> actions adopted at the end of a civil conflict in order to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of conflicts. A peacebuilding mission involves using military and civil personnel from diverse international agencies, with a mandate to carry out peacebuilding in a country that has just emerged from civil war (Paris, 2004, p. 38).

Usually, peacebuilding missions are approved in post-conflict contexts; however, there are also situations in which peacebuilding tasks are authorized in the midst of hostile contexts, as occurred at some point in MINUSTAH, and in the UN Mission to Stabilize the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Three United Nations pillars usually sustain a complex peacebuilding operation: i) diplomatic and political; ii) military (Blue Helmets); and iii) humanitarian – specialized agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Development Program (UNDP) (Hatto, 2013).

The different approaches mentioned (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding) have, in practice, overlapping and merging goals and functions. Despite the fact that conceptually we divide the types of peace operations, it is important to keep in mind that intersections among them are unavoidable, given that peacebuilding, for example, can be combined with peacekeeping, peacemaking or humanitarian assistance. Figure 1 shows this clearly.

FIGURE 1
Linkages and Grey Areas



Source: UN (2008, p. 19).

The "Brahimi Report" defines current peace operations, embedded in this *grey-zone* logic, as *complex peace operations*, since "peacekeepers work to maintain the security of the local environment while peacebuilders work to transform it into a self-sustaining one" (UN, 2000, p. 10). In addition to addressing more traditional issues of interposition and observation, in present-day peace missions one can observe new functions such as elections monitoring, judicial reform, disarmament, humanitarian assistance, etc. (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2004; Costa, 2015b).[6] Thus, these operations encompass activities in the political, military, police and humanitarian areas, in addition to requiring coordination and synchronization of diverse actors, ranging from the UN, with its agencies, programs and funds, through regional, local, non-governmental, and financial organizations, as well as representatives of civil society. That is why they are called multidimensional. It is based in these definitions and understandings of peace missions that in the following section we analyze Brazil's involvement over recent decades.

3 BRAZIL'S HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY IN UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS

3.1 Structure and decision making

Before beginning an analysis regarding the Brazilian trajectory in UN peace operations, it is important to understand the institutional structure of the Brazilian government and of the UN itself with respect to peace operations, how they interrelate and especially how and by whom decisions are made in order to legitimize and effectively enable Brazilian participation.

The UN body responsible for dealing with administrative matters of peace operations is the Secretariat, currently headed by Secretary-General António Guterres, through its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which works in partnership with the Department of Field Services (DFS). As a way to assure an official communications channel with the UN, Brazil maintains the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York (DelBrasONU), with representatives who deal with subjects of interest to the country, including peacekeeping operations.

6. For a more in-depth discussion of the historical evolution and differences between traditional and new robust peace operations, see Kenkel (2013b) and Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004).

The DelBrasONU is part of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE).[7] To compose the mission in a mixed and coordinated manner, there is a diplomatic corps (from the MRE) and a military advisor, who represents the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MD). While the diplomatic corps is more concerned with foreign policy issues, the military advisor assists the permanent mission in defense matters. Three officers support the military advisor, one from each branch of the Armed Forces. Figure 2 illustrates this organizational dynamic.

FIGURE 2
Brazilian organizational structure for dealing with peace operations issues



Source: Brazil (2013, p. 26).

7. The Department of Defense and Security Affairs, created by Decree No. 8.817/2016, which replaced the former General Coordination of Defense Affairs, provides important assistance to the MRE in the development of joint training and capacity building for peace operations (Brazil, 2017).

It is worth stressing, however, that the military advisor does not have the authority to represent Brazil at the UN, since their function is limited to advising. The only authorities who represent Brazil at the UN are the President of the Republic, the Minister of Foreign Relations and the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN.

On a more tactical-operational level, another institution of highest importance to Brazil with respect to issues of peace operations is the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Center (CCOPAB). Created in 2010, it replaced the Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (CI Op Paz). The CCOPAB's mission is to prepare military, police and civilian personnel for peacekeeping and humanitarian demining missions. Among the issues addressed in its courses are concepts of peace and international security, gender issues, sexual abuse, protection of civilians, protection of children, logistics, journalism in danger zones, cultural intelligence, etc. (Teixeira, 2017).

Despite being linked to the MD, CCOPAB is directly subordinate to the Brazilian Army (EB), through the 1st Army Division, which exercises functions of the Eastern Military Command. The center also has a link to the Land Operations Command (Coter), whose responsibility is to plan and supervise instructional and training activities. Moreover, the CCOPAB maintains a direct connection with the Army's Department of Education and Culture, in order to assure technical-pedagogical orientation (CCOPAB, [n.d.]). Figure 3 illustrates this relationship of subordination.

FIGURE 3
CCOPAB organizational structure



Source: CCOPAB ([n.d.]).

Although CCOPAB was created mainly due to a demand by MINUSTAH, during its years of activities it has developed and strengthened its own institutional corps and has achieved both domestic and international recognition. The center has built an integrated network of stakeholders, such as think tanks, universities, UN agencies and government bodies that are directly or indirectly involved with peacekeeping operations. Thus, the work of CCOPAB encompasses part of tactical and operational instruction as well as issues at the strategic level, for example, by means of partnerships with the MD, the MRE, the Brazilian Armed Forces and UN humanitarian agencies. The center, therefore, seeks

to project its activities beyond the experience of the MINUSTAH and offers support to possible future peacekeeping operations or those already underway (Teixeira, 2017).

With respect to decision making regarding the participation of Brazilian troops in peacekeeping operations, first there must be an invitation/informal consultation by the UN with the MRE, which sends it to the President of the Republic. Then there is articulation among three bodies to evaluate the proposal: the MD, the Ministry of Planning, Development and Management, and the Ministry of Economy. After forwarded the positive or negative assessment, the MRE will communicate with the UN, and if the response is positive, a deeper analysis will be undertaken jointly by the MD and the MRE to elaborate an inter-ministerial statement, to be sent to the President of the Republic. If the presidential decision is positive, the statement is submitted for evaluation by the National Congress, which, if it grants the authorization and issues a legislative decree, returns it to the President of the Republic to issue a presidential decree. After this process, the MD provides a ministerial directive to delegate to the Armed Forces the engagement in the peace operation in question. Figure 4 illustrates this decision-making process to authorize Brazil's engagement in UN peacekeeping operations.

FIGURE 4
Brazil's decision-making process for engagement of troops in UN peace operations



Source: Brazil (2013, p. 55).

3.2 Brazil's history in UN peacekeeping operations

Among the 71 peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN from 1948 to 2017, Brazil participated in 46, equivalent to 65% of the total – in addition to another five under the aegis of the Organization of American States (OAS) (Hamann, 2017). In these seventy years, the country contributed with over 57,000 personnel, including military, police and civilian experts. About 88% of this figure have been part of peace operations deployed in the last 25 years (Cezne and Hamann, 2016; Hamann, 2017).

Brazil has participated in UN peacekeeping operations since 1947, the year of the organization's first mission: the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). The UN General Assembly (UNGA) established this committee in October 1947 to verify the situation of the Greek civil war and the conflict in the Balkans, especially on the borders of Greece with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (Munro, 1997[8] cited in Bittencourt, 2009).

8. Munro, J. A. A crise da Grécia – 50 anos: a presença da Marinha do Brasil no grupo de observadores da ONU. *Revista Marítima Brasileira*, Rio de Janeiro, n. 117, 1997.

The countries participating in UNSCOB were Brazil, the United States, France, China, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. This pioneering UN peace operation consisted of a corps of observers and a corps of delegates. Of the 36 observers present, three were military personnel[9] working on the borders to verify the flow of people, conduct interrogations, and examine weapons captured by the Greek National Army. There were also two Brazilian diplomats, responsible for evaluating the reports produced by the observers and issuing suggestions to the UNGA (Bittencourt, 2009).[10]

Brazil's second participation in peace operations came in 1956, when the UNSC approved the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), this time with presence of the Blue Helmets.[11] With the efforts of the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and the then Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, UNEF I was implemented with the main purpose of solving the Suez Canal crisis in the Middle East. This operation unfolded on two fronts. In the first instance, the Blue Helmets were to secure a cease-fire and ensure a peaceful withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egypt. Later, in a second moment, the objective of the UNEF I was to act as a police force. The strategy was to create a line to establish an armistice demarcation line in the Gaza Strip, where troops under UN command would police the approximately 100-kilometer Israeli-Egyptian border to prevent the presence of Egyptian and Israeli military troops (Rosner, 1996).

The Brazilian infantry battalion that participated in the operation, known as the Suez Battalion, contributed with around 600 troops sent to Egypt to join UNEF I. During the ten-year peace operation (1957-1967), around 6,300 personnel joined UNEF I operational activities, with the Brazilian contingent rotating every six months. Furthermore, Brazil had the opportunity to command the UNEF I operations with Major-General Carlos Paiva Chaves from January to August 1964, and with Major-General Sizeno Sarmento, from January 1965 to January 1966 (Brazilian Army, [n.d.] b). The Brazilian image at the UN as a country interested in international conflict

9. The Brazilian military officers present in the UNSCOB were Lieutenant Captain John Anderson Munro (Navy), Captain Hervé Berlandez Pedrosa (Army) and Air Captain João Camarão Telles Ribeiro (Air Force) (Bittencourt, 2009).
10. The Brazilian delegates assigned to UNSCOB were diplomats Vasco Leitão da Cunha and Sílvio Rangel de Castro (Bittencourt, 2009).
11. During UNSCOB operations, observers and military personnel acting under UN command remained on the field without helmets. Due to the difficulty of identification, future peace operations, such as UNEF I, began to adopt the blue helmet or blue beret (Bittencourt, 2009).

resolution, added to the interest of the then president Juscelino Kubitschek in projecting Brazil into the international arena, was the reason that drove Brazil to act expressively at the UNEF I (Zanatta, 2012).

It is important to highlight the historical significance of UNEF I for the subsequent UN peace operations. The operation deployed on the Egyptian border showed that the conflicts in the region would not cease without a robust armed contingent under UN command, and not just small groups of unarmed observers (Kenkel, 2013b). This operation, which lasted ten years, can be considered the transition from a UN *peacemaking* stance alone to new approaches of *peacekeeping*.

In the period 1962-1963, two Brazilian military personnel who were working in the UNEF I in the Middle East moved to the United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) to provide reinforcements for the peace mission. Another military officer, from the Brazilian Army, who was also serving at the UNEF I, was transferred in June 1963 to become a military observer for the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) (Aguilar, 2015).

Brazil has also contributed to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964, sending about 180 military personnel from the Brazilian Air Force. A few days after the Democratic Republic of the Congo became independent from Belgium in June 1960, there was a period of crisis and political turmoil. The country faced anticolonial and intertribal conflicts, a separatist civil war in Katanga, and other occasional external interventions such as the invasion of Belgian troops and mercenaries (Spooner, 2009). Still in 1960, the new Congolese government requested help from the UN in order to restore domestic order and protection from external threats. Two days after the formal request, the UNSC approved Resolution 143, "requesting the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Congolese territory" (UN, 1960, p. 2). During the peace operation deployed in the country, the peak of the contingent of UN troops reached the figure of 20,000 (Spooner, 2009).

As part of the ONUC, the Brazilian Air Force joined the 1st Air Force Squadron, headquartered in Leopoldville, with the Brazilian Air Force Major Berenguer Cesar in command until March 1961, when it was unified with the 2nd Squadron, transferring the command to an Indian military representative. The Brazilian military contingent was responsible for transporting UN troops, logistical material for other Blue Helmet squadrons, supplies for refugees, as well as evacuating population and providing air

reconnaissance missions (Cruz and Santos, 2004). Brazil's experience at ONUC was especially important because it was the first peace operation in which Brazilian military personnel acted not only with strictly military issues, but also undertook humanitarian efforts, for example distributing food, assuring the safe passage of people, and providing medicines to the local population (Costa, 2015a).[12] In the same period, Brazil also sent ten military personnel to the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM – 1965-1966) and twenty military personnel to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP – 1964-1967) (Seitenfus, 2008).

Brazil's recurring participation in peace operations ceased between 1967 and 1989. The lack of Brazilian engagement in peace operations in this period is explained in great measure by the military regime, which ruled from 1964 to 1985. The military's foreign policy was focused on national autonomy, national-developmentalism and distancing from international conflicts and multilateral forums (Cavalcante, 2010), a characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy that Fonseca Júnior (1998) called *autonomy by distance*.[13] This position was strongly influenced by Araújo Castro (1972), who considered the multilateral mechanisms of the UN and international treaties as instruments to maintain the status quo among the international powers and set a hierarchy of power. From 1968, the country also ceased to be a candidate for non-permanent seats on the UNSC,[14] and in 1977 withdrew from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Cavalcante, 2010).

3.3 Brazilian participation in multidimensional peace operations

The period of redemocratization in Brazil, from the second half of the 1980s, accompanied the Brazilian return to UN peace operations. According to Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), Brazil's new stance of retaking international responsibilities and aligning with the guidelines of multilateralism reflects a transition in foreign policy from *autonomy by distance* to *autonomy through participation*.

12. The 1961 United Nations Yearbook clearly points out the interest of ONUC in acting on issues that went beyond the military: "in order to maintain a minimum of essential services, it was necessary to make extensive use of United Nations experts in the areas of public health, civil aviation, telecommunications and meteorology" (UN, 1961, p. 83). In 1961, only in the area of healthcare, almost US$ 4 million were spent, while almost R$ 1 million were spent in social activities (UN, 1961, p. 83).

13. According to Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007, p. 283, translated by the authors), the foreign policy of "autonomy by distance" can be defined as "the policy of not automatically accepting prevailing international regimes and, above all, the belief in partially autarchic development, focused on the emphasis on the domestic market; consequently, a diplomacy that opposes certain aspects of the great powers agenda to preserve the sovereignty of the National State".

14. Brazil returned to a non-permanent seat on the UNSC only in 1988.

Another reason for Brazilian re-engagement in peace operations was pointed out by Cavalcante (2010) as the fact that they had undergone transformations with respect to their functions, purposes and guidelines. The 1990s marked a period of new complex and multidimensional operations, given their focus not only on military forces, but also on police personnel,[15] medical teams, electoral observers, representatives of civil society, etc. This characteristic allowed Brazil a greater participation. Due to the Brazilian context, the discourse of achieving peace and security through development was a path that made possible Brazil's projection in multidimensional peace operations already at the end of the 1990s (Cavalcante, 2010; Kenkel and Hamann, 2013).[16]

The last 27 years have been the most expressive in terms of Brazilian participation in UN peace operations. Notable examples include the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III), the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), the International Force East Timor (UNTAET), the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (INTERFET),[17] the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNMISET), the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the MINUSTAH and the UNIFIL.

The UNAVEM I was a peace mission in Angola approved by UNSC Resolution 626 (1988). It took place from 1989 to 1991, with the main objective of supervising the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angolan territory. Another purpose of the operation was to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Cuban military forces and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), an opposition group to the Angolan government (UN, 1990). In addition to contributing to the peace operation with the presence of Brigadier General Péricles Ferreira Gomes, heading the command of seventy military troops, Brazil has also sent 16 military observers to act under the aegis of the UN (Rizzi, 2005).[18]

15. For more information on the participation of Brazilian police in UN peace operations, see Kenkel and Hamann (2013).
16. It is noticeable that in the 1990s Brazil began to take political-institutional measures to reinforce the country's importance in these operations. The publication of the 1996 National Defense Policy, with direct references, in the objectives section, about Brazil's participation in peace operations, is a good example of this new posture (Brazil, 1996).
17. It is worth noting that the INTERFET is not a peacekeeping operation, but a stabilization mission authorized by the UNSC under Chapter VII.
18. The UNAVEM was a result of the Cold War and the Angolan civil war, which began in 1975 and ended only in 2002, with some brief periods peace and fragile ceasefire agreements. In this scenario, there were two main rival groups, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which received support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and UNITA, supported by the United States (Saraiva, 1987).

Afterwards, the UNAVEM II (May 1991 to February 1995) was approved by UNSC Resolution 696 (1991), with the purpose of inspecting the Peace Agreement for a temporary armistice during the Angolan civil war, monitoring the ceasefire between the MPLA and UNITA, and observing the election process in the country (UN, 1991). The UNAVEM II continued to receive support from Brazilian forces, this time with eight military observers, nine police observers, a medical unit, and four electoral observers. (Brazilian Army, [n.d.]a). Moreover, Brigadier General Péricles Ferreira Gomes continued to command the military observers until October 1991 (Gonçalves and Manduca, 2008).[19]

The third peace operation in Angola, the UNAVEM III, took place from August 1995 to July 1997 and aimed to "assist the Angolan government and the UNITA in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation, in accordance with the Peace Agreement for Angola, the Lusaka Protocol and the UNSC resolutions" (Bigatão, 2014, p. 24, translated by the authors). This operation received from Brazil the largest number of personnel, including an eight hundred-military infantry battalion, a two hundred-military engineering company, two advanced health posts, totaling forty health officers, as well as nearly forty staff officers, fourteen military observers and eleven police observers (Brazilian Army, [n.d.]a). The significant Brazilian engagement during this period is reflected in 1996 UN data, which shows Brazil to be the fourth largest contributor of troops to the organization's peace operations at the time. Brazil's contributions also included Navy captains Carlos Eduardo Brandão, who commanded the Military Observer Corps between 1996 and 1997, and Carlos Ribeiro da Silva, who held the same position from 1997 to 1998 (Rizzi, 2005).[20]

With regard to the UVAVEM III, it is important to emphasize its character as a peace operation that already raised concerns not only to military issues, but also to those of a humanitarian and sustainable development nature,[21] as indicated in the 1997 progress report of the mission.

19. Although 1992 elections happened without much disruption during the process, the positive result for the MPLA representative was not accepted by the opposition party UNITA, which alleged fraud in the vote counting, culminating in the restart of the civil war (Saraiva, 1987).

20. At the end of UNAVEM, a new peace operation was deployed in the country, named United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), of which Brazil also took part with military, police and medical officers who acted as observers. This operation lasted until February 1999 (Rizzi, 2005).

21. For more information about Brazil's increasing participation in peace operations aimed at promoting development, see Andrade and Franco (2018).

> Humanitarian actions continued to focus on the demobilization process, on accelerating the social reintegration of former combatants and their dependents, as well as on reconstructing basic services in order to absorb the large influx of people. (…) The main activities of the Observer Mission, in addition to continuing military tasks, is the focus on political aspects, those of the police and of human rights, as well as humanitarian and public information programs, with the perspective of creating conditions for political, economic, and social stability as well as sustainable development (UNSC, 1997, p. 4-5).

The ONUMUZ was a peace operation that took place in Mozambique between January 1993 and December 1994, also including Brazilian forces. Mozambique was the stage of a post-independence civil war that began in 1977 and lasted sixteen years, with direct violent confrontations between the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and the opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The conflicts culminated in more than one million deaths and resulted in more than five million refugees. After new disagreements between the parties, the UNSC intervened and approved ONUMOZ, to guarantee that the General Peace Agreement was respected (Cavalcanti, 2007; Summary..., [n.d.]). According to the 1992 UN Yearbook, the primary mandate for the peace operation was

> the impartial facilitation and implementation of the Agreement, in particular: to preside over the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its sub-commissions; to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation of forces, demobilization and collection, storage and destruction of weapons; to monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of outside forces, as well as private and irregular groups; to authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructure; to provide security for the UN and for other on-going activities during the peace process; to assure technical assistance for monitoring the elections process; to coordinate humanitarian assistance operations, especially with respect to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local populations, and preside over the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance (UN, 1992a, p. 196).

Aligned to these central objectives, Brazil sent to Mozambique 26 military observers, 67 police observers, a medical unit, and an infantry company with about 170 military personnel (Brazilian Army, [n.d.]a). In addition, Major General Lélio Gonçalves Rodrigues da Silva served as the commander in the mission between February 1993 and February 1994 (Summary..., [n.d.]).

Brazil has also participated in missions in East Timor, such as INTERFET (September 1999 to October 1999), UNTAET (October 1999 to May 2002) and UNMISET (May 2002 to May 2005). INTERFET was established by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in order to carry out a referendum to decide East Timor's independence from Indonesia. With this purpose, the mission had the participation of a platoon of fifty people from the Army Police. The Brazilian engagement in INTERFET is particularly important because it was the first time the country sent troops for a Chapter VII mission, rather than just individual military personnel (Hamann, 2016b). The UNTAET, in turn, whose objective was to ensure implementation of the interim government and guarantee humanitarian assistance and management for the Timorese population, was led by the Brazilian diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello, as special representative of the UN Secretary General. Brazil has also sent 401 personnel, of whom 378 were military observers, staff officers and officers from the Army Police, in addition to 23 police forces. The Brazilian staff that had been in UNTAET was transferred to UNMISET, and the number increased to 503 Brazilians, among them 488 military personnel and fifteen police personnel, working to provide assistance to the recently independent East Timor (Hamann, 2016a).

It is also important to mention the Brazilian participation in the UNPROFOR, a peace operation established in Croatia to ensure the demilitarization and protection of United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). Its mandate was later extended to Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a focus on humanitarian aid and surveillance of exclusion zones. Subsequently, its activities were extended to Macedonia, with the specific objective of carrying out preventive monitoring of the border zone. The UNPROFOR stands out for having started as a traditional peacekeeping operation and having evolved into a multidimensional peace enforcement operation, supported by Chapter VII (Tardy, 2015).[22] Between 1992 and 1995, Brazil provided a contingent of 35 military observers and ten police observers for the mission, with Brigadier General Newton Bonumá in command of the UN Military Observer Contingent (Brazilian Army, [n.d.]a).[23]

22. The UNPROFOR was then considered one of the UN peace operations with the highest death toll and the largest contingent deployed, about 38,000 blue helmets (available at: <https://bit.ly/2D7lrvV>).

23. The Brazilian Admiral Bento Costa Lima Leite de Albuquerque Junior, then Corvette Captain, joined UNPROFOR as a military observer. He states that one of the most valuable lessons incorporated by the Brazilian Armed Forces and other national contingents during the mission is related to the development of civil-military relations during humanitarian activities, in addition to the issue of the protection of civilians, which became evident during the MINUSTAH and is currently on the agenda (Albuquerque Júnior, 2017).

3.4 The turning point

The growing Brazilian participation in peace operations can be explained for normative, political and institutional reasons, always in consonance with Brazilian foreign policy and defense guidelines of the period in question (Andrade and Franco, 2018). Thus, Kai Kenkel lists a number of factors – elaborated by Eduardo Uziel and Alejandro Sanches Nieto – that explains this continuous Brazilian historical engagement in peace operations:

- fully insert the country into the collective security dynamic of the UN (political/normative);
- increase Brazilian influence in the UN decision-making bodies (political);
- exercise the principles that govern Brazil's international relations, as stated in Article 4 of the Federal Constitution (normative);
- reinforce the concept of multilateralism and insert Brazilian interests among those that guide decisions, including a perspective of minimizing issues such as double standards in the UNSC (normative/political);
- validate Brazil's candidacy as a permanent member of the UNSC (political);
- use opportunities for cooperation during the implementation of peace processes (political);
- provide greater international experience for the Armed Forces (institutional);
- "Good Samaritan Syndrome", focused on ensuring public goods (such as peace) in areas not related to national interest (normative);
- monetary compensation from the UN (financial);
- real combat training for the Armed Forces (institutional); and
- national pride: prestige and image (political) (Uziel, 2009; Nieto, 2012 cited in Kenkel, 2013a, p. 340-341).

The foreign policy principles that have guided Brazil, therefore, have been aligned with the concepts of non-intervention, inviolability of sovereignty and territory, peaceful resolution of disputes, the non-use of force, and multilateralism. Moreover, Brazil has a strong engagement in regional issues (for South America) and in agendas related to socioeconomic development (Kenkel, 2010). The Brazilian government, as from 2003, represents a turning point in the way in which Brazil became involved in peace operations, especially due to its new, more assertive stance with respect to foreign policy, with the goal of projecting Brazil as a relevant political actor in the international system (Villa and Viana, 2010).

In this same context, Brazilian foreign policy, conducted by the then minister Celso Amorim, aligned itself to the principles of non-indifference and solidarity-based diplomacy, both bringing the idea of Brazil's responsibility in offering support to countries in crisis or in conflict, with the motivation to promote social justice in favor of humanity (Nasser, 2012). In the words of Amorim (2009, p. 1, translated by the authors), in a speech at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ):

> President Lula's foreign policy is guided by a combination of international solidarity and defense of Brazilian values and interests. It is in Brazil's interest that neighboring and friendly countries overcome their underdevelopment and do not succumb to situations of social and political convulsions or armed conflict. It is this vision of the world that gives rise to 'non-indifference', a humanist guideline in our foreign policy. It is this spirit of solidarity that, for example, inspired the decision to lead the military branch of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti or to provide supplies to the population of the Gaza Strip.

Thus, based on these changes in Brazilian posture regarding foreign policy, it is possible to observe two remarkable changes in the way Brazil engages in peace operations. The first refers to Brazil's contributions before 2004, which were mostly token contributions, that is, the sending of small contingents, with a timid and often marginal participation, predominantly military observers and staff officers.[24] The beginning of the twenty-first century has presented examples of more incisive Brazilian engagement (for example in the MINUSTAH and in the UNIFIL), in terms of the numbers of troops deployed and with the participation of force commanders, as well as in the realm of diplomacy (Kenkel, 2013a). Nevertheless, token contributions continued to be prominent, occurring in parallel to the Brazilian contribution in Haiti and Lebanon.

The second shift in Brazil's position after 2004 is related to the participation with troops in robust operations, guided by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially regarding MINUSTAH. It is important to note that since 1990 Brazil has sent personnel to about 75% of all missions authorized by the UNSC under Chapter VII. Participation in these missions took place through individual contributions, except in the aforementioned cases of East Timor and Haiti (Hamann, 2016b). Thus, Brazil's

24. The deployment of smaller contingents, but with specialized units, such as engineers, doctors or mine clearance experts, are not characterized as token contributions. For more information on token contributions, see Catharina Coleman (2013).

participation in MINUSTAH could mean a precedent – or an exception – for Brazil to engage more recurrently in UN collective actions under Chapter VII, that legitimize the use of coercive measures in pursuit of peace. This change in the way Brazil joins UN peace operations is strongly linked to the new foreign policy aspirations of global projection, cited above (Kenkel, 2013a). Graph 1 shows the number of Brazilian contingents that have been deployed in peace operations since 1990, with an explicit change beginning in 2004, the year that MINUSTAH began, and another in 2010 when a second Brazilian battalion was deployed immediately in the wake of the Haitian earthquake. Moreover, it is also noted that as of 2011 there was another slight increase when around three hundred Brazilian Navy personnel joined the UNIFIL.

GRAPH 1
Average number of Brazilian personnel in UN peace operations (1990-2017)



Source: DPKO.
Authors' elaboration.
Obs.: The DPKO does not present the number of annual contingents, only monthly. The value for each year corresponds to the average between the months of January and December.

Thus, both the MINUSTAH and the UNIFIL, which will be further addressed in the next section, are notable for Brazilian recent trajectory in peace operations and allow the country to better position itself as an important player in issues of international peace and security.

3.5 Brazil in MINUSTAH and UNIFIL

3.5.1 MINUSTAH

The MINUSTAH was established in April 2004 under UNSC Resolution 1542, after a series of armed conflicts took place in the city of Gonaives and threatened to advance toward the country's capital, causing the then President Aristides to abandon Haiti. The purpose of the mission was to assure a democratic environment favorable for the establishment of the rule of the law, help reform the Haitian police force, strengthen the judicial apparatus, and promote government transition. The mandate also included the goals of guaranteeing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, promoting and protecting human rights, assuring public health and sanitation, preventing and controlling HIV/AIDs, and coordinating humanitarian assistance coming from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other agencies in Haiti (UN, 2004). The peace operation was extended until mid-2017, when it was replaced by the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH).

In November 2004, the military contingent assembled by the UN to be installed in Haiti included 6,060 professionals and reached the number of 12,438 in 2011, within the context of the 2010 post-earthquake. Over the thirteen years of Brazilian military presence in MINUSTAH, Brazil contributed with around 37,000 military and police personnel, equivalent to 69% of the total sent to foreign missions in the country's history, around 57,000 (Hamann, 2017). According to General Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, the Brazilian experience in Haiti can be divided into the following stages: i) 2004-2005: adaptation, initial engagement and reordering of the operational structure and training; ii) 2005-2007: pacification; iii) 2007-2009: consolidation of pacification; 2010: earthquake;[25] and iv) 2010-2017: post-earthquake recovery and return to normality (Vieira Neto, 2017).

The initial preparation of Brazilian troops, between February and May 2004, and their deployment to Haiti, from May to December 2004, were extremely complex processes, with a short timeframe and focused on the urgent need to replace the

25. It is important to emphasize that the 2010 earthquake, of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter scale, caused the death of 21 Brazilians who were in Haiti at that time, being eighteen military personnel, a diplomat, a doctor and an unidentified woman (Veja..., 2010).

Multinational Interim Force led by the United States and France (Barbosa Junior, 2017). According to Admiral Ilques Barbosa Junior, the focus of planning, training and deployment activities in MINUSTAH took place around issues of interoperability (among the Navy, Army and Air Force, for example), readiness (based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter), material and personnel logistics, social communication, strengthening of interinstitutional relationships, and developing socio-cultural knowledge on Haiti. It is important to recall that Brazil was the first MINUSTAH country to enter Haiti on that basis and launch the peace operation (Barbosa Junior, 2017).

Throughout the following phases, Brazil not only assisted in armed engagement during the pacification process against hostile groups (gangs and paramilitary) in Bel Air, Cité Soleil and Cité Militaire,[26] but also was heavily involved in activities related to road and bridge construction, training of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and family agriculture. During this period, Brazil also engaged in the recovery of port infrastructure, humanitarian aid,[27] environmental recovery and the electoral process. As emphasized by Admiral Álvaro Augusto Dias Monteiro, who served as Commander General of the Marine Corps from 2006 to 2010, the civic-social activities in Haiti, the contact with community leaders and humanitarian efforts were, together, essential to secure the trust of the population and therefore to conduct the operations in an adequate environment (Monteiro, 2011).

Brazilian engagement in multidimensional robust peace operations, such as MINUSTAH, has brought a demand for deeper, more complex, systematized and standardized training. Within this context, particularly in post-earthquake environment in 2010, the CCOPAB was created and established in Rio de Janeiro, as detailed in the previous section of this paper.

26. The Brazilian activities in MINUSTAH were carried out based on the following stages: deployment of troops (combat base), large operations (siege and search in the area), presence in the area (central strategic points), small combat operations (maintaining pacification), joint operations with the Haitian National Police and the United Nations Police, and civil-military coordination (Miranda, 2017).

27. Among the Brazilian activities related to humanitarian aid, it is worth mentioning: drilling of wells, supply of potable water, distribution of food provided by the UN and by Brazil itself, medical and dental assistance, vaccination, surgeries (around 1,145) and clinical procedures (around 36,028), integration with NGOs, construction of refugee camps, assistance to refugees, etc. (Kipman, 2017). In addition, after the 2010 earthquake, with the support of the Brazilian Navy, the country transported more than 2,300 tons of cargo in humanitarian aid, including food, water, medicines, and other items (Vieira Neto, 2017).

It is also worth mentioning that the thirteen years of MINUSTAH took place with Brazil in charge of the military command, being the only UN peace operation whose all force commanders were from the same country, as observed in table 1.[28]

TABLE 1
MINUSTAH force commanders

Force commander	Period of activity
General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira	May 2004 to September 2005
General Urano Teixeira da Matta Bacellar	September 2005 to January 2006
General José Elito Carvalho Siqueira	January 2006 to January 2007
General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz	January 2007 to April 2009
General Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto	April 2009 to March 2010
General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz	March 2010 to March 2011
General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Batista Pereira	March 2011 to March 2012
General Fernando Rodrigues Goulart	March 2012 to March 2013
General Edson Leal Pujol	March 2013 to March 2014
General José Luiz Jaborandy Junior	March 2014 to August 2015
General Ajax Porto Pinheiro	October 2015 to October 2017

Source: COTER (2017).
Authors' elaboration.

Another important aspect concerns Brazil's involvement not only with the maintenance of the Force Commander, but also with the regular deployment of troops to a mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this respect, MINUSTAH represents a shift in the Brazilian posture, as the country participated as a protagonist and in a continuous manner in a robust peace operation. However, it is still early to say whether this deployment of troops under Chapter VII will have a sustainable continuity or whether it will be just an episodic case.

As pointed out by Andrade and Franco (2018), with respect to the UN collective security system, Brazil contributed with its expertise in coordinating civil-military and humanitarian actions, seeking engagement and proximity with Haitians, and aligning to the guidelines of a typically multidimensional operation. The MINUSTAH has also meant an opportunity to advance the foreign policy and defense agendas in an articulated

28. In addition to the eleven Brazilians, two Chileans also served as Force Commander in MINUSTAH, but provisionally and in an interim position: General Eduardo Aldunate Hermann (January 2006) and General Jorge Peña Leiva (September-October 2015).

manner, fostering for example international technical cooperation initiatives[29] and regional integration, as well as projecting Brazil into the international scenario. More specifically regarding the Armed Forces, MINUSTAH allowed training to Brazilian troops, improved logistics, deployment of military personnel, investment in defense equipment, integration among Navy, Army and Air Force, and the projection of military power.

3.5.2 UNIFIL

Another relevant Brazilian engagement to be mentioned is that of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The mission, approved by the UNSC Resolution 426 (1978), was established with the specific mandate of ensuring the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southeast Lebanon, reestablishing peace and security in the region, as well as assisting the Lebanese government in recovering effective authority in the area (UN, 1978). After the Second Lebanon War and the recurring hostile offensives of both Hezbollah and Israel, in 2006, the UNSC approved another Resolution (1.701) significantly increasing the number of UNIFIL troops and promoting an environment that enabled, months later, the Maritime Task Force (MTF) that replaced the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR or EMF). The main activities carried out within the MTF are:

> One, to establish a naval presence and surveillance over the Area of Maritime Operations, with priority to the Lebanese territorial waters; and two, to conduct Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), including identification and, within the Lebanese territorial waters, stopping/diverting or referring suspect Merchant Vessels for inspection by Lebanese authorities. If requested by the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy (LAF-Navy), MTF may also board and inspect a suspect vessel (UNIFIL, 2000, p. 1).

On February 24, 2011, Brazil made its first contribution to the UNIFIL, sending Rear Admiral Luiz Henrique Caroli to serve as the commander of the MTF, as well as deploying the frigate *União* (F45), a helicopter and a contingent of around three

29. For example, the technical cooperation between Haiti, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Brazilian National Service for Industrial Training (Senai) in the areas of professional qualification and cultural cooperation, the trilateral technical cooperation between Brazil, Spain and Haiti on the Mapou Basin Plant Coverage Management project, promoting reforestation and environmental preservation actions. It is also worth mentioning the technical cooperation between the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the Federal District Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Company (Emater-DF) for the implementation of an Agricultural Technology Unit in Fond-des-Nègres, focused on sustainable rural development.

hundred Navy personnel (Brasil, 2011). Since March 2018, Rear Admiral Eduardo Machado Vazquez has been in charge of the maritime operation.[30] In the words of the then Brazilian Navy Commander Admiral Eduardo Bacellar Leal Ferreira, in addition to Brazil "contributing to regional stability in the sea adjacent to Lebanon (…) and composing the joint effort to guarantee the security of maritime communication lines and the essential trade that flows through them", the Brazilian Navy also "demonstrates logistical and operational capabilities in maintaining its assets in remote areas" (FIESP, 2017, p. 2). As one of the many activities of the Brazilian Navy at UNIFIL, it is worth mentioning the humanitarian operation to rescue 220 immigrants in the Mediterranean Sea, near Greece, in 2015 (Navio..., 2015).

Although Commander Leal Ferreira acknowledged, during an interview, the success of the Brazilian Navy in the peace operation in Lebanon (Lopes, 2017), he expressed concern about budgetary difficulties faced by the Navy in recent years and warns of a probable aging of the Brazilian squadron, which could compromise the country's participation in UNIFIL or even possible future operations.

Between 2011 and 2017, Brazil sent more than 2,000 military personnel to this peace operation. In October 2017, for example, there were 205 Brazilian military personnel from a total of 10,382.[31] With the Brazilian engagement lasting until the present day, the UNIFIL is peculiar for the fact of being the first peace mission of the UN and of Brazil in the maritime field (UNIFIL, 2017).

4 CONCLUSION

The Brazilian government has played a significant role in UN peace operations since their genesis in 1947, having sent more than 57,000 military personnel, police forces and civilian experts to missions around the world over the past 70 years. The historical path developed by Brazil during these years is clear, acquiring knowledge and expertise on peace operations and their multiple aspects, such as the selection

30. In March 2019, the operation command was transferred to Rear Admiral Eduardo Augusto Wieland. In March 2020, in turn, the charge of the operation was handed over to Rear Admiral Sergio Renato Berna Salgueirinho. In January 2021, the Brazilian participation at Unifil was concluded. These events occurred after the original publication of this study.
31. For more information, access: <https://bit.ly/2D7lrvV>.

process, preparation, deployment of troops, logistics, relationship with diverse cultures, alignment with UN values, interoperability of troops, etc. The progressive capability that Brazil has acquired can be attested by the public recognition of the country's success in MINUSTAH and UNIFIL by Jean-Pierre Lacroix in 2017,[32] and by the UN's official invitation to Brazil to send troops to other peace operations, including MINUSCA, in the Central African Republic.

Throughout this involvement, Brazil has been able to follow the conceptual and operational evolution of peace missions. The UN's logic of collective security through interventions, with specific actions, accompanied by a peacebuilding project for socioeconomic development and humanitarianism, was quickly incorporated into the Brazilian approach during the missions. As previously demonstrated, Brazil has been involved in humanitarian issues and in the coordination of civil-military relations during peace operations since the mission deployed in Congo (ONUC), acting more prominently in MINUSTAH.

The leading role of Brazil in MINUSTAH, a mission endorsed by Chapter VII of the UN Charter and with a large number of armed troops, may point to a horizon with Brazilian presence in future peace operations, which can be explained by the country's willingness to satisfy its foreign policy and defense interests. Participation in UN peace operations offers Brazil a broader international insertion, provides the country with greater decision-making power in multilateral forums, validates a multilateral perspective of action within the international system, creates an image of trust in Brazil before international partners, and endorses the UN's directives on a peacebuilding process that is guided by the security-development nexus.

Even though Brazil intends to continue participating in other peace operations, it faces some challenges, as described below.

1) The country's political agenda tends to focus on domestic issues, such as economic and social matters as poverty reduction, combating violence and enhancing industrialization, which may cause lack of priority for Brazilian military engagement in the international arena.

32. Jean-Pierre Lacroix is the current UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations.

2) There is an intense debate on the transition between Chapters VI (peaceful means) and VII (potential use of force) within academia, government and the military, and a non-acceptance of the potential use of force could lead to a retraction of Brazilian participation in peace operations.
3) The Brazilian government has been imposing budgetary constraints since 2011, including in the defense and foreign policy sectors, and possible financial costs in peace operations may be seen as unnecessary in the midst of the crisis.
4) There is a low number of domestic non-governmental actors (NGOs, academia and civil society) engaged in supporting Brazilian involvement in peace operations.
5) It should not be forgotten that the country's greater presence in robust peace operations may harm the peaceful image that Brazil has forged in recent centuries.[33]

Although there was mobilization in several sectors for the Brazilian engagement in MINUSCA, Brazil chose to redirect its position and decline the invitation to participate in the peace operation held in the Central African Republic. According to a note sent by the Ministry of Defense to the newspaper *Sputnik Brasil*,

> the Brazilian government declined the consultation conducted by the United Nations Secretariat for the deployment of troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). We also inform that Brazil maintains its international commitment to collaborate with world peace, keeping the dialogue with the UN open and remaining in a position to contribute in the future to other peacekeeping missions (MD apud Patrick and Russo, 2018, p. 1).

According to *Revista Piauí* (2018), the Brazilian current socio-political and budgetary context ended up influencing the decision to decline the invitation for participation in MINUSCA. The two main factors would have been the federal intervention of the Armed Forces in Rio de Janeiro, with a military force of up to 30,000, incurring a cost of about R$ 1.2 billion, and the deployment of troops to offer humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan refugees in Roraima, by means of an emergency credit given to the Ministry of Defense in the amount of around R$ 190 million.

Thus, despite the numerous difficulties, challenges and uncertainties regarding Brazilian participation in other large-scale UN peace operations, it is impossible to

33. For a more detailed description of the challenges faced by Brazil regarding its engagement in peace operations, see Kenkel (2013a).

deny the progress in Brazil's trajectory, contributing to strengthen national interests and project the country on the international scenario. Therefore, it is important to explore in a strategic way, in future opportunities, the good performance that Brazil has demonstrated in peace operations.

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