Publication: Labor enforcement and formal employment : the effects of communication and punishment
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eng
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BR
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Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea)
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Reproduction of this text and the data contained within is allowed as long as the source is cited. Reproduction for commercial purposes is prohibited. É permitida a reprodução deste texto e dos dados nele contidos, desde que citada a fonte.
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Discussion Paper 2977 : Labor enforcement and formal employment: the effects of communication and punishment
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Abstract
Este estudo avalia os efeitos de um programa de larga escala de inspeção do trabalho sobre fluxos de emprego formal. O programa combinou um componente de comunicação (uma carta/e-mail oficial enviado a empregadores formais) e um componente de punição (inspeções face-a-face a empresas formais). Usando duas estratégias de identificação (design de descontinuidade de regressão (regression discontinuity design – RDD) e diferença nas diferenças (difference-in-differences – DiD), isolamos os efeitos de cada componente mantendo o outro constante. Os resultados mostram que ambos os componentes aumentaram a formalização de trabalhadores previamente informais, mas não alteraram a demanda por trabalho formal. Os efeitos
são observados apenas no curto prazo, indicando que os empregadores reagiram a cada componente durante a intervenção e depois retornaram ao seu comportamento usual de cumprimento da legislação.
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We evaluate the effects of a large-scale enforcement intervention on formal labor flows. The initiative combined a communication component (an official letter/e-mail sent to registered employers) and a punishment component (face-to-face inspections). Using two identification strategies (regression discontinuity design – RDD and difference-in-differences – DiD) we isolate the effects of each component keeping the other constant. Results show that both components increased the formalization of previous informal workers but did not change regular, formal labor demand. Effects are observed only for the short run, indicating that employers reacted to
each component in the aftermath of the intervention and then moved back to their usual compliance behavior.
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Citation
FOGUEL, Miguel N.; CORSEUIL, Carlos Henrique. Labor enforcement and formal employment: the effects of communication and punishment. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, Mar. 2024. 44 p.: il. (Discussion Paper, n. 2977). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/td2977-eng
